Imagined Transitions:
The Geography of Reform in American Foreign Correspondence From Post-Soviet Russia

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Geography

by

Eric Stephen West

Committee in charge:
Professor Stuart C. Aitken, Chair
Professor Helen Couclelis
Professor Doreen Mattingly
Professor John Pickles
Professor James Proctor

June 2004
The dissertation of Eric Stephen West is approved.

Helen Couclelis

Doreen Mattingly

John Pickles

James Proctor

Stuart C. Aitken, Committee Chair

February 2004
Imagined Transitions:

The Geography of Reform in American Foreign

Correspondence From Post-Soviet Russia

Copyright © 2004

by

Eric Stephen West
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Julia – Then, now, and from now on.
Many people contributed to making my dissertation a success. First of all, I would like to thank my entire committee, Dr. Stuart Aitken, Dr. Helen Couclelis, Dr. Doreen Mattingly, Dr. John Pickles, and Dr. Jim Proctor. They generously shared their unique gifts with me. Thanks particularly to Dr. Pickles for his unique insights on the textual aspects of my work and for his kind and generous participation as an external reviewer from North Carolina. Drs. Couclelis and Proctor traveled to San Diego several times as well, and I would like to thank them for their commitment and their energies. They helped to make the dissertation geographically rigorous, readable, and reminded me of how my work fit in with those who came before me. Dr. Mattingly stuck with me despite her move to another department and provided invaluable guidance through the most difficult re-write, when I was struggling to find the significance of it all. Her comments were always sharp and constructive. And finally, Dr. Aitken provided me with invaluable guidance and perspective, without which I never could have written this. He reinforced my productive ideas and saved me from innumerable goose-chases, all the while encouraging me that my insights deserved to be refined and read. He set excruciating deadlines for me during the spring of 2003 (most of which I met), and I could not be more thankful to him for helping me see what I can really do. Thanks also to Dr. Phil Pryde, for advising me initially when I entered the program in San Diego, and to passing me off gracefully to Dr. Aitken when I decided to study text.
I would like to thank my mother for her abiding patience, support, and love. She always showed interest in my work, listening even when I could barely explain it myself, and told me I was doing a good job, even when I was not. She tolerated my frustration admirably, including moments of weakness when I unfairly expressed it to her. My father took me to innumerable lunches, concerts, and other events in San Diego, providing me with the intermittent brain food and breaks from research that all doctoral students need to keep from losing their minds. In my days as a child, he fruitfully discussed with me many of the newspaper articles I read. The newspaper was my magic carpet. It was the fodder of my youth, and the impetus for this completed work. Thanks also to Marlene, my step-mother, for her generosity and for sweating out small details that made things a little bit easier for me. My sister Karen always insisted that my Ph.D. would work out. She graciously hosted her poorer brother, the graduate student, at numerous Thanksgiving and Christmas celebrations, and I am indebted to her for providing me with a sense of family cohesiveness when I could afford neither the time nor the expense to keep up with my family properly.

Thanks also go to Dr. Barbara Fredrich, who generously conversed with me about so many aspects of “the life,” sharing her wisdom, and teaching me about pedagogy and the simple things. She gave me someone in whom I could confide. I also would like to thank all of the office staff, Yumiko, Bonnie, Jean, Lilia, and the student assistants, for making the days run more smoothly.
There were of course friends who supported me, who listened to my tedious stories, and with whom I shared a camaraderie. They welcomed my successes and insisted that I get up after my failures. They include Boris Dev, Katie Comer, Dorn Bishop, and Jim Gahen. Boris was with me from my first semester, and he and Katie followed my progress always with interest and encouragement. Thanks to Michael Ponsler for welcoming me authentically, even when I was at my most selfish. I cannot thank enough my dear friend Luis Cerda, who supported me spiritually and emotionally as if he’d already known me for years before we met. To both of my I-Groups and all of my MKP Warrior brothers who critically held my feet to the fire, I send a resounding thank you. You were a turning point. And again, thanks to Stuart, for inviting me in to a community of men who place integrity at a premium.

I would also like to thank Peter Polito, Karl and Kathy Krohn, Sister Margaret Kelly, Father Bill Springer, and Father Justin Langille for their teaching, blessings, and support in welcoming me into the Catholic Church. They have nurtured in me the gift of faith, which will travel with me well beyond the time during which I was completing my dissertation. Thanks be to God.

Finally, I would like to thank Julia Houkom for her energy, wisdom, grace, and generosity. She always encouraged me to shoot for great things and traveled to San Diego to hear the public presentation of my dissertation. Less would be imaginable would it not be for her inspiration.
EDUCATION

Bachelor of Science in Geography, James Madison University, Harrisonburg, Virginia, May, 1992. Concentrations in cartography and wilderness research. Minor in computer science. Dr. Steven Wright, principal advisor.

Masters of Arts in Geography, The University of Kansas, August, 1995. Concentrations in biogeography, applications of GIS to natural resource problems, and spatial statistical analysis. Thesis Title: Analysis of Elk Habitat in the Cimarron National Grassland. Dr. Ling Bian, committee chair, SUNY Buffalo.

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

August 1992- May 1993: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Kansas.

May 1993 – December 1994: Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Kansas. Supervisor: Dr. Ling Bian.

January 1995 – May 1995: Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Geography, University of Kansas.

August 1995 – May 2004: Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Geography, San Diego State University.

PUBLICATIONS


AWARDS


Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship. May 1996. Full tuition waiver plus a $1,500 stipend.

Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. November 1993. $8,300.

Stephen Wright Award for Excellence in Cartographic Thought. October 1990. Department of Geography, James Madison University.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Representation of Place

Studies in Qualitative Analysis of Text with Professor Stuart C. Aitken

Studies in Geography of the Former Soviet Union and Sustainable Development with Professor Philip Pryde

Studies in Geography, Ethics, and Nature with Professor James Proctor

Studies in Earth Systems Modeling with Professors Alan Hope and Dar Roberts
ABSTRACT

Imagined Transitions:
The Geography of Reform in American Foreign Correspondence From Post-Soviet Russia

by

Eric Stephen West

This dissertation participates in the project concerned with how representations of place contribute to the geographic imagination. It examines American foreign correspondence on Russia in major American newspapers to determine how Russia and Russian identity were constructed for an American audience. The period of study, from 1992-2000, coincides with the Post-Soviet period of reform during the Yeltsin- and Clinton-administrations and is important, because it constitutes a period in which the American perception of the world was drastically changing. This study builds on observations that the rhetorics of reform and transition are ideological and interrogates the narration of the transformation from an authoritarian, command-economy to a democratic, pluralist society in the largest country in the world.
This dissertation employs both cartographic analysis and ironic reading (a type of discourse analysis) to interrogate the spatial, rhetorical, and political-economic aspects of transition. It identifies a small number of Russian regions which account for the bulk of references to place in American foreign correspondence and finds that most references to place were spatial. These references either incorporate conceptions of territory into identity; posit space as productive of social relations; or, deal with flows across space. The rhetorical portion of the analysis finds that social and spatial differences construct the implied audience as emotionally volatile in order to facilitate reading.

Moreover, the discourse on reform is dichotomous, representing space abstractly and rapidly changeable or as a more inert, historical-spatial product, depending largely on whether reporting is from Moscow or from the provinces. In speaking both from and to the margins and center, the printed discourse on change critiques the limitations of reform, law, international aid, and the failures of privatization. While the Clinton administration supports President Yeltsin almost unconditionally and American foreign correspondence often assumes a hopeful and optimistic attitude toward transition, it also criticizes both Russian laws and reformers as highly unreliable prospects for genuine reform. Ultimately, American foreign correspondence narrates the gradual divergence of the Russian government from American-recommended practices after repeated economic crises and tells of an impressive heterogeneity at local and regional levels.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 1
   Imagining Russia 5
APPROACH, METHODS, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS
   Moscow and the Corpus of American Foreign Correspondence from Russia 13
   Methods 16
   Organization 18
SIGNIFICANCE AND SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION 21

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 26
GEOGRAPHY AND TEXT 27
   Space-time Compression and Glocalization 27
   The Social Construction of Boundaries 32
   The Textual Production of Geographies of Difference 34
      Linking the Textual with the Extra-Textual 36
      Examples of Geographic Studies of Mediated Communication 39
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 43
   Combining Two Approaches to Data 43
   My Approach to Reading 45
      An Example 51
THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT AND RUSSIA 55
   The Foreign Correspondent as Embodied Fieldworker 55
   Layout and Description of the Russian Federation During the Reform Period 59
SUMMARY 73

CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY 77
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 77
   Data Reduction 79
   Data Gathering 81
   Data Display 84
   Conclusion Drawing and Verification 85
MAPPING 87
   Assigning a Theme to Each Observation 88
   Data Gathering and Storage 96
      Transcribing Observations from Articles with Moscow-Datelines 101
      Transcribing Observations from Articles with Datelines Outside of Moscow 102
   Aggregating the Data by Territory, Theme, and Dateline 103
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working with Digital Data</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVIEWS WITH JOURNALISTS</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 - REFERENCES TO PLACE IN STORIES WITH MOSCOW-DATELINES</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACRO-LEVEL FINDINGS</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A MAP-BY-MAP DISCUSSION OF THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT THEMES</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landuse</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Territories for References to Landuse</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Territories for References to Government</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Territories for References to Elections</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Territories for References to Economics</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Economics</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Territories for References to Government and Economics</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues and the Regions with Which They Occurred</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Codes and What They Mean</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place as Input in Social Processes</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Boundary Flows</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core-Periphery Relations</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of and Connections Between the General Spatial Codes</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5 - TEXT, IDENTITY, SOCIETY, AND POWER IN STORIES WITH MOSCOW-DATELINES</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach of the Chapter</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Chapter</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS - HOPE, FEAR, AND ABSTRACTION</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BOTTOM-UP CONSTRUCTION OF RUSSIA</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AID, BANKRUPTCY, AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION OF RUSSIAN SPACES

Codes That Take Sides
   The Stylized Construction of Government
   Psychological Space, Anonymity, and Emotion
   The Coded Importance of Trans-National Flows to Russian and Foreign Interests
   Austerity, Bankruptcy, and Barter

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 6 - BEYOND THE NEWS-FEED: THE JOURNALISTIC IMAGINATION OF RUSSIA FROM THE PROVINCES

The Spatial Distribution of Datelines
   Landuse
   Elections
   Government and Economics
   Economics
   Government

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 7 – A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF STORIES WITH PROVINCIAL DATELINES

Organization

Provincial Representations of Success, Contested Identity, and Culture in Russia
   Representations of Culture, History, and Identity
   Provincial Examples of Success and Failure in Manufacturing
   Other Trade Networks

Summary

The Storytelling Relationship in Foreign Correspondence with Provincial Datelines
   Staging the Extreme
   Staging the Transgressive
   Text and Distinction of Place
   Summary

The Reading Context: Local Voices, Ideology, and Change

CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS

The Progression of Transition
   The Initial Years
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 2.1 - Key for Regions Too Small to Contain Place Names 63
Table 3.1 – Description of the 13 Themes to which I Ascribed My Observations 90
Table 4.1 – The Top 17 Territories Referenced in Articles with Moscow-Datelines 114
Table 4.2 – Total Qualifying References by Economic Region 118
Table 4.3 – The Least Significant Territories 121
Table 4.4 – Distribution of Qualifying References Between Themes 122
Table 4.5 – The Most Important Territories for References About Landuse 127
Table 4.6 – Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Landuse 130
Table 4.7 – The Most Important Territories for References About Government 134
Table 4.8 – Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Government 144
Table 4.9 – The Most Important Territories for References About Elections 149
Table 4.10 – Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Elections 156
Table 4.11 – The Most Important Territories for References About Economics 161
Table 4.12 – Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Economics 167
Table 4.13 – The Most Important Territories for References About Government and Economics 172
Table 4.14 – Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Government and Economics 184
Table 4.15 – General Spatial Categories 196
Table 5.1 – The Four Textual Functions in Foreign Correspondence with Moscow-Datelines 231
Table 6.1 – The 15 Territories Visited at a Mean Rate of at Least Once a Year 263
Table 6.2 – The Least Important Provincial Datelines 266
Table 6.3 – Distribution of Stories Between Themes 269
Table 6.4 – The Most Important Territories for Stories About Landuse 270
Table 6.5 – The Most Important Territories for Stories About Elections 276
Table 6.6 - The Most Important Territories for Government and Economics Stories 285
Table 6.7 – The Most Important Territories for Stories About Economics 299
Table 6.8 – The Most Important Territories for Stories About Government 308
Table 7.1 – Two Additional Textual Functions in Foreign Correspondence with Provincial Datelines

Figures

Figure 2.1 – Political-Administrative Territories: Western Russia  
Figure 2.2 – Political-Administrative Territories: Russia East of the Urals  
Figure 2.3 – The Eleven Major Economic Regions  
Figure 4.1 – Moscow-Datelines by Region  
Figure 4.2 – Observations by Economic Region  
Figure 4.3 – References by Theme: Landuse  
Figure 4.4 – References by Theme: Government  
Figure 4.5 – References by Theme: Elections  
Figure 4.6 – References by Theme: Economics  
Figure 4.7 – References by Theme: Government and Economics  
Figure 4.8 – The Big Messages Territories Delivered  
Figure 6.1 – Provincial Datelines by Region  
Figure 6.2 – Provincial Datelines by Economic Region  
Figure 6.3 – Articles by Theme: Landuse  
Figure 6.4 – Articles by Theme: Elections  
Figure 6.5 – Articles by Theme: Government and Economics  
Figure 6.6 – Articles by Theme: Economics  
Figure 6.7 – Articles by Theme: Government
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

...national identity [in the United States] is defined by a set of universal political and economic values [especially] liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets…the promotion of democracy, human rights, and markets is far more central to American policy than to the policy of any other country. (Huntington 1993, 82-83)

...human life has value insofar as it contributes to the wealth and power of the privileged. It is the interests of the rich men who run the world that determine the basic contours of policy. (Chomsky 1996, 23)

One need not look far to find competing representations of the roles of states, nations, and individuals in global economic development. The geographer Gearóid Ó Tuathail argued in his book *Critical Geopolitics* (1996) for the term “geo-graphy” to underscore the creative essence of geographical description. He, along with many others (see for instance Pickles 1985; Soja 1989; Lefebvre 1991; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Agnew 1998; Harvey 1999) mount arguments based on the contention that no geographical order exists independent of human design and conception. Political geographies are inherently mediated experiences, be they through the speeches of politicians, school textbooks, or news stories (Campbell 1992; Walker 1993; Weber 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Agnew 1998). Furthermore, Luke (1989; 1991) identifies mass telecommunications as one of the fundamental drivers behind other aspects of post-industrial society, like transnational corporate commerce and the contemporary world-system of nation-states. To him and others (Lyotard 1984; Harvey 1989; Jameson 1991) the proliferation of material and symbolic, trans-
national flows are aspects of postmodernism. Ó Tuathail (1998) and Dalby (1998) have even characterized postmodern, political geographies as political geographies constructed vis-à-vis mediation over vast distances.

Another feature of so-called postmodern geopolitics is the idea that geographical description involves an inherent deferral to non-geographic concepts. Joanne Sharp (2000) attributes this to the unavoidable metaphorical aspects of language. For instance, the classical geographer Friedrich Ratzel invokes non-geographic (biological) metaphors in his description of geographic territories. Ratzel, who was heavily influenced by a “non-hypothesis-testing positivism” (Ó Tuathail 1996, 37) argues that the state is a living organism and insists that natural laws govern its expansion (Ratzel 1898; Ratzel 1969). Geopolitics is postmodern then in its recognition that geographic representations of space always have been aspatial and linked to wider social forces. The representation in geopolitical discourse of “the natural”, for instance Ratzel’s insistence that states are as natural as biological organisms, has been identified as ideological, privileging certain social groups above others (see for instance Lefebvre 1991; Cresswell 1996). Geopolitics, as many geographers conceive of it (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Agnew 1998; Dalby 1998; Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998), strives to relate wider social forces to space in ways that are meaningful to geography rather than to consolidate notions of politics that endow practitioners of statecraft with the exclusive pedagogical authority to
speak. With this dissertation, I further involve geography in interrogating politics and the state by addressing the privileged language of foreign correspondents in the printed news-media.

This dissertation pulls from recent studies on place in the media that interrogate the way privileged voices construct futures, identities, class, and geographical relationships between individuals through storytelling and rhetoric (see for instance King 1991a; King 1991b; Sack 1992; Wahrman 1995; Mitchell 1996; Martin 2000; Sharp 2000). Specifically, I investigate the ways in which Post-Soviet Russia has been constructed in American newspapers, working from the premise that media texts are “saturated with geographical meanings and messages” (Burgess 1990, 141). I understand the mediated geographical orders relating “the American” and “the Russian” as geographic imaginations that are jointly created through storytelling. I seek to uncover the ways in which America and Russia were co-narrated in journalistic rhetorics during the nine years succeeding the dissolution of the Soviet Union by investigating the role of space in producing identities. Simultaneously, I analyze the role of identity and other seemingly aspatial, social forces in producing space. By produced space, I am referring to the interrelationship between the development of space and the production of meanings, concepts, and consciousnesses of space that development necessarily entails.¹ By focusing on the time period 1992-2000, this

¹ Geographers such as Smith (1990) and Soja (1989) use the term “produced space” similarly.
study isolates representations of the development which took place immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin was president of Russia during all but a portion of the last year under consideration.

Through interrogating how conceptions of “the Russian” have evolved in print-journalism during the Post-Cold War era, I participate in an ongoing discussion in critical geopolitics pegged to the idea that mediated discourse is what makes world politics spatial (see Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Agnew 1998). By focusing on representations of Russia since it emerged from the defunct Soviet Union, this research builds on observations that rhetorics on the so-called political and economic transition are based on “the wishful thinking of their advocates” as much as on any empirically observable, political-economic practices (Unwin 1998, 285).² Rather than disregarding rhetorics on recently-emerged Russia as ideologically tainted and therefore unusable, I acknowledge that mediated rhetorics play a substantive role in constructing the mental boundaries complicit in forming national identities. In doing so, I attempt to connect territorialized identities with wider social forces as well as to make the everyday practices of statecraft available to interrogation in a geopolitically meaningful way.

This dissertation asks two main questions: How did newspaper articles on the newly independent Russia communicate information about space during the

² see also Callinicos (1991), Miliband (1991), and Burawoy (1992)
Imagining Russia

On March 13, 1998, the *Los Angeles Times* printed an article on a meeting in California between Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (Shogren 1998). According to that article, the meeting introduced Chernomyrdin to some of the top entrepreneurs who spearheaded the multi-billion dollar, high-technology military advancements in the United States, as well as to show off “the vibrancy of America’s free market system.” The giant aerospace firm Lockheed Martin alone had made business deals with Russian companies totaling some $7 billion involving the use of Russian engines to propel rockets with satellite payloads. The article conjured up memories of a trip to Russia.

Fifteen time zones away from the Silicon Valley and less than a year prior to Chernomyrdin’s elbow-rubbing visit, I was in Siberia. I remember well Pavel’s comment, made during a ride through the taiga in the summer of 1997: “All that we make any more is rockets.” In Pavel’s Toyota sedan, he and I made our way north to the village of Chornaya Rechka, or Little Black River. The

period of reform from 1992-2000?; and, How was space during that same period related to the way the articles conceived of “the Russian,” “the American,” and the role of the individual in society? Before I describe how I answer these questions, I will briefly discuss their origins and relevance.
drive from Tomsk was tedious, the last portion of it over thick, granular mud. It was important to keep the car high-centered over the deep ruts gouged by the Soviet-era trucks still used to haul raw agricultural products. It was harvest time, and a difficult one. That August was particularly wet and cold. Pavel no longer had regular work, but through a fairly intricate maze of connections that led me from San Diego, through an acquaintance from Kazakhstan, and then through the Tomsk Business Support Center (supported by the United States Agency for International Development), he had temporary work as my personal chauffeur, driving me about a small portion of West Siberia.

During our drive that day, we passed by a site in the taiga where, according to Pavel, trucks outfitted with intercontinental ballistic missiles used to hide under the cover of thick Siberian pine, cedar, and fir. Our day-long drives through Siberian back-country were sometimes quite tedious, and Pavel had taken to making comments along our journeys about various landmarks. His comment would have stuck in my memory regardless of the economic message, because the formative years for my own geopolitical imagination happened during the Reagan presidency and the Cold War. As a teenager, I devoured the international sections of newspapers. I surmised that the politics of the day were as likely to lead the United States into armed conflict as they were to keep the country at peace. And I was afraid. But the message that stuck in my head from
Pavel’s comment that day was different. One Russian, whom I had gotten to
know casually, believed that Russian industry was no longer for Russian people.

The difference in perspectives between Pavel Grecheynuk, an
unemployed Siberian who did driving and other odd jobs for his livelihood, and
two of the world’s more powerful politicians, vying for presidential seats, was
undoubtedly enormous. Yet their sentiments basically were representative of two
poles of thought identifiable in contemporary conversation circles. One pole,
represented by Gore and Chernomyrdin, held that the Soviet-socialist system of
production was misguided. With the installation of a proper system of
production, molded after that in the west and made possible by aid from the west,
Russia would experience a previously unforeseen boom in opportunity and
progress. The other pole, reflected by Pavel Gretcheynuk’s statement, was
concerned that Russia was becoming nothing more than another link in a
production chain defined by and serving the interests of the advanced,
industrialized, western nations. These positions pitted small-scale, local concerns
against large-scale, national and multi-national ones. The central issue at stake
seemed to be development for Russia.

But what about Pavel and his new life as well as others like him? Russia
is a vast territory\(^3\) in which over 100 million identities have been reconstituted –
in a variety of social and spatial milieux – since the disintegration of the Soviet

\(^3\) At over 17 million square kilometers, it is by far the largest state in the world.
Union. However, representations in the press of Russia at the time I set out to write this dissertation seemed mostly concerned with states, geopolitics, and economic growth rather than about local geographies. Barrages of impersonal, macro-level commentaries on economic reform and transition—the new economic reality—seemed to drown out messages about the everyday, geosociological contexts in which material relations in Russia were constituted. Was the ideological victory of the United States over Russia insofar as the Cold War was concerned and the ensuing opening up of Russia to outside investment so much more important than the lives of everyday Russians that their voices in the major United States newspapers were overrun? So, equipped with my own experience of the Cold War and my curiosity around the construction of Russian identity, I set out to investigate the geography of Russia as imagined by American foreign correspondence.

During the course of my work, I found a great many articles that staged contests not only about who had the right and the means to produce for Russia, but involving many other social and spatial concerns. Some articles were primarily invested in the local, other stories involved contests between the federal and regional levels within Russia, while yet others staged international interactions between Russian and outside concerns. In total I read approximately 2,500 articles, looking in some only for passages that contained key words; skimming others; and, pouring over others exhaustively. From these readings,
some key phenomena emerged that clearly represented transformation in how Russia was imagined. Some examples of these represented phenomena I encountered included:

- **privatization vouchers** issued by the Russian government to every citizen for the purpose of shifting ownership of firms from public to private. The vouchers were of so little monetary value that many Russians didn’t even bother to pick them up. Other Russians sold theirs for a fraction of face-value or traded them on the street like scalpers. See for instance (Bohlen 1992a; Simon 1992e; Hiatt 1993e).

- **gambling.** Some Russians spend measly pensions on lottery tickets, while others gamble away $5,000 a day in fancy clubs – recently emerged spaces built for the extraordinarily wealthy (Simon 1992e; Bohlen 1993d).

- **moribund spaces.** Many cities with factories unable to survive in a more open, money-based economy resorted to barter as well as to printing their own, local currencies. It was reported that should those factories be properly bankrupted, whole cities would vanish. Likewise, inhabitants in cities in the extreme Russian north were reported as being on the brink of death. Unable to work or pay exorbitant market prices for shipping food and fuel to such remote regions, these people could neither afford to survive in-place nor
afford to leave. See, for example, Reynolds (1999c), Wines (1998c), and Boudreaux (1998).

- **civil disorder** caused by nation-wide strikes. Workers frequently protested by blocking railways and staging demonstrations over unpaid wages. Public protest, uncommon in the Soviet era, became a normal social-spatial practice. See Shapiro (1993a) and Williams (1995e).

- **the decentralization of political power**, sometimes even involving the passage by regional legislatures of laws around private property and real estate that outright violated the national constitution. And in some cases, local or regional autocrats were represented as wielding almost total power against all social, economic, and political activity within their territories, even in the face of the president himself. See Dahlburg (1998), Wines (2000c), Bennett (1998c), and Schmemann (1993f).

- **the emergence of industrial super-giants** like Gazprom. One newspaper article printed a quote that conflated the well-being of the company with the well-being of the country: “What's good for Gazprom is good for Russia...Anybody who comes to power is going to have to manage to live with Gazprom, because without Gazprom they won't manage to live at all” Hoffman (1995c). Such
representations downplay the significance of democracy⁴ and construct a linear link between the political power of state and business. See also Erlanger (1993d), O’Brien (1998), and Simon (1995b). And,

- **the imagination of who is on “our” side.** After Yeltsin’s support of the war against Chechnya, multiple collapses of the exchange rate of the Ruble, and Yeltsin’s periodic disappearances from political life in Russia because of his health problems, the American perspective on Yeltsin as the savior of Russia changed significantly. (see Erlanger 1995a; LaFraniere 1998c). Furthermore, while the mainstream American perspective advocated democracy in Russia, the economic turmoil most Russians were experiencing showed up in election results as support for non-reform parties. Representations of Russian workers between stories were contradictory, with some stories constructing workers as problems for reform (Williams 1997e), while other stories constructing them as “going to the barricades” for Yeltsin (Shapiro 1993d).

So, this dissertation is concerned with many ways in which Russia and Russian identity were imagined in American foreign correspondence. Central to

---

⁴“Efforts to create a free-market economy in Russia have generated a small group of powerful, super-rich individuals, known collectively as “the oligarchs,” but have also left millions of Russians unpaid” (Marshall 1998).
those imaginings, some of which I brought out in the previous examples of representations of Russia, is the unevenness of development. In writing the dissertation, I prioritized three particular aspects of the represented geographical relationships between individuals and states:

- **Geographies of difference.**
  
  Who participates in social, political, and economic life in Russia and how?

  Who are the legitimate citizens of Russia?

- **Contested Boundaries**
  
  Which spaces are legitimate or open and which spaces are moribund or clandestine?

  Who has the right to produce for Russia?

  How does the global figure into the construction of the local and vice versa? And,

- **Power, Knowledge, and the Authority to Speak**
  
  Whose voices show up in news-representations of Russia, from where, and under what circumstances?

  How does the representation structure the audience in order to deliver its messages?

In order to understand how representations of Russia constructed identity and space along these various fronts, I choose analytical techniques that were open to
many different messages as well as sensitive to local-oriented, national-oriented, or global-oriented representations of society and space.

APPROACH, METHODS, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS

Moscow and the Corpus of American Foreign Correspondence from Russia

In order to answer the research questions, I link the wider social and spatial forces that are part of the environment of news-production with the messages conveyed by news-stories themselves. Moscow is the location of the bureaus headquarters of all three major US newspapers from which I collected data.\textsuperscript{5} It is where American foreign correspondents in Russia spend most of their time collecting and assembling the information they use to write stories. This is the case primarily because the bureau headquarters provides subscriber-access to a rich array of “running feeds” from mostly Russian, domestic news sources, like ITAR-Tass and Interfax, as well as to Russian television and radio coverage. These feeds constitute a rich variety of domestic, Russian news sources that are already reporting on events taking place in the various, spatially disparate locales within the country. Other news feeds such as the Associated Press and Reuters are available as well (Goldberg 2003, personal communication). Moreover, the bureau headquarters offers to the foreign correspondent Russian

\textsuperscript{5} I collected data from \textit{The New York Times}, \textit{The Washington Post}, and \textit{The Los Angeles Times}.
translators and assistants as well as a reliable modem connection that enables stories to be e-mailed, rather than relayed by voice, to the main office in the United States.

Carry Goldberg, a former foreign correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times* whose assignment in Russia ended in 1995, indicated to me that by far the most significant reason to work at the bureau headquarters is to avoid being “caught out of position when some big news happens. It would be very, very difficult to try to write the overarching, big story of what’s happening when you’re in a place with lousy communications and not getting all of the input that you usually would get. It’s a lot easier to cover big, happening stories from your base in Moscow” (Goldberg 2003, personal communication). In other words, for American foreign correspondents working in Russia, Moscow is the dominant node from which they have the best access to news sources, reliable communication, and support from other newspaper-related staff. Simply by being in Moscow, foreign correspondents have available to them, quite conveniently, all they need to put together and transmit a story. Conversely, being in the provinces of Russia separates the foreign correspondent from these news feeds and very well may limit the foreign correspondent to sub-standard methods of communication. Any time a foreign correspondent leaves Moscow, even for the purposes of covering breaking news that has already emerged, that foreign
correspondent risks alienation from any event at all, from any part of Russia, that potentially could be newsworthy.

The most direct consequence then of the spatial network of news feeds, writing support, and other communication links that makes the foreign bureau so conducive for reporting is that most stories published from Russia are written from Moscow. The dateline, which is part of the header-information for every article and is located next to the headline, tells from where the story was written or where the most significant fieldwork for the story was conducted. Of the 2,457 total references to place I recorded, 1,863 or three-quarters occurred in articles written from Moscow. The basic institutional relationship between the foreign correspondent and the foreign bureau thus lays the foundation for the geography of foreign correspondence.

I consider news-stories written from Moscow as comprising a first comparison group and news stories written in Russian provinces away from Moscow as a second comparison group. By doing so, I equip myself to answer the question of how foreign correspondents as field-workers writing from Moscow construct American and Russian identities differently than when they are writing from locations outside of Moscow. I am conceiving then of these two comparison groups as competing bodies of representations which imagine the roles of states and individuals in global and national economic development quite differently, based on the location of the journalist and the type of field work that
the journalist undertakes as part of the enterprise of story-writing. I am hypothesizing that these two bodies compete with each other insofar as Moscow-based foreign correspondence addresses the needs of mainstream political and economic culture (a reform-oriented agenda centered in Moscow and concerned about market-driven capitalism and democracy) and other foreign correspondence from Russia addresses different cultural needs as voiced by individual Russians in places outside of Moscow. I am positing that whether any given foreign correspondent writes from or away from Moscow has much to do with the way the resultant story differentiates “us” from “them”; produces identities; and, construes the meanings of global or domestic events within Russia.

**Methods**

Chapters four through seven constitute the analytical core of the dissertation. Chapters four and five concern foreign correspondence with Moscow datelines, while chapters six and seven deal with foreign correspondence from the provinces. Each pair of chapters balances a traditional approach, mapping, with a more contemporary approach, post-structural analysis of text, to analyze the journalistic construction of geographies of Russia. The dissertation thus dedicates two chapters to post-structural analysis of text and two
chapters to more traditional methods, and both kinds of analytical approaches are applied to each comparison group. Interviews also help to inform the work.

This study dealt with a very large set of data: all newspaper articles written by American foreign correspondents from Russia during the period 1992-2000, which contained at least one of around one hundred local and regional place names. While I used two different techniques in addition to interviews to bring out aspects of the data in which I was most interested, inductive reasoning was the main force behind the analysis. So that data collection and analysis could proceed based on established procedures, I relied on the grounded theory approach outlined in Strauss and Corbin (1990) but established in Glaser and Strauss (1967), and followed by Glaser (1978) and Strauss (1987). Developing a grounded theory means that data collection and theory development exist in a reciprocal relationship with one another. The method applies a mostly inductive approach to analysis, although the later stages of theory development do employ deductive reasoning. Grounded theory development results in a “middle-range” theory that is less than an “all-inclusive,” universal theory but substantially more than a “minor working hypothesis” (Merton 1957, 5-10; Glaser and Strauss 1967). The results “can be presented either as a well-codified set of propositions or in a running theoretical discussion, using conceptual categories and their properties” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 31). Grounded theory has recently been employed by geographers in a wide range of studies (Florida and Jonas 1991;
Chapter four investigates the ways that places are conjured up by journalists in stories with Moscow datelines in order to support journalistic prose. It answers the question “How would I expect place to be used within a story?” It treats the incidence of place names in a story as an entrepreneurial way for a journalist to introduce important meanings about wider social forces into a story. It looks past the overall messages that stories with Moscow datelines may construct about Russia in order to ask how places figure into narrative reasoning. I use maps as the primary interrogative tool to query the messages that references to place bring into the storytelling milieu. In doing so, I construct a particular geography of foreign correspondence by representing the frequency with which place names corresponding to the various Russian regions appear in news-stories. I map how place names showed up for a variety of themes like government, economics, and landuse, in order to draw conclusions about how the various regions were invoked and constructed in order to introduce meaning and serve the purpose of storytelling. The maps structure an ongoing, qualitative discussion about the journalistic employment of territories for the purpose of Moscow-based storytelling. The chapter thus demonstrates the importance of the
territories of the Russian Federation to Moscow-based storytelling. It reveals a spatially uneven network of place names upon which Moscow-based foreign correspondence relies.

Chapter five investigates the textual aspects of how American foreign correspondents constructed Russian and American identities in print-journalism. It focuses exclusively on messages about the economic transition in Russia transmitted in print journalism with Moscow datelines. It is minimally concerned with differences in the ways various Russian regions were constructed. Rather, the chapter examines the various roles that represented spatial practices play in the imagination of social groups. It analyzes social relationships in Russia as well as between Russian and American communities. It answers the question, “What does American foreign correspondence emanating from Moscow tell the reader about Russia and Russian communities and how does it position the reader to receive that message?”

Chapter six is the first of two chapters that concentrate on journalism with datelines throughout the provinces of Russia. The approach to chapter six is similar to that of chapter four in that it uses mapping to represent a geography of foreign correspondence. The main difference, however, is that instead of focusing on the appearance of place names within stories, it focuses on all of the articles I collected with Russian datelines outside of Moscow. Chapter six contains a series of maps which represent for each territory in the Russian
Federation the overall magnitude at which stories with datelines corresponding to those territories were published for the period under consideration. The maps are aggregated by the primary theme of the article, again like government, economics, and landuse, to demonstrate how the various territories showed up in American foreign correspondence on Russia. By considering only instances in which the journalist traveled away from Moscow to do fieldwork in the territory about which the story was written, the chapter addresses the question “How often did foreign correspondents travel to the territories in order to write a story and when they did so, what were the stories about?” It creates a powerful basis to compare the results of chapter four, which interrogates the kinds of messages that places bring into stories with Moscow datelines, with the ways in which those same places are constructed when foreign correspondents actually visit the places themselves!

The approach to chapter seven is almost identical to that of chapter five, except that it interrogates the textual aspects of the construction of identity for articles with Russian datelines outside of Moscow. Like chapter five, chapter seven looks into the various roles that represented spatial practices play in the imagination of social groups. It answers the question, “What does American foreign correspondence emanating from Russia outside of Moscow tell the reader about Russia and Russian communities and how does it position the reader to receive that message?” It allows me to juxtapose the results of chapter five,
which interrogates the joint construction of American and Russian identities in Moscow-based foreign correspondence, against the way national identities are constructed in American journalism from the Russian provinces. This comparison reveals how the fieldwork that journalists do affects the identities constructed in their writing.

Chapter eight constitutes the culmination of the preceding work. I discuss the geographic importance of provincial datelines and summarize the narrated policies of the West toward Russia and the represented, material consequences of those policies for stories written from both Moscow and the provinces. I highlight the predominant features that characterized representations of transition and reform and elaborate on the various views toward Russia and the world posited by American foreign correspondence. Finally, I conclude with an assessment of the importance of foreign correspondence as a cultural product.

SIGNIFICANCE AND SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

In 1988, Simon Dalby published an article called “Geopolitical discourse: the Soviet Union as other.” His article studied how statesmen
drew on a series of “security discourses,” namely sovietology, the realist literature in international relations, nuclear strategy, and geopolitics to ideologically construct the Soviet Union as a dangerous “Other.” It traces how each of these discourses operate ideologically to hinder progressive political change and to perpetuate militarization [in the United States].
(Dalby 1988, 415)
The ways in which Russia was imagined changed very shortly thereafter. The end of the Cold War saw Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article “The End of History” (reprinted in Ó Tuathail et al. 1998) in which he openly wondered if the end of the Cold War marked the end of history. He pondered whether the fall of the Soviet Union signified “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Ó Tuathail, Dalby et al. 1998, 114). Fukuyama’s article was widely criticized (see Atlas 1989; Ryan 1992), and geographers began studying in new ways the construction of foreign and American identities during the Post-Cold War era (see for instance Castells 1996; Dalby 1998; Rygiel 1998). Studies of textual imaginings of Bosnia (Dodds 1998), the Gulf War (Sidaway 1998), and the Oklahoma City bombing (Sparke 1998) have been among the various works opening up mediated representations of Post-Cold War geopolitics. Wark’s Virtual Geography (1994) dealt with not only with representations of the Gulf War but with representations of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the civil unrest at Tiananmen Square, and the New York Stock Market crash of 1987 in an examination of exceptional moments in recent mediated geographies.

I am suggesting that the newly emergent Russia has been neglected as an important source from which mediated representations of contested identities, spaces, and futures originate. Although the other geographers I have cited here are very much warranted in using the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to
study the importance of non-Soviet places in American geopolitical imaginations, it should not be overlooked that Russia too has not reached the end of history. The importance of Russia in the American geopolitical imagination is likely never to be as great as was the Soviet Union’s in for instance Dalby’s (1998) account. Geographers continue to publish interesting work on Russia, for instance the edited volume by Smith and Pickles (1998). However, in that volume, there was minor emphasis on the construction of geographies of difference or identity in representations of Post-Communist places. Yet, as I argued earlier, mediated geopolitics are not “behind” reality; they construct it.

This research contributes to the ongoing conversations in geography on critical geopolitics as well as the conversations by Russian regional geographers who have identified that the rhetorics on the economic transition of the newly independent Russia are ideological (see Unwin 1998). It builds off of the arguments of Castells (1996), Agnew and Corbridge (1995), Ó Tuathail (1996) and others that geopolitical space is networked and stringy, that the analysis of it requires radically different approaches than those used by past geographers. It understands the local not as separate from the global but as both a product and productive of it. In these terms, the geography of everyday experience is constituted by a “world where immediate perception is also distant perception” (Ó Tuathail 1995, 758). The mediation of codes, that portion of glocalization that
encompasses symbolic exchange, is thus what makes geopolitics spatial (Agnew 1998).

In its conception of postmodern geopolitical space, this dissertation understands nations and identities as to a degree socially constructed through texts. It plans to interrogate newspaper articles on the newly independent Russia in terms of the way Burgess (1985) sees them, as richly geographic accounts of “people-in-place” (Burgess and Gold 1985, 192). News-representations of the newly independent Russia are important, because they offer a powerful source of data on how the expansion of the involuntary social relations of production inherent to capitalism is portrayed. In particular, this work is interested in how news representations invoke either territorial definitions of society or social definitions of territory to represent the uneven development inherent to capitalism itself. It asks two questions: How did newspaper articles on the newly independent Russia communicate information about space during the period of reform from 1992-2000?; and, How was space related to the way the articles conceived of “the Russian,” “the American,” and the role of the individual in society?

My methods combine mapping, textual analysis, and interviews with grounded theory. Because relations of power are especially central to the topic, I chose an interpretive technique that was simultaneously quite insensitive to and highly susceptible to ideological rhetorics in order to facilitate comparisons.
between different interpretations of the same symbolic material. As such, the analysis can reveal how multiple identities and geographies of difference are constructed simultaneously in a single story; it is true to the contentions of political and human geography that representations do not naively reflect reality but are productive of it. By being flexible in its interpretation, the analysis stresses the relationships between power and knowledge; between power and the authority to speak; and the relationships between individuals themselves, between individuals and states, and between states themselves. It always understands the contested boundaries that define “us” from “them” as textual and rhetorical rather than territorial and fixed. The resulting theory does not make causal statements, for instance that a certain way of representing space results in a certain material practice. It instead represents the complex ways in which material practices and symbolic practices are interwoven as uneven, capitalistic development plays itself out in new frontiers. This is significant, because the resulting theory is sensitive to manifold news-representations of an unpredictable, Post-Soviet Russia during a period of profound social and economic change.
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review develops in three major parts. The first and most significant part broadly deals with geography and text. It first discusses the characteristics of postmodern space and its consequences for geopolitics and representation. Next, it problematizes the representation of boundaries and geographies of difference by pointing out that texts (including narratives and maps) are problematic devices in which communicated meanings are contingent on a process of encoding and decoding complex codes. It then goes on to demonstrate some of the ways that narratives construct geographical differences and how textually-produced geographies of difference can misrepresent socially produced (extra-textual) geographies of difference. Finally, it reviews other studies in geography that analyze newspaper articles or other popular culture texts.

The second part of the literature review details the perspective on textual analysis that I adopted for the dissertation. The third part contains information pertinent to the movement through Russian space of the foreign correspondent. It first deals with some of the recent literature in geography on the fieldworker as embodied. Then it takes up the political organization of the Russian Federation. That discussion is necessary in order to familiarize the reader with the basic political geography of Russia, which foreign correspondents navigate when they
decide to leave Moscow. It also prepares the reader for my analysis of Russian place names in foreign correspondence.

GEOGRAPHY AND TEXT

Space-time Compression and Glocalization

Geography in the sense of distance is bound to matter less and less as new technologies come on stream to shrink space further...

(Agnew and Corbridge 1995, 183)

Recent studies have called into serious question the meaning of space in everyday life. In his book Virtual Geography, McKenzie Wark (1994) explores how the space of imagination is mediated, how “the geography of experience and everyday life” is constituted by a “world where immediate perception is also distant perception” (Ó Tuathail 1995, 758). He develops the concept of the vector, in which modern flows, mediated by various technologies, bypass physical space and transgress traditional boundaries between what were until recently discrete locations. Ó Tuathail (1995, 758) praises Wark and laments that geographers have been slow “to wrestle with these new networks of connectivity in as intellectually pioneering a way as a non-geographer like Wark does.”

Geographers however have paid attention to the role of technology in remaking space, particularly in geopolitics and economic geography. As early as

---

6 I familiarize the reader with these terms now. They are established within geography by Janelle (1968; 1969); Soja (1996); Massey (1992); Harvey (1989); Featherstone and Lash (1995);
1968, Donald Janelle coined the term “time-space convergence rate” to refer to the pace at which human settlements grow closer to each another in time-space as transportation technologies become more advanced. He built on his theory of time-space convergence a year later by developing a model to represent processes of economic development and centralization over space as advances in transportation technology alter place utilities (Janelle 1969). In an article which tries to make some sense out of the various ways in which space has been remade by modern technologies, Robert Dodgshon (1999) notes that many scholars, both geographers and non-geographers alike, have wrestled with the concept of time-space convergence in various guises. Dodgshon (1999, 607) notes that in general time-space convergence refers to “the degree[s] to which goods, services, and ideas are now exchanged globally, with which people now interact cross-culturally, and with which images and symbols are communicated almost instantaneously, [which] are seen as transforming society’s experience of time-space dimensionality in a radical way.”

It is difficult to overstate the strange character now irreversibly kneaded into space by the technologies of time-space convergence. Numerous geographers and others have attempted to define and qualify the boundary-altering forces that uncountable, imbricated, and distant social connections have

---

wrought in remaking space. For instance, Appadurai (1996), Shapiro and Alker (1996), and Castells (1989) invoke the terms *flows, networks, and webs* to represent postmodern space. Reich (1991) argues that the nationality of corporations—and hence the very meaning of the “national economy”—tends more toward irrelevance as old, centralized operations are rebuilt into new, web-like geometries with global outreach. Castells (1996, 469) argues radically in *The Rise of the Network Society* that “the power of flows takes precedence over the flows of power.” Bruno Latour takes an even stronger position, using an application of actor-network theory to argue:

> ...modern societies cannot be described without recognizing them as having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary character that is never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structure, systems...Literally there is nothing but networks, there is nothing in between them, or, to use a metaphor from the history of physics, there is no aether in which the networks should be immersed. (Latour 1997)

Hence emerges the postmodern term *glocalization*, which attempts to capture the global amalgamation of physically distant yet socially bound localities brought on by the innovations of time-space convergence, a conjoining that challenges the very notion of “the local” as something other than “the global” (see Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Robertson 1995).

Glocalization also calls into question the notion of formal culture regions, because it suggests that physically proximate entities need not exploit common social networks in order to share the same physical space. Ó Tuathail (1998, 25-26, 29) summarizes the profound implications for conventional geography of
time-space convergence, that the notions of proximity and distance as well as distinctions between the local and the global are highly problematic.

The science of geography, of mapping, measuring and triangulating physical space, is useless [for networked spaces] for it seeks to define universal measures of proximity, distance, and scale based on physical measurements....If geography is reconceptualized as connectivity not space, traditional ‘real space’ geography is merely one network among multitudes...the Euclidean world of discrete nation-states imagined by so many political realists [disintegrates].

A direct consequence for geography of time-space convergence is that maintaining distinct borders remains, perhaps even more so than in the past, a matter of political theatrics and rhetoric (see Campbell 1992; Walker 1993; Weber 1995). Furthermore, the maintenance of borders is increasingly complicated as glocalization continues to confuse and muddle them further.

One effect then of the interrogation by critical geopolitics into the social and spatial effects of the technologies of time-space convergence has been the destabilization of the meaning of boundaries themselves. If boundaries are increasingly poor delimiters of how societies are laid out in physical space, then what do they mean exactly? The question, although well intended, is poorly worded, because it fails to consider much of the recent theoretical work in human geography which argues that territoriality is not just a result of social organization but is productive of it (see for instance Cresswell 1996).8

The view that boundaries mark difference rather than play an active part in creating it assumes that national identity precedes statehood. Yet much work on

---

8 One citation alone for this supposition is scanty, and I hope that the reader generously will continue to the next section, where I will elaborate. It would be unfair to Henri Lefebvre, however, not to credit him before leaving the section on glocalization. Lefebvre’s work, particularly The Production of Space (1991), has enormously informed the thinking of many of the political geographers mentioned thus far.
nationalism has shown that in the vast majority of cases, nationhood has most often followed from the construction of states and in all cases has been reinforced and refined by the institutions of statehood.

(Sharp 2000, 28)

Sharp’s concise argument is based particularly on Benedict Anderson’s (1991) *Imagined Communities*, which details how nations are socially constructed through the imaginations and literatures of populations who belong to the same reading communities. Campbell (1992), applying Anderson’s argument to America, posits that America is the grandest imagined community of all, noting that powerful notions of America existed in the European imagination before Europeans even set foot on American soil.

The next sections deal with how boundaries, identity, and discourse are interrelated. First there is a discussion on how boundaries are problematic geographic features which pose complicated problems for communication and for the linguistic devices necessary to communicate. Then I elaborate on how textually produced boundaries construct powered relationships between individuals and states and how those boundaries can be understood in the context of the powered social relationships that exist outside of texts. I mention a number of studies in geography which link heterogeneous spaces and uneven development to identities contested in texts before proceeding to the next section of the literature review.
The Social Construction of Boundaries

...far from being drawn in indelible ink, boundaries are dynamic in time and space and are, in the last analysis, one of the primary ways in which we construct and reinforce geographies of difference.

(Morehouse 1995, 53)

The geographer Barbara Morehouse (1995), proceeding from her own work (1993) as well as that of other scholars of border issues (such as Taylor 1994; Thomas 1994) advanced the concept of boundary functions, which links geographic boundaries to geopolitical discourse. She demonstrated seven ways in which boundaries are produced or reproduced in discourse, thus elaborating on how “boundaries do not exist as separate and independent entities, but persist only to the extent that they are reinforced through social discourse and practice” (Morehouse 1995, 53). She furthermore noted that boundaries are simultaneously the inputs and outputs of countless social interactions including relations of power and resistance. Understanding maps as representational devices that project power, J.B. Harley (1989) criticized the rigidity with which maps represent bounded space. He argued that maps imprison the reader in a [static] spatial matrix, freezing the past in an image of the representational culture of geography. Although my research incorporates maps, I briefly want to use them as a way to emphasize that texts are coded representations, precisely because maps are so ingrained, as Harley (1989) states, in the way geography represents space.
Harley (1989) and Pickles (1992) stress that because maps are representations, they are coded messages. Non-geographers also agree that communication involves a sender, the source of inputs, which are then transmitted through a medium to a recipient who “extracts” outputs from it. Maps employ a system of signs that according to Barthes (1984, 109) “presupposes a signifying consciousness” (see also Barthes 1981; McKenzie 1986; Thompson 1995). This model of communication, like any other system of communication (see Mitchell 1995), requires that the sender encode information into a system of signs which must then be decoded by the recipient. Maps do not convey information based on a naive correspondence to reality, and the act of mapping itself is fraught with interpretation: “In order to move from the real situation to the map it is necessary to divide up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs substantially different from the object they communicate” (Pickles 1992, 217).

The other important point from Harley (1989) and Pickles (1992) is that they argue that maps have a textual character which cartographers have not yet accepted. In treating maps as texts, they insist that maps are socially produced, social constructions of reality, and their writing is directed at displacing the stigma of maps as forms of representation that are unassailably geographic. Since maps are texts, then analyzing primarily lexical texts (newspaper articles) for codes on space is not wholly different than analyzing primarily graphical texts.
(maps) for codes on space. Changing from one type of text (genre) to another only necessitates changing the rules that are involved in encoding and decoding the information represented by the signs involved in communication: “The map image itself is also linguistic” (Pickles 1992, 221). Indeed the message is communicated vis-à-vis a certain interplay of graphical and lexical codes, and that interplay is what makes maps a unique genre for communicating information about space.

Finally, relative to other kinds of texts, maps are relatively unimportant to geopolitics (see Ó Tuathail 1998). In a world where boundaries and discourse are locked into mutually formative processes, maps remain in a state of “textual poverty...they are a lexicon without people” (Harley 1989, 86). The analysis in this dissertation balances mapping with interpreting newspaper articles for their coded information on space. The interpretation will include people and the sites from which they speak as it studies the maintenance of the imagined boundaries that define “us” from “them”. I will now review the textual production of geographies of difference and mention some other studies in geography that have dealt with spaces encoded in texts.

The Textual Production of Geographies of Difference

Critical geopolitics is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The boundary-drawing practices we seek to investigate...are both conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, social and aesthetic. Critical geopolitics is particularly interested in analyzing the interdigitation of all these practices, in examining how certain conceptual spatializations of
identity, nationhood and danger manifest themselves across the landscapes of states and how certain political, social and physical geographies in turn enframe and incite certain conceptual, moral and/or aesthetic understandings of self and other, security and danger, proximity and distance, indifference and responsibility. (Ó Tuathail and Dalby 1998, 4)

Geopolitical discourse seems to play itself out along many confusing variables: moral (right/wrong); aesthetic (natural/unnatural); social (developed/undeveloped and modern/backward); et. cetera. Geographers have noted in various studies how these factors are related to territories. For instance, Agnew and Corbridge (1995) mention an obvious current in modern geopolitical discourse in which temporal metaphors (such as modern/backward) are used to express social and spatial differences. Cresswell (1996, 161) concludes “the process of differentiation through which ‘others’ are created is a basic ideological mechanism...Ideologies involve the removal of beliefs and actions from their social roots and their placement in the realm of ‘nature’... the ‘nature’ of place can thus be offered as justification for particular views of what is good, just, and appropriate.” Anderson (1991) argues that nationality is determined by the style (aspatial aspects) in which it is imagined. Sharp (2000) builds on that by drawing attention to the way society in the United States is collectively imagined in Readers Digest as “America.” Whether rhetorics exploit temporal metaphors to express spatial difference, legitimize certain places vis-à-vis recourse to nature, or employ other linguistic devices, national conceptions of space emphasize a territorial definition of society. Linking society to place serves to consolidate power and authority which, because of the complexity of society, is
unclear Sack (1980). According to Sack (1980, 179), territorial definitions of society mean that “social relationships are determined by location in a territory primarily and not by prior social connections.” The political rhetoric of states, which is interested in reproducing its own power, thus makes recourse to territorial definitions of society that remain uninformed by glocalization. Territorial representations of space are ideological (see Lefebvre 1991). A key component in studying the way space is represented in narratives is identifying the rhetorical devices that make space ideological, favoring territorial definitions of society over social definitions of territory.9

**Linking the Textual with the Extra-Textual**

This research draws on the contributions of geographers such as Neil Smith (1990), Robert Sack (1986), David Harvey (1989), and Edward Soja (1989) who have insisted that geographical categories such as national identity are socially defined, that rather than being “finished products” of analysis, they actually participate in their own production. Emphasis in geography concurrently has shifted away from traditional description of regions themselves to the significance of geographic forces with respect to explaining other phenomena.

---

9 Thompson (1995) considers ideology to be knowledge in the service of power. Lefebvre (1991) notes that the distinction is largely made in French by *savoir*, knowledge that serves power, versus *connaissance*, or knowledge that refuses to acknowledge power. Lefebvre considers ideology, as I am treating it here, as consisting largely of a discourse on social space which is invested in reproducing power for power’s sake.
and vise versa (see Gregory 1994). Tim Cresswell (1996, 12) states the new concerns of human geography succinctly: “Recent theoretical geography has attempted to put the object of geographical analysis somewhere on the conveyor belt—helping in the production process...Thus territoriality is an intrinsic part of the organization of power and the control of resources and people.” This means that the spatial world is socially constructed while the social world is spatially constructed. A crude but perhaps helpful metaphor for this study is that it understands print-journalism as one conveyor belt in a geopolitics in which the geographies of yesterday are the primary stuff from which the geographies of today are made. However, regardless of whether the “product” is the reproduction of a geopolitical identity or the creation of one anew, those identities always place social subjects in relation to power (see also Barthes 1981; Chambers 1991).

The social definition of territory is favorable, because capitalism necessarily entails involuntary social relations which are productive of spatial and social differences between the classes. Moreover, capitalism produces spaces that immediately become factors of production for later steps in

---

10 Also see the edited volumes of Jones, Nast, and Roberts (1997); Light and Smith (1998); and, Watson and Gibson (1995).
11 Harvey (1999) provides an excellent explanation of the social relations of production, which involve the production of commodities for the sole purpose of exchange. In order to organize production, capitalists purchase labor power at a price which corresponds to that necessary to reproduce the standard of living of the working class. As part of this arrangement, workers surrender their labor power in return for a wage which is less than the value of the labor power to the capitalist. The social relations of production thus imply a class struggle. They involve an unequal power relationship between laborers and capitalists in which capitalists make the most
the production process (see Soja 1980; Smith 1990; Lefebvre 1991). The involvement of this research with Russia stems in part from an interest in how emerging differences in Russia were represented during the first nine years that Russian space was available to capitalistic development. I am particularly interested in how journalism territorializes emerging social differences, representing them as territorially based rather than socially rooted in the capitalist mode of production itself.\textsuperscript{12} Massey (1979) elaborates on the complex relationship between regional development and production and is quite clear that regional problems, \textit{rather than being produced by regions}, are caused by the global organization of production itself, by the “changing relationship between the requirements of private production for profit and the spatial [global] surface” (Massey 1979, 241). Time-space convergence and the ensuing networked character of space are directly related to the need under capitalism for enterprises to search the globe for the cheapest sources of labor, material inputs, and markets. Massey’s analysis concludes that production and the spatial distribution of difference are inseparable. Mandel (1968), Lefebvre (1991), Harvey (1999),

\textsuperscript{12} Lefebvre (1991, 33) has been especially important in recognizing that representations of space support the production of spatial and social difference linked to capitalism rather than criticize it, because representations of space “are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes.”
and Soja (1980) all have reached the same conclusion, the latter three arguing that the capitalist mode of production produces, exaggerates, and sustains spatial inequities in order to assure its own survival. Regional heterogeneity itself is thus strongly connected to globalized, capitalistic production. In this dissertation, my analysis of newspaper articles is especially concerned with the ways that journalistic representations of space relate or fail to relate uneven geographical development and social heterogeneity to the expansion of capitalism into Russia. It recognizes that capitalism subjects individuals to power involuntarily and that territorial representations of space are ideological, because they hide the glocalized social relations through which power flows.

*Examples of Geographic Studies of Mediated Communication*

Burgess and Gold (1985, i) argued that “the *Daily Mirror* has as much to say about the nature of places as the *Geographical Journal*.” Since the publication of their edited volume *Geography, the Media, and Popular Culture*, geographers have conducted numerous studies on the way geographies are imagined in mediated texts. Joanne Sharp (2000) studied the geographical imagination in the *Reader’s Digest* with respect to the representation of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. She explored how readers were complicit subjects in the production of Cold War political identities. Arguing that it is “important to understand how people
are drawn into political beliefs and spurred into action of any sort,” she considered three scales of political imagination: international politics, the role of America in international politics, and the role of the individual in American society (Sharp 2000, xvi). She argues that the magazine constructs a series of four geographies: a first in which the Russian character is produced in an environmentally deterministic way as an eternal quality of the Soviet part of the world; a second in which the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is a zero-sum game in which every situation translates into a loss by one power and an equivalent gain by the other; a third in which linguistics are of primary importance in deciding which “side” has the power of truth; and finally, a fourth and most important geography in which the reader is located within the greater system of global politics and reasons given for why the reader is personally invested in geopolitics. Sharp’s study is important, because it recognizes and elaborates on the significance of a serial in constructing geopolitical identities, particularly in terms of constructing powered relationships and attaching notions of truth to various modes of representing place.

Other studies in geography, though less similar to the proposed work than Sharp’s, deserve mention. Katharyne Mitchell (1996) examined the construction of rhetorical discourses in a series of newspaper articles on the proposed redevelopment of Vancouver. She focused on the interplay between landscape and ideology and on the way authority legitimized certain representations over
others. Deborah Martin (2000) examined the differences and interactions between marginalizing and alternative representations of an inner-city neighborhood in mainstream and neighborhood-based newspapers. Her work considered how representation participated in the formation of placed-based identities. Alison Blunt (2000) analyzed newspaper articles in order to deconstruct representations of women at different sites during conflict between Indians and British troops in the nineteenth century. She found that significant differences in the way British and Indian women were represented were related to the nationality of women surviving warfare.

Geographic studies of media texts are certainly not limited to newspapers. A whole volume has been dedicated to the geography of film (Aitken and Zonn 1994). Joanne Sharp (1998) examined the rescripting of the world order since the end of the Cold War through studying representations of various films. John Gold (1985) explored the urban geographic imaginations of film creators during the period 1919-1939. Garth Myers (2000) studied representations in novels of revolution in Zanzibar. He categorized representations of the revolution as either dominant or oppositional based on a cultural materialist interpretation that factored in social relationships. Recent theses in geography on representation and identity include Veronis’ (1999) study on the spatial metaphor “margin.” Veronis studied newspaper articles, government reports, and interviews to examine the links between politics, representation, power, and space. Dugas (1999) used
discourse analysis in a study of how two different newspapers represented a strip of bars in Quebec. He found that different journalists employ very different literary devices and perspectives to write about the same place.

The above-mentioned studies all share the position that territorial differences and identities are firmly grounded in symbolic exchange over a distance. They are invested in the idea that networked spaces have redefined the space of imagination and have elevated the importance of distant events in individual experience. They represent the ongoing move in geography away from the study of physical space to the study of spaces created and imagined by the technologies of space-time convergence in order to understand the construction of postmodern geographies of difference. Even though each researcher uses various textual methods of reading (interpretation), they stress the relationships between power and knowledge; between power and the authority to speak; and the relationships between individuals themselves, between individuals and places or states, and between places and states themselves. They also focus on the ways that future spaces are contested, linking the spatial and material practices associated with capitalism to textual representation and rhetoric in interesting ways. In many instances, the contested boundaries that define “us” from “them” are textual and rhetorical, weaving the spatial and the aspatial in such a way that they cannot be understood apart from one another.
Combining Two Approaches to Data

This dissertation takes advantage of two traditionally separate, theoretical fields: one social-spatial and the other literary. Literary theory provides the dissertation with a way to identify codes on space through an understanding of how narratives work. However, because the term “code” can be confusing, it is important to distinguish between the two ways I am using it. In the case of this research, emic codes are the linguistic codes expressed within the data, while etic codes “are those assigned by the analyst to describe events and attribute meanings and theories” (Crang 1997, 189). The qualitative research process involves a shift from localized emic codes that occur at various places within narratives toward the development of theoretically oriented etic codes and categories. This technique resembles the classic inductive approach of scientific inquiry which is designed to develop categories, their properties, and the relationships between them (see Glaser and Strauss 1967). For instance, an emic code that appeared in a newspaper article about the beginning of privatization in Russia reads: “650 Russians today lined up in the cold to begin undoing what was certainly one of the former superpower's greatest mistakes” (Hiatt 1993c). As the analyst, I assign that passage to the etic code “All space must be available to production under capitalism.” The emic code communicates that resisting
entry into the involuntary social relations of capitalistic production is wrong and specifically links territory (the emic codes on space “Russians” and “superpower”) to that resistance. Hence, an etic code that links space and power emerges.

The terms “emic” and “etic” were coined by the linguist Kenneth Pike (1954) and entered general usage in the social sciences. Numerous researchers have written specifically about them and have conducted studies that involved either emic or etic approaches to data (see for instance Birdwhistell 1952; Lounsbury 1956; Jacobs 1959; Frake 1961; French 1963; Price-Williams 1967; Filstead 1970; Johnson 1978; Rapport and Overing 2000). Price-Williams (1967, 307-8) is particularly effective at describing how the two different approaches to data work:

An emic classification represents the way in which members of a society chop up their universe into its various domains. An etic approach employs an external method of analysis wherein all observations are categorized by a scheme of classification which is logically prior to the observations.

Furthermore, Pike (1954, 10) terms an emic perspective on analysis ‘internal’ or ‘domestic’, because it “classifies behavior in reference to the system of behavior of which it is immediately a part.” He writes that emic approaches strive to discover and describe behavioral systems in terms of themselves, in terms of their own units. Since the proposed study is interested in rhetoric and theatrics, it is important to describe journalistic representations on the newly independent Russia emically.
Maintaining the distinction between emic and etic is important for several reasons. First, it forces the analyst to be aware of when the data are “speaking” for themselves and when the analyst is superimposing constructs onto the data which may be foreign to or outside of their internal behavior (Pike 1954; French 1963; Price-Williams 1967). Because the emic approach to data assumes that human behavior is patterned into units which the members of society may not be aware they are building (Pike 1954) the etic codes that will emerge from the proposed analysis will create an awareness of space in the representation that may not exist either in the authoring journalists or in the statesmen or individuals they quote. In fact, interviews with journalists have confirmed that they often write about space but are unaware that they are doing so (Dahlburg 2000; Gaddis Smith 2000; Reynolds 2000b). Moreover, emic codes are likely to be volatile between journalists as well as over time (Schoenberger 1991). Etic codes allow for the classification of multiple emic codes that are theoretically related under a single label. They present a way to specify and relate concepts about the way Russia “in transition” is represented through rhetoric during the nine year period of interest.

My Approach to Reading

Now I will lay out the theoretical foundation for the narrative analysis I adopted for the research. This work understands that for all forms of narrative,
the primary motivation of the narrator is to convert the desire of the narratee for narration into the desire of the narrator to narrate (Chambers 1984). What I mean is that the mediated text cannot address a specific reader, but it can presuppose a reader who is somehow involved in the differential, powered relationships that discourse produces (for instance that of laborer and capitalist). The author thus inserts codes into the text that correspond to the circumstances of powered relations so that the text is available to interpretation by all members of a society (Terdiman 1985). The conversion of the narratee’s desire for narration in favor of the narrator’s desire to narrate is accomplished by the way the text establishes and rewards a particular interpretive subjectivity with the ease of reading (see Chambers 1984). In order to simplify Chambers’ (1984; 1991) sophisticated lexicon, I will call that subjectivity casual.

A reader who adopts the casual subjectivity can interpret the representation unproblematically, because that subjectivity is flattered by the narrator and thus positioned to decode the message with the greatest ease. Another way of stating this is that the reader already has all the necessary codes to interpret the text and is ideologically predisposed to agree with the author. An alternate way of reading is to interpret the representation from a voyeuristic perspective, as a theoretical “objective, excluded, third party.” This perspective is interested in how the casual subjectivity of the narratee is produced within the text. In other words, even though the “excluded third party” might know a way to
decode the codes used in the text, they do not produce the effect of flattery on him or her. Yet rather than discarding the text as too laborious to read, this reader seeks to understand those codes that do provide the service of flattery so that the casual reading is possible. Rather than having his desire for narration being converted into the narrator’s desire to narrate, the desire for narration of the “excluded third party” becomes a desire to understand what makes the particular, collaborative act of story-telling and story-receiving possible. Therefore, the mode of reading of the “excluded, third party” uses logic to focus on the coded interaction between the narrative “voice” and the narratee in order to understand how the author attempts delivery of the message. So there are two interpretive positions at opposite theoretical extremes: that of a casual reading and that of excluded third party (Chambers 1991). In a causal reading, the reader understands the message as straightforward. In an ironic reading, as excluded third party, the reader understands that the author is lampooning. This approach is similar to Sharp’s (2000) in its understanding of readers as complicit subjects in the production of political identities.

A reader who shifts modes of reading from casual to ironic produces a split in the text. An interpretive space opens up which provides a terrain for discovering the whole dynamic of the powered relationship between narrator and narratee, who theoretically are both members of a socially and spatially differentiated society (see Chambers 1991). That interpretive space facilitates the
interrogation all six basic functions of language identified by Jakobson (1958).

Those basic functions are:

- **referential or denotative**: the ability of language to refer to things outside of the text;
- **poetic or esthetic**: the aspect of coded speech that promotes the palpability of language;
- **emotive**: the expression of the attitude of the speaker toward the message;
- **conative**: the expression of the attitude of the speaker toward the audience;
- **phatic**: the use of codes and formulas to open and maintain a channel of communication; and,
- **metalingual**: the ability of language to verify that the sender and recipient of a message are using the same codes.

The application of ironic reading in this study examined all of these basic functions of language in determining how space was important in constructing Russian places.

Chambers (1991) furthermore pairs the above basic functions of verbal communication into three levels of production of context, each of which accounts for the performance-ability of language. The level of production *by reference*, a product of the referential and poetic functions, allows language to construct a world that preexists the text. This is the most commonly understood result of linguistic performances. The *narrative* level, made up of the emotive and
conative functions, is where the narrative relationship is constructed between narrator, message, and audience. (This level is also referred to as the level of production by simulacrum, because the narrator, message, and audience are all implied. They are all constructed simultaneously from language.) At this level, speech is understood as an expression of the narrator; as an observance of the qualities of the audience which affect the use or choice of codes; and, as impacting an implied audience which is changed through its understanding of the speech-act. Finally, the level of production by self-figuration, constructed by the phatic and metalingual functions, is where the reading context is produced. This level contains the understandings about communicability, intrinsic to the design text, that make it interpretable and meaningful. Ironic reading explores all three of these levels in its exploration of how coded messages are delivered and how they may communicate multiple meanings simultaneously to different implied audiences.

Ironic reading is sensitive to all of the textual structures normally detected by discourse analysis. In addition to Dugas (1999), other geographers such as Haylett (2001), Myers (2000), Klodawsky (2002), and Burgess et al. (2000) have used discourse analysis to investigate various aspects of texts. Klodawsky’s (2002) adaptation of Callahan and Callahan (1997) identifies several objectives of critical discourse analysis, including:
• determining the significance of the ordering of information within the sentence;
• examining the ways that key messages are reinforced at the level of the sentence;
• understanding how elements of the text fit together, including the relationships between key messages and the headline and first paragraph;
• interrogating how the text as a whole buttresses or challenges the knowledge that readers have about the world prior to reading the text; and,
• looking for any of a number of strategies that make the text more readable, including hyperbole, repetition, and contrast.

Discourse analysis understands texts as hierarchically constructed structures (words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, opus) within and between which there are relationships. Ironic reading, as a kind of discourse analysis, is not pegged to an understanding of the text less as a hierarchical structure, because it approaches text as a linguistic performance in which multiple meanings and relationships are constructed simultaneously through all functions of language. Ironic reading might better detect not only the relationships addressed by discourse analysis but innumerable others as well, because it proceeds from a more organic understanding of the basic functions of language.

Interrogation of the design of the text through ironic reading uncovers a figure-ground relationship, which displays a foreground (knowledge) against a
background (ideology). This figure-ground relationship criticizes the mediated discourse on power and on space. It discovers the rhetorical devices that serve the social-spatial contradictions inherent to capitalism itself precisely by implicating ideology and power with the production of knowledge about the extra-textual world. By reading firstly as casual reader and secondly as excluded third party, I can identify emic journalistic codes relating to Russian space during the so-called transition and reorganize them into etic codes. Now that I have elaborated on the concept of codes, the research questions can be restated as follows: What are the journalistic codes on space for the economic ‘transition’ of the newly independent Russia?; and, How do those codes participate in the textual construction of geographies of difference?.

An Example

In order to demonstrate the efficacy of the above interpretive technique, I analyzed the newspaper article by Michael Parks (1992b) “Russia taking painful steps to a free market.” Because the article and the analysis together are lengthy, they can be found in Appendix 1. Here I present the conclusion of the textual analysis followed by the research methods.

The newspaper article represents competing geopolitical discourses, both of which are pegged to the notion of the control of space. A first story, told by the casual reading, presents a natural, unitary, territorial conception of space, a
highly ideological conception allied with the expansion of capitalism into Russia. Righteousness is married with the coded sincerity of statesmen, who are represented as brutally honest and doing their best to solve various problems, each of which in the narrator’s voicing of a Russian statesman’s rhetoric “is difficult and requires unpopular decisions.” In this story the government is in a largely proactive position. The story flatters “other” (American) ideological perspectives on capitalism by representing them as capable of expanding into new spaces in a controlled way that benefits people evenly irrespective of social (class) differences. The second, ironic reading reveals glaring contradictions in the first geopolitical discourse, including problematic metaphors (such as “shock”, “reform”, and “common people”), appeal to economic realism, and the confusion of intent with necessity. It sees the expansion of capitalism into Russia as inevitable yet raises questions about the lack of political choice repeated several times throughout the narrative. In particular, my ironic reading questions the inevitability of the lifting of price controls. The ironic narratee wonders whether the discourse on inevitability, as part of the first story, doesn’t work to justify the subjugation of the working class to the interests of the capitalists by pushing the costs of “reform” onto all households while most enterprises are allowed to raise prices freely. The ironic reading agrees with the first reading, that “Yeltsin is worried about an explosion of social discontent as prices soar,”

---

13 both the perspectives and capitalism
but not for ideological reasons. It recognizes instead that fragmented (networked) space threatens the statesman’s claims to power (see Sack 1980).

The narrative also posits relationships between individual Russians and the Russian state. The casual narratee is the object of the statesman’s desire, of gestures to cultivate popular support for the “reform” program by flattering capitalist ideology through a discourse of austerity. Flattery seduces the casual narratee into patience, tolerance, and a cooperative attitude toward the government, because the casual narratee understands himself as fairly warned about the dangers for democracy if popular support for the government collapses. The ironic reading disrupts the narrator’s voicing of the statesman’s rhetoric, that if the current administration is voted out that “the stabilization of prices, of finances, the economy -- will be achieved undemocratically by the second post-Communist government.” Instead, the ironic narratee recognizes that marginalized Russians, as objects of political desire, have little influence over political-economic change, because their government is either forced to enact inevitable policies or uses such rhetoric in order to justify policies that consolidate the social position of capitalists. The emic codes communicate an entirely different geopolitical message in the ironic reading. The ironic narratee understands that most Russians cannot look toward the federal government for help, and in the face of quickly rising prices, stand to lose their savings and perhaps their jobs as well. In the ironic reading, the narrative is
highly cynical, failing to suggest any survival strategies other than to avoid getting “killed...fighting outside a bread shop.” While the casual reading reassures the audience of the social positions of “common” Russians in spite of the hard times ahead, the ironic reading tells the audience that space and social relationships are fragmenting and that in the chaos, the government is invoking rhetorics that support policies that protect the interests of capitalists above the interests of “others.”

This research interrogates journalistic rhetoric in order to determine how it re-presents social-spatial relationships of power in the construction of identity. The method of ironic reading is very sensitive to power relationships in understanding how various geographical imaginations of society and space are coded in geopolitical rhetoric. It shows how multiple identities – state as defender of nation/individual as responsible citizen/individual as part of nation versus state as consolidator of power/individual as marginalized worker/individual as isolated in fragmented space – are constructed simultaneously in a single story. The analysis reveals how geographies of difference may be necessarily included in stories which narrate national homogeneity. This example elaborates on one essential part of my proposed methodology while demonstrating the close ties between my theoretical orientation and my application of method. It shows how texts produce a relationship between a narrator and a narratee and how that relationship can be
developed through an interpretive, ironic reading. Through interpretation, the reader can identify codes on space in a geopolitical message about social change in the extra-textual world.

THE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT AND RUSSIA

The Foreign Correspondent as Embodied Fieldworker

Hester Parr (2001) remarked, “it is still unusual for geographers to acknowledge the body and its use as a research tool in geographical research.” Indeed, this study stems from curiosity about the ramifications for representing foreign identity around the journalist’s decision to do fieldwork. By comparing the representation of Russia in stories written from Moscow with stories written from the provinces of Russia, I recognize the body as a research-tool by problematizing the ways in which American foreign correspondents conduct fieldwork in Russia. I am examining the ways that foreign correspondents construct Russia and Russian identity from Moscow, when various, mediated news-feeds are their primary (or even only) sources of data, and when they are in the provinces, collecting data with their bodies in a very different way.

Nairn (1999) used the term “embodied fieldwork” to describe concurrent modes of doing fieldwork, which privilege the hands, the eyes, and the mind (the geography work) and at the same time the body, through the need to walk, eat,
drink, and sleep. That journalistic fieldwork employs bodily interactions other than the cerebral is evident. Consider the following passage from Goldberg (1993a), who has just, according to the article, flown in a helicopter for half an hour deep into the Siberian wilderness:

The picnic table is covered with bread, vodka, smoked fish, wine, ukha [Russian fish soup] and a plate of the Siberian delicacy, stroganino-frozen raw fish, marinated and sliced fine, frightening to eat but delicious. The vodka toasts begin. Ulyanov raises his glass: “To people who live in different countries, in different places, different conditions, but still believe in one thing: in kindness. Let’s drink to people, to love.” There is no hope of taking only a sip of vodka. No excuses. “Here, you drink as much as you’re poured,” Lyutikov says with mock strictness that is not really so mock.

In this example, the body is not only part of the fieldworker’s experience, it is integral to it.

Medical and feminist geographers have been especially concerned with the ways in which the body relates to geography. For instance, Buttimer (1980) and Kearns (1993) argued for a balancing of the “insider” and “outsider” views of deviant bodies insofar as they are objects of inquiry in a reformed medical geography. Dorn and Laws (1994) advocate a reclamation in medical geography of “the body as a site of resistance,” in accordance with previous arguments in geography made by Massey (1991), Jackson (1993), and Rose (1993). And the importance of considering in geography various social-theoretical views on the body goes back to the seventies, when David Seamon (1979) introduced to geography theoretical work on the body by Merleau-Ponty (1962).

Feminist, in addition to other geographers, have critiqued disembodied representations of fieldwork (see Rose 1992b; Rose 1992a; Johnson 1994; Nast
1994; Jones 1995; Longhurst 1997). They pinpoint the privileging of the visual as well as the maintenance of analytical distance for the purpose of hiding irrationality and emotion. Disembodied fieldwork, in other words, disavows that fieldwork takes place in a body. And Nairn (1991, 272) points to the concept of embodied fieldwork as a way to draw attention to how “body work is inserted into geography fieldwork just as geography fieldwork is inserted into body work.” Other feminist geographers who critiqued the production of knowledge as disembodied include McDowell (1989), Harding (1990), and Haraway (1991).

That the body is made political through contested geographic and social processes is evident from readings of the above literature. hooks (1984) specifically argues that juxtaposing insiders’ representations of space against outsiders’ representations of space at various scales is a technique for oppressed people to speak “from the margins to the center, and understand both.” And Massey (1993) indicates that the phenomenon of space-time compression can be manipulated to favor oppressed groups. By linking space-time compression and the body with contested geographic processes, the geographic literature on the body positions me to connect

- **on one hand**, how foreign correspondence from various parts of Russia advocates the interests of geographically and socially diverse groups of Russians, with

---

14 as well as masculine and objective
15 see also Knopp (1992) and Pile (1993)
• *on the other hand*, how the journalist’s body, as a site from which mediated discourses emanate, is positioned inside or outside of Moscow vis-à-vis the political and institutional considerations of the profession of journalism itself.

The concepts of embodied and disembodied fieldwork are relevant to this study, because foreign correspondence from the provinces of Russia is probably as likely to emphasize the embodiedness of the journalist as is foreign correspondence from Moscow is to hide it. This study builds off of the above-mentioned works by participating in geographic research that “[recovers] bodies as both sites for geographical analysis and embodied entities that inform, build, and are intrinsically part of geographical knowledge” (Parr 2001, 158). It participates in the geographic enterprise of “rethink[ing] places as they are contested in embodied social practice” (Dorn and Laws 1994, 108). I create a number of significant opportunities to differentiate between the various textual techniques of constructing Russian identities in American journalism as the foreign correspondent moves around in Russian space. And in doing so, I rethink the social construction of Russia as contingent upon the facility of the foreign correspondent to navigate foreign spaces.
Layout and Description of the Russian Federation During the Reform Period

Because this dissertation analyzes representations of Russia and not Russia itself, it is not especially important to dwell on traditional descriptions of the geography of Russia. However, I will make a small effort to provide some basic background on the political and economic geography of the country in order to prepare the reader for what lies ahead. In addition, this section will familiarize the reader with some terms that are important to the analysis.

The Russian Federation is a multi-ethnic state made up of 87 political-administrative territories, each with its own governor, parliament, and representation in the houses of the federal legislature. The political-administrative status of each territory is designated in one of four ways: oblast, republic, kray, or autonomous okrug. One of the ways in which the designation is significant is that republics, krays, and autonomous okrugs tend to be peripheral regions within the Russian Federation. Oblasts are the core, administrative, political economic category within which most ethnic Russians live. Autonomous Okrugs and Republics may contain significant proportions of ethnically non-Russian peoples. Krays tend to be especially large regions, but

---

16 For convenience I include Chechnya as one of these republics.
17 This does not mean that ethnic Russian do not make up significant proportions of territories of other designations. Stephanie Simon (1992d) reported for instance “Ethnic Ukrainians and Russians make up the vast majority” of the population of Birobidzhan, the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Okrug. Of the population of 87,500 in the city, “only about 4,500 Jews-a negligible percentage of Russia's total Jewish population-live in Birobidzhan.”
that spatial quality may also apply to autonomous okrugs and republics. The sparsely populated Russian North, the North Caucasus region, the long periphery along the Mongolian and Chinese borders, and large parts of Siberia and the Russian Far East are designated as republics, autonomous okrugs, and krays. In comparison, all of the fifty political-administrative units within the USA that carry comparable political power are designated by the label “state.” Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show maps of the political-administrative territories of the Russian Federation. Table 2.1 contains the key for regions too small to contain place names.

Each territory has an administrative center. There are some cases in which a territory, for instance Irkutsk Oblast, shares the same name with the administrative center. In other instances, such as that of Ufa, which is the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the names differ. This information is important to the methods, because when collecting data I searched on both the name of the territory and the name of the administrative center.

According to Shaw (1999), 81.5% of the Russian Federation is composed of ethnic Russians. Tatars, Ukrainians, and Chuvash are all more than 1% of the population. All other ethnic groups, starting with Bashkirs (0.9%), Belorussians (0.8%), and Mordvinians (0.7) account for less than 1% of the total population.

The size of the Russian Federation is over three-quarters that of the former USSR, which makes it the largest state in the world. Shaw (1999) reports
Figure 2.1: Western Russia
Figure 2.2:
Russia East of the Urals
### Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Place Name</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bryansk Oblast</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Mordvinian Republic</td>
<td>Y4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgorod Oblast</td>
<td>E1</td>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Y5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash Republic</td>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>Orel Oblast</td>
<td>A6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanovo Oblast</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Ryazan Oblast</td>
<td>A7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaluga Oblast</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Smolensk Oblast</td>
<td>A8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirov Oblast</td>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>Tambov Oblast</td>
<td>E4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma Oblast</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Tula Oblast</td>
<td>A9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk Oblast</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Tver’ Oblast</td>
<td>A10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipetsk Oblast</td>
<td>E3</td>
<td>Vladimir Oblast</td>
<td>A11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mari-El Republic</td>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>Voronezh Oblast</td>
<td>E5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Oblast</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Yaroslavl’ Oblast</td>
<td>A12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that at 17.1 million square kilometers, it is 70 times the size of the United Kingdom and 1.7 times the size of the United States. Its east-west extent encompasses eleven time-zones, stretching from the Baltic coast of Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland, and the Black Sea territory of Krasnodar all of the way to the Bearing Sea and the Sea of Japan. The climatic regimes of Russia also vary from polar in the north to semi-desert along the Caspian sea and
Mediterranean-like along the Black Sea. In general, the climate of Russia is severe continental, allowing for long, cold winters and short, warm summers.

For the purposes of macro-level political-economic discussion, Russia is divided into eleven major economic regions (see Figure 2.3). The names of these regions easily identify them with physical geographic features of Russia. The largest regions are the three regions east of the Urals: West Siberia, East Siberia, and the Far East. The only region that does not share some border with an edge of Russia is the Volga-Vyatka Region.

The emergence of the Russian Federation as an independent state redefined economic ties with other portions of the former Soviet Union and posed new questions for the ways in which Russians would meet their consumptive needs. This is interesting for the study in terms of how dependencies on foreign interests like governments and corporations are represented. For instance, the dissolution of the Soviet Union impacted the availability of natural resources to Russia. Shaw (1999, 17) writes:

Thus, in the late 1980s, with 51 per cent of the USSR’s total population, the Russian Federation produced only 46 per cent of its agricultural output. The loss of the productive mixed forest, forest-steppe and steppe lands of the Baltic states, Belarus’, Ukraine and Moldova, together with more specialized kinds of production in such regions as Transcaucasus and Central Asia, poses problems for government. This is because...Russia’s agricultural resources are less productive than those further to the west.

However, the case remains that Russia’s endowments of non-agricultural resources, such as oil, gas, coal, and timber, are enormous. Many of these resources within Russia are located in Siberia and the Russian Far East, making
The 11 Major Economic Regions

Figure 2.3:
them more difficult to exploit. For instance, in 1989, Russia accounted for 91% of Soviet oil and gas production, and 67% of total production was supplied by Siberia and the Far East alone (Sagers 1990). Energy exports were particularly important to the Soviet Union, because they provided a means to finance imports of materials and technology that it could not produce (Shaw 1999). It should not be surprising, then, that in addition to dealing with government and economy, representations of Russia construct certain territories as resource-endowed.

Appendix 2 displays a chronological list of political-economic events I extracted from American foreign correspondence from Russia for the period under study. The reader can inspect the table as a way to prepare for the large number of references and articles that I will discuss in subsequent chapters, as well as to obtain a general idea of the major political-economic events that characterized reform in Russia during the 1990s. As the dissertation progresses into the analysis, it will become clearer how individual territories were important to the representation of these events, and new ways of thinking about the representation of Russian places will emerge as well. A short discussion of the significance of the chronology follows based on the articles cited.

Prices for most consumer-goods rose suddenly in early January, 1992 when they were “liberalized” or freed from state control. In Tver’, an oblast in the Central Economic region, for instance, a husband and wife (both medical doctors) were reported on as “earn[ing] a combined monthly salary of 1,000
rubles – a sum that would have been considered princely five years ago. But now it converts to less than $10 a month, making the Hayuts… some of the poorest people on Earth” (Goldberg 1992c). Shortly thereafter, Tatarstan, an oil-laden republic, which in the Soviet Union had little say over the dispossession of its natural resources, declared itself by referendum a sovereign state. One reason for doing so presumably would be to protect its main financial resource (oil), which on the world market rather than at home, would bring a hefty sum. Less than four months later, long lines for gasoline were reported, precisely because producers preferred to sell their petroleum on the world-market. Prices for the distillate in Russia remained controlled and at only one-tenth of what oil would fetch if sold abroad.

By the following year, privatization had begun, and the majority of Russians were still struggling economically. President Yeltsin survived an impeachment vote by the Congress of People’s Deputies, Russia’s upper house of parliament. Still, a slim margin of voters expressed confidence in Yeltsin in a national referendum on him and his economic policies.

Four months after the referendum, the Russian Central Bank suddenly and unexpectedly invalidated all Ruble banknotes printed prior to 1993. Representatives of the bank explained the move as necessary to shore up the value of the currency, which was failing. However, many Russians learning about the nascent banking system lost their cash savings. Two months later,
Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament in a move that was criticized by the Chief Justice of the Russian Supreme Court, Valery Zorkin, as unconstitutional. Many legislators refused to vacate the Russian White House, the analogue to Capitol Hill in the United States, and they received even strong support from some regional legislatures, such as Novosibirsk’s, at the risk of alienating themselves from Russia’s chief executive. Street-fighting involving thousands of Muscovites erupted, and Yeltsin facing (according to those with positions similar to Zorkin’s instigating) a major breakdown of law and order brought in troops and tanks to force the parliamentarians out and regain control of the streets.

The preceding events of almost two years, as fast and furious as they occurred, were capped off by the adoption of a new constitution securing the Russian chief executive broad powers. However, in elections to the lower house of parliament, the party of nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky won the plurality of the vote. That kind of showing meant that Zhirinovsky and his party received half of the seats in the Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, and put him in position to lead that governing body (Bohlen 1993b). This election result set the context for many of the following years, during which President Yeltsin operated with a parliament voicing constant, as well as several Russian regions voicing intermittent if not constant, opposition against him. One foreign correspondent reported:

The strong showing of an ultranationalist extremist in elections for a new Russian legislature is a political earthquake triggered by millions of voters dispossessed, dispirited and disgusted by the changes that have convulsed this
land since the Soviet Union's collapse. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a caustic hard-liner who has called himself a dictator and has said he wants to restore the Russian empire in the boundaries of the former Soviet Union – plus add Alaska, Poland and maybe Finland for good measure – was the big winner in the first multi-party balloting here since the fall of communist rule two years ago. [M]any people blame Yeltsin’s team of young advisers for the economic policies that have brought so much hardship here along with the obvious signs of progress (Hockstader 1993b).

By this time, US investment was trickling into Russia, as is evidenced by a fairly large contract for US West to install modern communication infrastructure in the Rostov area. Business deals did not necessarily stabilize the Ruble, which plunged in October of 1994, accompanying reports that the Russian Central Bank was low on currency reserves. But by June of 1995, at what amounted to an economic summit with delegations accompanying both Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, a $15 billion deal was signed for the development in the Russian Far East of oil and gas fields near Sakhalin Island. And in October of that same year, “nuclear scientists and engineers from Chelyabinsk-70, Arzamas-16, Tomsk-7 and the other closed cities opened a joint public exhibition of civilian projects for which they [were] seeking investors”18 (Hoffman 1995b).

Later in 1995, it was reported that the loans for shares privatization program was running into significant difficulties. The initiative was constructed

18 The Soviet Union implemented a system of closed (off-limits) cities for highly specialized places that were instrumental in its nuclear weapons programs. The names and locations of the cities were even kept secret. The nomenclature here indicates their “proxy” names, which were derived by adding an enigmatic number to the name of a city somewhere in the same general area. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the names of these cities have become publicly known. Tomsk-7, for instance, is now called Seversk. In the 1990s, it became important to the American agenda to see the economic function of these cities transformed to non-military purposes.
as “a bewildering scheme” in which the federal government would trade its shares in companies to private concerns in exchange for loans. “The creditor would take partial control of the [company] for three years. After that transition, it would be free to sell the stock. But the government would claim a chunk of the proceeds – enough to wipe the loan off its books as well as earn a profit.” The program was billed as an incentive for investors to profit by reforming companies through “streamlining” operations. Less than half of the auctions that were planned actually took place, and banks excluded from the bidding process complained that it was fixed. “The rush-rush method is no way to run a privatization program, Alfa Bank President Pyotor Aven declared in a broadcast interview: ‘It takes you several months just to figure out how to sell your apartment, if you do proper market research, and here we are trying to do this all in a month’” (Simon 1995b).

While some aspects of the Russian nuclear program, like the way scientists were awarded contracts, were in open transformation, others were not. In February of 1996, Alexander Nikitin, a former officer of the Russian Navy, was arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service, the successor agency to the KGB, and charged with espionage. Nikitin worked with a Norwegian organization with environmental concerns called Bellona.

Nikitin was accused of handing over to Bellona ‘secret information on the Russian nuclear fleet’ for money, according to a statement issued by the security service in St. Petersburg and published after his Feb. 6 arrest. It said he used his connections among naval officers to obtain the information…The
arrest came after the security agency spent months, interrogating, searching and detaining people associated with Bellona” (Hoffman 1996f).

Bellona published a report in 1994 with specific information about “sources of radioactive contamination around Murmansk and in other areas of the Russian Far North.” The report, entitled *Sources of Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Counties*, indicated that military installations posed the principle risks to the environment there (Efron 1995c; Hockstader 1995a).

In April of 1996, it was reported that a category of entrepreneurs called “shuttle traders” had emerged, who “peddle at a handsome profit the cheap clothing and trinkets they collect on trips to China, Dubai, Turkey and Greece.” Hundreds of thousands of these traders cross the border into China every year. They were imagined as the type of people who would “return Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin to power” (Williams 1996c). Yeltsin indeed won reelection, and in March of 1997 he appointed Boris Nemtsov, a reformist governor from Nizhniy Novgorod, to the position of First Deputy Prime Minister.

By September 1997, the conversion of the nuclear reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk to civilian-use only was receiving considerable bi-national attention from the US and Russia. And in September of that year, Alexander Lebed won the governorship of Krasnoyarsk Kray, an especially vast and well-endowed territory in East Siberia. However, on a single day, a mere one month after the Russian government won $22 billion in credits to support the Ruble, the currency lost a third of its value. The government announced that it was defaulting on its
domestic treasury bills and imposed a 3-month moratorium on international debt service. Again a month later, analysts announced that notwithstanding any major changes in Russia’s economic prognosis, the country would default on “as much as $200 billion in foreign debt – the largest default by any government in history” (O'Brien 1998).

With three collapses in the Ruble in about six years, journalists wonder how Russians keep going. Foreign correspondents report in December of 1998 through the following year that barter makes up over half of the Russian economy. One factory-official remarks “These days only 5% to 6% of [Russia’s] transactions are in real money” (Reynolds 1999c). Meanwhile, President Yeltsin’s cantankerous relationship with parliament continues, with his sacking of Prime Minister Primakov, who enjoyed broad parliamentary support. It was Yeltsin’s third shuffling of the occupants in executive-level posts in 15 months, and the action instigated another impeachment attempt against him by the Duma. Two months later, another naval officer, a Captain Pasko, was released from jail in Vladivostok where he served 20 months based on a court decision around his filming of the process of the dumping of nuclear waste by the Russian navy into the Sea of Japan. One naval official, Vice Admiral Viktor Topilin, chief of the Navy Department of Operation, maintained in 1993 that storage facilities for such waste were full and that there was no money to build new ones (Hiatt 1993f)
Vladimir Putin, hailed as an autocrat who would bring order to Russia, was elected president in March of 2000. That May, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the governor of Primorskiy Kray, was represented as having “taken over private businesses, seized control of the press and judiciary, pumped government budgets dry and, according to Mr. Yeltsin's Kremlin, regularly ignor[ing] federal decrees” (Wines 2000c).

SUMMARY

Modern flows brought on by technological innovation rework characteristics of space and perception. One consequence of modern flows is that the geographies of everyday experience are produced in part by symbolic exchanges that transmit messages about place across vast distances. Local identities are thus made to a new degree by coded interactions with representations of peoples inhabiting other locales that are physically distant yet symbolically proximate. And as a consequence of glocalization, the global amalgamation of physically distant yet socially bound localities, geographies of difference depend more and more on political theatrics and rhetoric and less on physical distances.

Some of the literature in geography evidences how boundaries, how geographies of difference, are produced by texts rather than existing as “separate
and independent entities” (Morehouse 1995, 53). Narrative and the map are similar, in that both are graphic representations that rely on symbolic codes, as well as an agreed upon system for encoding and decoding information, in order to communicate messages between sender and receiver. But insofar as narrative is concerned, metaphor, in addition to other seemingly aspatial devices, is employed in order to express spatial difference. To this end, political and ideological rhetorics on space may suggest that social differences are territorial, rather than admit that they are “determined...by prior social connections” (Sack 1980, 179). This is one of the ways discussed in this chapter that discourses on space are also discourses on power.

This study understands print-journalism as a sort of daily conveyor belt in which the geographies of yesterday are the primary stuff from which the geographies of today are made. As a consequence, the dissertation is interested in how emerging differences within Russia and between Russians and Americans were represented during the first nine years that Russian space was available to capitalistic development. And it strives for a particular awareness of how journalistic representations of space relate or fail to relate uneven geographical development and social heterogeneity to the expansion of capitalism into Russia. The study belongs to a body of other work in geography, for instance by Joanne Sharp (1998; 2000), Aitken and Zonn (1994), and Blunt (2000), which takes the position that territorial differences and identities are firmly grounded in symbolic
exchange over a distance. By taking to task the contesting of future spaces, the
differentiation between “us” and “them”, and the representation of power and
space, all of these works take seriously the changes that the technologies of time-
space converge have wrought on space and society.

This study takes an inductive approach to the analysis of text. The
resulting distinction between “emic” codes and “etic” codes is important,
because by avoiding an a priori classification of the data, I create an awareness
of space in representations that does not exist either in the authoring journalists
or in the statesmen or individuals they quote. I adopted the particular method
used for reading foreign correspondence, called ironic reading, from Chambers’
work (1984; 1991). The mode of ironic reading uses logic to focus on the coded
interaction between the narrative “voice” and the narratee in order to understand
how the author attempts delivery of the message. By reading first casually, which
is a mode of reading highly susceptible to the persuasive powers of rhetoric, and
then ironically, I am able to discover the dynamic of the powered relationship
that exists between narrator and narratee. The work of the chapters in the
dissertation involving analysis of text relies on this discovery in order for me to
reorganize the spatial information in foreign correspondence as etic codes.

Finally, although the dissertation does not assume any background
knowledge in the reader about Russia, the reader should be prepared to encounter
representations of Russia, and my interpretations of those representations, that
deal with government, economics, and landuse. Russia is a multi-ethnic state, with multiple designations for its constituent political-administrative territories. There is some relationship between the designation of the territory and its demographic composition, autonomous okrugs and republics being, all else equal, ethnic territories. However, many of the major events that characterized the reform period in Russia during the 1990s were political-economic in character.
CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY

The methods I used included mapping, analysis of media-text, and interviews with journalists. All chapters incorporated some degree of grounded theory development, but my use of grounded theory was much more intensive for the chapters related to analysis of text than it was for the mapping chapters. Moreover, while a great many articles (more than 2,000) went into the data set that I used for mapping, I analyzed approximately 150 articles intensively for the textual analysis portion of the research. The procedures for collecting data for the mapping chapters were also quite different from the analysis of text, and thus it is necessary to divide this chapter into several parts. The first section deals with the procedures I followed to collect and analyze data for the qualitative, textual-analytic portion of the research. The next portion of the methodology describes the methods I used for mapping. The final section describes how I conducted the interviews, which were relevant to both the mapping and textual-analytic portions of the research.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The methodology for the component of the research that is best classified as qualitative analysis entails three related steps: identifying emic codes through
ironic reading; a Marxist-geographic analysis of those codes to determine how they function as etic codes on space; and, interviewing journalists to interrogate the author behind the narrative “voice.” The steps that I describe here are most pertinent to chapters five and seven, which deal with textual analysis of newspaper articles with Moscow- and non-Moscow-datelines, respectively. However, I also used inductive reasoning to a lesser extent for chapters four and six, which are concerned with mapping. And because interviews also informed my approach to mapping, I will withhold my description of the interview-process until after I have covered the mapping section of the methodology.

Many qualitative researchers agree that data collection, analysis, and writing should be reciprocal actions that inform each other (see Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Tesch 1990; Wolcott 1994). Analysis, rather than being the final stage of the research process, is viewed as part and parcel of data collection (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Different researchers strike different balances between preconceived procedures for organizing and retrieving data versus the imaginative work of interpretation. Huberman and Miles (1994) provide a conceptual model for data analysis which is appropriate enough to the research design that I use it as a framework for discussing this research. Under their conceptual model, there are three connected processes which drive data analysis: data reduction; data display; and, conclusion drawing and verification.
Data Reduction

Analysis is largely an inductive process led by the data themselves (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Tesch 1990; Wolcott 1994). In the process of data reduction, data are summarized and reduced into categories or groups according to either their topics or the conceptual models of the analyst. Identifying important themes and patterns depends on the process of coding, which reorganizes the data so that the analyst can think about them in innovative ways (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Coding distills bulky data into analyzable units through generating categories with and from the data. Strauss (1987) points out that coding is not just about making data more simple but also about opening them up so that the analyst may think about them and interrogate them further. Huberman and Miles (1994) understand etic codes as labels for attaching units of meaning to the information, either descriptive or inferential, collected during the course of a study. Generally, codes are affixed “to ‘chunks’ of varying size—words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting. They can take the form of a straightforward category label or a more complex one (e.g. metaphor)” (Huberman and Miles 1994, 56). Emic codes are used later in the interpretive phase so that inferences can be made (Coffey and Atkinson 1996).

In my study, reading ironically provides the basis for the coding process. The unit of analysis varies in size from a word to a paragraph and is opened up,
after it is identified through reading, to other forms of interrogation. In that next stage, the data can be reorganized in many interesting ways to discover how they relate to the research questions and to each other. Data for my study came from two different sources. Newspaper articles were available electronically through Lexis Nexis. Interviews with journalists were tape-recorded and transcribed, the transcripts providing the operational data source for coding. I used the software QSR NUD*IST Vivo (NVivo) for the coding process itself. The software combines two concepts from which its name derives: first, the concept of “non-numerical unstructured data with powerful processes of indexing searching and theorizing” (QSR 2001) and second, the concept of “in vivo” codes, which are literally emic codes taken from the data sources and informants themselves (Glaser 1978, 70; Strauss 1987, 33).

“NVivo provides a range of tools for handling rich data records and information about them, browsing and enriching them, coding them visually or as categories, annotating and accessing data records accurately and swiftly” (Richards 1999, 4). The software supports a wide variety of utilities for entering and connecting ideas and concepts as well as looking for and investigating patterns within the data. It incorporates many options for linking the various components of a research project, integrating thoughts and stored data, and organizing codes into sets. Its functions include a variety of browsers which enable easy viewing of the documents, links, and sets through which emic and
etic codes are organized. All data files are represented in a rich text format, which means that documents can be coded the “old fashioned way” with highlighting and color coding or using more advanced constructs called nodes which represent more sophisticated links among the data. Nvivo emphasizes versatility so that it does not impose a set research method onto the analysis, and it even treats memos about the data as fully functional data documents themselves. Additionally, the analyst can learn Nvivo during the research process itself, which makes the software available to less experienced qualitative researchers. After coding, the most immediate question is one of gathering data. To which article should I next turn for more data?

**Data Gathering**

“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 45). At the outset of the research process, preconceived data collection procedures can be problematic, because they may occur ahead of theory development. Grounded theory development typically calls for the nascent theory itself to suggest the next steps via emerging gaps in the theory and by research questions inspired by previous answers. It is
advantageous to leave room for unplanned data gathering guided by the emerging theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

In order to develop categories and their properties and relationships, a comparative analysis is used that compares emic codes from different groups of data. Comparison groups provide control over population scope and the conceptual level of categories developed (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In this study, control comes not only from comparing articles written from Moscow with those written with datelines outside of Moscow, but also from gathering articles written by different journalists at various newspapers, gathering articles over a nine-year period, and gathering articles that deal with political-economic issues on one hand and with other cultural topics on the other hand. The basis for stopping the theoretical sampling of one category and moving on to another is theoretical saturation. The researcher knows that the analysis is nearing conclusion when significant saturation of categories in “many groups to the limits of his data has occurred, so that his theory is approaching stable integration and dense development of properties” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 64). Other clues that theoretical saturation has been reached are that no additional data are emerging to develop a category, and the connections between categories are well-established and validated (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

The data for this study, newspaper articles, were gathered from three major, general circulation newspapers in the United States: The New York Times,
The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times. These newspapers have major, metropolitan coverage with extensive foreign bureaus including bureaus in Moscow. Together they represent three of the top five daily newspapers in the United States according to circulation (see Editor and Publisher 2000); however, the news syndicates associated with these papers distribute stories to most other small and medium-sized newspapers in the United States. Data gathering was informed by the fact that historically pivotal or dramatic events are particularly attractive sources of material for journalists (Marshall 2000, personal communication).

The textual-analysis portion of the dissertation included detailed analysis of around 90 documents with Moscow-datelines and over 50 documents with provincial datelines. Although the sample size may seem small, the quantity of cases is not especially important for adequate theory development. This research is designed to develop theoretical categories and to posit empirically grounded relationships between them rather than to test systematically the relationships between those categories. Glaser and Strauss (1967) maintain that one case is enough to suggest a general property or conceptual category, and just a few additional cases can confirm that suggestion.
Data Display

Once data have been coded, it is possible to move back to the “big picture.” It is time to interrogate the data in a systematic investigation in order to manufacture new meanings (Delamont 1992; Coffey and Atkinson 1996). In the data display phase, the data are arranged in a way that permits easy reading. The term “data display” refers to the manner in which data are visualized though diagrams, pictures, or text to show what the data infer. The actual display is a dense, organized construction of information that enables “conclusion drawing” or “action taking” (Huberman and Miles 1994). Data compression comes from the physical presentation in one place of chunks of data that “belong” to a particular code or category. The researcher then investigates the make-up of each coded group.

NVivo supports sophisticated data display as well as modeling functions to represent graphically relationships between categories. It provides a “modeler,” which enables various visual representations of the data such as free-form sketches as well as more formal networks which can represent hypothesis or cause and effect relationships. The modeler supports “live models” with links that support free movement between “model and design, analysis, search, redesign, [and] model revision” (Richards 1999, 145). It also can handle “layered models” which represent stages of discovery, various phases of interpretation, and alternate perspectives on the data. Furthermore, the searching utility
provided within Nvivo allows researchers to ask specific, exploratory questions by specifying the scope of the data to be interrogated as well as the format of the results. For instance, the results can be represented as an etic code or be directed into a table. Nvivo enables a tabular display of document attributes, coding attributes, or search results any time the analyst so desires.

**Conclusion Drawing and Verification**

At this stage, displayed data are interpreted to create new meanings. Various tactics can be employed, from inspecting similar and contrasting cases, using metaphors, and tracing themes and patterns (Huberman and Miles 1994). Dey (1993) recommends various devices, such as dividing categories into subcategories and re-linking them. For Dey, the purpose of codes is to create new “pathways” through the data. It is important to keep in mind that codes are not permanent fixtures; they can be abandoned, altered, re-organized, or renamed. Chunks of data that do not fit should not be disregarded (Delamont 1992; Coffey and Atkinson 1996). Once data are reorganized from codes, they are recontextualized in the research context and may be considered in an altogether new light (Tesch 1990).

From the comparisons stem the inevitability that contexts are actually combinations of the properties of the general phenomenon that are discretely
expressed along their dimensional ranges, forming patterns. As the data are related at the levels of properties and dimensions in addition to at the broad, conceptual level for each major category, the fundamentals of a theory emerge. I validated my theory against the data to complete its grounding by laying it out into memos either with narratives or diagrams. New statements of relationship were then made and validated against the data. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), some cases will not fit exactly, but I traced significant variations in order to locate the conditions that causes them and then built them into the theory. Continual movement between inductive and deductive modes of thought and the constant cross-checking of categories for consistency with empirical data is what makes the theory grounded. The grounded theory approach calls for the analyst to return to the categories to add any missing features in order to maximize the theory's conceptual density and conceptual specificity. As the theory is completed, small, final gaps in the theoretical formulation will emerge and be filled (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

---

19 A dimensional range is a theoretical continuum along which properties of a concept are expressed (Strauss and Corbin 1990). For instance, the concept of protest has various properties such as frequency, extent, intensity, and duration. The context of rioting is distinguishable from the context of civil disobedience, because they are expressed differently along their dimensional ranges. Rioting might be infrequent, geographically discrete, extremely intense, and brief, while on the other hand civil disobedience might tend to be common, geographically widespread, of low intensity, and lengthy in duration.
The two chapters that incorporate mapping as major parts of the analysis are chapters four and six. Chapter four investigates the ways that places are used by journalists in stories with Moscow datelines in order to support journalistic prose. It is centered around the use of place names in foreign correspondence with Moscow-datelines, particularly the incidences of those place names and the meanings that they are used to bring to the storytelling environment. It contains a series of maps which represent the total number of times that place names representing each Russian territory were invoked in order to bring certain kinds of messages, about for instance government, landuse, and economics, to the story. There is one map representing the number of references by stories with Moscow datelines to each territory for each theme.

Chapter six concentrates on foreign correspondence with datelines away from Moscow. The approach to chapter six is similar to that of chapter four in that it uses mapping to represent a geography of foreign correspondence. The main difference, however, is that instead of focusing on the appearance of place names within stories, it focuses on the broader message of each article I collected with a dateline outside of Moscow. Instead of mapping the kinds of messages (again by such themes as government, landuse, and economics) that place names brought to stories, chapter six maps the overall themes around which local places
were constructed on the basis of a reading of the whole article. Chapter six then contains a series of maps. Each map represents the overall frequency at which stories with provincial datelines in Russia were published around a specific theme. Because each theme in chapter 6 is the same as each theme in chapter 4, I create a basis to compare the way places are constructed in journalism from Moscow with the way the same places are constructed when the journalist actually visits them.

Next, I will discuss the 13 themes I used to categorize the data I gathered. Once I have established this important basis for comparing articles written from and away from Moscow, I will explain how I collected and recorded the data I used for chapters four and six. Next I will elaborate how I aggregated my data by territory, theme, and dateline. This second section of the methodology will conclude with a description of how I created two sets of maps, one for references to place in articles with Moscow-datelines (chapter 4) and another for individual pieces of foreign correspondence written away from Moscow (chapter 6).

**Assigning a Theme to Each Observation**

Because I wanted to understand what kinds of messages place names brought into the storytelling environment, the need for categorizing the messages accompanying place names into themes was evident. However, the number of categories or themes that was appropriate, in addition to the titles of those
categories, was not obvious at the outset of the research. I developed 13 etic categories inductively, loosely following the procedures for grounded theory development. In order to do so, I read passages containing place names from stories with Moscow-datelines. In total, I read roughly 30 stories for each of fifteen place names. Those place names corresponded to the following territories: Orel and Tula from the Central Region; Belgorod and Lipetsk from the Central Black Earth Region; the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug, and Primorskiy Kray from the Far East Region; Arkhangel’sk and Vologda from the Northern Region; Rostov from the North Caucasus Region; Chelyabinsk and Orenburg from the Urals Region; and finally, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug from West Siberia. Taken together, these territories fairly represent the North-South and East-West extents of the Russian Federation and vary widely in size. After I was sure that I reached theoretical saturation, I stopped sampling for the purpose of developing the themes and began collecting data in earnest for the purpose of mapping. Table 3.1 lists the thirteen themes to which I ascribed each of my observations as well as descriptions of those themes. Appendix 3 contains some examples of references to place that I ascribed to each category.

---

20 The following section explains how I searched for newspaper articles using place names as search-terms.
Table 3.1: Description of the 13 Themes to which I Ascribed My Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>Any reference to a place explaining some aspect of why that place was invested in the war in Chechnya beyond a simple statement that a military unit from that place was physically in Chechnya counts as an observation about the war in Chechnya.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Civil Society | • Any aspect of society involving not-for-profit behavior or organizations, such as demonstrations, protests, non-governmental organizations, and universities, OR  
                         • Any reference involving the press.                                                                                                                          |
<p>| Culture     | Any reference around a place name having to do with religion; art; cultural norms, customs, or heritage; or multi-cultural society                                                                                       |
| Demographics | Observations that concern differences in the composition of society, like sex, race, or age. If observations incorporated demographic information but constructed an issue as a more wide-ranging social problem, I coded them as Social Issues instead. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>References that deal with the various elective and non-elective offices of governmental officials and the behaviors of those officials, OR democracy, communism, international politics, law enforcement, censorship, and the courts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government and Economics</td>
<td>Joint constructions of political and economic activity. References that deal with privatization or the liberalization of markets, the political environment of business, managed economies, price-controls, and any other aspect of the governmental regulation of the marketplace or the effects of governmental behavior on business activity. The effect of business on politics, especially the presence and influence of particular politicians in government as owing to support from business. the exchange rate of the ruble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>References that deal with production, trade, exchange (including retail and wholesale activity, securities, investment, and barter), banking, and labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Elections | References to elections included any behaviors imagined as pertaining to elections, as far in advance of an election as speculating who might }
be on a ticket, and as late as day-after election reporting on the ramifications and results of the returns. They sometimes mentioned other aspects of political, economic, and social life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Historical references dealt with things that happened before 1992 or put current happenings in the context of historical events. One exception was events relating to nuclear disasters, which I coded as “landuse.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landuse</td>
<td>I coded as “landuse” references that involved all sorts of land-related phenomenon. Examples include agriculture; the storage of nuclear waste and nuclear contamination as well as other types of pollution; the construction of regions as natural-resource areas; earthquakes; land-ownership; and, eco-tourism. Sometimes references also involved economics or sensational issues, like earthquakes, and I had to decide to which theme to attribute them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>I coded references that dealt with violence, the use of force by the police, law enforcement by the military, the detention of foreigners, and issues related to the military preparedness or organization of Russia as “Military”. The major exception is that Chechnya received its own category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensational</td>
<td>References in this category dealt with sudden, unexpected events and disasters. They frequently involved violence(^{21}) as well as natural and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{21}\) when it was loosely or not at all connected with other social forces or factors
anthropogenic disasters and accidents, like fires, earthquakes, and airplane crashes. Sometimes, quite a few stories were dedicated to one event. In some cases, I coded the first, breaking stories as *sensational*, and the subsequent, stories—more in-depth or put in a broader context—as another category. The Sakhalin earthquake of 1995 is an example of an ongoing story which started as *sensational* but later became *landuse*.

| Social Issues | • References to social services like education and medicine;  
|              | • References to social problems like crime and political assassinations\(^\text{22}\); corruption; hunger; poverty; and, alcoholism; and  
|              | • Any reference that emphasized the connections between place and social well-being or social differences in such a way that the relationships between individuals and society or the dream for Russian society was emphasized above other aspects |

Most of the differences between the categories are straightforward, but I will explain the four most confusing categories: government; economics; government and (meaning *conjoint with*) economics; and, elections. I found when developing the 13 themes that an overwhelming number of references had

\(^{22}\) The culture of violence surrounding political figures was oftentimes represented as a systemic, social problem, thus warranting categorization under *Social Issues* rather than *Military*.
to do with government$^{23}$, so I looked for a way to divide those kinds of references into categories that were both meaningful and manageable. First, because elections are really events that decide who belongs to government and are only about what the government is doing insofar as the government is the body that officially holds elections, I decided to make elections a separate category. As the analysis will show, there were enough references to elections so that a category exclusively based on elections could stand on its own merit. However, doing so still left an overwhelming number of references in the category “government,” so it remained necessary to look for another way to divide the category.

I choose further to divide the category “government” into two themes: “government” and “government and economics.” This worked, because since the period of study was the reform period of the 1990s, many observations concerned for instance privatization, decollectivization, the removal of government subsidies from corporate budgets, the exchange rate of the ruble, and new ways in which the economy (including small businesses, agricultural enterprises, and even nascent securities markets) would be regulated by law. It was not clear in these cases, whether to assign observations to the category “economy”—because they were about economic behavior—or to the category “government” on the same grounds, that they were about the behavior of government. So I created a separate category, “government and economics,” to

$^{23}$ All of the themes I am explaining now save economics are about government.
enable the intervention into economic behavior of government as well as the
effects of business-activity on government. In doing so, both of the separate
categories “government” and “economics” remained large, but they became
manageable and meaningful enough not to warrant further division. In any case,
Table 3.1 suggests that these two categories should be large with respect to the
overall population of observations.

Drawbacks to performing a categorical analysis include forcing
observations into categories in which they do not belong as well as constraining
observations relevant to multiple categories to only one category. The prior
drawback is not a significant problem in this research, because I developed the
categories inductively based on the data themselves. The category Government
and Economics is an attempt to resolve conflicts between placing observations
into either the Government or Economics categories at the expense of the other.
Etic codes developed for observations in the Government and Economics
categories overlap somewhat with the other two categories. However, references
that pertained both to social issues and economics were placed in one or the other
category based on the judgment of the analyst. Because of the quantity of
observations in this study, bias resulting from the decision to place observations
in only one category is minimal.
Data Gathering and Storage

I chose to use the Lexis Nexis website, a subscription-based service, to collect electronically all newspaper articles used in this study. The website is available to all San Diego State University students and faculty from a hyperlink on the Article Databases page of the San Diego State University library website (http://infodome.sdsu.edu). I used the tab Guided News Search to enter the search criteria for all of my searches. I always searched on the news-category “general news” and the news-source “major papers.” The website allowed me to specify the range of dates from January 1, 1992 through January 1, 2001. Under the entry for publication titles, I always entered the phrase “New York Times OR Los Angeles Times OR Washington Post” in order to specify that I was only interested in articles from those three newspapers.

At this juncture, the only remaining data necessary for the Lexis Nexis search-engine to function are the search terms themselves. My search for place names related to each territory included a search on the name of the administrative center (capital) as well as on the name of the territory itself. The study relies on this searching strategy in order to develop the measure for the frequency at which a territory appeared in foreign correspondence. It makes the assumption that an insignificant number of references to place within the searched-on articles fail to mention both the region of the territory within which that place is located as well as the name of the administrative center of that
territory. This assumption was necessary in order to make the study manageable. It would have been logistically impossible to search on every place name within a territory in order to develop the measure for the frequency at which the various territories of Russia appeared in the news. I additionally searched on the events in the chronology listed in Appendix 2 in order to ensure broad coverage of geopolitically important moments.

Additional factors complicated the searches. For instance, there are some cases in which a territory, for instance Irkutsk Oblast, shares the same name with the administrative center. In other instances, such as that of Ufa, which is the capital of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the names differ. Furthermore, the Republic of Bashkortostan can also be referred to as Bashkiria. The facility for entering search terms however easily accommodated this problem, by allowing for multiple windows within which I could enter search terms as well as for logical connectors such as “AND,” “OR,” and “AND NOT” to link various search terms. Another complication is that multiple spellings of place names referring to the same place are possible, depending on the particular system used by the individual foreign correspondent to transliterate Russian place names, represented by the Cyrillic alphabet, into place-names represented in English by the Latin alphabet. For instance, “Nizhniy Novgorod” and “Nizhny Novgorod” both refer to the same place. Because “Novgorod” is a separate Russian place, it was necessary for me to search on “Nizhniy” as well as “Nizhny.”
For seven of the 87 territories, either historical circumstances or circumstances related to the name of the territory made search and retrieval untenable. For instance, while Vladimir is an important oblast in the Central Region, it is also a common given name. Any reasonable search on the place name Vladimir returns an error, because the results contain over 1,000 hits, almost entirely on the given name Vladimir. It also did not make sense to search on “Vladimir AND Russia,” because many articles that mentioned a person “Vladimir” also mentioned that “Vladimir” was “from Russia.” So I choose to exclude Vladimir Oblast from the study altogether. Three other territories I excluded were from the North Caucasus Region and resulted either in search-errors or in an overwhelming number of observations, because they were so frequently cited as involved somehow in the war in Chechnya. Chechnya so affected the construction of these Russian places that it should suffice for me to mention them—the Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestan Republics—as overwhelming participants in the imagination of Chechnya and not particularly useful for other aspects of this study. The other three territories for which I did not search were Leningrad, because there were too many observations to manage; Sverdlovsk Oblast, because it was former President Yeltsin’s birthplace, and its involvement in representations of Yeltsin distorted the participation of the region in foreign correspondence; and finally, Moscow itself, because this study
is not concerned with the representation by American foreign correspondents of Moscow when they are away from Moscow.24

Generally only a minority of articles that were returned as part of a search were usable for this study. Because of the study’s exclusive focus on foreign correspondence, and the impossibility of communicating to the search-engine my need to read foreign correspondence only, I visually had to sort through thousands of articles in order to determine if they were eligible to participate. Usable references included all citations for articles written by foreign correspondents with datelines inside of Russia that were not:

- editorials;
- magazine articles;
- published from the Travel Desk, Entertainment Desk, Science Desk, Society Desk, or Book Review Desk;
- citations from Information Bank Abstracts for the Wall Street Journal;
- exclusively film- or chess-related;
- only related to a photograph, list, or table supporting an article;

24 In terms of biases introduced into the study by the decision to eliminate these territories, the place names that were especially likely to occur, particularly those corresponding to St. Petersburg and Chechnya, would have contributed to a skewed frequency distribution of references to place. And overall, the North Caucasus economic region is significantly underrepresented, with three territories missing from the study. The Chechnya category certainly suffered from developing because of the absence of these territories. In addition, the categories Culture, Civil Society, and Government may have been hurt most by the omission of Saint Petersburg. Saint Petersburg is known as an important cultural center away from Moscow that contributes to mainstream as well as to alternative political views.
• obituaries;
• speech-acts of non-prominent figures;
• only including the place name as part of a reference to a military unit in Chechnya from that place;
• people speaking who just happened to be from a particular place; or,
• only using a place name as part of the name of a company, a physical feature, or geographic district (such as a neighborhood or suburb) other than an oblast or administrative center.

Generally, the articles I used appeared in the “A” (World) or “C” (Business/Financial) sections. For example, the full search-criterion I used for the Republic of Bashkortostan was [(Ufa AND Russia) OR (Bashkortostan OR Bashkiria OR Bashkirya)]. While this search returned 75 raw hits, only 32 qualified as usable observations. Appendix 4 lists the names of the 80 territories on which I searched, the names of their administrative centers, the search criteria I used, the total number of hits returned, and the total number of references that qualified as usable.

Lexis Nexis displays the results as an index in chronological order, 25 citations per page, starting from the most recent. Hyperlinks allow the user to move from the index-pages to web pages presenting individual articles. The data on the index page, which include the dateline of each article, usually allowed me to determine quickly if the citation to a particular article would lead to a usable
reference. If the article was usable, I proceeded with transcribing. Transcribing proceeded differently depending on if the article was written with a Moscow-dateline or if it was written outside of Moscow.

_Transcribing Observations from Articles with Moscow-Datelines_

Once in the display-page for an individual article, Lexis Nexis shows in boldface all search-terms that appear in the article. This feature allows for a simple, scrolling-through of the entire article using the “page up” and “page down” keys in order to locate all occurrences of search-terms without having to read the entire article. Once I located the search terms, I read the surrounding pieces of text and recorded the observation either by copying and pasting the sentences in which the search-terms occurred into Microsoft Word or by paraphrasing the sentences so as to preserve the semantic sense in which the place-reference was important to the article. I also kept track of the years of articles in which the various observations occurred. If search-terms for any one search occurred several times in the same article, I made a judgment call about the theme carried by the place-names based on the overall way in which place names were used. And regardless of how many times search-terms for any single search occurred in an individual article, that article could only count as one observation per search.25

25 So hypothetically, an individual article with a Moscow-dateline could account for a maximum of 80 observations, if it contained a place name for every territory that I searched on within the
Transcribing Observations from Articles with Datelines Outside of Moscow

Recording observations from Articles with Datelines Outside of Moscow was significantly more laborious than for articles with Moscow-datelines. In this second case, I was interested in the overall meaning of the article instead of the very limited meaning of an isolated reference within an article. I started the process of transcription by recording in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet the following data about the article: dateline; page on which the article began; the section in which the article occurred; name of the foreign correspondent; sex of the foreign correspondent; whether the article was designated as a “special”; the name of the series in which the article appeared if it was part of a series; the newspaper; the edition of the paper; the number of words; the date; and, the headline. In this manner, I created a detailed reference to every article with a dateline outside of Moscow that constructs a geographical imagination of that place. I did not maintain, on the other hand, bibliographic information for most of the articles represented in the study with Moscow-datelines, simply because the sheer quantity of articles would have made the enterprise prohibitively time-consuming.

Then I proceeded to reading the entire article under consideration. After a thorough reading, I transcribed much larger parts of the article by the same process described above into Microsoft Word. I also recorded information that Russian Federation. However, no matter how many times those place names occurred, this exotic article could never result in more than 80 observations.
linked the record in Microsoft Word with the bibliographic data I stored in Microsoft Excel. Then I decided, based on the careful reading, to which of the 13 themes the article most spoke and recorded that result in Microsoft Word as well. If the decision was especially difficult, I also recorded a second and even third choice, so as not to disregard completely large parts of the message simply for the sake of reducing the article down to one theme. At the end of the transcription, then, I had recorded: large blocks of text in Microsoft Word; complete bibliographic information about the corresponding article in Microsoft Excel; and, a first, second, and third choice for themes to which the whole story spoke.

**Aggregating the Data by Territory, Theme, and Dateline**

While collecting and transcribing all of the usable references to place for each territory, I decided to which of the 13 themes they belonged. I recorded that information in the margins next to the transcribed data. Once I finished searching on place names for all of the territories in a given economic region, the data were ready to be aggregated in a meaningful way. I printed tally-sheets onto which I could summarize with pencil marks the number of references for each territory by theme.


Working with Digital Data

After all of the tally-sheets were filled in, I transferred the corresponding numerical data into Microsoft Excel to enable me to work with them in spreadsheet-format. I aggregated data by economic region in individual sheets. Once the data were in Excel, I summed them using the $\Sigma$ function in order to determine the importance of each kind of observation by dateline as well as the frequency of each theme.

I used IDRISI32 running in a 32-bit windows environment to produce the maps for the dissertation. IDRISI, developed by Clark Laboratories, is a raster- and vector-based geographic information system and provides basic mapping tools. I obtained over the internet internal boundary files of the Russian Federation from the Washington State Geospatial Data Archive. Once I imported the boundaries into IDRISI, I created a spatial database of the variables I mapped using the Database Workshop. I produced the maps using the map composition features.

INTERVIEWS WITH JOURNALISTS

Interviews with foreign correspondents were important for two basic reasons. First, they helped me to develop the textual analysis by allowing me to

---

26 The boundary data were available as .e00 files as well as shapefiles, both common ARC GIS file formats that IDRISI can import. The archive provides oblast- and rayon-level boundaries.
expose nascent results to the scrutiny of writers who actually served (or were serving at the time of the interview) tours of duty in Russia. Interviews with the writers themselves afforded me the opportunity to explore the intentions behind the texts. Secondly, interviews allowed me to better understand the institutional constraints acting on foreign correspondents that caused them to write a disproportionate number of articles from Moscow. Foreign correspondents also provided me with reasons why they left Moscow, what was at risk by leaving Moscow, and how foreign correspondents acted as a team working out of a single bureau headquarters.

I used an ethnographic approach to interview foreign correspondents by telephone. When I selected foreign correspondents to interview, I looked for ones:

- who collectively worked in Russia for the entire period under study;
- about whose foreign correspondence I had questions regarding the accuracy of my etic codes;
- whom I could ask questions regarding Moscow-based stories as well as correspondence with datelines outside of Moscow; and,
- who worked for all three newspapers.

27 http://wagda.lib.washington.edu/data/
Interview questions focused on aspects of the institutional environment of the journalist that affected the location from which the journalist wrote as well as the ways that the journalist encoded messages taken from the Russian context so that an American reader could read them. Sensitivity on the part of foreign correspondents to my categories on the representation of space indicated that I was using data in appropriate ways to draw conclusions. Conversely, a lack of sensitivity or indifference suggested that I reconsider parts of the analysis.

Altogether, I conducted five interviews of journalists from the *Los Angeles Times* as well as one interview with the foreign editor of the *San Diego Union-Tribune*. Appendix 5 contains a list of questions that I asked Carol Williams, a foreign correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*.

Periods of social and economic change that pose problems for traditional theoretical principles or analytical categories are particularly good times to use the corporate interview method (see Schoenberger 1991). The interview format is unstandardized and consists largely of open-ended questions designed to facilitate an understanding of observed behavior (in the case of my research

---

28 Correspondents for neither *The New York Times* nor *The Washington Post* responded to my solicitations, so all of the interviews for the study came from conversations with current and former correspondents for the *Los Angeles Times*.

29 I used my location in San Diego as an opportunity to interview in-person David Gaddis-Smith (2000), who turned out to be an accessible foreign editor. I interviewed him before speaking with any foreign correspondents. I used the interview as an opportunity to get familiar with speaking to newspaper-staff as well as to get an idea of whether bias from foreign editors would be relevant to the study. It turned out that both this particular foreign editor as well as the foreign correspondents I asked agreed that local reading audiences are regarded as primarily American rather than as San Diegans or Los Angeles. Additionally, they agreed that foreign correspondents are given a wide latitude in terms of what kinds of stories they will write.
empirically available texts) with respect to institutional history and other
considerations directly linked to the context of production (Schoenberger 1991).

I formulated questions from collections of newspaper articles written by
individual journalists. I made no attempt to guarantee statistical generalizability,
and the meanings of the questions varied considerably between different
journalists. The goal of the dissertation was to construct a new theory on
journalistic codes as they applied to space rather than to test relationships
between categories that have already been theoretically established. Conflicts,
tradeoffs, historical contingencies, and other factors relating to the production of
the newspaper article as a commodity that affect the author-narrator relationship
were the objects of interest rather than ahistorical or universal categories. And
because existing theory strongly suggests that codes change along with the
changing social formations inherent to the relations of production (implicit in
‘transition’), it was questionable whether a quantitative research strategy which
emphasized replicability, consistency, and reliability would have been useful.
Schoenberger (1991) remarks "the value of its [the corporate interview's]
qualitative and inductive aspects may be highest in periods of great economic
and social change that pose new challenges to the analytical categories and
theoretical principles underlying much quantitative research."

Another reason for open-ended questions is the issue of control.
Journalists are accustomed to being in the position of asking questions, and the
more published and established ones may feel that they deserve a certain level of influence over the interview situation. According to Schoenberger (1991, 182), “The corporate interview is susceptible to problems of control since the likely respondents are people accustomed to being in control and exerting authority over others.” There is a danger that the respondent will attempt to impose her or his own agenda, external to the concerns of the research. The optimal interview, then, would be one in which a “collaborate dialogue” engages the respondent, who helps to fashion the discussion without controlling it. A fixed sequence of closed-ended questions would have called into question the accuracy and validity of the respondent’s answers by placing too many constraints on the interview situation and on the opportunities for the respondent to take advantage of her or his own, highly personalized experiences in answering the questions. The respondent should have some power to guide the direction of the interview given the likelihood that the interviewer cannot know a priori all of the respondent’s concerns.

In terms of interview strategies, the most important is to be familiar with the business of the respondent. It reassures the respondent and gives the interviewer a greater likelihood to control the overall direction of the interview.\textsuperscript{30} It is also a good idea to build checks into the interview in order to assist in evaluating the validity of the answers. The interviewer should be able to identify

\textsuperscript{30} The Moscow Correspondents (Bassow 1988) details much about the lives of American correspondents in Moscow.
contradictions in the respondent’s statements and be willing to ask for clarification or even debate the most controversial points. Combining general questions with specific ones helps to guarantee that the conversation has not closed topics prematurely and gives the respondent room to suggest alternative lines of reasoning. Finally, a “meta-interview”, or discussion which wraps up the interview, can help insure that the interviewer has drawn the right conclusion about the respondent’s statements and that any potential misunderstandings have been resolved (Schoenberger 1991). All interviews were transcribed and coded in NVivo to enable links and structures between interviews and articles.

SUMMARY

This study examines foreign correspondence on Russia from the *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *Washington Post*, three of the top five daily papers in the United States by circulation. It employs grounded theory, a research method in which data collection and analysis inform each other, and the result is a mid-range theory in which statements are validated against the data themselves. Etic codes assigned by the analyst to the data are reorganized in way that expresses relationships between the data that are not obvious through emic codes alone. In this study, ironic reading is the interpretive method that provides the basis for the coding process. The method was chosen because of its flexibility at
understanding foreign correspondence as both serious and lampooning and its
approach to language as constructive of power relationships that favor certain
forms of knowledge over others. Control comes from the use of two comparison
groups, foreign correspondence either from Moscow or from the provinces, as
well as from the incorporation of foreign correspondence by many journalists
over a number of years.

This study uses the qualitative research software NVivo, which provides
facilities for the automated storage, retrieval, display, and analysis of textual
data. The visualization tools supplied by NVivo allow for extensive comparisons,
linking, and reorganization of etic codes necessary for the process of theory
development and testing. The dissertation also employs mapping as a way to
understand the importance of different Russian regions to foreign
correspondence, either through references to place in stories written from
Moscow or through fieldwork in the various Russian provinces themselves.
Finally, it uses a limited number of interviews in order to balance interpretation
of journalistic texts with statements from foreign correspondents as well as to
understand the reasons why Moscow accounts for such a disproportionate
number of datelines.
CHAPTER 4 - REFERENCES TO PLACE IN STORIES WITH MOSCOW-DATELINES

This chapter is about understanding the ways in which newspaper articles written exclusively with Moscow datelines relied upon Russian place names outside of Moscow as part of storytelling. It explores the journalistic usage of Russian places distant from the journalist at the time of writing by interrogating American foreign correspondence for the participation in meaning-making of the many Russian territories outside of Moscow that are politically and spatially analogous to US-states. It uses mapping as a primary tool and relies on data provided by the Lexis Nexis Academic Universe website, which allows for advanced searches on newspaper articles. All of the search-terms I used were place names in Russia outside of the Moscow-region. I regard, as the two major components of the narrative-roles of each Russian territory, the frequency with which a territory appeared between stories as well as the topic around which that territory was constructed.

By measuring the frequency with which a territory appeared between stories, I did not treat as special the cases in which a place name on which I searched occurred more than once in the same article. If for instance Tula is a search-term, and the word Tula appears three times in an article with a Moscow dateline, the study weighs the appearance of the search-term Tula the same as if that place name had appeared only once in the article. Such is the case when the
maps in this chapter represent the frequency at which various Russian place
names occurred in stories with Moscow datelines. Of course, an individual
newspaper article can generate more than one hit (reference) if it employs
several, different, searched-on place names outside of Moscow. Additionally,
multiple occurrences of a single search-term in an article did influence the topic
around which that territory was constructed. If a search-term occurred several
times, I made a judgment call about the topic carried by the place name based on
the overall way in which the place name was used. Two points should be made
clear early on, however. First, this chapter is not concerned with the raw,
numerical usage of territories outside of Moscow in stories with Moscow
datelines. Secondly, individual articles are represented in my data set once for
every instance in which a place name corresponding to the name of a discrete
territory—or the administrative center of that territory—appeared at least once in
that same article.

I would also like to make clear at this point that I ascribed to every
observation one of thirteen themes, depending on the essence that the reference
to place contributed to the story, as outlined in Chapter 3. Those topics were
Chechnya; civil society; culture; demographics; government; economics;
government and economics combined; elections; history; landuse; military;
sensational; and, social problems. If the narrative was about privatization, for
instance, but a reference to Irkutsk mentioned a polluting paper-mill, I ascribed
to the observation the topic of landuse. I did so, because in the example the reference constructs Irkutsk as a place where landuse issues, and not necessarily issues related to privatization, are a problem. Another way to think about this example is that the place Irkutsk is used to deliver to the story a message about landuse, and the reference to Irkutsk would count the same in the study regardless of any interpretation of the overall thrust of the story. The contribution of Irkutsk to the story is landuse and not government or economics, and this chapter is precisely about the way places are used, employed, exploited, marshaled, and conjured up by foreign correspondents in order to support journalistic prose.

Chapter 4 is organized into three major sections. First, I present a macro-level discussion of foreign correspondence about Russia based on country-wide maps across all themes. Then, I move into a geographically finer discussion about place, driven by a series of maps, which shows the spatial distribution of observations for the most frequent themes. This is the most lengthy discussion in the chapter, in which I investigate they myriad ways in which space was coded in the journalistic use of place names. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the results from the first two sections with an eye toward the overall study. It finds that particular place names arise with specific issues and that space is coded in a variety of ways in conjunction with the use of place names.
MACRO-LEVEL FINDINGS

Of the 80 political-administrative territories within Russia for which I collected and analyzed data, the top seventeen territories accounted for 56.0% of the references to articles in which search-terms appeared (Table 4.1). All but one of the eleven major economic regions of Russia, the Central Black Earth region, finds representation in at least one of these seventeen territories. Figure 4.1 shows the total number of articles with Moscow-datelines in which occurred the searched-on place names for each territory. The most significant territories for references in news-stories are shaded black. Primorskiy Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, and Tatarstan Republic, comprising only 5% of the regions in the study, are the most frequently observed territories, accounting for references to 402 articles, or 21.4 percent of the total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
<th>Most Important Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>Gov-Econ (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society(17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Elections (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landuse (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>Most Frequent Topics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Government (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economics (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Government (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chechnya (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov Oblast</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Military (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensational (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk Oblast</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Government (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensational (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landuse (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Gov-Econ (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensational (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelyabinsk Oblast</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Military (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landuse (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Society (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Government (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elections (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk Oblast</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Government (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Culture (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Elections (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov-Econ (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk Oblast</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Sensational (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Social (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chechnya (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Elections (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomsk Oblast</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Landuse (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk Kray</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Sensational (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Government (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1051</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1
Figure 4.1: Moscow-Datelines by Region

1876 Total Observations

Legend:
- X: 0-7
- 0: 8-15
- 1: 17-30
- 2: 35-63
- 3: 87-115
Twenty-four references stood between Tatarstan and the fifth most significant territory, Rostov. The next block of references is tightly clustered, including Rostov (63), Murmansk (61), Sakhalin (61), and Chelyabinsk (60). These four territories accounted for 245 references (13.1%), with Chelyabinsk nine references away from the ninth most significant territory, Samara. The frequency distribution of references from Samara on down to the regions which were not referenced at all is fairly smooth.

These data indicate a number of things, the first of which is that in general, all of the economic regions of Russia have a territory that stands out in the news. For the nine year period under study, Saratov Oblast, which figured least prominently of the seventeen places in Table 4.1, was referenced in articles with Moscow datelines at a mean rate of once every three months. Overall, the above seventeen places were mentioned in the news at a mean rate of 2.2 times per week. Primorskiy Kray, which was the most frequently mentioned Russian region in the news, appeared on average about once every month. Additionally, only one of the top four most frequently referenced regions was an oblast. This indicates that physically peripheral or ethnic regions may even show up as place references at a rate that exceeds that for other, seemingly more central regions.

It is interesting that territories in the Central Region as a whole (excluding Moscow of course) figured little in constructing Russia. Tula is the only territory from the Central Region that appears in the top seventeen regions,
and it does not occur until fourteenth. Primorskiy Kray, Krasnoyarsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Tatarstan, Rostov, Murmansk, Sakhalin, and Chelyabinsk together, although widely separate geographically, account by themselves for over a third of the references to articles in which searched-on place names appeared. This indicates that the news coverage of Russia was not at all straightforward in terms of which regions made it into the news and why. Figure 4.1 suggests a complicated pattern in terms of the how various Russian regions are present in the news. In order to understand better the spatial patterns involved in the regional construction of Russia in the news, I aggregated the data by economic region. Table 4.2 shows the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2 indicates that the vast and sparsely populated regions of Russia which lie east of the Urals (Siberia and the Russian Far East) exerted an enormous influence on the construction of Russia

31 The phrase “reference to an article in which a searched-on place name appeared” is an exact expression of how articles qualified for the set of data I constructed; however, it is a tedious phrase to reoccur. I will use the terms “qualifying reference” or “observation” interchangeably to mean this from now on.
during the period of time under study. While these regions together account for a very large proportion of the total area of Russia, they are home to only roughly a quarter of the population (Shaw 1999). In the news, however, these three regions account for 38% of the total qualifying references (QRs, or references that passed the selection-criteria outlined in Chapter 3). Furthermore, the three lowest-ranking economic regions combined resulted in 275 observations, about the same as the whopping 267 observations accounted for by the Volga Economic Region and quite a few QRs below the 324 to regions in the Russian Far East. Overall, the total numbers of qualifying references for each economic region seem to occur in four distinct clusters. These clusters are mapped in Figure 4.2.

Examining the data from the bottom rather than from the top also yields some interesting observations. Table 4.3 shows the 37 territories, about 47% of the total number of regions for which data were collected, that each account for less than 15 qualifying references. These regions account for 248 observations altogether, or 13.2% of the total. In other words, the 37 least-likely to occur place name-pairs (a territory and a corresponding administrative center) representing territories outside of Moscow in foreign correspondence with Moscow-datelines, about half of the regions in the study, don’t even account for 15% of the total number of qualifying references. These 37 territories included: 9 of the 10 autonomous okrugs; 12 of the 18 republics; none of the five krays; 15 of the 45 oblasts; and, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. The autonomous okrugs thus
Figure 4.2: Observations by Economic Region
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th># of Refs.</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th># of Refs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evenki AO</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Buryat Republic</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi-Permyak AO</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kabardino-Balkar Republic</td>
<td>N. Caucasus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mari-El Republic</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kaluga Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adygeya Republic</td>
<td>N. Caucasus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kostroma Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aga-Buryat AO</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Karacheyevo-Cherkess Republic</td>
<td>N. Caucasus</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryak AO</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Penza Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ust’-Orda Buryat AO</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tver’ Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gornyy Altay Republic</td>
<td>W. Siberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mordvinian Republic</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Oblast</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tyva Republic</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taymyr AO</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khakassia Republic</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanty-Mansi AO</td>
<td>W. Siberia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Udmurt Republic</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipetsk Oblast</td>
<td>Central B.E.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vologda Oblast</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nenets AO</td>
<td>North</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Belgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Central B.E.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Autonomous Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kalmymkia Republic</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirov Oblast</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Komi Republic</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chita Oblast</td>
<td>E. Siberia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Orel Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamalo-Nenets AO</td>
<td>W. Siberia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Orenburg Oblast</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tyumen’ Oblast</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3
played very little role in constructing Russia from Moscow, while the krays were particularly important. The lower two class intervals in Figure 4.1 correspond to these regions.

I now move into the discussion of the most significant themes, highlighting for each of the themes the most important territories contributing to the construction of each theme. Table 4.4 shows the overall distribution of observations for each theme. Fifty-six percent of the qualifying references fell among five of the 13 themes: government, elections, government and economics, landuse, and economics. It is interesting to note that economics occurred at the same rate as social issues, when economics apart from state intervention is considered as a separate category. Because elections is really a special category for government, all of the top four categories but

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Economics</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landuse</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensational</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Issues</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4
landuse are directly related to either government or economics. Furthermore, QRs that deliver sensational messages occur at slightly higher rates than do QRs about military, economics, and social issues. This result means that QRs that convey sensational meanings compete significantly with QRs that have more substantive meanings.

As it turns out, the topics in which this dissertation is most interested match up with the four themes that occurred at rates above that of the sensational theme, in addition to the economics category. Those five themes account for fifty-six out of every one hundred observations and are the subject of the next section.

A MAP-BY-MAP DISCUSSION OF FIVE THEMES

This section looks at each of the five most important themes for this study: Government, Elections, Government and Economics, Landuse, and Economics. The ongoing development of spatial etic codes as well as maps of qualifying references for each territory structure the discussion. For each theme, I make general observations and discuss some of the references for each of the territories represented by the top two of five class intervals. Etic categories appear in boldface to help the reader maneuver through the references I discuss.

---

32 Because references to landuse were overwhelmingly defense- and nuclear-related, all five of the top categories were actually connected to government and economics.
The first theme that I cover in this section is Landuse. Although Landuse is not numerically the most significant theme for references to place, it is an appropriate starting point for this discussion. Landuse competed with other themes for QRs, because oftentimes specific landuses were involved in references ostensibly about other themes. The contested aspect of land made it less likely for a reference that involved land to fit purely into the landuse category.

For example, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug had five references in the Landuse category. These references pertained mostly to the physical presence of enormous natural gas deposits underneath the Yamal Peninsula. Another reference ended up under the Government and Economics theme. I quote an extended version of that reference here:

Gazprom is Russia's largest company, but it is much more. It has become a state within a state. The company's influence is felt across international frontiers, at the highest levels of authority in Moscow and out across the vast Siberian expanses. By some estimates, it ranks second in the world among companies in the amount of its profits, and supplies a quarter of Western Europe's natural gas...Gazprom, hungry for investment capital to build a $ 40 billion pipeline from the Yamal Peninsula in western Siberia to Europe, makes no secret of its outsize importance to Russia's economy. “What's good for Gazprom is good for Russia,” says the company's publicity. Chairman Vyakhirev said recently, “Anybody who comes to power is going to have to manage to live with Gazprom, because without Gazprom they won't manage to live at all.”

(Hoffman 1995c)

In the above example, the land corresponding to the Yamal Peninsula is loaded with political and economic meanings by virtue of the construction of Gazprom as “a state within a state.” Theoretically this makes perfect sense, because as writers like Lefebvre have asserted, space is imminently political. The
consequence is that landuse is somewhat of a problematic theme. On one hand, it is interesting to geography to find out how landuse in a strictly physical-geographic sense is represented in the media. On the other hand, the conventional conception of landuse fails to address the politicization of land. Sticking purely to the traditional conception of landuse in this study risks losing sight of the richly coded connections that land and territory have with the representation of social and cultural phenomena. Therefore, I develop the theme of Landuse first, understanding it in a traditional sense, and then explore the other themes with the idea that space is constructed in them in more subtle ways.

Landuse

Figure 4.3 shows the frequency of observations by Landuse. The top five territories cited all occur in Table 4.1 and account for 67 (42.7%) of the 157 references. Table 4.5 shows the five most important territories. The mean frequency that all territories appeared in landuse references is 1.96.

Significant Territories for References to Landuse

Tomsk

All of the 22 landuse references for Tomsk involved nuclear-related landuse issues. They dealt with the shutting down of nuclear reactors (Gordon 1997b; Gordon 1997c; Dobbs 2000); switching military-use reactors
Figure 4.3: References by Theme
(Moscow-Dateline)
over to strictly commercial applications (Williams 2000b); the production of too much plutonium in Tomsk (Williams 1996b); the security of the plutonium in Tomsk (Shapiro 1995c); nuclear pollution (Shapiro and Suplee 1994); building an installation for the storage of plutonium; explosions at nuclear facilities (Dobbs 1993d; Dobbs 1993a; Goldberg 1993f; Rupert 1993a; Goldberg 1997); and finally, Tomsk being off-limits to foreign journalists. The references fell into the categories **Radiation danger** (13); **Defense conversion** (6); **Production and storage of nuclear materials** (2); and, **Land as isolated** (1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tomsk Oblast</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chelyabinsk Oblast</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Murmansk Oblast</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5

**Krasnoyarsk**

16 of the 19 landuse references for Krasnoyarsk involved the shutting down of two reactors there used to produce weapons-grade plutonium (see *The Washington Post* 1992; Goldberg 1993d; Gordon 1996; Dobbs 2000) or other issues related to the production and storage of plutonium (for instance Dahlburg 1992b; Shapiro and Suplee 1994; Agence France-Presse 1999; Miller 2000), including nuclear accidents. They included 8 **Defense conversion** QRs (for
example Shapiro 1992a); 6 Production and storage of nuclear materials QRs (see Efron 1995d); and, 2 references to Radiation danger. There was one Land as isolated QR (Hiatt 1994f) as well as two Other specific impacts and uses references, including the formation of the Sayano-Shushensky nature reserve (Hiatt 1994h) and an aluminum factory (Gordon 1999f).

**Chelyabinsk**

Similarly, the thirteen landuse-QRs for Chelyabinsk were about nuclear-related issues. Seven Radiation danger references dealt with a reactor explosion at Chelyabinsk, nuclear landuse, and contamination (see for instance Dahlburg 1992b; Boudreaux 1993b; Dobbs 1993d; Rupert 1993a). Three Production and storage of nuclear materials QRs involved the importance of Chelyabinsk for the production and storage of plutonium (see Shogren 1992c; Gordon 1998e). And two Defense conversion references concerned the redevelopment of Chelyabinsk-70 (see Kempster 1992; Goldberg 1993d). One Land as isolated reference dealt with a visit by Putin to the closed city of Snezhinsk, once called Chelyabinsk-70 under Soviet nomenclature (Dixon 2000b).

**Murmansk**

Six of the seven landuse references for Murmansk (Radiation danger) dealt with nuclear pollution in the north from Russia’s pacific fleet and the risks
of storing dozens of decommissioned submarines with reactors still not disassembled (see Reuters 1996a; Paddock 1998e; Paddock 1999b). An additional Other specific impacts and uses reference mentioned a nuclear-powered icebreaker that leaves from Murmansk on leisure Arctic cruises (see Efron 1995b).

Primorskiy Kray

Four of the six references to landuse in Primorskiy Kray dealt with ecological disaster, including:

- **Radiation danger** (3): two QRs dealing with the dumping of nuclear waste into the sea between Vladivostok and Hokkaido because of full storage facilities (see Hiatt 1993f; Sanger 1993) as well as one reference to the radioactive contamination of undersea soil because of a catastrophic accident onboard a nuclear submarine (Hoffman 1998g); and,

- **Other specific impacts and uses** (1): one reference to an earthquake on Sakhalin Island (Associated Press 2000b).

The other two references involved **Production and storage of nuclear materials**. They mentioned a new site “to safeguard the highly enriched uranium used in Russian Navy nuclear vessels” at Vladivostok (Wines 2000f) as well as

---

33 Two mentioned the arrest of Nikitin and the raiding of Bellona’s offices in Murmansk by Russian security agents.
another reference that the disposing of fuel from decaying Russian nuclear submarines was a problem for submarines that could not endure towing to proper facilities (Wines 2000e).

### Classes of Qualifying Reference by the Theme of Landuse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radiation danger</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production and storage of nuclear materials</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense conversion</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specific impacts and uses</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land as isolated</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Summary

The nuclear legacy left over by the Soviet Union much dominated the Landuse theme. Table 4.6 shows that 62 of the 67 landuse references discussed here, nearly 90 percent, were related to the weapons-production legacy of the Soviet Union. Within those 62 references, half were related to the presence of high-levels of radiation (Radiation danger). The remaining half of the QRs was split evenly between Defense conversion and Production and storage of nuclear materials.

It is interesting that more QRs did not occur for the presence of natural resources, like for instance timber, fish, oil, natural gas, and diamonds. Because natural resources were used to construct territories as politically or economically advantaged or special, references that dealt with these natural resources ended up in other themes. Yet the codes Radiation danger, Defense conversion, and those pertaining to hazardous, weapons-related materials all contribute to the
spatial etic category **Landed Identity**. This hierarchically broader category includes codes that pertain to factors intrinsic to land or landuse which play a formative role in the imagination of regions or regional problems. **Landed Identity** is the first of several spatial etic codes that describe how foreign correspondence used placenames to construct spatial meanings, in this case one in which the represented environmental impacts of hazardous materials created long-term risks for spaces that fundamentally changed the geopolitical significance of those spaces and constrained or affected future development. I will build on the code **Landed Identity** when I discuss the Government and Economics theme. Now, however, I turn to the theme of Government.

**Government**

References to place for Government concern wider spatial and political contexts of regional governments; the implications of central authority for regional governance; and, the non-elective promotion of regional officials to Moscow. This includes the exercise of regional power against central authority or in support of it, involvements of political parties, and the use of spaces outside of Moscow by federal authorities and the extension of federal power into those regional spaces. Conversely, there is a lack of attention in these references to regional jurisdictions themselves, as they exist on their own merit. In other words, references from Moscow to government that involve the Russian
regions portray regional spaces as both regional and federal and deliver messages almost entirely about the contradictions and alignments bound up in that dualism.

Figure 4.4 shows the frequency of observations by the theme of government. The eight most frequently observed territories, all of which occur in Table 4.1, account for 40% or 128 of the 318 QRs. The Bashkort Republic accounts for eight observations and is the most frequently occurring territory not listed in Table 4.1. Table 4.7 shows the 16 territories with seven or more observations. The mean frequency that all territories appeared in governmental references is 3.98.

Government was the largest theme in terms of the quantity of QRs, and three spatial etic codes were informed by such references to place. They included the Delegation of Political Power, Staging, and the Fragmentation of Political Power. The following discussion is organized in order to make the presentation of these codes as straightforward as possible.

Significant Territories for References to Government

Nizhniy Novgorod

Nizhniy Novgorod, with 33 qualifying references, shows up as the most frequently relied upon territory by foreign correspondents to deliver messages about government. It helped to develop all three spatial etic codes which related to the Government theme, and it is also a good example of the coding of core-
Figure 4.4: References by Theme
(Moscow-Dateline)
Thirteen references, which I coded as Core-periphery, filling of federal posts, involved Yeltsin’s appointment of Boris Nemtsov, the “telegenic” and “charismatic” former governor of Nizhniy Novgorod, to the position of deputy prime minister (see Stanley 1996d; Gordon 1997g; Gordon 1997a; Specter 1997c; Williams 1997h; Williams 1997l; Gordon 1998f; Williams 1998c). 34 Two other Core-periphery, filling QRs mentioned both Sergei Kiriyenko and Nemtsov as members of Yeltsin’s cabinet from Nizhniy Novgorod (Hoffman 1997e), and still three more dealt with the appointment by President Yeltsin of “little-known” Kiriyenko to the position of Prime Minister (Stanley 1998a). So altogether, an impressive eighteen QRs dealt exclusively with Core-periphery, filling! And Nizhniy Novgorod is another example of a region for which one specific issue predominated.

---

34 The place seems to make it into the news because of the politician. Nizhniy Novgorod is prominent in the news, because Boris Nemtsov is prominent in the news.
The Core-periphery, filling category falls under the spatial etic code Delegation of Political Power.\textsuperscript{35} The Delegation of Political Power deals with several concepts, which rely on the geographic apportionment of space, including: the coded importance of local or regional political success in order to make national office; the use of place to maintain political power or prominence; and, territorial factors affecting the outcome of an election. The category thus constructs place as a seat of political power or as a stepping stone for vertical political moves, and it relies on the geopolitical relationship between jurisdictions formed at distinct spatial scales. No additional lower level etic codes within the Government theme contribute to the Delegation of Political Power. However, Krasnoyarsk, Samara, and Primorskiy Kray contributed seven additional Core-periphery, filling references to its development.\textsuperscript{36}

Codes from QRs to Nizhniy Novgorod also contributed to a second spatial etic code, Staging. Staging involves territory in politics by linking place with visits and vocalized messages from political figures, thus connecting political agendas and place. The category constructs space as a platform for political behavior and as an object of political desires. Staging includes lower

\textsuperscript{35} Another core-periphery observation for Nizhniy Novgorod involved the regional legislature denouncing Yeltsin’s 1993 disbanding of parliament. I coded it as Provinces involved in federal executive-legislative power struggle, and it did not contribute to the Delegation of Political Power spatial code.

\textsuperscript{36} The references to Krasnoyarsk dealt with Governor Lebed as a potential successor to Yeltsin, while the references to Samara involved the promotion of former mayor Oleg Sysuyev into President Yeltsin’s cabinet.
level etic categories from both the Government and Elections themes. The Government theme included two of these categories: **Place as stage** and **Visiting diplomats**. Two **Place as Stage** references involved visits to Nizhnii Novgorod by President Yeltsin, who commented on the army as well as visits of heads of states to the provinces (Williams 1997p). Another **Place as Stage** QR involved former General Secretary of the Communist Party Gorbachev (Schmemann 1993b). A **Visiting diplomats** references involved President Clinton answering questions from a studio audience in Nizhnii Novgorod.

A final observation for Nizhnii Novgorod, this time contributing to the spatial etic code **Fragmentation of Political Power**, was a **Regional autonomy** reference to industrial regions like Nizhnii Novgorod producing a lot of draft-dodgers (Gordon 2000d). The **Fragmentation of Political Power** involves territorial or administrative divisions in national space because of intrinsic characteristics of territory that result in spatial heterogeneity. It relies on political actions that find their basis in those differences and challenge or divide federal authority. Hence, because draft-dodging was attributed to a particular kind of land use (industrial), it is included in the **Fragmentation of Political Power** spatial etic code.

Other QRs to Nizhnii Novgorod were unsuitable for organization into higher level spatial etic codes. They included four references to **Party politics**;
three references involving Nemtsov prescribing various types of action (What to do); two QRs to Between party conflict; and, a reference to Political coalitions.

Thus far, I have introduced four of the six spatial etic codes developed in the analysis. The following bullets help to outline where the chapter is in that development. Shaded text indicates codes not yet introduced.

- Landed Identity
  - Radiation danger, Defense conversion, weapons-related materials processes
  - Privatization, Territory as Resource Pool

- Delegation of Political Power
  - Filling of federal posts
    - Yeltsin ousting, Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset, Place as non-participant

- Staging
  - Place as stage, Visiting diplomats
  - Staging support, Place as battleground

- Fragmentation of Political Power
  - Regional autonomy
  - Ethnic republic

- Protecting Regional Economy

- Place as Nexus

I will return to this “map” periodically to remind the reader of the progress in the chapter. No additional spatial etic codes are introduced under the Government theme, and the rest of the work for this theme shows how administrative units with a significant number of QRs under government either arise in relation to a
small number of issues or contribute to the conceptual specificity and density of the spatial etic codes already introduced.

**Tatarstan**

Tatarstan, with 19 qualifying references, is the second most frequently relied upon territory by foreign correspondents to deliver messages about government. It was constructed as a “would-be nation” (Hiatt 1992b); “one of the most militant of the ethnic republics in asserting its independence” (Schmemann 1993g); compared to Chechnya in pressing for its independence (Williams 1997m); and, as a place offered “regional autonomy” (Schmemann 1993g). Altogether, 14 of the 19 references for the territory fell under the code **(Core-periphery, regional autonomy).**\(^{37}\) It is clearly one of the most significant cases for the imagination of a region that received special attention from Moscow in terms of its political status within the Russian Federation. And it contributed heavily to the spatial etic code **Fragmentation of Political Power.** Moreover, I coded three additional QRs involving the construction of Tatarstan as a special, ethnic republic as **Core-periphery, ethnic republic** (Dahlburg 1992c; Schmemann 1993g). These QRs also buttressed the **Fragmentation of Political Power** spatial etic code. Two references I coded as **Political coalitions** did not contribute to any spatial etic code.

\(^{37}\) Two of these references included the coded reaction of Tatarstan to a proposed confederation of Russia with Belarus. One QR indicated that Tatarstan wanted the same economic and political
The fifteen references to Krasnoyarsk were dispersed over a large number of sub-themes. Three Core-periphery, regional autonomy QRs dealt with the issue of Russian territories confederating or somehow forming their own republics (Goldberg 1993b; Rupert 1993c; Schmemann 1993a). Three Core-periphery, filling of federal posts references dealt with the possibility that Lebed, as governor of Krasnoyarsk, was a potential successor to Yeltsin (Hoffman 1998b; Wines 1998a; Reynolds 1999b). And two Visiting diplomats QRs incorporated a summit in Krasnoyarsk between Presidents Yeltsin of Russia and Hashimoto of Japan (Hoffman 1997i; Williams 1997q), while another Visiting diplomats reference involved the potential inspection of a nuclear-project in Krasnoyarsk being inspected by the US Ambassador to Russia. Four references that did not contribute to any spatial etic codes were split between Strange politics, power vacuum, statements by Governor Alexander Lebed regarding the lack of executive power in the absence of Yeltsin, and Federal executive-legislative, actions of parliament, Governor Lebed commenting in his capacity as a member of parliament that Russia’s top prosecutor Skuratov would have to be ousted (see Paddock 1998g; Bohlen 1999e; Dixon 2000c). Another observation, in which an advisor to the Krasnoyarsk government stated that regional leaders understood that they needed a functioning federal power, status as Belarus should the confederation be realized (Wines 1999d).
belonged to the spatial etic code **Provinces Caught in Middle** (Erlanger 1993b). I will discuss this code next, in the section about Novosibirsk. Overall, however, eight of the fifteen references to government in Krasnoyarsk somehow involved Alexandr Lebed.38

---

**Novosibirsk**

Twelve of the fifteen QRs for Novosibirsk dealt with the involvement of the regional executive and legislative branches in the 1993 feud between President Yeltsin and parliament, thus overwhelmingly constructing Novosibirsk as a place name that arose in the context of that power struggle. These QRs involve *Core-periphery* relations and count toward the spatial etic code **Provinces Caught in Middle**, because they imagine federal and regional jurisdictions together and posit regional territory and political power as socially constructed vis-à-vis the interpersonal relations between a president and a legislature in opposition to him (see for instance Efron 1993a; Erlanger 1993h; Hiatt 1993i). Furthermore, the intervention of regional power in the federal dispute involved the reproducibility of federal political power. The spatial etic code is unique to the history of Russia in the early reform-period, however, and does not help in the generalization of other etic codes. Two *Place as stage*

---

38 One reference, ten days into Putin’s administration, constructed Alexander Lebed as a “political powerhouse in [his] own right” (Reynolds 2000c). This construction, which from Moscow emphasized solely regional authority, was unique.
references involved Gorbachev and an agrarian party leader giving speeches in Novosibirsk.

Murmansk

Five out of the fourteen QRs for Murmansk involved law enforcement actions around the Nikitin trial and Bellona (see for instance Efron 1995c; Bohlen 1999d). Murmansk was thus a place that brought the issue of environmental activism and law into the news, although Law enforcement did not inform any of the spatial etic codes. Additionally, three Place as stage references involved the cancellation of a visit by Yeltsin to Murmansk because of health-related reasons (Erlanger 1995b; Hockstader 1995d), while three other Place as Stage QRs involved Yeltsin making angry comments in Murmansk about President Clinton failing to “consult with the leaders of other countries...before allowing the attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan to go ahead” (Bennett 1998a; LaFraniere 1998d). Two Provinces Caught in Middle QRs dealt with a deputy from Murmansk saying that the sides in the federal power struggle were looking for support in the locales. A last QR dealt with a Norwegian diplomat in Murmansk being thrown out on the grounds of spying (Visiting diplomats) (Service 1998).

---

39 One of these QRs dealt with the release of a detained Greenpeace ship (Simon 1992c).
Primorskiy Kray

Primorskiy Kray, like Murmansk, made it into the news around the issues of environmental activism and law. Six of the thirteen references dealt with Law enforcement: the arrest of Pasco, his trial, his imprisonment, or his release (see Paddock 1998c; Bohlen 1999d; Gordon 1999b). Three Visiting diplomats references concerned a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Vladivostok in the context of the withdrawal of Bosnian troops from Sarajevo (Efron and Parks 1994; Hiatt 1994c; Williams 1994b). Three Regional autonomy references dealt with a declaration of the parliament of Primorskiy Kray “turning its resource-rich strip of the Pacific Coast into a republic, with greater rights and lower taxes” (Goldberg 1993b; Rupert 1993b; Schmemann 1993a).\textsuperscript{40} And finally, a Filling of federal posts QR concerned the possibility of “an emergency regime in economic centers like...Vladivostok” because of the danger associated with organized crime (Reuters 1994).

Other Provinces

The Bashkort Republic, Saratov, and Samara had between 8 and 10 QRs each. The Bashkort Republic was usually referenced (6 out of 8 times) with

\textsuperscript{40} Of these three references, one emphasized Primorskiy Kray as resource-rich, one characterized it as militarily and economically important, and one focused exclusively on the issue of sovereignty.
Regional autonomy QRs (for example Schmemann 1992c; Schmemann 1992d; Boudreaux 1993a), while references to Samara and Saratov were spread more thinly. However, I coded three of the nine QRs for Saratov under the lower level etic code I just introduced, Passing of laws at regional level, because they involved the territory legalizing prostitution and real estate (see Williams 1997i; The Washington Post 1998b). Three of the ten QRs for Samara involved Filling of federal posts, because they mentioned the promotion of the former mayor of Samara, Oleg Sysuyev, into Yeltsin’s cabinet (see Gordon 1997g; Hoffman 1997g). Other QRs for these regions generally reinforced the spatial etic categories I already introduced, which just a few aspatial observations, like Party politics, formation of new party; Party politics, efficacy of parties; and, Law enforcement showing up. And finally, of the seven administrative regions with seven QRs, five of them were dominated by five or more references around a single issue.

Summary

References to place with respect to the theme of government were dominated by core-periphery interactions (see Table 4.8). 79 out of the 138 references to government that appear in the above discussion involved core-periphery relations, including Provinces Caught in Middle. The next most significant group of observations was the aspatial references, with 23 of the 32
QRs distributed between Law enforcement and the routine operation of political parties. Visits by Russian politicians and foreign diplomats accounted for 25 more observations. Regional autonomy, Passing of laws at regional level, and Ethnic republic combine for a total of 36 QRs, indicating that challenges to federal authority by the provinces accounted for the greatest proportion of references to place. The filling of federal positions with regional leaders and the involvement of the regions in President Yeltsin’s 1993 debacle with parliament also figured quite prominently. In the prior case, place is constructed as a stepping stone or as an arena in which politicians prove themselves before promotion, with the roles of regional politicians in the latter case informing promotion or ousting by President Yeltsin. Furthermore, it is interesting that visits to the regions by outside Russian politicians were significant yet only slightly more so than those by foreign diplomats.

\[41\] includes one case of Yeltsin ousting a regional-level official

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-P, Regional autonomy</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-P, Filling of federal posts[41]</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-P, Provinces caught in middle</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place as stage</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visiting diplomats</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party politics, Political coalitions, Between party conflict</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-P, Passing of laws at regional level and Ethnic republic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other aspatial etic codes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8
Certain territories stood out as predominantly referenced in certain ways. For example:

- 22 out of the 33 QRs for Nizhniy Novgorod involved Boris Nemtsov;
- 17 of 19 QRs coded Tatarstan as a place where regional autonomy was important. Such was also the case with Bashkortostan, for which 6 out of 8 references involved regional autonomy;
- 12 of the 15 references to Novosibirsk constructed it as involved in Yeltsin’s dispute with parliament or taking an anti-Yeltsin stance;
- 6 of 13 references to Primorskiy Kray involved Pasco; and,
- 6 of 14 references to Murmansk involved Nikitin, Bellona, or environmental activism.

This trend suggests that the bulk of citations for each territory occurs around only one or two issues. Thus over time, reader’s impressions of the regions from Moscow may be reinforced by similar reporting.\(^{42}\) Samara and Saratov, for example, were the only territories discussed that lacked an especially powerful influence from any one factor.

The following chart shows the development of the etic codes related to space up to this point:

- Provinces Caught in Middle
- Fragmentation of Political Power

---

\(^{42}\) This is not always the case. In the case of Novosibirsk, for instance, Yeltsin’s widely-reported on dispute with parliament was confined to 1993.
• Regional autonomy, Ethnic republic

• Staging
  o Place as stage, Visiting diplomats
  o Staging support, Place as battleground

• Delegation of Political Power
  o Posts (filling and ousting by Yeltsin)
  o Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset, Place as non-participant

• Landed Identity
  o Radiation danger, Defense conversion, Production and storage of nuclear materials, Land as isolated, Other specific impacts and uses
  o Privatization, Territory as Resource Pool

• Protecting Regional Economy
  o Passing of laws at regional level
  o Withholding money from center, Separate currencies, Export authorization, International financial assistance, Interruption of service

• Place as Nexus

Elections will fill out the Staging and Delegation of Political Power etic codes.

Elections

Regions were constructed, through the appearance of place names in the news, as feeding elections with political candidates as well as spaces where the tensions of reform were expressed through local voices and voting behavior. Territory was imagined as an object of seduction, and in a sense, regional spaces were constructed as discrete classrooms in which politicians were challenged to
make sense of recent political and economic history. Elections were identity-forming events, as voters and politicians alike struggled to reconcile past losses and hardships with the prospects of the future. And territory functioned as the social basis for opposition to and reinforcement of the status quo, with regional boundaries fragmenting the political landscape. Election-related public appearances (stagings) provided an important forum for meaning-making about reform and provided for a survey of attitudes towards reform and reformers. Elections thus were processes that told American audiences what Russians were thinking about reform while simultaneously disturbing those same thoughts.

Figure 4.5 shows the frequency of observations by the theme of elections. The top five territories cited, all of which occur in Table 4.1, account for 35% or 80 of the 230 references. The Chukchi Autonomous Okrug and Kemerovo Oblast account for eight observations each and are the most frequently referenced territories not in Table 4.1. Table 4.9 shows the 12 territories that account for six observations or more. The mean frequency that all territories appeared in references about elections is 2.88 times for the period under study.

**Significant Territories for References to Elections**

**Krasnoyarsk**

A great many of the 23 election-related observations involving Krasnoyarsk relied on Alexander Lebed, and they contributed most strongly to
Figure 4.5: References by Theme

Elections

(Moscow-Dateline)

Managing the ticket includes representations of the actions and conditions necessary for a candidate to support a bid in an election, for instance Lebed’s declaring his candidacy, running, and being too busy to run for president. The other Managing the ticket references concerned the removal of candidates who were running from Krasnoyarsk from Zhirinovsky’s slate (Gordon 1999g); a hypothetical, election-time alliance between Zyuganov and Luzhkov against Lebed (Hoffman 1998e); and the reduced chances of Lebed running in the 2000 presidential election because of the cooption of his political style by Vladimir Putin (Paddock 2000a). Managing the ticket references support the spatial etic code Delegation of Political Power,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tula Oblast</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chukchi AO</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kemerovo Oblast</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Perm' Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Volgograd Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.9

43 Other issues for this etic code include the health of a political candidate, withdrawal from a race, election-time alliances, and the composition of a ticket.
because they are social constructs resulting from the political apportionment of space.

Another lower level etic code, **Election day mechanics**, covers references to place that represent what happens on an election day, like voters showing up at polls, the tallying of results, and polls opening or closing. As direct constructs of the political apportionment of space, they also contribute to the spatial etic code **Delegation of Political Power**. References to **Election-day mechanics** included Lebed winning the 1998 election for the governorship of Krasnoyarsk as well as Lebed’s brother winning a gubernatorial election in a neighboring region (Bohlen 1998a; Hoffman 1998f; Paddock 1998b; *The Los Angeles Times* 1998; Agence France-Presse 2000). Another **Election-day mechanics** reference mentioned a lack of support in returns for Putin in Krasnoyarsk (Wines 2000a).

After **Managing the ticket** and **Election-day mechanics**, **Staging support** was the third most common type of election-related reference for Krasnoyarsk.\(^{44}\) **Staging support** references included a mentioning of Zyuganov stumping in the region in addition to four references to Yeltsin campaigning in Krasnoyarsk and speaking about Grigory Yavlinsky, a high-profile reformer to whom Yeltsin offered the position of Deputy Prime Minister (Hockstader 1996a; Specter 1996a; Stanley 1996h; *The New York Times* 1996; Williams 1996i).

\(^{44}\) Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, and Staging support accounted respectively for seven, six, and five QRs.
Staging support contributes to the Staging spatial etic code and includes QRs that involve public displays by candidates in support of electoral campaigns.

The remaining five QRs were split between two etic codes. One Place as asset, entryway QR involved Lebed using Krasnoyarsk as a springboard for the presidency, while two more mentioned a factory chief from Krasnoyarsk running against a Moscow-favored candidate for a Federation Council seat (see for instance Goldberg 1994f; Gordon 1998a). This lower level etic code covers references that construct political or economic positions in places as gateways for higher political office and informs the Delegation of Political Power. Finally, two references constructed Krasnoyarsk as a Battleground, one explaining that political arguments broke out in public in Krasnoyarsk after a visit by Zyuganov (Hockstader 1996e) and the other detailing Krasnoyarsk as highly contested space in a runoff election battle between Lebed and Valery Zubov, which attracted strong backing and attention for both sides (Williams 1998g). Place as battleground is an etic code that deals with the unusual concentration of attention to a territory during an election and informs the spatial etic code Staging as an instance in which the outside focus on election-time activity sharply brings a region into the news.

The representation of Krasnoyarsk is an interesting case, because as the most referenced territory for the Elections theme, every one of its 23 QRs helped to build the spatial etic codes related to the theme. The five etic codes that it
contributed and the ways in which they helped to build spatial etic codes are shown in the following bullet-diagram:

- **Staging**
  - Staging support, Place as battleground

- **Delegation of Political Power**
  - Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset

Another territory that received attention during an election because of former General Lebed was Tula.

**Tula**

Lebed was involved in almost all of the election-related references to Tula, which was his home-region. For instance, four *Place as entryway* references as well as one *Managing the ticket* reference occurred in 1996, prior to his campaigning in Krasnoyarsk.\(^{45}\) These QRs involved Lebed’s running for and winning a seat in Russia’s lower house of parliament from Tula (Hoffman 1995a; Stanley 1995a; Stanley 1995b; Hoffman 1996b; Williams 1996g). After Lebed won the seat for the Russian parliament in Tula in 1996, a *Place as battleground* reference mentioned that Tula would be a place where Yeltsin would have trouble in the next election (Specter 1996b).

Most of the other references involved a bizarre election drama, set up by Lebed’s vacating the Tula seat after Yeltsin appointed him to the position of

\(^{45}\) Two additional *Managing the ticket* references involved speculation that Lebed would run for the governorship of Tula (see Williams 1996d).
national security advisor. As it turned out, Yeltsin sacked a man, General
Korzhakov, who served as his bodyguard. Korzhakov subsequently pursued the
same parliamentary seat in Tula left vacant by Lebed. Lebed’s open support of
Korzhakov, at that point one of Yeltsin’s political adversaries, was regarded as
scandalous and ultimately resulted in Yeltsin dismissing Lebed from his
administration. Ten references were related to this fiasco: six Staging support
(Hoffman 1996k; Reuters 1996b; Stanley 1996e; The Washington Post 1996;
Williams 1996f); one Managing the ticket (Stanley 1996a); and three Election-
day mechanics (Bennett 1997b; Gordon 1997e; Hoffman 1997d). Finally, a
Corruption QR, which did not inform a spatial etic code, involved a candidate
removed from the ballot by a court-ruling that found he illegally paid voters by
having them register as campaign workers.

Tatarstan

The lack of participation in Tatarstan with respect to low voter turnouts,
failure to participate in referenda, and failure to field enough candidates in
national-level elections\(^{46}\) accounted for eight QRs. I coded these QRs as Place as
non-participant (see Shapiro 1992b; Boudreaux 1993f; Boudreaux 1993c;
Dahlburg 1993c; Efron 1993d; Erlanger 1993a; Schmemann 1993e). Place as
non-participant informed the spatial etic code Delegation of Political Power

\(^{46}\) These tendencies were connected to Tatarstan’s status as an ethnic republic, natural resource
endowment, or other special physical and demographic features.
simply by indicating areas that either threatened the results of referenda or did not contribute to elections by failing to allot power through voting.

The other seven QRs were scattered among several categories. Those of which that could be integrated into spatial etic codes included:

- **Election-day mechanics**: Tatarstan as a whole voting heavily for Zyuganov (Boudreaux 1996b);
- **Provinces caught in middle**: the potential for “separatist tendencies” to be stirred by a referendum during Yeltsin’s struggle with parliament (Bohlen 1993g); and,
- **Staging support**: Putin campaigning in Tatarstan at a planting festival (Tyler 2000c).

Other etic codes covered Corruption and scandals, First person testimony of a resident of Tatarstan about Putin, and two references to Coalitions.

**Nizhniy Novgorod**

Most of the twelve electoral references for Nizhniy Novgorod had to do either with Boris Nemtsov or Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin in Nizhniy Novgorod was reported on twice in Managing the ticket QRs regarding whether he would seek a third term as president (Gordon 1997f; Hoffman 1997h). One Election-day mechanics reference posited whether people vacationing from Nizhniy Novgorod during an election would reduce the vote for Yeltsin (Williams 1996a)
and another involved Nemtsov’s “handpicked successor” in Nizhniy Novgorod winning an election (Williams 1997e).

Two Staging support references concerning Nemtsov located him in Nizhniy Novgorod putting up billboards (Hoffman 1999c) and warning that “a communist win could threaten all that had been accomplished” and turn Russia into a North Korea (Hiatt 1995a). A final Staging support QR mentioned Putin filming an interview in Nizhniy Novgorod (Gordon 2000c).

Three Corruption and scandals QRs dealt with Nemtsov castigating Lebed for campaigning for the presidency while Yeltsin was still alive (Williams 1996d); Nemtsov’s office in Nizhniy Novgorod being occupied by Zhirinovsky as a campaign stunt (Goldberg 1994b); and a scandalous mayoral election in Nizhniy Novgorod (Williams 1998h). There were two other QRs in which members of the electorate expressed opinions (First person testimony) that as well did not fit into any spatial etic code.

Kaliningrad

Two of the five Election-day mechanics references for Kaliningrad involved reports on the success of Putin and the commander of the Baltic fleet in elections (Reuters 2000b; Wines 2000a). Another Election-day mechanics QR dealt with an opponent to the Kremlin-supported candidate winning (Williams 1996e). The final two QRs drew attention to the Baltic province as the site of the
polling stations at the extreme western end of the 93,000 polling places in Russia (see Specter 1996d; Wines 1999e).

Anti-Yeltsin rhetoric was reported in Kaliningrad in a **Staging support** QR (Bohlen 1993f). Four other **Staging support** QRs involved Yeltsin’s opposition meeting in Kaliningrad; Yeltsin catching a cold while campaigning in the Kaliningrad region (2); and, a “visibly exhausted” Yeltsin campaigning there as well (see for instance Hoffman 1996a; Williams 1996j). A final, aspatial reference (**First person testimony**) indicated that many people interviewed outside of polling stations chose to vote for Yeltsin in the 1993 presidential election (Dobbs 1993b).

**Summary**

Table 4.10 shows the distribution of QRs between the election-related categories. Most of these references dealt either with **Staging support**, **Election-day mechanics**, and **Managing the ticket**. **Staging** accounted for a much higher proportion of the observations for Elections (25%)
than for Government (10%). These results aren’t particularly surprising, and it is noteworthy that the code **Place as Battleground** emerged in this analysis as one way in which external attention concentrates on locales. It was not such an important way in which places were imagined in stories from Moscow about elections, but it nonetheless influences the understanding of election-related stories from the provinces. And while political coalitions were reported on for Elections as for Government, aspatial references for elections were much more likely to focus on either corruption or individual testimony of Russians about government.47

Krasnoyarsk, where Alexander Lebed served as governor, and Tula, where he was born, both made it into news stories largely because of Lebed himself. Tula was also referenced on its own seven times because of a carnivalesque election involving a bodyguard sacked by Yeltsin. Additionally, insofar as political personalities bring places into the news, Boris Nemtsov takes the lion’s share of the credit for bringing Nizhniy Novgorod into stories. Tatarstan showed up as an ethnic republic in which voter participation and separatist tendencies were problems. And while Kremlin-backed candidates were constructed as having support in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave was mostly

47 It is worthwhile to note that the study selectively considered acts of voicing as spatial. When voicing had to do with the navigation through space of Russian, federal-level politicians, I considered reporting of the speech-act as a spatial phenomenon. However, I did not consider as relevant to space those instances in when foreign correspondents simply reported on what individuals were saying in their home regions.
represented as opposing Yeltsin. Kaliningrad’s geographical distinctiveness as the Westernmost territory of Russia also influenced its representation.

At this juncture, with the Economics and Government and Economics themes yet to be discussed, the spatial etic codes are developed as follows:

- **Provinces Caught in Middle**
- **Fragmentation of Political Power**
  - Regional autonomy, Ethnic republic,
- **Staging**
  - Place as stage, Visiting diplomats, Staging support, Place as battleground
- **Delegation of Political Power**
  - Posts (Filling and Ousting), Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset, Place as non-participant
- **Landed Identity**
  - Radiation danger, Defense conversion, Production and storage of nuclear materials, Land as isolated, Other specific impacts and uses
  - Privatization, Territory as Resource Pool
- **Protecting Regional Economy**
  - Passing of laws at regional level
  - Withholding money from center, Interruption of service, Separate currencies, Export authorization
- **Place as Nexus**
  - Trading hub; Securities and bonds; Organization of productive capital, exchange, and labor

The next section, which discusses the Economics theme, will fill out the spatial etic code **Place as Nexus**.
Economics

Most of the place-references to economics had to do with the coming together, maintenance, and dislocation of economic facilities and practices. The represented economic practices—such as joint-ventures and international contracts; the exchange of securities and bonds; and, barter—crossed established political boundaries as profit-motivated firms connected with each other in interesting ways. New contracts and patterns of ownership influenced the production of commodities made significant through references to place from Moscow, particularly expression of ownership which geographically separated the possessors of productive capacity from its physical manifestation in space. And references to place indicated that foreign correspondents were interested in the establishment of new business connections and practices insofar as they constituted the core of reform from an economic perspective. At the heart of this journalistic attentiveness was the focus on factories and firms as sites where organized productive capacities came together in order to create commodities. This perspective gives rise to the spatial etic code Place as Nexus as a way to understand the representation of productive activity.

Figure 4.6 shows the frequency of observations by the theme of Economics. The top seven territories cited, all of which but Krasnodar occur in Table 4.1, account for 41 of the 138 references or 29.7% of all economics references. Table 4.11 shows the seven territories that account for five
Figure 4.6: References by Theme
(Economics - Moscow-Dateline)
observations or more. The mean frequency that all territories appeared in economics references is 1.73.

**Significant Territories for References to Economics**

**Nizhniy Novgorod**

References to Nizhniy Novgorod weren’t dominated by any one issue and helped to develop two new lower level etic codes:

- **Organization of labor**: a man from Nizhniy Novgorod being deported from Moscow for looking for work there (Swarns 1996), and

- **Organization of productive capital, dismantling**: the declaration of bankruptcy for the Lazur military-industrial factory (Shapiro 1994b).

Nonetheless, a third of the QRs for Nizhniy Novgorod involved vehicle-manufacturing industries (which were also coded as important for Tatarstan):

- **Organization of productive capital, existing, operation**: a company in Nizhniy Novgorod retrofitting Volga cars with foreign engines (Lakhman 1997);

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rostov Oblast</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tomsk Oblast</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.11

---

48 This category informs the spatial etic code **Place as Nexus**, because it formulates where employed and unemployed reserves of labor accumulate.
• **Organization of productive capital, existing, new contracts**: Fiat deferring the start of a joint-venture project (Banerjee 1999b); and,

• **Securities and bonds**: a reference to a Siberian aluminum plant buying a controlling stake in a bus factory in Nizhniy Novgorod (Tavernise 2000d).

Other references that supported already introduced codes involved Coke, the franchising of a Russian snack company, bustling cheese shops, and the construction of a new hotel and business complex (see respectively Hiatt and Shapiro 1995; Knobel and O'Dell 1995; Jones 1997; Banerjee 1999a).

So thus far, the development of etic codes which informed the spatial etic code **Place as Nexus** looks like this:

- **Place as Nexus**
  - Organization of productive capital
    - formation, existing (new contracts, operation)
    - dismantling
  - Securities and bonds
  - Organization of labor
    - Wage arrears
  - Organization of exchange
    - trading hub, retail outlet, barter, smuggling

**Primorskiy Kray**

References to Primorskiy Kray were focused more on exchange than for the other regions, including:
• two **Organization of exchange, trading hub** QRs: a place where traders gather (Tavernise 2000c) and a hub where Japanese cars are dropped off (Uchitelle 1992a);

• one **Organization of exchange, retail outlet** QR: a deal for the construction of a supermarket in Vladivostok that went sour during the final stages of construction (Hockstader 1996b); and


One **Securities and bonds** QR dealt with Far Eastern Shipping of Vladivostok attempting to raise money by selling shares to investors (Stevenson 1994b). A **Organization of productive capital, formation** reference represented Coca-Cola opening four plants in Vladivostok to the tune of $116.5 million (*The New York Times* 1997).

**Tatarstan**

Half of the observations for Tatarstan were **Securities and bonds** QRs, covering the sale of bonds by the Kamaz truck factory (Bloomberg News 1998); an entrepreneur going to Tatarstan to “snap up” shares in oil companies, mines and utilities (Andrews 1997a); and, expectations of an oil company called Tatneft to default on a Eurobond (Hoffman 1999a). Two **Organization of productive capital, formation**
capital, formation QRs related to vehicles involved comments released by General Motors regarding when production would begin at the automobile plant under construction in Tatarstan (see The Los Angeles Times 1995). Lastly, one Organization of productive capital, existing, operation QR mentioned an existing plant in which Chevrolet Blazers were made (Lakhman 1997). These observations deal with new networks of trade and production that traverse Russian national space and internationalize Russian production and production-related decision-making. They contribute to the construction of uneven development by bringing to the forefront those areas which are recipients of investment and attention from foreign financial interests. And that attention focuses on specific locations, where productive forces, manifested in communication networks and individual factories, agglomerate. It is exactly those spatial concentrations, and the financial networks which support them, that bring places into the news. Hence, all of the lower level etic categories here inform the spatial etic code **Place as Nexus.**

**Krasnodar**

Krasnodar had three Organization of productive capital references, including two operation QRs to meat and candy factories cutting production “because warehouses were full of goods that consumers couldn't afford” (see The Los Angeles Times 1992) and one new contracts, for a snack-making company.
striking a franchising deal with a firm in Krasnodar (Hiatt and Schneider 1993). One Securities and bonds QR mentioned Philip Morris taking percentages in factories in the Krasnodar region (Hiatt and Schneider 1993), while a final observation, which I coded Organization of exchange, trading hub, constructed Krasnodar as an important hub in informal urban trading networks.

The Other More Frequently Referenced Territories

References to Krasnoyarsk, Rostov, and Tomsk contributed three QRs to Trading hub and two QRs to Organization of labor, including

- one article about nuclear scientists and another about travel agents from Tomsk going to Moscow to improve business practices (Stanley 1994; Hoffman 1995b);
- Krasnoyarsk being a popular place for shuttle traders (Hiatt 1994d);
- the intentional mismanagement of the oil company Tomskneft which resulted in layoffs of tens of thousands of workers (O'Brien 1999); and,
- a worker from Rostov continuing to show up at work after not having been paid for months (Hoffman 1996j).

Two new and interesting issues arise here. The first is a reference to Rostov in which an electric distribution station discontinued power to an air traffic control center, which I coded as Interruption of service (The Los Angeles Times 1994). The cutting off of electrical service is a forceful way for regional
energy authorities to confront federal consumers with non-payment and thus informs the Protecting regional economy spatial etic code. And a reference for Krasnoyarsk explained that a tire company relied on barter, a kind of Organization of exchange, for nearly all of its transactions (Andrews 1997b). Articles from the provinces go into detail about interregional barter networks.

Two Organization of productive capital, existing, operation references constructed Siberia as an important place for metals processing, representing Krasnoyarsk as a major aluminum producer (Banerjee 2000a). Rostov was constructed as an important place for telecommunications contracts in two Organization of productive capital, formation QRs with Qualcomm winning a contract there to build a cellular telephone network as well as Coke building a plant there. An additional Organization of productive capital, formation QR involved Coke opening a plant in Krasnoyarsk. Moreover, a Organization of productive capital, new contracts reference involved a venture for US companies to provide cellular phone service, cable television and other communications services in the Rostov area (see for instance Stevenson 1994a). Finally, an interesting Securities and bonds reference explained that because privatization occurred so quickly, “there are no stock certificates or tradable paper in Russia” resulting in the need for potential investors in Moscow to travel to Tomsk to buy shares in the large oil company Tomskneft (Erlanger 1994b).
Finally, a Retail outlet reference mentions the availability in Tomsk of condensed milk for the first time in twenty years in 1993 (Dahlburg 1993a).

Summary

References to the formation of productive capital outstripped those to the dismantling of productive capital in Russia by a margin of 8 to 1 (see Table 4.12). And overall, emphasis on the formation of productive capital, new contracts for existing firms, and exchanges of securities and bonds that empowered outside interests to make changes in production in Russia outnumbered references to the operation of existing plants 19 to 6. This indicates a strong tendency in place references from articles with Moscow-datelines to report on new business activity rather than simply the distribution and operation of existing facilities.

Furthermore, what companies were doing contractually was almost as significant as what companies were doing physically in terms of the act of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Productive capital formation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities and bonds</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation of existing productive capital</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading Hub</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New contracts for existing factories</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of labor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail outlet</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interruption of service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantling of productive capital</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.12
fabrication itself.\textsuperscript{49} It would seem then that much of the interest of the American foreign correspondent from Moscow in Russian places has to do with where formal agreements are being made to do economic things and how American and other foreign interests interface with Russian spaces. On one hand, it confirms empirically the existence of a certain curiosity in print about the way economic Agreements would be made in Post-Soviet Russia. On the other hand, it raises questions with respect to how progress in Post-Soviet Russia was imagined, particularly in terms of how contingent progress was on foreign involvement.

References to place overall occurred for stories involving large American interests like Philip Morris, Coca Cola, Qualcomm, and General Motors, as well as the Italian Fiat Corporation. This implicates foreign interests, particularly those of American financial concerns, fairly strongly in the construction of Russian place along economic lines. The data raise other questions as well, especially about the ways in which Russian place names make it into American foreign correspondence without doing so on the coat-tails of foreign-based economic ventures.

One reference, the one involving the Far Eastern Shipping Company of Vladivostok, pointed to a Russian firm actually soliciting foreign investment. The references involving ownership dealt with the sale of bonds to foreign

\textsuperscript{49} Had US-datelines been included in the analysis, company news notes would have pushed the announcement of contractual information and building plans well above references to production itself.
interests most strongly. They also involved messages about the general problems associated with the exchangeability of securities in Russia, which are important to domestic as well as to foreign interests. And there was one reference about a Russian firm probably defaulting on a Eurobond, also an interaction with a foreign party. Most significantly, however, the code Trading hub was as common as the other two codes for the Organization of exchange combined (Retail outlet and Barter). Where people and things came together was a significant focus, be it a factory, a communications network, or a trading center.

At this juncture, with the Government and Economics theme remaining to be discussed, the spatial etic codes are developed as follows:

- Provinces Caught in Middle
- Fragmentation of Political Power
  - Regional autonomy, Ethnic republic
- Staging
  - Place as stage, Visiting diplomats, Staging support, Place as battleground
- Delegation of Political Power
  - Posts (Filling and Ousting), Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset, Place as non-participant
- Landed Identity
  - Radiation danger, Defense conversion, Production and storage of nuclear materials, Land as isolated, Other specific impacts and uses
  - Privatization, Territory as Resource Pool
- Place as Nexus
Organization of productive capital (formation, existing, dismantling); Organization of exchange (trading hub, retail outlet, barter); Organization of labor; Securities and bonds

Smuggling, Wage arrears

Protecting Regional Economy
- Passing of laws at regional level, Interruption of service
- Withholding money from center, Separate currencies, Export authorization

Now I turn to the Government and Economics theme to finish the development of the spatial etic codes in the chapter.

**Government and Economics**

This theme deals with the interactions between economic and political life in Russia. Many of the references consider territory to be “in process” and focus either on social organization or the fragmentation of the political and economic landscape. While government and economics are considered to be changing, the working of government are made specific and economic circumstances are clarified through an elaboration of the role of the government in production.

Figure 4.7 shows the frequency of observations by the theme of *Government and Economics*. 52.1 percent or 110 of the 211 references are accounted for by the top eight territories cited (a mere ten percent of the territories in the study), all of which occur in Table 4.1. Table 4.13 shows the
Figure 4.7: References by Theme (Moscow-Dateline)
eight territories that account for six observations or more. The mean frequency that all territories appeared in governmental references is 2.64.

**Significant Territories for References to Government and Economics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sakhalin Oblast</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rostov Oblast</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.13

**Nizhniy Novgorod**

Because the theme Government and Economics deals with the integration of economic and political life, it is broad enough to inform five different spatial etic codes. Take for instance, references to Nizhniy Novgorod, out of which 7 of 21 QRs dealt with **Privatization**. They mentioned, for example, that Nizhniy Novgorod was remarkable for the degree of privatization (Efron 1993c), concerned the breaking up and privatization of collective farms (Efron 1993e), and cited total numbers of retail outlets and trucks privatized (Boudreaux 1992). However, because privatization almost always dealt with the transfer of land from state to private hands, it informed the **Landed Identity** spatial etic code. This coding treats ownership as an intrinsic characteristic of land. Ownership is what makes land property, and as far as this study is concerned, no land cannot
be owned. The ownership and transfer of land as property played a formative role in the imagination of regional problems, and hence Privatization informs the Landed Identity code.

Defense conversion is another etic code that informed Landed Identity, and in the case of Nizhniy Novgorod, there was one such reference that involved a formerly military facility receiving help from the United States for commercial ventures (see Gordon 1998c). Defense conversion involves references to the conversion of military-related facilities to civilian uses, and it informs Landed Identity, because it inherently involves landuse in the imagination of Russian territory. Other regions, such as Krasnoyarsk, figured much more prominently in Defense conversion references.

Coincident with the seven references to Privatization are four QRs that all inform the spatial etic code Protecting Regional Economy. This code embodies core-periphery, economic tensions of an economic quality and includes references that had to do with circumstances and measures that divided regional economies from the national economy. I assigned each of these four QRs from Nizhniy Novgorod to separate lower level etic codes, including:

- **Withholding money from center**: provinces like Nizhniy Novgorod often violate federal law by implementing ambitious programs, with some areas having “simply stopped sending revenues to the center” (Gordon 1998c);
- **Separate currencies**: the city of Nizhniy Novgorod is “printing its own chits, in one example of the trend toward regionalization of the economy” (Schmemann 1992e);

- **Export authorization**: Yeltsin authorized arms-sales from a vehicle-factory in Nizhniy Novgorod to boost the economy (Hiatt 1992e); and,

- **International financial assistance**: cities such as “Nizhniy Novgorod have secured their own international bank loans and credits to jump-start industries” thus bypassing federal measures to restrict spending (Williams 1997i).

Other QRs for Nizhniy Novgorod fell into etic codes already developed, like three **Filling of federal posts** QRs which involved for instance Yeltsin’s promotion of the “young and popular reformist” governor of Nizhniy Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov, to First Deputy Prime Minister (Hoffman 1997g; Paddock 1997f) as well as Yeltsin’s naming of the “free-marketer” Kiriyenko, also from Nizhniy Novgorod, as Acting Prime Minister (Williams 1998m). Two **Securities and bonds** references involved Nemtsov introducing a program to upgrade his region’s badly deteriorated phone system (Stevenson 1994a) plus the region perhaps floating its own bonds (Hoffman 1996d). There was also a **Place as stage** reference involving a visit by President Yeltsin, who spoke about the economy (Bennett 1998b). Three aspatial references to reform (**Political**
personality) all drew attention to Boris Nemtsov as an advocate of reform or as a “reformist” governor.

Sakhalin

Sakhalin Island was constructed with a sharp and powerful focus for the theme Government and Economics. The category Territory as resource pool accounted for a whopping 17 of 18 references! These QRs dealt with consideration or progress on natural resource development projects, oil- and gas-fields, which were advocated by multiple governments, including South Korea (see Dahlburg 1992a; Erlanger 1994c; Hiatt 1994b). They fell into the Government and Economics category because of the involvement of governmental parties, particularly on the Russian side, that was instrumental to these enormous energy-related projects. Territory as resource pool informs the Landed Identity spatial etic code, because natural resources are intrinsic components of land that result in it being represented differently.50 The Gore-Chernomyrdin commission also drew attention to Sakhalin as good for investment. QRs involved the foreign-owned companies Exxon, Mobil, and Sodeco (a Japanese company) expressing interest in oil and gas fields in Sakhalin and making deals and committing to projects worth up to $15 billion (see for example Boudreaux 1995c; Boudreaux 1995a; Hiatt 1995b). Production-sharing,

50 This code also connects somewhat with Visiting diplomats, because foreign political officials were coded as visiting Russia to discuss ventures involving the exploitation of natural resources.
a technique in which payment of taxes in oil itself, was used by the Russian government late in the game as an incentive to attract foreign developers. The remaining QR, Visiting diplomats, involved a delegation from North Korean in Sakhalin to discuss joint construction projects that were not focused on natural resource extraction (Gordon 2000b).

So at this juncture, the developed spatial etic codes appear as follows:

- Provinces Caught in Middle
- Fragmentation of Political Power
  - Regional autonomy, Ethnic republic
- Staging
  - Place as stage, Visiting diplomats, Staging support, Place as battleground
- Delegation of Political Power
  - Posts (Filling and Ousting), Managing the ticket, Election-day mechanics, Place as asset, Place as non-participant
- Landed Identity
  - Radiation danger, Defense conversion, Production and storage of nuclear materials, Land as isolated, Other specific impacts and uses, Privatization, Territory as resource pool
- Place as Nexus
  - Organization of productive capital (formation, existing, dismantling); Organization of exchange (trading hub, retail outlet, barter); Organization of labor; Securities and bonds
  - Smuggling, Wage arrears
- Protecting Regional Economy
  - Withholding money from center, Separate currencies, Export authorization, International financial assistance, Passing of laws at regional level
  - Interruption of service
**Primorskiy Kray**

In marked contrast to neighboring Sakhalin, the 17 QRs to *Government and Economics* for Primorskiy Kray were spread out over a wide terrain, with no category having more than three QRs and involving 12 categories overall. Six references did not contribute to spatial etic codes, including ones that simply mentioned the liberalization of prices, unethical business practices, and the exchange rate of the ruble. QRs and their frequencies that contributed to spatial etic codes included:

- **Privatization** (2): pilot sales in Vladivostok and later the example of Vladivostok for the acceleration of privatization in Russia (Schmemann 1992b; *The New York Times* 1994);

- **Place as Stage** (2): the possibility of transport and agriculture deals with North Korea to be discussed in Vladivostok during a visit by Kim Jong Il as well as Russian officials leaving Vladivostok for United States for talks with the Microsoft Corporation and Boeing (*The Washington Post* 1999; Gordon 2000a);

- **Territory as Resource Pool** (2): Primorskiy Kray imagined as endowed with “enormous mineral riches” and “vast tracts of virgin forest” (Specter 1997g) and regions like Primorskiy Kray “want[ing] to control their own natural resources” (Erlanger 1993g); and
• **Regional autonomy** (2): Cities like Vladivostok “have assumed extensive control over their economies and fates” (Schmemann 1993c) and Governor Nazdratenko ignoring federal decrees and seizing control of assets, the press, and the judiciary (Schmemann 1993c; Wines 2000c).

• **Securities and bonds** (1): foreign investors competing with Governor Nazdratenko for shares in the Far Eastern Shipping Company (Banerjee 1999c);

• **Ousting of regional officials** (1): Yeltsin stripping Nazdratenko of most of his powers (Specter 1997e); and,

• **Tariffs**\(^{51}\) (1): a duty on food-processing equipment and seeds delaying a large food project in Vladivostok by a Seattle-based company (Imse 1994).

---

**Tatarstan**

Over ten of the *Government and Economics* references to Tatarstan constructed it as an oil- or energy-rich republic. Eight of those references were **Territory as resource pool** involving for instance power-sharing agreements between Tatarstan and Moscow and political alliances between elected political figures (see Efron 1993a; Goldberg 1993b; Goldberg 1993h; Boudreaux 1994b;

---

\(^{51}\) This code contributes to the **Place as Nexus** spatial etic code, because as in this example,
Additional Regional autonomy QRs concerned the success of a referendum on sovereignty (Goldberg 1992d; Shapiro 1992b) as well as resulting complications in traveling by rail (Hiatt 1992c). One Ethnic republic reference incorporated Tatarstan’s special ethnic status in reporting the possibility for its own judicial system (Bennett 1998c). Two more references, which contributed to the development of the Protecting Regional Economy spatial etic code, involved Tatarstan not paying taxes (Withholding money from center) (Boudreaux 1993d) and Tatarstan as a debtor to the federal government paying little money back (Region as debtor) (Wines 1999a). A final Privatization QR referred to bureaucrats in 1992 not releasing control of retail outlets.

Krasnoyarsk

Krasnoyarsk supported the Defense conversion code with three more QRs, which dealt with financial and political agreements between the US and Russian governments to fund commercial ventures so that reactors in Krasnoyarsk and Tomsk would “no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium” (see Gordon 1997b; Gordon 1997c; Gordon 1998c). The other three QRs that

---

52 Sometimes it was difficult to code references to Tatarstan, which was coded both as rich in resources and ethnically non-Russian.
informed spatial etic codes involved **Wage arrears** and their associated civil unrest at an intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile station (Hoffman 1998m); Lebed suggesting that Russian regions could introduce **Separate currencies** “to escape the consequences of the Russian ruble's collapse” (Bennett 1998c); and, “possessive bureaucrats” in Krasnoyarsk not letting “milk stores and vegetable markets out of their hands, as they were supposed to under a national program for ‘small-scale **Privatization**’” (Dahlburg 1992d). Eight aspatial codes involved campaign financing and the effects of poverty on support for politicians (see for example Hoffman 1998c; Hoffman 1998i; LaFraniere 1998b; Gordon 1999h; Hoffman 1999b; Associated Press 2000a).

**Samara**

References to Samara were interesting, because they constructed the mayor Oleg Sysuyev in a way analogous to the way in which Boris Nemtsov was constructed for Nizhniy Novgorod. In terms of articles about government and economics, five **Filling of federal posts** QRs linked qualities like “reform-mindedness” (Gordon 1998g) and success at “introducing elements of a market economy” (Paddock 2000b) with Mayor Sysuyev and Governor Titov (for four of the references) occupying federal posts (see also LaFraniere 2000c; Tyler 2000b). Of the other QRs, two **Visiting diplomats** references described Gore

---

53 Wage arrears inform the spatial etic code Place as Nexus, because they involve the flow, really the lack thereof, of capital as wages.
visiting Samara to attract U.S. investment there (Paddock 1997a; Williams 1997c), while one Place as Stage QR described President Yeltsin making comments about new currency notes from Samara (Stanley 1997). One International financial assistance QR54 dealt with Samara securing foreign loans to develop industries (Williams 1997i), and one Privatization reference dealt with the dismantling of an energy-utility (Banerjee 2000b).

Rostov

Four of the seven references to government and economics for Rostov were aspatial and dealt with the arrest of Richard Bliss by counterintelligence agents while surveying for Qualcomm (see Williams 1997a; Williams 1998i).55 A Privatization reference involved a university professor in Rostov commenting on state-ownership of industries in the United States (Hockstader 1996c). There were two other QRs that supported spatial etic codes. A Wage arrears QR involved First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov being deployed to Rostov when unpaid coal workers blocked railroad lines in protest (Williams 1998d). An Organization of productive capital, existing, operation QR mentioned air-traffic software in Rostov not needing Y2K upgrades (Wines 1999b).

54 Coded as Protecting regional economy.
55 The story of Bliss unfolded over many days, with 12 other references split between the Sensational and Military themes. Only when these stories moved away from sensational perspectives or perspectives limited to the arrest of bliss to the issue of economic behavior as
Kaliningrad

References to place associated Kaliningrad with transgressions. Three Withholding money from center references, supporting the Protecting Regional Economy code, cited a declaration of a state of emergency there to control prices and mentioned that Kaliningrad had enacted “possibly illegal price-capping measures” (see Bennett 1998c; Williams 1998k). Two Smuggling QRs attributed the proximity of Kaliningrad to Western Europe and its status as a free trade zone to the illegal shipment of vodka and various goods (Specter 1997f). A final, aspatial reference, Contradictions as normal, mentioned Kaliningrad as an example of how things that might apply in one part of Russia do not necessarily apply in other parts of the vast country (Hiatt 1994a).

Summary

The regions involved in this portion of the analysis stood out as quite different from one another yet supported the notion that placenames arose with specific issues. For example:

- Sakhalin was overwhelmingly constructed as endowed with oil and gas fields that drew international corporate and political attention;

subject to state intervention did I categorize these references as Government and Economics.  
56 Smuggling informs the Organization of Exchange spatial etic code, because it involves multiple factors, like the physical location of territorial boundaries and the political regulation of economic activity, as they structure clandestine trade.
• Boris Nemtsov stood out as an important politician from Nizhniy Novgorod, which was imagined as a progressive region;

• Tatarstan was constructed as a republic made special both by its endowments of oil and by its status as an ethnic republic. These conditions combined gave it special claims to sovereignty;

• Krasnoyarsk made it into the news with the help its high-profile governor, Alexander Lebed, and was represented as affected by the need to shut down nuclear reactors and wage arrears;

• Samara, like Nizhniy Novgorod, was constructed as progressive and where parts of a market economy prevailed;

• Kaliningrad was imagined somewhat as special, because of its far western location, which for instance facilitated smuggling; and,

• Rostov was prominent in the news because of the arrest for spying of Richard Bliss.

Furthermore, Table 4.14 shows the counts for the etic codes just discussed. The most populous category, at 27 QRs, was **Territory as resource pool**. Sakhalin, Tatarstan, and Primorskiy Kray contributed to this category, with 17, 8, and 2 QRs respectively. At 17 QRs, Sakhalin scores the highest of all frequencies for a territorial reference in a single category under any one theme. In fact, Sakhalin showed up more in this one category than did 39 individual territories of the Russian Federation across all thirteen themes! This result indicates that there is a
significant and ongoing conversation in American foreign correspondence on Russia about the exploitation of land-based resources, particularly oil and natural gas, that involves government intervention.

**Territory as resource pool, Privatization, and Defense conversion** combined to account for 44 references under the spatial etic code **Landed Identity**. The Government and Economics theme thus significantly involved political and economic dimensions of landuse and landuse change. Moreover, the Visiting diplomats code was co-opted by **Territory as resource pool** in the sense that many diplomatic visits occurred around the development of natural resources. I find that for the representations studied, the exploitation of natural resources by foreign parties was the most likely scenario for foreign diplomats visiting Russia.

![Table 4.14](image-url)
Regional autonomy and Ethnic republic constituted six observations about core-periphery tensions in addition to the twelve, various lower level codes that contributed to the Protecting Regional Economy spatial etic code. Thus, core-periphery tensions were another significant topic for the Government and Economics theme, with references dealing with core-periphery relations spread out among a wider number of issues. Additionally, the Filling of Federal Posts observations depicted another nine instances of core-periphery relationships in which success at reform at the regional-level was important for advancement to higher office. So core-periphery relationships then accounted for 27 of the observations overall.

References to the uneven distribution of wealth were spread across various categories and accounted for more than twenty references. This suggests that foreign correspondents may introduce place names into journalism when those place names deliver messages about spatial heterogeneity and money. This is a very important observation. And although the observation does not necessarily facilitate any conclusions around the larger ways that space is represented in journalism, it does suggest that there are degenerate cases around which place names may be used to introduce meanings around the uneven distribution of wealth. Altogether, these cases contribute to an important kind of geographic diversity in print-journalism that deserves to be acknowledged.
CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated the ways that places were conjured up by journalists in stories with Moscow datelines in order to support journalistic prose. It answered the question “How would one expect place to be used within a story?” It treated the incidence of place-names in a story as an entrepreneurial way for a journalist to introduce important meanings about wider social and spatial forces into a story. The chapter looked past the overall messages that stories with Moscow datelines may have constructed about Russia in order to ask how places figured into narrative reasoning.

Issues and the Regions with Which they Occurred

The representation of place in stories with Moscow-datelines turned out to be significant in two ways. First, the majority of the regions represented most frequently in references to place appeared in the news predominantly for a small number of reasons. Some regions, like Krasnoyarsk and Primorskiy Kray, occurred with a broad range of issues. But most regions, such as Tula, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Sakhalin, made it into the news on the basis of a small number of issues. Figure 4.8 shows cartographically the culmination of this work in terms of how the most important regions, measured by the frequency of references,
Figure 4.8

The Big Messages Territories Delivered
showed up in articles with Moscow-datelines. These regions, from West to East
generally, include:

- Kaliningrad (Yeltsin opposition meets here, It’s Election Day, and
  Smuggling);
- Tula (Election drama);
- Rostov (Qualcomm, cell phones);
- Saratov-Samara (Clinton here, Place as stage, Core-periphery filling);
- Tatarstan (Non-participant, regional autonomy, vehicle manufacture);
- Chelyabinsk (Radiation);
- Bashkortostan (Autonomy);
- Nizhniy Novgorod (Nemtsov Free-Market Bastion, strange politics);
- Murmansk (Activism, Radiation, Yeltsin’s fury);
- Tomsk (Radiation, defense conversion);
- Novosibirsk (Challenges to Yeltsin’s authority, strange politics);
- Krasnoyarsk (Plutonium, staging support, Election Day!, Wage Arrears,
  Lebed, Regional Powerhouse, and Strange politics);
- Primorskiy Kray (G&E Potluck, Diplomatic entourage, Pasco, Hub,
  Ecological Disaster, and Radiation danger); and,
- Sakhalin (Resource pool).

While some regions in Russia were referenced many times and show up
big in Figure 4.8, place names corresponding to vast, inter-regional stretches of
territories were virtually unreported on. Those areas, mostly comprising territories referenced fewer than a mean of 1.5 times per year, include:

- the long strip of territories along the Kazak, Mongolian, and Chinese borders, stretching eastward from the Gornyy Altay Republic through the Jewish Autonomous Oblast;
- an enormous arc of territory, perforated by the northern arm of Krasnoyarsk Kray, from Kurgan, through Tyumen’, including the Komi Republic and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and running through the northern autonomous okrugs in West and East Siberia; and
- a smaller arc, around but not encompassing the Moscow, Vladimir, and Nizhniy Novgorod Oblasts, including in a counterclockwise direction Kaluga, Orel, and Lipetsk, stretching eastward through the Mordvinian Republic into Chuvashia, and then north, through Kirov, into Kostroma and Vologda.

Spatial Codes and What They Mean

This study found that a majority of references, when coded emically, did not appear ostensibly to be about space. Yet when coded and rearranged into spatial etic codes, these references turned out to convey a small variety of meanings about space and the geography of Russia. I further organized these codes and their meanings into three general spatial categories: Place as Input in
Social Processes, Trans-Boundary Flows, and Core-Periphery Relations. The following sections describe the spatial etic codes that contribute to the general spatial categories, how they do so, and their significance.

*Place as Input in Social Processes*

Two spatial etic codes contributed to this category: Delegation of Political Power and Landed Identity. For the Delegation of Political Power, the referenced territories contributed to this general category on the basis of the participation of place in the allotment of political power. References to managing the ticket and election-day mechanics relied on the political apportionment of space and the personalities associated with the resulting regions in order to bring place into the news. Other references, like the filling of federal posts and place as entryway, relied on the past success of politicians as regional leaders under reform in their reporting of the promotion of regional leaders to federal office. Hence regional spaces were imagined as arenas which fed both regional and national-level process vis-à-vis elective and non-elective promotion.\(^{57}\) Thus, regional spaces were imagined as self-reproducing, and the federal jurisdiction was constructed as dependent on lower jurisdictions for filling federal posts and in general for the participation of Russia’s regions in the national political scene.

\(^{57}\) The delegation of political power also connects strongly with core-periphery relationships. A significant proportion of references dealt with moves from the regional level to the federal level.
The codes under Landed Identity posited place as a factor in its own development. They sometimes imagine a breaking away from federal political power, like in the case of privatization and territory as resource pool. In other instances, they posit a reliance not only on federal but on international assistance, as is the case with defense conversion and territory as resource pool. But whatever the case, these codes involved a conception of place which clearly relied on space, especially landuse, as an input for constructing regional identity or putting social activity in its proper context.

The general spatial category Place as Input in Social Processes covers two spatial etic codes which ask: Where are the more important sources of political power in Russia?, and, In which places does landuse or the configuration of land significantly transform development and identity? And insofar as foreign correspondence provided the answers to these questions, it constructed a conception of social processes that was significantly bound to physiographic and political factors which made the Russian territories distinct.

Trans-Boundary Flows

The spatial etic codes Staging and Place as Nexus contributed to this general spatial category. Staging references represented travel and the movement through space of political figures as an important geographic dimension of political showmanship and of understanding Russian politics from national and
international perspectives. Voicing (speech acts) turned out to be a particularly important geopolitical moment in terms of the imagination of relationships between people and territory. Staging references involve territory in politics by connecting place with messages from political figures, by linking agenda with specific regions. They construct place as a platform for political behavior, specifically that which locates politicians at various places on the national political landscape.

Place as Nexus also included representations of spatial interactions that fundamentally crossed political boundaries. It was predominately economic in focus, and references to place happened where trans-boundary flows came together. This category understood ownership, productive capacity, labor, and retail as spatially disparate moments of the production process. These moments were fixed in space in unique ways as the production process changed in Russia during the 1990s. Thus references that fell under this spatial etic code dealt with various places, both in Russia and abroad, that were somehow invested in either production or consumption networks in Russia.

Thus, the general spatial category Trans-Boundary Flows includes two spatial etic codes which ask: Which places participate in the national network of political appearances in Russia?, and, Where do economic actors and capital concentrate and what relationships connect them? And as foreign correspondence from Moscow gave the answers to these questions through
references to place, it imagined the creation, maintenance, and destruction of political and economic networks that crisscrossed Russian spaces and challenged Russians to decide between and cope with elements of the familiar juxtaposed against elements the foreign, the profane, and the progressive.

*Core-Periphery Relations*

The Fragmentation of Political Power and Protecting Regional Economy contribute to the overall construction of the general spatial category Core-Periphery Relations, along with Provinces Caught in Middle. The Fragmentation of Political Power dealt with decentralizing processes in which territories contested their Russianness and consented less to rule from without. These clashes of federal and regional power were based on seemingly intrinsic characteristics of territory, predominantly the existence of provincial boundaries and ethnic divisions along those same lines. The contested aspects of reform, highlighted under this code, worked to posit reform as a process of reconstruction in which local and regional interests, mostly independently of or against federal power, staked out their identities and futures by taking actions that constructed them as “other than” ruled from the center.

Likewise, references to Protecting Regional Economy also dealt with decentralizing processes, this time in which territories contested the pace of change from and dependence on the center based on the faults or shortcomings
of federal governance. They involved a diverse range of techniques, from passing laws to withholding taxes and even printing separate currencies, which served either to insulate regions from the political and economic turbulence emanating from the center or to forge ahead with agendas that the center generally failed to initiate or support.\textsuperscript{58} Protecting Regional Economy is different from Fragmentation of Political Power, because the latter involves outright disputes over sovereignty, while the former only addresses the limitations of sovereign federal power at serving the regions.

Finally, Provinces Caught in Middle dealt exclusively with references that posited the regions as inherently involved in the federal power struggle between President Yeltsin and parliament in 1993. This struggle, which culminated in a siege of the Russian parliament building and ultimately received widespread “live” television coverage, was so profound that it alone accounted for 20 references to place. This contest over power was spatial in the sense that it involved the Russian regions involuntarily in a dispute between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. It conflated regional and national jurisdictions to the degree that no space, no matter how small or remote, was imagined as separate from this national debacle. It ultimately posited a supremacy of national political events over regional political events, and the

\textsuperscript{58} In one case, that of Export authorization, President Yeltsin did support the export of arms-sales from Nizhniy Novgorod. This code was rare and did not justify developing a separate etic code concerning federal support of the territories in strengthening regional economies.
choices that regional legislatures and executives made in supporting either parliament or President Yeltsin were constructed as feeding back into the production of space, as President Yeltsin expunged governors who supported parliament and replaced them with reformers, who were judged as the rightful architects and guardians of Russian regional spaces.

The general spatial category Core-Periphery Relations thus accounted for codes that asked the questions: Which regions were imagined as substantially “other than” Russian for demographic or landuse-related reasons?; Which regions took measures to protect or advance their economies apart from Russian federal authority?; and, Which territories were constructed as key players as the feud between parliament and President Yeltsin in 1993 subsumed and played out in regional jurisdictions? And as foreign correspondence answered these questions, it constructed core-periphery tensions between the regions and the federal government which indelibly influenced the course of reform and development in Post-Soviet Russia.

*Significance of and Connections Between the General Spatial Codes*

The lower level spatial etic codes informed the three general spatial codes at different rates. Table 4.15 shows the numerical distribution of etic codes between general spatial categories. It is interesting that Place as Input in Social Processes occurred at about the same frequency as the other two general spatial
categories combined. However, this observation does not preclude the following connections between categories:

**Place as Input in Social Processes**
- connects to Trans-Boundary Flows through
  - Privatization, which can be thought of as an important instance of the Organization of productive capital, formation code, and
  - Defense conversion, which is a landuse-specific case of Organization of productive capital, dismantling
- connects to Core-Periphery relations through
  - Territory as resource pool, which relates to Regional autonomy through local claims of dominion over natural resources, and
  - Filling of federal posts and ousting by Yeltsin, which constitutes the reproduction of federal power vis-à-vis regional divisions.\(^\text{59}\)

**Trans-Boundary Flows**
- connects to Place as Input in Social Processes through

---

\(^\text{59}\) I considered making Reproduction of Political Power a separate spatial etic code, however, its absolute reliance on regional spaces as an input for that process led me to use this coding.
o Staging, which relates to Landed Identity by constructing regions essentially as territorialized arenas in which political identities are formed, and

o Place as Nexus, which relates to Landed Identity by territorializing (pegging) the imagination of regions to how they are made economically productive

• connects to Core-Periphery Relations insofar as references to Staging involve federal political figures using appearances in Russia’s regions to construct themselves

Core-Periphery Relations

• connects to Place as Input in Social Processes through

  o references coded as Regional autonomy and Ethnic republic, which to a great extent rely on the construction of a territorialized (landed) identity based on natural resources or ethnicity, and

  o the Passing of laws at regional level, which ties into Landed identity by constructing various regions, based on the legislation passed, as havens, for example, of private ownership of land or of prostitution
connects to Trans-Boundary Flows through the rest of the codes under Protecting Regional Economy, all of which contain references that either establish new flows or break down previously established pathways for flows between the regional and federal levels.

So, an important finding of the study is that the codes relevant to space in foreign correspondence are interrelated. While I developed in this chapter an economical way to understand spatiality in the references to place in foreign correspondence from Moscow, many of those references related to space in more than one way. The complex emic coding of space in stories does indeed suggest that foreign correspondence entails a richly geographic imagination. And that imagination in particular involves ongoing discussions about the roles of natural resources and ethnicity in regional autonomy; the conversion of military facilities to commercial purposes and the storage of nuclear materials (seemingly a carry-over from cold-war politics); the appointment and election of officials to regional and federal offices; and, business deals, including the purchasing of securities and the operation of new and existing plants. And in emphasizing the human aspects of development in Russia, foreign correspondence often underemphasized changes in spatial relationships in its focus on human figures.

60 It is important to remind the reader that the great majority of stories with Moscow-datelines do not contain any references to place. While some of them contain discussions about privatization, international aid, and the release of credits to firms from the central government, other articles, about political personalities for instance, may be predominantly aspatial.
The reporting of land-based hazards and transgressions of regions against central political authority were the notable exceptions.\textsuperscript{61}

Moreover, combining the observed representations of place-oriented functions of government with the interview data that indicate presence at the foreign bureau is especially important, so as not to miss a breaking story, leads somewhere interesting. Speech, especially from ranking government officials, is a very important source of data for foreign correspondents. Moreover, any mid-to high-ranking government official, from anywhere in Russia, can conceivably voice or delegate authority in a way deemed newsworthy by a foreign correspondent at any time. In other words, the qualities of the speech act itself—sudden, ephemeral, and perhaps unexpected—conceivably contribute significantly to the importance of the spatial network of news-feeds leading to the foreign bureau and constructing the particular geography of foreign correspondence observed here. And additionally, the Moscow-based foreign bureau, as an important node through which information flows, adds to the appearance and construction of Russian places in the news through reporting the verbal and delegated aspects of governmental behavior.

Chapter five builds on the finding in this chapter that the reporting on political personalities and the speech act was a mainstay of foreign

\textsuperscript{61} Chapters six and seven show how the reporting of transgressions was important for stories with datelines from the provinces.
correspondence from Moscow. It does so by explaining how the focus on political personalities serves foreign correspondence in textual ways.
CHAPTER 5 - TEXT, IDENTITY, SOCIETY, AND POWER IN STORIES
WITH MOSCOW-DATELINES

Chapter five is the first of two chapters that investigate the textual aspects of how American foreign correspondents constructed Russian and American identities in print-journalism. It focuses exclusively on messages about the economic transition in Russia transmitted in print journalism with Moscow datelines. Unlike chapter four, this chapter is minimally concerned with differences in the ways various Russian regions were constructed. Rather, the chapter examines the various roles that represented spatial practices play in the imagination of individuals. It analyzes social relationships within Russia as well as between Russian and American communities. As part of that analysis, the chapter considers the emotional construction of the reading audience alongside the representation of success and failure in a restructuring, Post-Soviet Russia. It finds that the political geographies constructed in foreign correspondence are also emotional geographies.62 And furthermore, representations of space and attitudes toward the use of space are important in the production of an emotional response in the audience.

62 Emotional geographies are produced in texts through language, for instance in terms of the coded hopes and fears of policy-makers with respect to emerging events in Russia. The imagined landscape of reform in Russia was ordinarily signified though coded thoughts and actions, which were intrinsically emotional, both to the characters in journalistic narratives as well as to the implied narrator and audience of the stories. I explain this throughout the chapter and will connect these insights to other work in geography related to emotions at the conclusion.
Chapter seven interprets the considerably smaller body of texts with datelines outside of Moscow. Together, chapters five and seven allow me to differentiate the textual aspects of Moscow-based journalism from the textual aspects of journalism from the provinces. Chapter eight will consider the cumulative results of chapters four through seven. It will connect the constraints on the journalist as an embodied fieldworker with observations about the imagination of Russian and American communities that occur when the journalist is in discrete locales. The dissertation thus culminates with comments on the textual and referential implications of journalists’ movements through developed Russian spaces.

Approach of the Chapter

I argue in this chapter that the production of an emotional reading audience is pervasive in stories about the economic transition. Furthermore, it occurs very early inside of individual newspaper articles, in conjunction with mostly abstract logics about society and space, including attitudes towards future geographies. Because consumers of newspaper articles may very well cease reading after the first few paragraphs (Marshall 2000), early emotional and

---

63 Sometimes a foreign correspondent writes one story from multiple places. An interview with Carey Goldberg (2003, personal communication) indicated that there are rules for determining what the printed dateline should be. It is normal for foreign correspondence to avow the locations of informants and data collection when writing from the provinces. Based on my reading of foreign correspondence, I found that datelines reliably indicated the most important location for putting together the story.
logical involvements of the American reader with the text figure prominently in
the construction of the American geopolitical imagination about Russia in
transition. As newspaper articles progress, however, they typically include
evidence that for instance reassures and alarms the audience, indicating that the
emotional involvement of the reader with the text is as important as any factual
information that may be transmitted by the article. The production of reassurance
and alarm furthermore rely on representations of the progress and future of
political and economic reform, which was the most important concept in news
stories from Russia in the 1990s. The representation of the progress of reform
mimics a morality play by juxtaposing good versus bad and geopolitically
stabilizing forces against centrifugal ones.

Reform appears in many guises, such as: ostensibly about Russia; about
the geopolitical relationship between Russia and the countries of the West;
concerning the relationship between President Yeltsin and a parliament in
opposition to him; about the relationship between Russian producers and foreign
producers in the world market; and, concerning the relationships among Russian
workers and between Russian workers and the newly rich. Of central importance
in the mediated discourse on reform is a controversy about space involving two
archetypal and competing viewpoints. The dominant perspective in the press,
emanating both from Russia and even more uniformly from the economic experts
representing Western countries, maintains that space and spatial structures are
changeable enough to accommodate rapidly the new spatial structures of capitalism and democracy. The very concept of reform is ideological and thus hinges on a certain optimism about the availability of everyday spatial practice to radical change. That optimism de-emphasizes the historicity of space in favor of a flattering appraisal of the abilities of planners to manufacture new spatial practices and to delete the old ones. The concept of reform posits a territorial conception of Russian society by treating it as a surface across which reforms would uniformly act to produce a democratic, capitalistic Russia.

An alternate viewpoint on space maintains that spatial practice is historical and that as an historical product, space carries a certain inertia or resistance to reform or progress. This perspective on space is ideologically “in the wrong” in the mediated discourse on reform, or rather, contrary to the beliefs promulgated by Western planners. It is coded in the voices of myriad people

---

64 By the later part of the 1990s, it was commonly conceded that reform had not yet brought a “market-economy” to Russia. However, even by that time, the perspective on space I just identified remained mostly the same. The main change in it occurred relative to the amount of time that was needed for a “market-economy” to take root, rather than any consideration that economic spaces might not be as alterable in terms of the end-result as was hoped. Economist Barry Ickes, for instance, was cited as stating that many Westerners “overestimated the power of the market.” And he continues by indicating that Russia just needs more time to make the requisite changes. “‘Russia needs some breathing room,’ he says, to gradually dismantle its current economy. Accounting practices have to change. Factories must be slowly whittled down to efficient size. A social safety net must be put in place to support those dislocated” (Reynolds 1999c).

65 In all of my experience reading newspaper articles about the economic transition in Russia, I have never come across anyone asking the following question: At what threshold would transforming Russia into a pluralist-democracy, into a capitalistic society, be so difficult that the term “reform” would no longer be appropriate to describe that change? Poignant observations regarding limitations to change in Russia were made early on, for instance, by Tyler Marshall (1992) and by Fred Hiatt (1993h).
living in the provinces, particularly factory-managers, who speak about the constraints of reform in stories with provincial-datelines. This perspective, however, is also emulated in Moscow-datelines as third-person commentary by the foreign correspondent, as well as infrequently by Yeltsin’s communist or hard-line opposition. For instance, the issuance to every Russian of privatization vouchers, worth only about $40, was explained by Yeltsin’s deputy prime minister Chubais as “the starting point of the capitalist education of the Russian people” (Bohlen 1992a). The dominant explanation implies the changeability of spatial structures and economic practices in Russia through the issuance of paper certificates which should create change through education. The foreign correspondent herself attributed the common opinion that the voucher program would not change anything to ignorance, even though it was unclear how $40 worth of shares per person would generate anything akin to a widespread, public participation in securities markets. Former General Secretary of the Communist Party Gorbachev, however, lamented that the voucher program was weak: “It will only alienate people. I think it is a sham. I think it is deceiving people” (Bohlen 1992a). The polarization of reformers against communists in terms of introducing capitalistic practice to Russia was furthermore strongly codified by Chubais: “If the Communists say we have to stop, that means we have to do it as soon as possible” (Bohlen 1992a).
As another example, Tyler Marshall of the *Los Angeles Times* compares the task of rebuilding Russia to that faced by Germany in integrating the territory of East Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall:

> While the German experience in rebuilding its formerly Communist eastern region may contain valuable lessons for those working here, it also carries a depressing message: Initial Western estimates of the costs and time needed to revive a Soviet-style centralized Communist economy were hopelessly optimistic. Bonn has failed to generate any real revival in the east, despite spending well in excess of $200 billion in the past two years -- and that in a region one two-hundredth the size of the former Soviet Union, with a population only slightly larger than that of greater Moscow and a tradition of economic competition far stronger and more recent than in Russia.  
> (Marshall 1992)

The article still carries a flattering assessment by a planner of the potential for change:

> Although the Western help actually aimed at rebuilding the economies of the former Soviet Union remains small, aid officials note that it is structured for maximum impact. “It's an impressive amount of money when you realize it's not going for hardware but for technical support, advice and training,” said Norris. “This country has tremendous problems, but it also has a rich corps of skilled people.”  
> (Marshall 1992)

And by 1998, “Two competing scenarios--the return to some sort of socialism or the rise of a nationalist strongman--are said by some observers to be possible, but not as likely as a long, gray period of muddling through” (Dahlburg 1998). In the same article, Anatoly B. Chubais, the former head of Russia's privatization program remarked “Now it is clear--the transition will take decades, with retreats, defeats and crisis” (Dahlburg 1998). Chubais commented that his “biggest mistake” was to “believe that the Russian economy could be reinvented in a few years.”
Moscow-datelines dominate the overall number of stories, and they normally report the logics of high-level planners and policy-makers. American foreign correspondents as a community thus encode for the bulk of the transition-period an attitude toward space that is ideologically predisposed toward the belief that social behavior occurs in space, that space is not a product of social behavior but a mere canvas upon which social actions occur.\textsuperscript{66} More specifically, this attitude holds that social behavior can be engineered in space though thoughtful analysis and careful practice in mental, economic spaces. The mediated discourses on reform tend to concentrate on international lending to Russia, on the inflation rate of the Ruble, the bankruptcy of Russian firms, and on the personalities occupying various positions in Russian government. The Moscow dateline, then, is the nexus where journalists could most readily stage those variables that were at the heart of the mediated discourse on reform in Russia.\textsuperscript{67} Moscow is where political, economic, and social experts of all stripes, both Russian and foreign, gathered to decide the fate of Russian spaces by working in predominantly mental, economic spaces. Indeed, the reform movement in Russia was powerfully imagined in American foreign correspondence as a personality cult, as a collection of individuals who

\textsuperscript{66} This does not at all mean that competing viewpoints were not present. It means, however, that competing viewpoints did not find a voice unless they were placed in opposition to the dominant perspective on space. Maura Reynolds (2000b, personal communication) verified that the dominant perspective had to be mentioned first.

\textsuperscript{67} Reporting from the provinces, foreign correspondents tended to elaborate on regional concerns or to explore in depth one issue, such as bankruptcy, landuse change, or demographic support for a political candidate.
comprised Yeltsin’s “reform team,”68 as evidenced in Chapter Four by the political stagings in references to place.

This chapter, concerned only with the Moscow dateline, thus confronts representations of spatial practice and of mental spaces that emanated from American foreign correspondence in an international discourse on the economic transition in Russia. It delves into some of the inner workings of journalistic texts, which were constituted by a stream of symbols from Russian sites to American ones. The source, involving the foreign correspondent as embodied fieldworker, located the journalist as rubbing elbows with a wide array of international and Russian power-brokers, who wielded major decision-making power over spatial practices as well as over the representation of those practices. On the other end of the stream were the sites of consumption of mediated messages, distant from the Kremlin and the edgy streets of Moscow. And somehow the messages about space and power in Russia, regardless of whether the reader finished the story, first told the reader one of only a small handful of things: be sympathetic, be confused, be reassured, or be alarmed.

**Organization of the Chapter**

This chapter is divided into three additional sections. The first section considers the beginning paragraphs of articles written during the entire period under study. It includes elaborate textual analyses of parts of a small number of

---

68 see Shogren (1992b)
articles. I develop an argument from the results for the emotional involvement of the casual reader in the newspaper-article. I posit that the emotion with which the audience is invested belongs to a very small group of emotions and opens up an interpretive space, which structures the reader’s further involvement in the news-story as well as the reader’s imagination of Russia. The second section builds off of the emerging results by expanding the discussion of reform to include additional, represented, spatial practices. It incorporates an analysis of an article which was noteworthy in the casual reading in its treatment of space as an historical, material product. The last section fills out the etic codes I developed on reform from articles with Moscow datelines and considers the coded relationships under reform between aid, austerity, bankruptcy, and the expansion of new business-practices in Russia. It also builds on the discussion of the previous two sections by connecting the emotional construction of the audience with geopolitical attitudes towards Russians and future spaces.

THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS – HOPE, FEAR, AND ABSTRACTION

Textual analysis indicates a strong commonality between the initial few paragraphs of virtually every news-story I studied. The link occurs at the level of production of the storytelling relationship, where the narrator’s relationship with the audience as well as with the story itself emerges. The analysis suggests that
almost all articles begin in one of four ways. Each article initially produces an audience, which is emotionally invested in Russia, predominantly feeling either confusion, sympathy, hope, or fear. Should the casual reader abandon the news-story after reading the opening paragraphs, the reader would leave with a feeling about Russia that fits one of those four emotions. These dominant emotions structure the reader’s further involvement in the news-story by opening up interpretive spaces either to occupy or reject. I will first consider the case of fear, as is exhibited in the following passage.

\[\textbf{ALARM}\]
A decision by Russia to pay Government workers by printing more money, coupled with a shuffling of ministers, has brought sharp domestic questioning about President Boris N. Yeltsin's commitment to austerity measures in the transition to a market economy.

The recent Russian moves have also generated concerns at the International Monetary Fund, according to international monetary officials. They said that an I.M.F. team had just returned to the fund's headquarters in Washington from a visit to Moscow and was evaluating the latest Yeltsin Government actions.

The I.M.F. is preparing a series of loans to Russia and the other former Soviet republics once it is satisfied that they are limiting inflation and taking other economic measures that would permit them to repay the loans.

Western economists say that any retreat from the Government's policy of economic austerity could jeopardize an agreement now being negotiated between Russia and the I.M.F. for the release of the first credits in a $24 billion package pledged by industrial democracies early this year. (Bohlen 1992b)

The audience produced by the text mimetically adopts the concerns of Yeltsin’s observers, who in this case occupy both domestic and foreign positions. Its fear, expressed most simply, is that the “transition to a market economy” is in jeopardy. And Yeltsin, as the chief executive of Russia, is blamed for not being “committed to austerity measures” deemed necessary to make that transition
happen. The end goal of reform is represented in abstract, that is, making Russian space into a market economy. And it is the questioning of the highest executive’s commitment to produce that space that creates fear in the audience. Thus the most important concept for the reform period, the transition to a market economy, is expressed in terms of abstract space. And the printed discourse over the future of Russian space is closely tied to political figures, who are regarded as the architects of space itself.

The construction of a fearful audience in this article is so pronounced that the first paragraph alone is enough to establish an attitude of alarm, that there is “sharp domestic questioning,” presumably emanating from reformers inside of Russia, of Yeltsin’s commitment to a market economy. The casual reader, in learning that paying workers is dangerous to reform if it involves “printing more money,” gathers that the interests of workers in Russia may not always coincide with the interests of the International Monetary Fund. Thus a geopolitical relationship is imagined between Russian workers and foreign planners, an international interaction not manifest in chapter four. In this case, austerity serves the coded interests of the IMF much better than it does the interests of Russian workers, and the attitude that the casual reader adopts places the reader into an antagonism with the latter.

---

69 “Most Russians” are more interested in prices than the workings of government. The full article suggests in the causal reading, therefore, that Russian democracy needs outside assistance if only for the reason that “most Russians” are too distracted by daily affairs to monitor and interact with bureaucrats.
Distancing himself from the economic reforms that are the hallmark of his presidency, President Boris N. Yeltsin today accepted the resignation of Anatoly B. Chubais, a pillar of economic reform and the last liberal in his increasingly hard-line Cabinet.

Mr. Chubais, 40, the Deputy Prime Minister who supervised the stabilization of the Russian economy and planned its privatization program, said he was leaving because Mr. Yeltsin had criticized his work. At a news conference tonight, Mr. Chubais, a beacon of free-market reform to the West, warned that any change of economic course before the presidential elections in June would be a “monstrous mistake.”

With Russian troops bogged down in an attempt to overwhelm hostage-taking Chechen rebels in southern Russia, and other rebels holding Russian captives on a ferry in the Black Sea, the Russian President appeared to be struggling to salvage his political viability at home.

He did not try to talk Mr. Chubais out of quitting. Mr. Yeltsin, who is increasingly behaving like a man readying himself for a re-election campaign, has started recasting himself as a centrist intent on reining in the less-popular economic programs of his Government. (Stanley 1996b)

The coding of Chubais as “a pillar of reform” and “a beacon of free-market reform to the West” constructs another international interaction, in this case that “the West” is needy of signs and reassurances from Russia that “changes of economic course” will not “distance [Russia] from economic reforms.” Moreover, the above coding buttresses the argument that reporting focused on political figures as architects of space by suggesting how just one person in government has had a major influence as “a pillar of economic reform.” However, an interesting caveat of this approach to space vis-à-vis political figures emerges, that is, that electoral politics distort the reform process.

---

70 Later in the article, the reader finds that Chubais “won the trust of many Western bankers and decision-makers, had almost single-handedly crafted the Russian Government's position on complying with I.M.F. conditions for the loan.”
My ironic reading suggests that the political presence of “hard-liners” in government offers Yeltsin additional maneuverability. At the appropriate time, Yeltsin might be able to exploit cabinet positions in order to represent temporarily his political attitude as something other than it is, as less threatening to the working class. The reader might imagine that workers, who were hurt by austerity in the first example, may benefit from this distortion, since it causes Yeltsin to “recast himself as a centrist” by manipulating his cabinet so that it is “increasingly hard-line.” And consequently, the interests of foreign planners may appear jeopardized. In other words, the presence of “hard-liners” and Yeltsin’s ability to manipulate them at election time seriously complicates reform politics for both Russian workers as well as for outside observers, who may want reassurance that reform can follow a steady path worthy of the code “economic course.” Elections could be times during which “the West” is most desirous of reassurance, because of the pending status of elective offices, yet be least likely to get it. This posits a geopolitical relationship between Russia and the United States in which Western parties are ironically less reassurable because of democracy. And the representation of spaces stricken by the Chechen conflict, which in this case did not show up in chapter four because of the absence of searched-on place names, is used further to destabilize Yeltsin’s political viability.71

71 Because territories around Chechnya were not used in the search for place names, the representation of space interfering with Yeltsin’s popularity are most akin to the core-periphery,
The phrase “distancing himself from the economic reforms that are the hallmark of his presidency,” with which the narrative voice confidently opens, is therefore problematic. It cannot be known from the text to what extent it applies to Yeltsin as image-maker versus to Yeltsin as practitioner. So emerges a problem with reporting on political personalities as architects of space. Political posturing at election-time may make the behavior of elected officials seem arbitrary or inconsistent. And because the treatment of the future of Russian spaces from Moscow relies on the actions of political figures, the implied futures of Russian spaces may seem more arbitrary or unpredictable than would be otherwise justified by reasoning grounded in the material and historical ways in which space is produced. In other words, the ways in which space is represented predisposes messages to alarm the audience by making the future of Russian spaces seem less predictable. Treating politicians as the lone architects of space, as is common to so many representations from Moscow, predisposes an audience to certain instabilities or swings in emotion.

The following article, published six months after Stanley’s article on the departure of Chubais from Yeltsin’s administration, begins with the announcement of Chubais’ return to Yeltsin’s side. It helps to shed further light on the representation of political economics in news about Russia.

<C> REASSURANCE
Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin on Monday rehired a castaway leader of his economic team, Anatoly B. Chubais, and made him Kremlin chief of staff,
vaulting a free-market pioneer into one of the three most powerful posts in his new administration.

Chubais, 41, architect of the massive sell-off of state property and tamer of Russia's wild post-Soviet inflation, was fired six months ago as an unpopular political liability. But he remained loyal and managed the president's come-from-behind reelection campaign against a Communist rival.

The surprise appointment delighted Russian reformers but was partly eclipsed by continuing concern about the health of the 65-year-old Yeltsin, who abruptly postponed a meeting Monday with U.S. Vice President Al Gore and left the Kremlin just before Gore arrived.

Brushing off the unusual lapse of protocol, U.S. and Russian officials said Yeltsin will receive Gore today at his walled summer retreat in Barvikha, west of Moscow.

Perhaps the most obvious difference between the two articles is that the prior article codes Chubais as resigning, while the latter article explains that Chubais was fired. I submit that with respect to the rehiring of Chubais, coding him as having previously been fired by Yeltsin produces more drama and a greater emotional involvement in the audience than coding him as having resigned. Additional analysis supports the argument that drama is manufactured by the news-story in multiple ways. For instance, the audience is told in the second paragraph that Chubais “managed the president’s come-from-behind reelection campaign,” thus constructing Chubais as an intimate insider to Yeltsin with enormous influence over Yeltsin’s fate as a politician. The hiring of Chubais as “Kremlin chief of staff” seems much more, to my ironic reading, like a horizontal move from the most crucial position in a presidential reelection campaign outside of the presidency itself. The phrase “the surprise appointment delighted Russian reformers” further capitalizes on the construction of Chubais as a “castaway.”
Yet those portions of text that code Chubais as Yeltsin’s campaign manager criticize other portions of text that code Chubais as a “castaway leader.” My ironic reading judges that the construction of Chubais as castaway serves to produce a drama, Chubais’ meteoric rise, his “vaulting…into one of the three most powerful posts in [Yeltsin’s] new administration.” Drama, and the emotional construction of the audience, is instrumental in this story about how two political figures maintain their positions in government.

Moreover, in the story about Chubais and Yeltsin claiming their positions in the federal government, the audience is asked to take sides. Chubais, whose appointment “delighted Russian reformers” is further represented in exhilarating terminology as a “free-market pioneer,” an “architect,” and a “tamer” of inflation. These codes would make little sense if the reader was not positioned in a fanatical relationship with Chubais’ appointment and the reelection of Yeltsin. They are geopolitical in that they position the foreign reader, in the casual reading, to view the political empowerment of Yeltsin and Russian reformers in a positive light. Later in this chapter, I will argue that the coded geopolitical attitude of the audience towards future spaces is instrumental in producing the coded emotional response.

The next observation about these opening paragraphs is that they advance the commentary on the representation of oppositional behavior in the higher echelons of government. Part of the construction of Chubais “vaulting” is the
sudden, unexpected atmosphere with which the text endows it, and this observation can moreover be brought to bear as hindsight about electoral politics. The analysis of Alessandra Stanley’s earlier article on Chubais’ resignation left off by concluding that Yeltsin could use cabinet appointments near election time as tools to gain votes by flattering workers and hard-liners.\textsuperscript{72} I am not surprised in my ironic reading at the appointment of Chubais but rather understand that reformers, by virtue of their own coded surprise at Chubais’ reappointment, are sometimes unaware of the tools—specifically oppositional behaviors—that a reformist president may use to capture the vote in Russia’s nascent democracy.\textsuperscript{73} The latter article helps to confirm the earlier observations that oppositional behavior on the part of Yeltsin could complicate matters for political critics both inside and outside of Russia. Chubais is constructed in the latter article as a competent strategist, who as campaign manager brought Yeltsin a major political victory. So in the imagination of my ironic reading, he could clearly be capable of designing a strategy to leave temporarily Yeltsin’s administration in order to run his campaign from “behind the scenes.”\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} This statement just scratches the surface in terms of Yeltsin’s outlandish rhetorics, gestures, trips, and gift-giving around election time. Yeltsin was constructed by American foreign correspondence as a notoriously entrepreneurial candidate.

\textsuperscript{73} Another interpretation, however, is that those politics constitute a message about the limits to news. If high-level bureaucrats and reformers play the system, then reporting on those practices at daily intervals may produce textual drama about a more orderly, extra-textual world. Furthermore, very few casual readers could ever draw this conclusion. Journalism, by virtue of its daily repetition, makes itself imminently available to the political entrepreneur who uses drama as a smokescreen. In this case, journalism serves to make democracy less transparent.

\textsuperscript{74} My ironic reading imagines that plan as masterful purely from the standpoint of Chubais, because it maximizes his influence during Yeltsin’s reelection campaign, thus guaranteeing
My final observation about the above opening paragraphs is that the narrative voice began with a hopeful message about Chubais as “free-market pioneer” entering a very powerful position in Yeltsin’s government. Yet the hopeful message very quickly turned into an alarming one, voicing concerns about Yeltsin’s health. And then without further elaboration, it suddenly transmogrified into reassurance, that Yeltsin still “will receive Gore today,” only at an alternate location. The article, which announces that Yeltsin is only officially reconstructing his relationship with Chubais, is but a small part of an ongoing, daily news-drama of fear and hope, of reassurance and alarm. Its opening paragraphs are exemplary in their production of an emotionally unstable audience, experiencing a small group of emotions during the act of interpretation through a wide range of actants. While the first two examples of opening paragraphs show only the production of alarm in the audience, the third moves from reassurance to alarm and then back to reassurance again.

This chapter questions the connection in American foreign correspondence on Russia-in-transition between textual drama—which I understand as the production of an emotionally unstable audience—and space.

---

Chubais a high position in Yeltsin’ new government should Yeltsin win. Moreover, by managing Yeltsin’s campaign from a clandestine site, Chubais conceivably protected Yeltsin from any flak he would otherwise have taken from voters, workers, or hard-liners, dissatisfied with Chubais’ “massive sell-off of state property” and his “taming of Russia’s wild post-Soviet inflation” by limiting the supply of money.

Actant refers to the character as coded in the text and is separate from actor, social actor, or person, who presumably exists outside of the text.
Specifically, the evidence strongly suggests that casual readings of foreign correspondence with Moscow datelines produced textual drama, and that textual drama was by far the most common mechanism through which the narrator maintained the audience’s interest in reading. Moreover, there is a textual reward for not treating space in a material or historical way. Reporting changes in political posts for instance compactly produces drama. There is a textual reward for following changes in government. And elections specifically served the textual needs of foreign correspondence by creating a changing political landscape that posed risks to reformers, risks that may not necessarily have held for produced spaces.

This chapter considers the importance of abstract, mental spaces versus produced spaces with regard to the production of textual drama in news-representations. I am arguing that news-stories with Moscow datelines employed abstract, mental spaces to produce textual drama at a much greater rate than did news-stories with provincial datelines. In other words, disembodied reporting normally relied more heavily on abstract conceptions of space, particularly economic ones. And those conceptions constrained the storytelling act insofar as it depended more on emotional swings produced in the implied audience to maintain the interest in the reader which drove the story rather than on say identification or sympathy of the implied audience with the personal, embodied experiences of a character in a story. Those emotional swings were produced
through movements between hope and fear in the implied audience, resulting from the interpretation of emerging abstract codes about space from the perspective of an implied audience that generally advocated capitalism and democracy in Russia. I argue that Moscow-datelines depend more on abstract reasoning about space because of increased dependence on extended mediation; it is easier to collect more second-hand information on space in central places as well as to interview high-profile personalities whose showmanship and political importance make good material for textual drama. By bringing to bear in Chapter Eight the results of textual analysis on the conditions in which journalists elect to do fieldwork, the dissertation will conclude with observations about how the spatial constraints on the production of journalism produce textual bias which favors certain logics about space over others even though the reporting itself may seem to be neutral. Before continuing to the second section of the chapter, which goes beyond the initial paragraphs of articles in considering the imagination of Russia in the news, I will present the openings of several more articles and then propose a model for the cycling between alarm and reassurance within and between news stories.

**REASSURANCE**

For its next economic gamble, the Russian Government will begin on Thursday to issue vouchers worth 10,000 rubles each to every man, woman and child in the country. It is hoped that by year's end, the Russians will take their share of state-owned industry and invest it in the shaky beginnings of a capitalist system.

“This is the starting point of the capitalist education of the Russian people,” said Anatoly B. Chubais, the 33-year-old Deputy Prime Minister in charge of
privatization, in an interview today. “The first thing we have to do is start the process.”

Privatizing the Economy

According to the Government's rosy projection, over the next few months, 5,000 to 7,000 medium and large factories -- about 60 to 70 percent of Russian industry -- will reorganize themselves as joint-stock companies, in which citizens can buy shares with their vouchers or cash. A 10,000-ruble voucher is the equivalent of about two months of an average worker's salary -- about $40 at current exchange rates.

In the process, the Government's projection goes, state companies will become private, factory directors will become major stockholders and Russia's economic reforms will get a shot in the arm, as stock exchanges take over where state subsidies left off.

Launched at a time when Acting Prime Minister Yegor T. Gaidar and his team of young economists are caught in a political struggle to keep the rest of their economic program on track, the voucher campaign is an attempt to win popular support for what its architects call the irreversible dismantling of the old Communist system. (Bohlen 1992a)

The opening paragraphs of this article are important first because of the quoted rhetoric, “This is the starting point of the capitalist education of the Russian people.” The casual reader does not notice anything problematic at all about the statement, because the article produces an audience in favor of private enterprise as part of nascent capitalism in Russia. My ironic reading notices, however, that the narrative voice asks the audience to forget the past. Russians as Soviets were always educated about capitalism, not as participants in a capitalist system but rather as participants in a system that manufactured great meaning in opposition to it.76 Furthermore, reform had been underway for ten

---

76 A popular Russian joke in the early 1990s, soon after the USSR disintegrated, was “Comrade, I have good news, and I have bad news. The good news is that everything they told us about communism was a lie. That bad news is that everything they told us about capitalism was true.”
months before Chubais made this particular statement. How he chose this very moment, the event at which vouchers were distributed, to characterize as “the starting point” seems arbitrary. Thus, my ironic reading notices how easily the produced audience accepts the narrator’s request to forget the past and moves on to technical details of the process of privatization. And in the judgment of my ironic reading, the audience has unwittingly abstracted Russians from their spaces and their history in order to maintain the position of easy reading. And the coding of the distribution of vouchers as “the starting point of the Capitalist education of the Russian people” of course serves the textual need of producing the drama of something really important happening.

After the opening two paragraphs, the audience which accepted the reassuring message of “the irreversible dismantling of the old Communist system” is now presented a contrary argument, that the government’s projection for success is “rosy.” Distressing to the casual reader is that the voucher campaign, at first blush a decisive, economic act, is contaminated by political posturing, by a need to “win popular support” for an “economic program” which Gaidar’s “team of young economists” is “caught in a political struggle to keep…on track.” The voucher campaign may not even be able to stand on past successes, because it itself is an attempt to shore up support for “the rest of [the] economic program.” After the fifth paragraph, the reasons behind the voicing of
the voucher program by the narrator as an “economic gamble” are becoming clear. The audience, at first reassured by the message, is now alarmed by it.

A third mode of structuring the audience’s involvement with the text at the beginning of the story is through complication. Complication produces a sense of confusion or wanting to know more in the audience, usually through the presentation of inconsistent or contradictory evidence. Inconsistencies can be based on the behaviors of various actants; evidence that suggests one trend at a particular spatial or temporal scale yet another, opposing trend at a different scale; or through some other literary device. Whatever the individual case may be, the audience is compelled to continue receiving the message based on a coded curiosity with the duplicity in the story. That curiosity may ultimately be rewarded with for instance a clarification of the finer points surrounding the evidence or even a resolution of the coded tension. Take the following example:

<E> COMPLICATION

When they first came to power, Russia’s young, eager reformers broke up central control over the economy, smashed totalitarian rule over thought and action, and carried out an immense transfer of state property to private hands.

Five years later, Anatoly Chubais, one of the most durable yet unpopular of the original reformers, surveys the aftermath from a commanding vantage point in the Kremlin. After so much chaos and collapse, Russia is almost ungovernable from the center. Now, Chubais says, the time has come to impose an iron grip on this weakened post-Soviet state. “In order to have a democracy in society,” he declared recently, “there must be a dictatorship in power.”

(Hoffman 1996m)

This opening juxtaposes intense action in the first paragraph—energetic reformers “smashing totalitarian rule”, actively transforming economic and
political relations—against a pensive and solitary Anatoly Chubais. In the second paragraph, Chubais stands alone in the Kremlin, outside of the fray of “chaos and collapse,” tranquil, reflective, and in a state of being rather than doing. The representation of space here – the documentary-like setting of Chubais surveying “the aftermath” from the Kremlin – plays an important role in constructing difference. And the gap (inconsistency) between the collective action portrayed in the lead-paragraph and the individual reflection in the second paragraph creates the literary space for the even more profound contradiction introduced by the quotation at the end of the second paragraph: dictatorship is necessary in order to have democracy. This contradiction is so confusing that it may even blind the casual reader from the third and perhaps greatest contradiction, which is best stated in the form of a question: How will a centralized dictatorship address the needs of a state that has become “almost ungovernable from the center,” if not by governance? It would seem that now reform is about acting totalitarian, which apparently the instinct for which the “young, eager reformers” failed to smash after all.

The first two paragraphs, five sentences in all, produce an audience charged by the introduction of opposites and by the desire to unravel, or at least understand, the coded contradictions. Or put another way, the audience has a coded need to learn how to digest the dilemma under consideration, which is the reintroduction of totalitarian rule in Russia a half-decade after the Soviet Union
fell apart. The imagined core-periphery relationship is that a democratic central
government is too weak to carry out reform. And whereas in a previous example
elections obstructed reform, reforms here have gotten in the way of democracy
itself. The danger of reform, it seems, is that it continually generates the seeds of
its own destruction.

<F> COMPLICATION
That Boris N. Yeltsin won a vote of confidence in the national referendum
three weeks ago, nobody denies. But what that means is a matter of sharp
debate.

Ardent supporters of radical change, who had hoped that the President would
seize on the victory to sweep aside the bothersome legislative opposition and to
ram through sweeping market reforms, have been disappointed.

The President's major concrete actions since the referendum have been the
dismissal of two disloyal aides, the further humiliation of Vice President
Aleksandr V. Rutskoi and the appointment of two first deputy ministers of
dubious devotion to radical reform.

But beyond vows of a stiff fight against inflation, the Government has yet to
produce a concrete plan of action to reduce credits, handle bankruptcies or
speed the breakup of monopolies. Meanwhile, the ruble has continued its slide
against the dollar, rapidly approaching the 1,000-to-1 mark.

In the broader context of the struggle between progress and reaction that has
marked Russia's economics and politics since the failed Communist coup of
August 1991, however, Mr. Yeltsin's victory can be viewed as a dramatic
comeback from the brink of disaster. (Schmemann 1993c)

This example, 3.5 years prior to the first, opens with the conundrum that the
meaning of Yeltsin’s victory in the referendum is up for grabs. This
interpretation is ostensibly inconsistent with the traditional interpretation that an
election victory is good. Like the previous example, it stages a space for action
next to a space of inaction. It provides further evidence to understand the printed
discourse on reform as a discourse of what has happened against a background of
what has not happened. In this case, the audience considers a ramming through of market reforms and a hypothetical “sweeping aside the bothersome legislative opposition” alongside a Yeltsin, who in the judgment of the narrator, seems to have gone through a combination of inaction and misdeed through changes in his own administration more to corrode reform than to catalyze it. Interestingly, the case against Yeltsin is based on concrete evidence, while the hopes about the legislative opposition and reforms are just that – fantasy. Representing space abstractly through imagination provides greater freedom in the narrative to stage oscillations or gaps that provide the actions or spaces around or within which the audience can wrap or insert its imagination. The contested spaces of Russia then are not just geographies of difference, in terms of who wins or loses or who is right or wrong, but they are textual geographies of difference. Differences, imagined through abstract or social conceptions of space, provide the energy for the story.

The audience is further asked to consider the meaning of Yeltsin’s vote of confidence in a referendum result only three weeks old against newer data, that bankruptcies, monopolies, and reducing credits are issues that remain undealt

77 This observation is significant, because the rules for the presentation of inconsistencies allow for the juxtaposition of “the physical” against “the imaginary.” In other words, the discursive right to leverage the hopes and fantasies of actants in the story against representations of physical happenings affords the foreign correspondent a considerably wider textual terrain for forming this type of entry. I believe this is important, because hope and fear are also intangibles. Allowing for the intangibles of mental spaces increases the flexibility of the foreign correspondent to write a lead, which impacts not only whether a potential story is newsworthy at all but how one type of entry competes with another for space on the printed page.
with, while the ruble all along has been losing value. The construction of contradiction winds up with the narrator suggesting a much wider spatial and temporal scale with which to judge the chief executive. The audience is being told that both the immediate context and the broader context are valid, yet in this case, “the broader context of the struggle between progress and reaction that has marked Russia's economics and politics since the failed Communist coup of August 1991” is more relevant. The audience is on a roller-coaster ride of sorts, gently rolling from three-weeks out to the present, only to be rocketed back to five years in the past.78 Why did the narrator code the meaning of the referendum three weeks ago as “a matter of sharp debate,” only to construct a few sentences later a reassuring, “dramatic comeback”?79 A final inconsistency delivered by the message is that because of what happened in 1991, today’s data is superannuated even as it happens. The only ground for a genuine, negative judgment about progress and reform will be the loss of Yeltsin from the federal government. And that observation transitions smoothly into the final entry the analysis uncovered, which is the construction of identification.

78 This combination of temporal perspectives is fascinating. At the level of production of the storytelling relationship, the time-frame of three weeks out is textually most significant. That time frame was introduced in the lead-paragraph. However, in terms of the level of production of the extra-textual world, the narrator would have the audience believe that a much broader time-frame is more important. My ironic reading, at the level of production of the reading context, finds both time-frames equally relevant, with neither unable to exist in this story without the other. Chapter seven will specify further the geographic construction of the narrator.

79 The narrator asks the audience to remember the past in order to support the story without providing any rules about why it is more important in this case to do so, news being primarily “new” (Dahlburg 2000, personal communication). It imagines Yeltsin’s critics as forgetful, because they in particular are not putting the proper emphasis on historical context, ironically a
IDENTIFICATION

When Boris Yeltsin announced Feb. 15 that he would run for reelection, a number of his closest advisers stood in the wings and quietly cried. Some of them feared they were witnessing the president's last hurrah.

Yeltsin had traveled to his home base, the Urals city of Yekaterinburg, to make the announcement. That day, most major polls showed Yeltsin in fourth or fifth place in the presidential race, and many political observers had all but written him off. It was a frigid, damp day, and the president's normally booming baritone was reduced to an unhealthy rasp.

"We were standing behind the curtains, and several of the president's aides -- their eyes welled up with tears," said Igor Mintusov, a key strategist for Yeltsin. "Here was this elderly president with his hoarse voice who was showing this tremendous determination. It was an emotional moment." The story of Yeltsin's comeback, which reached its climax this week with his decisive runoff victory over Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, is political drama of the highest order. In interviews this week, Yeltsin aides and campaign consultants outlined several key factors and turning points that made it possible:

In this example, the audience is asked to identify emotionally with Yeltsin and his closest advisors, who “stood in the wings and quietly cried” over Yeltsin’s announcement in 1996 to run for reelection. Place is used as a stage, much akin to the way it was used in chapter four. Presumably, their tears flowed from fear of failure, likely because “many political observers had all but written him off.” This interpretation is consistent with that of the previous example, which concluded that the loss of Yeltsin from government is the only genuine reason to judge reform as a failure. Yeltsin as actant, as an elderly, cold, wet president with a raspy voice, determined to press on for reform in his career against the odds for reelection, is produced as an object toward which the audience is invited to

semantic exercise that news as a whole usually forgoes. In this case, the remembrance of history serves the textual function of reassurance.
emotionally act out. The audience is quite literally given permission to cry over the emotional significance of this “political drama of the highest order.”

The next two paragraphs, not reproduced here, inform the audience that Yeltsin was likely over “the official campaign spending limit of a little more than $3 million” by an astonishing two orders of magnitude and that he used “scare tactics…to convince Russians that a Communist victory could trigger a famine.” Textually, what is at risk is that Yeltsin as actant will be emotionally abandoned as corrupt or unworthy, through the introduction of these later details. However, the audience is quickly reminded of the emotional worthiness of Yeltsin: “Above all, the campaign saga is an intensely human story of an aging and ailing leader – a man by his own description at his best when the chips are down – who at considerable risk to his fragile health shook himself awake from a long political torpor to mount an astonishing come-from-behind victory.”

<H> IDENTIFICATION

From $30,000 Cartier watches to $150,000 stretch limousines, there is a brisk business to be done in Moscow these days catering to the gaudy and gargantuan appetites of Russia’s new rich.

At the Escada shop on the second floor of the old State Department Store, known as GUM, across Red Square from the Kremlin, young women breeze through racks of $2,000 suits without even a grimace. At the Almaz Jewelry Store on Kutuzovsky Prospekt, less expensive Cartier watches, priced at about $6,000, sell out as fast they are shipped in.

"Usually, we put them out in the morning, and by midafternoon they are gone," said a saleswoman at the Almaz store, where diamond earrings going for $250,000 tend to linger just a little bit longer.

---

80 Corruption is a significant theme, and it will show up more in the later chapters as an additional way to produce drama.
On an average Saturday, the Botany 500 men's store at GUM will do $14,000 in sales, 80 percent of it to Russians, said Jenny Bower, operations director for Astrum International, the parent company of Botany. "It is hard to beat that in the States," she said. (Bohlen 1993d)

This example is interesting, because it does not suggest how the audience should emotionally act out toward the actants, in this case Russians who sell upscale jewelry and haberdashery, as well as “Russia’s new rich.” The entry simply sets up a stage where “brisk [retail] business” is being done, where exorbitant prices do not even phase shoppers, and where sales are so good, they’re “hard to beat…in the States.” All of the commodities dealt with here, pricey suits, limousines, and especially jewelry, are luxury items that have exaggerated exchange values without proportionately high use values. The entry works or doesn’t work based on whether the reader emotionally acts out toward the actants produced as the objects of sympathy, in this case Russia’s newly rich, or abandons the actants altogether. The power of this particular entry lies precisely in its flexibility, it’s lack of a need to ask the audience how to act out emotionally. All human beings, once exposed to extreme material wealth, have judgments about it, whether they are impoverished, working class, or millionaires. The weakness of the entry is that the alternative pathway, abandonment of the objects of sympathy rather than emotional acting out, is potentially more likely to compel the reader to discard the story than to continue the act of reading. This weakness of the identification entryway I believe is why it is used less often than messages that overtly reassure or alarm the audience.
Of the 84 articles with Moscow datelines that I analyzed, about 80% open with messages that produce either an alarmed or reassured audience. It seems that if journalists can martial the data in order to produce a message that fits into a discourse on alarm or reassurance, they will do so. I am proposing the model in Table 5.1 for the lead paragraphs of articles by American foreign correspondents written with Moscow datelines under the period of study.

The first two cases, alarm and reassurance, coexist in general with a high degree of forgetfulness about space and society in order to accomplish textual drama. Textual drama plays a large role in seducing the reader into reading casually. Additionally, the construction of audiences as hopeful or fearful in past articles has little relevance to the emotional state in which the audience begins in

**Table 5.1: The Four Textual Functions in Foreign Correspondence with Moscow-Datelines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function of Message</th>
<th>Audience’s Predominant Feeling</th>
<th>Pathways or Space for Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alarm</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Allow fear to be maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allow fear to be assuaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassurance</td>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>Allow hope to be maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allow hope to be dashed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complication / Contrast</td>
<td>Confusion</td>
<td>Make sense out of things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Judge the situation as too complicated or relative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Allegiance</td>
<td>Emotionally act out toward the object of sympathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abandon the object of sympathy as unworthy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81 The majority of the articles I analyzed related to the chronology of events listed in Appendix Two. They dealt for instance with privatization, the operation of Russia’s government, international lending, and the value of the ruble. Other articles dealt more with personal accounts of life in Russia, doing business, and elections.
another article. Furthermore, the emotionally unstable audience allows for swing, sometimes subtle and sometimes quite pronounced, between the states of hope and fear within any given article. The dynamic of the swing is as follows:

- Reassurance plays off of fear. It flatters the optimistic sensibility that Russian space is not lost. It works to convert fear to hope.

- Alarm plays off of hope. It flatters the pessimistic sensibility that “as is,” Russia is lost. It works to convert hope to fear.

Stories with Moscow datelines that open by producing a confused audience or one that emotionally acts out are less numerous, because they implement more risky textual strategies. These articles seem to involve a greater degree of historicity in the understanding of space, especially those which produce an identification of the audience with an actant in the story. In the case of confusion, the audience can oscillate as freely as is coded between the judgment that sense has been made out of things and the position that the situation is too complicated to sort out. The risk is that the reader will interpret

---

82 In other words, any article can open up as fitting an archetype, as either “Western officials hope” or “Western officials fear.” And in either case, the hopes or fears of Western officials can be reproduced mimetically in the reader.
the situation as hopelessly relative, and with that final judgment, opt out of the story. Identifying audiences may act out emotionally toward any actant in any way, perhaps but not necessarily producing more drama in the text than in the case of Complication. The risk in this case is that if the reader is not compelled by the specific details about the actants to which the narrator commits, this reader may quit reading early out of indifference.

Summary

This section demonstrated how the printed discourse on reform treated space abstractly by dealing mostly with political figures as the architects of space rather than with representations of space itself. Russia was treated as the container or arena within events took place, and social conceptions of territory were largely absent. Representations of space were otherwise confined to using space as for instance a stage to help construct differences in stories that served a textual function. Furthermore, many of the themes and sub-themes that showed up in chapter four were manifest here, for instance trading hub (Moscow catering to the new rich), election-day mechanics (Yeltsin’s victory in a referendum), and privatization (the use of vouchers to transfer ownership of industry to Russian citizens). Thus far, the meanings which place names were used to deliver to stories, discussed in chapter four, did not differ markedly from meanings that were constructed without the use of place names. In other words, the presence of
a place name in a story with a Moscow dateline does not generally suggest the occurrence of a topic or a way of thinking that could not be delivered without the place name. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of foreign correspondence constructed an emotionally charged and sometimes unstable audience, which structured the casual reading of the story. The following section contributes to this discussion by demonstrating a material/historical approach to space as well as an occurrence of how Russian people outside of government were important to Russian policy-making.

THE BOTTOM-UP CONSTRUCTION OF RUSSIA

This section builds on the geopolitical imagination of identity by introducing the less common construction from Moscow of individual or ordinary Russians as space-producing agents. So far, I have called attention to the construction of Russian identity-politics by drawing attention to the represented antagonism between Western observers and Russian workers. That antagonism located reformers on the side of Westerners insofar as they implemented “austerity measures” that limited inflation; transferred property from the state to private individuals; and, generally worked toward establishing a legal environment for business that allowed Western firms to operate inside of Russia’s borders. These measures were top-down, in that they existed first in the
planning spaces of the Moscow-elite and conceived of individual Russians and Russian spaces more or less evenly as targets or objects of change.

Another imagination of Russian individuals, a minority conception from Moscow, posited individual Russians as distributed spatial agents who affected the outcome of things from the bottom up. Russia was imagined as spatially heterogeneous, with various regions absorbing the impacts of reform more than others. Rather than objects of the desire of Russian planners and foreign analysts, they were constructed as subjects who shaped Russian spaces, influenced policy, and deserved consideration apart from the necessity that they conform to “market” practices in order to make Russia a “market” economy. A 1993 article by Fred Hiatt decisively renders what is at risk for Russians under reform-oriented policies while simultaneously representing as tenuous the mental spaces about which the battle over reform is fought. Consider the following:

To move to a more efficient, market-driven economy, Moscow should stop subsidizing these dinosaurs [unprofitable enterprises], making space for new, more sensible enterprises to emerge. But the government cannot take such a step without condemning millions to unemployment. In some cases, entire cities built around one huge factory would die.

So any government will have to walk a nearly invisible line between promoting efficiency -- and thereby allowing some social pain -- and protecting the poor, the ill-trained and others who cannot adjust to the new world. Too much such protection means spending money the government does not have, which leads to hyperinflation, which leads to collapse; too little protection, many Russians fear, could lead not only to untold suffering but to popular revolt. And state industry, in any government, will remain a powerful lobby against reform…

(Hiatt 1993h)

Hiatt narrates a reform that means entire cities developed under Soviet planning stand to vanish. In his representation, reform produces victims: forced migrants,
the poor, and those unable to cope. Furthermore, he constructs the code “nearly invisible line” to demonstrate the danger of reforms to the political future of reformers vis-à-vis the spatial unevenness of the harsh effects of reform.

Regardless of how much money the government spends under the auspices of Yeltsin as reformer, Hiatt constructs reform as inherently destabilizing to the political party in power. In other words, the historical development of society and space in Russia has produced for reform politics a significant voting block that is alienated from reform policies no matter what choices the government makes. In just two paragraphs, Hiatt has imagined a geography for Russia in which democracy is tentative; democracy produces little choice for many innocent people; and, the relationship between economic policy and those who hold elective office is convoluted. And morale, expressed by the potential for popular revolt, is an important mediator between the people and the government. Morale was represented as a messy and stochastic feature of the Russian mindset, a product of the knowable flows of credits to industry, the success of local industries, and political campaigning as well as seemingly arbitrary ebbs and flows.

Hiatt’s construction of the spatial basis for anti-reform logics in fact informs his imagination of the politics of the drastic and painful redevelopment of Russian space and society.

While Yeltsin may run this parliament out of town, it is wrong to assume today’s legislators oppose his reforms and accommodations with the West only because they are ex-communists or because reforms will hurt their personal
interests. Under any government, reform will provoke grave opposition, because it is going to be extremely painful for millions of blameless Russians... A new legislature will be confronted with the same economic albatross bequeathed Russia by decades of central planning...resource-rich regions will push to go their own way. They will hand in less tax revenue, which means Moscow will have less to give the resource-poor regions, and the gap between rich and poor will grow. The resulting strains and questions over whether Russia itself can remain intact can only inflame nationalism and increase anxiety in a people already at sea, in many cases, because of the loss of an ideology they grew up with...In practical terms, these problems mean that, even if new elections are held, a substantial number of nationalists and anti-reform politicians are likely to win seats. And Yeltsin, having won the battle and gotten his wish, might find himself wondering why he fought so hard. (Hiatt 1993h)

Hiatt’s arguments are rare for articles with Moscow datelines. His reasoning, which problematizes the rapidity with which reform can be accomplished and is thus ideologically opposed to the logics of Western economics, does not rely on sarcasm or irony. He questions the validity of attacking anti-reform politics purely on ideological grounds by way of his own construction of a historical, materialist geography (for instance the development of cities around single, large factories and the distribution of natural resources) and a subtle leaning toward analysis based in Russia’s regions. He has criticized the efficacy of abstract reasoning about space by rendering Russian individuals with a greater spatial agency, which ultimately may result according to his narration in greater regional differences and the reelection of a parliament opposed to reforms. His story destabilizes the boundaries between politics, elections, and economics by considering regional heterogeneity and even anticipates a political backlash against reform from the innocent who will be hurt by the new economy. His representation of reform-politics in this respect coincides with the analysis of
previous text, that politicians, in order to win the vote, are forced to behave as
political entrepreneurs.

Importantly, Hiatt’s representation imagines core-periphery relationships in Russia that favor one region over another, depending on the uneven
distribution of resources at a regional-level. Based on ensuing regional favoritism from the core, the story argues for tensions between regions themselves. Ultimately, Hiatt argues that Yeltsin’s dissolution of the parliament in 1993 was perhaps irrelevant, because the electoral geography of the nascent democracy would nevertheless return communists and nationalists to power. In giving credence to historically produced spaces in the construction of Russia’s political economy in transition and to Russian individuals as important actors, Hiatt’s narrative argues for a reform so rife with contradictions that no matter how good of an idea it seems, it may be counter-productive. And he thus critiques the political drama of Yeltsin’s dissolution of parliament as irrelevant. Hiatt’s article, which at 1221 words is a story of normal length, produces a vividly geographical imagination that suggests the emphasis on changes in political personnel in the federal government in most Moscow-based reporting might be somewhat misguided.

Hiatt’s article, as different as it is from most others in its explicit consideration of space as a material and historical product of social behavior available to the casual reader, still begins according to the proposed model for
the opening paragraphs of journalism on Russia in transition. It produces in the first paragraph a reassured audience, which in the second paragraph quickly transforms into an alarmed audience:

President Boris Yeltsin, having ruled out compromise with his reactionary opponents in Moscow, may manage to break the political stalemate that has largely paralyzed his government over the past two years.

But even in the best circumstances, and despite the fond hopes of Western policy makers, no tactical political victory can ensure that Russia will follow a consistently pro-Western, pro-reform path in the coming years. Russia's economic problems are too deep-seated, its regional tensions too systemic and its spiritual and ideological compass too disoriented to produce anything but turbulence for some time to come. (Hiatt 1993h)

Reassurance and alarm are again used to open up a space for interpretation. But Hiatt’s article lacks the ahistorical perspective that characterizes the more abstract reasonings about space. It is also less dramatic, producing a much more emotionally stable audience that does not alter its state of alarm after the second paragraph. These observations support the argument that imaginations of daily changes in Russia are best produced using ephemeral data that constitute abstract representations of political and economic spaces, data which can be collected, tallied, and represented at any convenient interval. Hiatt’s article, for instance, only used one direct quote:

"No matter how dramatic the events of Sept. 21 may seem, they are still events at the top," Leonid Batkin, a historian and political observer, said in an interview tonight. "The whole burden of old problems remains." (Hiatt 1993h)

The casual interpretation of the quote, even Hiatt’s entire article, strives to de-emphasize the role of political drama in determining Russia’s future! And it gives primacy to bottom-up geographic forces over top-down ones. It also
produces an audience that is less interested in the story because of the drama of success and failure and more interested in Russians out of mercy. It understands Russians more as vulnerable to reform and less as docile objects who can be objectively rewarded for success or blamed for failure.

The next section fills out the etic codes I developed on reform from articles with Moscow datelines and considers the coded relationships under reform between aid, austerity, bankruptcy, and the expansion of new business-practices in Russia. It builds on the discussion of the previous two sections by connecting the emotional construction of the audience with largely unstated geopolitical attitudes towards Russians and future spaces. In doing so, it understands the audience as taking sides and that act of taking sides as fundamentally complicit in the emotional construction of the audience. It finds that the geopolitical and moral imagination of Russians informs the audience’s emotional movements, which in turn drive the casual reading which delivers messages about the politics of change in Russia.

AID, BANKRUPTCY, AND THE MORAL IMAGINATION OF RUSSIAN SPACES

Aid was the principle construct that connected the United States and the West to Russia during the 1990s. Aid involved the calculated and controlled flow of credits and loans from the West to the Russian government and to Russian
firms as well as monetarily less significant technical assistance and advice. The correct flow of credits and loans, combined with fiscal austerity on the part of the Russian government, was imagined in the majority of stories about aid as creating the economic impetus for the bankruptcies of antiquated Russian firms. Such bankruptcies were conceived of as clearing the Russian industrial landscape in order to make room for new and profitable economic ventures. Meanwhile, privatization programs would turn more efficacious firms over to private hands.

The printed discourse on for instance hard-liners opposed to privatization and the questioning of President Yeltsin’s commitment to market-reform, already mentioned in this chapter, was part of the larger represented process of economic and political reform in which the West, through aid, participated. Hiatt’s article, discussed in the second section, problematized the clearing of the industrial landscape by suggesting that the historical development of Russian cities around single factories implied that reform would be socially caustic and jeopardize the political empowerment of reformers themselves. This section focuses more on the construction of the world outside of the text, that is the referential ways in which foreign correspondence from Moscow worked, as opposed to the construction of the storytelling relationship already discussed. It is designed to expand on the previous sections by showing how the discourse on aid was structured by a moral, geopolitical attitude about how Russian space should be developed. That attitude included taking sides around the issue of reform, and it
informed the emotional movements in the audience discussed earlier in the chapter.

**Codes That Take Sides**

Foreign correspondence normally constructed an opposition to reform made of up hard-liners, scary communists, and extreme nationalists. These codes survived both short and long periods during which Yeltsin himself either acted radically—for instance his dissolution of parliament or his support of violence in Chechnya—or because of his ill health was unable to act at all. The suggestion here is that tags such as hard-liner are special labels in international political discourse. They are codes that in representations produce categories of actants with respect to the desires of outsiders. 83

For instance, it was reported that Yeltsin’s dissolution of parliament in 1993 violated the Russian constitution by his own admission (Shapiro 1993f). A hypothetical correlate for the United States, for instance Richard Nixon dissolving a congress bent on impeaching him, pushes the meaning of the term radical to its limits. However, American foreign correspondents normally code Yeltsin’s parliamentary opposition as “hard-line” rather than him. 84

---

83 “Young reformers” were constructed as winning “arguments over economic and fiscal policy” supported by western governments and international financial institutions. Reforms were sometimes coded as “western-style.” See for instance Erlanger (1993d).

84 I do not recall a single instance of Yeltsin being emically coded as a hard-liner. There is an example, however, of his cabinet becoming “increasingly hard-line.” See Stanley (1996b).
readings almost always favored the message that Yeltsin was a reformer, regardless of extremes in his behavior. Yeltsin was so fanatically sided with in the geopolitical imagination of foreign correspondence that he was sometimes even constructed as having an unvoiced mandate to “rule out compromise” (Hiatt 1993h). This logic has ramifications for the production of alarm or reassurance in the audience, because it indicates that Yeltsin represented as “in charge” was always reassuring. The analysis suggests however that the codes “reformer” and “hard-liner” rest on shaky turf, because they detach the audience’s emotional involvement with Russia from the development of democracy there while simultaneously relying on that very development to generate meaning in the first place. These codes are floating signifiers.85

**The Stylized Construction of Government**

One striking feature of the foreign correspondence under study is the style in which journalists imagined “the government.” In the following example, parliament is represented as “setting aside two key elements of the Government’s [reform] program” in a situation in which those specific elements are much more coherent with Yeltsin’s reform agenda than with the agenda of a parliament in

---

85 Derrida (1972) introduced the concept of freeplay, arguing that the whole field of usage of signifiers lacks a central signified to which they point. Because of the absence of a central point for the signified, the additional use of signifiers supplements previous usages rather than totalizing them or closing them off. Hence, additional significations are said to be “floating” (Derrida 1972, 260). Other linguists also argued for incomplete or vicarious significations, such as Barthes (1984), who discussed how the signified can be detached from the signifier and how signifiers can be understood as empty.
opposition to him. It is not clear how or why the parliament, as part of the
Russian government, is coded as ostensibly owning these elements before they
were set aside.

The future of economic reform has also become a battleground in Mr. Yeltsin's
widening feud with the Russian Parliament, which last week brusquely and
without debate set aside two key elements of the Government's program86, one
a bankruptcy law and the other a revised program to privatize state factories
and enterprises. (Bohlen 1992b)

And in this example, an opening paragraph, the audience is coded as
understanding that one branch of government might discredit the whole of it:

Injecting a new note of urgency into the domestic debate over the country's
economic future, a high Government official bitterly accused the Russian
Central Bank today of working to discredit the Government and undermine the
entire process of economic reform.87 (Erlanger 1992)

By the third paragraph, the audience is unproblematically interpreting a message
in which Yeltsin can have a government all to himself while the remainder of the
federal body-politic, the parliament and the Central Bank, somehow does not
deserve the category “government.” In this message, Yeltsin’s government has
important economic initiatives threatened by other federal bodies that don’t
deserve the label “government.”

Mr. Vasilyev's comments stepped up a recent campaign by the Government of
President Boris N. Yeltsin to put pressure on the Central Bank and Parliament,
which controls the bank, to stop lending so much money. The lending threatens
to produce an inflation rate that would cripple the Government's other
economic initiatives. (Erlanger 1992)

---

86 In this example, the Russian parliament is constructed as intransigent by refusing to pass laws
that no other branch of government can enact.
87 This accusation followed the printing of more money by the Central Bank. The Central Bank is
responsible for indirectly maintaining the value of the ruble by controlling the amount of
currency in circulation.
The analysis indicates that the construction of the category “government” is unstable and enlisted by the foreign correspondent in the greater project of producing alarm and reassurance in the audience. It marginalizes political agents that are judged as threatening reform. In the above cases, alarm is produced in an unfolding drama between a protagonist, Yeltsin’s Government, and an antagonist, composed of the Central Bank and Parliament. Furthermore, if the government itself or divisions of the government are coded as protagonist and antagonist, they are actants. If these large bodies can be coded as discrete subjects to which actions can be ascribed, then it is also possible, as actants, that they could be constructed as thinking or feeling, as psychologically unified. This theoretical induction and subsequent observation have given rise to a new category, psychological space.

Psychological Space, Anonymity, and Emotion

Psychological spaces are produced when space is constructed with the ability to act, negotiate, and carry on as a real person would. The imagination of Russian space as internally undifferentiated is critical to this construction.\textsuperscript{88} When Russia is imaged as homogenous and positioned as grammatical subject, a monolithic actant-space results in which the subject exhibits no discontinuity with itself. As such, space is personified – coded as deciding and acting. This

\textsuperscript{88} Agnew (1998) noted that imagination of space as homogenous was also important to Cold War conceptions of Soviet spaces.
construction even allows space, as actant, to be imagined as accountable. These kinds of imaginations protects the anonymity of social actors in the spaces outside of the text, which are internally differentiated. This rhetorical technique is tantamount to setting up a straw man. In each of the following examples, Russia is imagined as an internally undifferentiated space, which opens up rhetorical possibilities for establishing agency and blame. Consider the following examples of journalistic rhetoric and the implications, which I have indicated:

Ending 74 years of socialism, Russia embarks today on the first substantial effort to transform its centrally planned, state-owned economy so that market forces and entrepreneurship predominate in the future. (Parks 1992b)

**Opposition within Russia doesn’t count as “Russia.”**

**Anonymous:** those resisting or skeptical of transformation

Russia also said it would accelerate the overhaul of big state-owned enterprises, the financial sector and agriculture. (Mufson 1992)

**All of Russia can speak with a single voice.**

The whole country is liable for the promises of one small group of negotiators.

**Anonymous:** those opposed to these overhauls

In an effort to speed aid to Russia, Moscow and the International Monetary Fund will announce an agreement soon under which Russia will receive $1.5 billion in aid within the next few weeks in exchange for promises to control inflation, fund officials and advisers to Russia said today. (Greenhouse 1993)

**The whole country stands to gain from aid to Russia.**

**Anonymous:** Russian people who do not consider IMF money as aid

With double-digit monthly inflation, the Chechnya war and some bizarre personnel appointments, Russia has dug itself a pretty deep hole with Western Governments and the International Monetary Fund, which is now debating a $6 billion loan Moscow is counting on. (Erlanger 1995a)

---

89 IMF money allows the government to operate with less tax money while industry is bankrupting. It allows for credits to flow selectively to the regions that are most important in reeecting reformers.
Russia is responsible for all of these events, separated in space and time.

Anonymous: all parties responsible for the problematic circumstances

Psychological constructions of Russian space seem most important in high-level discourses on reform, especially those that involve international intervention and aid. Psychological spaces produce a scapegoat (Russia in these examples) and conceal the identities other parties affected by or participating in reform. The other parties may be undervoiced in narratives on transition.

Generally, when divisions within the government were specified, they were attributed to a parliament dominated by anti-reform figures. It wasn’t unusual for Yeltsin to be constructed as conciliatory and honest while parliament was constructed as combative or sarcastic (Boudreaux 1993e). In one case, the “congress in opposition” to Yeltsin was even referred to as an “anomaly”, as if in a democracy it were unnatural for a legislature to oppose a president (Erlanger 1993c). With the notable exception of Chechnya, Yeltsin was even represented as entitled to brutality, because he was on the right side. Yet the financial and identity crises within government, combined with the general lack of experience with capitalism and democracy, meant that the reform-contingent within Russian government was heavily dependent on international advice and assistance. Western interests and fears, typified for instance by the fear of loose nukes and the assumption that the involvement of Western firms in Russia would speed the transition, contributed to the establishment of close relations between Western
financial experts and Russian reformers. The key concept that characterized these new geopolitical relationships was that more than ever, Russian space was porous to external flows of material, symbols, and people.

The Coded Importance of Trans-National Flows to Russian and Foreign Interests

There were myriad styles in which Russian space was constructed as porous, including the represented controversy over loose nukes and the assumption that investment from outside would engender the transition in Russia. In narratives, Muscovites recognized that Russia competed with other countries for outside investment. Some Russians testified that as individuals and members of families, they depended on trade for their own survival (Dahlburg 1998). For now, I will focus on the significance of monetary exchange in international trading partnerships. Specifically, as part of understanding the construction of Russia as a moral space, I want to describe how the different needs of Russian and non-Russian trading partners may be met or unmet with respect to the discourse on economic austerity in Russia.

Remarkably, there are casual readings, although certainly not the predominant ones, that clarify in fits and starts why a stable Ruble is valuable to outsiders. Well into an article by Celestine Bohlen (1993e), the reader discovers:

Because of its debt problems, Russia has not been in a position to obtain commercial bank loans to buy these [foreign] commodities...credits were not so much aid as business arrangements that helped the lending nations find markets
for their goods more than it helped Russia pay for them... [And furthermore] [m]ost of these credits are a prepackaging of old programs, circulated by the lending countries for their own domestic purposes...It is very difficult to qualify them as aid.

In other words, international lending agencies may very well be constructed as beneficent toward Russia when they make loans to Russia designed to allow non-Russian producers to claim Russian market-space. The casual reading of Bohlen’s article, however, destabilizes the very code “aid:”

“The Americans are talking about expanding aid to Russia,” said Sergei Y. Glazyev, Russia's Foreign Trade Minister. “What we demand is a free access of Russian goods to the markets of developed countries, including that of the United States, and an end to discrimination against Russia in foreign markets.”

(Bohlen 1993e)

Bohlen’s article codes a powerful geographical imagination that links social practice with spatial practice. Market-reform here means giving American firms new spaces in which to sell their products.

Most articles, however, established a different rhetoric, employing phrases like “Western aid,” “loans to Russia,” (Erlanger 1993e) and “helping Russia” (Shapiro 1993c) that served the purpose of constructing in my casual reading a beneficent Western or American lending community. One sentence reads, for instance, “[T]he West is pushing institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to be less rigorous in their financial standards where Russia is concerned” (Erlanger 1993e). Another article states, “The I.M.F.’s proposals mainly seek to strengthen the ruble so that it is more readily convertible into hard currencies. A stable ruble, in turn, helps to attract foreign investment and encourages foreign trade, which are two other goals being
sought by the fund” (Uchitelle 1992b). My casual reading associates good judgments with foreign investment through the codes “strengthen,” “stable,” “attract,” and “encourage.” My ironic reading here, however, notices that Russia is constructed schizophrenically. “Russia”, in understanding itself as a beneficiary of loans on “less rigorous” terms, has forgotten that part of itself that produces. My ironic reading connects beneficent international lending with the business of putting Russian producers out of Russian markets. Aid to Russia thus stands problematized. The very code “aid” itself, having been identified as a linchpin in a discourse on space that claims to be for Russia yet acts against Russian producers, seems to be as much imperial as it is Post-Soviet.

I have established thus far that Western logics in the print-media advocated widespread bankruptcies of Russian firms. In a minority of stories, aid was linked in casual readings to that agenda. Now, however, I will take a look at how austerity was constructed as not working according to the logics of abstract, mental spaces.

**Austerity, Bankruptcy, and Barter**

The trenchant shortage of cash commonly represented as part of the Russian national economy in the 1990s stultified the reward for producing goods

---

90 Austerity policies further advocate the interests of non-Russian firms operating in Russia by helping to minimize devaluation as a thief of profit. Because foreign-based firms must repatriate capital in order to return profit to investors, they are vulnerable to exchange rates in a way that Russian firms are not.
in Russia. It alienated Russian producers from Russian banks, which could lend to the government with greater assurances of being paid back, while simultaneously and severely retarding production by making payment difficult if not impossible. The cash shortage resulted in hoarding, because price became a meaningless representation of the value of goods. And because the freeing of prices was the first major economic step that the Russian government took in 1992, there was no time for the government to develop a legal environment for bankruptcy (Bohlen 1992a).

Bankruptcies did not automatically happen just because there was no cash. Russian firms were represented as “teetering on the edge of bankruptcy” but somehow not going over that edge in 1993 (Schmemann 1993c; Shapiro 1993b) and they were still “teetering” in 1998 (Hoffman 1998l)! By the time the Ruble experienced its most dramatic devaluation in 1998, barter was pervasive (Andrews 1997b; Gordon 1998d; Williams 1998j). And by 1997, a potentially lucrative trade had emerged in paper bonds called Veksels (Andrews 1997b). Veksels represented corporate IOUs. They were traded on a margin, on the probability that sometime in the future, debts could be paid in cash.

Austerity, rather than clearing Russian spaces of the “Soviet dinosaurs” of enterprise, produced new types of economic spaces through partnerships. Partnerships, first through bartering and second through the trade in bonds as IOUs, reworked newly porous Russian spaces with networks that allowed
producers to survive in economic spaces that lacked sufficient money to represent the value of goods in circulation. An industrial decline that far surpassed what the United States experienced during the Great Depression failed to surrender Russian spaces wholesale to the preexisting, international, corporate networks that depended on capital. What emerged in Russia was a different set of dependencies in which whole towns, predicted to disappear once the factories upon which they relied were bankrupted, refused to die. This will be a subject taken up much more extensively in Chapter Seven. For now, it suffices to conclude that partnerships between Russian firms, laborers, and entrepreneurs, some of whom even operated on a profit-motive, constructed major obstacles to the reworking of Russian spaces for the purpose of the free flow of capital. These “results” for Russian spaces fit with the social conception of territory, while abstract (aspatial economic) ways of thinking about space, and the policies built around them, failed to produce the intended results.

CONCLUSION

This chapter found that the political geographies constructed in foreign correspondence are also emotional geographies. They rely on both a predominant feeling (hope, fear, confusion, or sympathy) in light of the emerging data in the text as well as a predominant geopolitical attitude of the audience toward Russia.
as an embryo of capitalism and democracy. The coded attitudes toward future spaces in Russia constituted geographies of desire, as the audience took sides, for instance through the fanatical support or rejection of political figures, with respect to how Post-Soviet, Russian spaces should be correctly and morally redeveloped. President Yeltsin, for instance, was never coded as a hard-liner, and the codes “dinosaur” and “path to reform” clearly projected into the text specific notions about social and spatial change. The act of taking sides informed then the emotional construction of the audience that was so basic at structuring the casual reader’s involvement with the text. In this sense, foreign correspondence constructed geographies of difference, because it relied so heavily on difference to drive emotionally the act of storytelling. And the emotional involvement of the reader with the text was as significant as any factual information transmitted by the journalistic message.

Geographers have previously worked with emotion, the earliest being Bill Bunge (1975) and Susan Smith (1987; 1989). Bunge (1975) found that parents’ fear about crime or mishaps varied depending on whether families lived in low-rise or high-rise apartments and that their fear informed parental restrictions on play and mobility for children in Chicago. Smith (1987) found that mothers’ anxiety about crime was affected by mediated representations and that their perceptions of danger often informed their directions to children about where to play. Valentine (1989) argued that women associated male-violence with
particular spatial contexts and that women’s perceptions of their vulnerability in
various contexts extensively influenced women’s use of space. Valentine (1992)
also investigated how understandings of safety and risk for the built environment
are constructed over time in women’s minds. Fernando Bosco (2003, personal
communication) argues that many political movements that affect the landscape,
such as NIMBYism, originate with an emotional reaction. In terms of
geopolitics, Dalby (1988) found that fear about communism helped to perpetuate
increased militarization, while Ó Tuathail (1998, 4) remarked that conceptions of
danger are expressed on the landscapes of states. And Sharp (2000) concluded
that in representations of the Cold War, The Reader’s Digest imagined
Americans unafraid of Communism as the greatest reason to be afraid.

Desire, either for protection, to block development, to militarize, or to
prevent the spread of Communism, is part of an emotional geography that
compels people to act. In all of these examples, fear is predicated by difference:
inaccessibility derived from spatial gradients; outstanding locations in the news;
gender differences; proposed changes in landuse; and, divergence in political
ideology. This chapter fits in with the literature on geography and fear, because
it argues that constructed differences, this time from a textual perspective,
generate emotional responses, while also finding that other emotions, such as
hope, confusion, and sympathy, are predominantly associated with the
*Geographies of Exclusion* to feelings about difference, arguing “Feeling about others, people marked as different, may also be associated with places…Who is felt to belong and not to belong contributes in an important way to the shaping of social space” (Sibley 1995, 3). He again emphasizes fear and anxiety in the conditioning of people’s relationships and critically, “that fear, anxiety, nervousness *also affect attitudes to knowledge*” (Sibley 1995, 183, my emphasis). This has been a major thrust of the argument in this chapter, that is, specifying the ways in which coded attitudes towards difference, expressed in emotional terms, have structured the ways in which the delivery of certain messages and meanings was favored as opposed to other messages and meanings. Moreover, Sibley considers Julia Kristeva’s (1982) conception of abjection, which incorporates the desire to expel things that threaten the boundary between us and them, to be inherent to human experience. In this context, reform significantly recodified the Russian as a desire in *them* to be like *us*. Consequently, the aspiration in them to be like us automatically served the boundary-making function of differentiating us from them. Communists and hard-liners challenged the new codification of reform by destabilizing the new boundary between the Russian and the American and thus were objects of fear, and along with the persistent “old-style” practices embodied in the persistence of outdated factories and old Communist gentry, were subject to erasure through aid.
In terms of the referential functions of language, the most important concept for the geography of Russia under reform was the transition to a democratic, market economy. This transformation was most often expressed in terms of abstract space. Abstract spaces served foreign correspondence in a variety of ways, the most important of which was enabling the treatment the voiced intentions of political figures as indicators of future geographic change. The discourse on future Russian spaces was a discourse on the presupposed architects of those spaces, and those architects from the Moscow-dateline tended strongly to be figures in national government. Articles from Moscow mostly dealt with top-down governance, although bottom-up political forces, the most important of which was morale, did show up. Speech acts were essential to imagined geographies, because foreign correspondence on Russia was a discourse on designing space, on future geographies, and on the political contests around who would be the privileged writers of those spaces. The notion about space that most enabled the production of textual drama around political theatrics and rhetoric was that Russian space was changeable enough to accommodate rapidly the new social and spatial structures of capitalism. This perspective made the daily reporting of political culture in Moscow relevant.

A much less common conception of space posited it as resistant to change. This condition was reinforced both by the predominant, coded agreement that spatial change should be engineered by decision-making and practice in
mental, economic spaces as well as the general dearth of reporting from Moscow that considered space as a historical and material product. Hence, heterogeneity within government was often imagined as ideologically rooted. And the coded emotional movements in the audience so replied upon, in order to structure the casual reading of the text, playing favorites with political personalities that oftentimes any interrogation of how those personalities actually served the political or economic interests of the Russians whose lives were at stake was foregone. This was manifested for instance in floating signifiers.

Taking sides was important in the representation of the government and of Russian territory, which sometimes hid or marginalized social actors in order to bring others to the forefront in the project of creating a clear pathway towards an emotional response in the audience. Thus the imaginations of Russian government, as the principle architect of Russian space, as well as Russian territory, were subject to abstraction in service of the textual needs of the narrator. Abstract representations of space served textual needs by providing more flexibility in storytelling to create an emotionally compelling message. Helping Russia through aid and austerity, however, was an abstraction that used a territorial conception of society, according to some readings, in order to advocate the hidden interests of foreigners over the interests of Russians. In this sense, aid itself was ideological.
Nonetheless, the constructed geopolitical relationship between Russia and
the West involved a certain partnership. For a variety of reasons, Russia was
imagined as needing outside help. And the West was represented as needy of
assurances, especially during election-time, that Russia was on track. But
elections were imagined as events that complicated the process of reform. And
by virtue of the abstract ways in which space was understood in news stories,
they were made into spectacular events that through hopes and fears over the
development of future Russian spaces played out. Place as stage was a common
modality, through the voicing of political figures, for this chapter as it was in
chapter four.

The kinds of messages that stories with Moscow-datelines delivered
independently of using place names included the categories of spatial messages
broadly found to be delivered by regional place names in chapter four. In other
words, the general spatial categories Place as Input in Social Relations, Core-
Periphery Relationships, and Trans-Boundary Flows, developed in chapter 4,
were all relevant to the discussion in this chapter. Particularly,

• the concept of Place as Input in Social Relations was evidenced in
  morale (the ways in which the electorate perceived President Yeltsin in

---

91 for instance to receive the necessary expertise to build a free-market system, to receive
financial support at a time of fiscal crisis, and as an assurance that democratic practices were
taking root at a time when ordinary Russians were too occupied with daily life to focus on
government
92 And conversely, this suggests that references to place are special in stories about Russia,
because they are not required to introduce the ideas behind the general spatial categories l
light of progress in regional development), in Chubais’ statements about the governability of Russia, and in the inherent attention paid to policy in the context of the progress of reform “on the ground”;

- Core-periphery Relationships were most evident in the printed discourse about the flow of credits from the Russian Central Bank to individual firms; and
- Trans-Boundary Flows were inherent to the mediated discourse on aid and austerity.

However, many abstract conceptions of space lacked a connection to the general spatial category Place as Input in Social Relations in favor of a conception of Russian spaces as best understood through for instance economic indicators and political appointments. The greatest disagreement on space, always implicit and occasionally made explicit by stories like Hiatt’s (1993h) occurred in terms of how and to what extent space, as a historical and material product, influenced its own development.

This chapter examined the various roles that represented social and spatial practices played in the imagination of social groups in Russia. It is part of a larger project which demonstrates that news-stories with Moscow-datelines are substantially different than news-stories with provincial datelines at the textual level. That difference, I am arguing, occurs because news-stories written in developed in chapter four. Rather, they are particular instances in which foreign correspondents choose to specify or indicate spatial relationships.
Moscow exploit the features of Moscow as central place. They rely on the phenomenon of extended mediation. And most of the abstractions demonstrated here work from voiced data from political figures; from highly compact, empirical and aspatial approaches to changes in the economy and government; and, from reasoning in abstract, mental spaces. And it is precisely these data, available on news feeds, which are easily transmittable, compact, and readily available for use by foreign correspondents. Chapter six now turns to a cartographically driven analysis of articles with provincial datelines in order to begin the work for the second major comparison group in earnest. It begins the task of showing how stories based on fieldwork in the provinces, in terms of their reasoning about space and the use of space in their reasoning, are distinct from stories from Moscow.
CHAPTER 6 – BEYOND THE NEWS-FEED: THE JOURNALISTIC IMAGINATION OF RUSSIA FROM THE PROVINCES

This chapter is the first of two chapters that deal with foreign correspondence written outside of Moscow. It is about understanding the ways and degrees to which foreign correspondents used trips to provinces outside of Moscow in order to produce news-stories. Like chapter four, it is structured by maps and relies on an understanding of journalism based on themes. Unlike chapter four, this chapter is not about the journalistic usage of Russian places distant from the journalist at the time of writing. The mapped data instead represent occurrences of entire articles (rather than particular references to place within an article) produced on occasions during which the foreign correspondent traveled to a province and wrote a story about that same province. It deals with foreign correspondents when they are away from the bureau headquarters in Moscow, doing a very different kind of fieldwork.

It is important to note that just like chapter four, this chapter relies on a rigid categorization of the data into thirteen themes. In using that categorization, I respected the breadth and depth of the messages in each story. In fact, landuse as a theme in Chapter Four was embedded or co-constructed along with other themes. So the significance of landuse, going purely by the numbers, was downplayed as joint constructions of landuse and “something else” were
categorized as that “something else.” Because of the assignment in this chapter of whole stories, commonly exceeding over 1,000 words, to a single theme, it should be expected that interesting connections emerge between the categories that I develop here. I bring those connections to light at the appropriate times.

This chapter is organized in three sections. The first section broadly analyzes the distribution of the datelines published by American foreign correspondents as they traversed Russian spaces. The second section is a map-based, theoretical discussion of how the five themes discussed in Chapter Four show up in articles with provincial datelines. Finally, the last section summarizes the results and prepares the reader for Chapter Seven, which is a textual analysis of the stories with provincial datelines.

THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DATELINES

The provincial datelines that appeared at least once a year accounted for over half (240 or 55%) of all occurrences of provincial datelines. Those 15 territories are listed in Table 6.1. The overall distribution of the occurrence of provincial datelines for the whole study period is mapped in Figure 6.1. Primorskiy Kray occurred 52 times, or once every nine weeks! The frequency of

---

93 Only two of these territories, Sakha and Karelia, did not appear in Table 4.1, which represented the top 17 places referenced in stories with Moscow-datelines.
**The 15 Territories Visited at a Mean Rate of at Least Once a Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Number of Stories</th>
<th>Most Important Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Economics, Culture, Gov-Econ, Landuse, Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast (Obl.)</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Gov-Econ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk Obl.</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Landuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov Obl.</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakha (Yakut) Republic</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Landuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Government, Gov-Econ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Obl.</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Obl.</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>History, Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk Obl.</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Landuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelyabinsk Obl.</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gov-Econ, Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Landuse, Sensational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara Obl.</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karelia Republic</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk Obl.</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Elections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1

Primorskiy-datelines is so high, that it occurred as a provincial dateline at a higher rate than did 72 of the 80 territories studied in references to place in articles with Moscow-datelines. Primorskiy occurred as a provincial dateline...
Figure 6.1: Provincial Datelines by Region
more than twice as often as did Nizhniy Novgorod, the second-ranking territory in Table 6.1, with 24 occurrences. Including Murmansk, with 16 occurrences, the top three provincial datelines account for one-fifth of all occurrences.

Table 6.2 shows the provincial datelines that appeared on average less than once every two years. These datelines correspond to the lower two class intervals represented in Figure 6.1. In general, spatially peripheral areas of Russia contributed heavily to these two class intervals, as did the Autonomous Okrugs, along with much of the North Caucasus and Volga-Vyatka Economic Regions. Primorskiy, which is spatially peripheral, is a definite exception to this trend, as is Sakhalin Island, Murmansk, Rostov, and Chelyabinsk. Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk are also popular provincial datelines. And while the northern half of West Siberia is poorly represented, much of the southern portion accounts for provincial datelines at at least an average rate. It is especially interesting that the Sakha republic stands out as an important provincial dateline, while commensurately northern, remote and sparsely populated regions to the east and west of it were not significant.\footnote{This suggests that represented landuse, predominantly the mining of gold and diamonds, drew journalists to Sakha.}

Figure 6.2 shows the frequency of provincial datelines by economic region. The Central Black Earth economic region, which does not even find representation in Table 6.1, has one less provincial dateline than the Northwest region. These two economic regions figure last in terms of the overall quantity
## The Least Important Provincial Datelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adygeya Republic</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bashkort Republic</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aga-Buryat AO</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Buryat Republic</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki AO</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Chuvash Republic</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gornyy Altay Republic</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kabardino-Balkar Republic</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmykia Republic</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kursk Oblast</td>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khakasia Republic</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Orenburg Oblast</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirov Oblast</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Pskov Oblast</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi-Permyak AO</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Smolensk Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryak AO</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Tyva Republic</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Oblast</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>U'lyanovsk Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mari-El Republic</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Belgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mordvinian Republic</td>
<td>Volga-Vyatka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nenets AO</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Tyumen' Oblast</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taymyr AO</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yamalo-Nenets AO</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ust'-Orda Buryat AO</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bryansk Oblast</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chita Oblast</td>
<td>East Siberia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jewish AO</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Dateline Region</td>
<td>Dateline Region</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachayev-Cherkess Republic</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khanty-Mansi AO</td>
<td>West Siberia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipetsk Oblast</td>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>North Osetian Republic</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magadan Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Penza Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stavropol' Kray</td>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd Oblast</td>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Udmurt Republic</td>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur Oblast</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Vologda Oblast</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkhangel'sk Oblast</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Voronezh Oblast</td>
<td>Central Black Earth</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2

of provincial datelines. This is not especially surprising, because the Central Black Earth region only accounts for five territories and showed up poorly in articles with Moscow-datelines as well. The Northwest region certainly would have ranked higher, had Leningrad Oblast been incorporated into the study. The numerous territories of the central region combine to give that region a high score. And the Far East, composed of the enormously influential Primorskiy, in addition to Sakhalin Island and Sakha, accounts for an impressive 105 provincial datelines or nearly one-quarter (24%) of all stories with provincial datelines.95

95 Goldberg (2003, personal communication) indicated that fieldwork away from Moscow presented foreign correspondents with the opportunity to have an adventure. The construction of the Far East, for instance Vladivostok as a “Wild East Boom Town” (Hockstader 1994b), could have made the Far East more attractive for fieldwork.
Figure 6.2: Provincial Datelines by Economic Region
Table 6.3 shows the distribution of stories between themes. Comparing it to Table 4.4, which showed the distribution of references between themes, leads to some interesting results. The themes of Government and Economics, Economics, and Elections retain the same importances relative both to each other as well as to the whole, constituting three of the most significant themes overall. The theme of landuse moved from fourth in importance to first, representing 60% more stories than the second most significant theme. That gap is larger than (but still similar in magnitude to) the gap between the first and second most important themes for the overall distribution of references. The theme of government, on the other hand, which occupied the top position for the distribution of references between themes, fell to seventh in Table 6.3. Foreign correspondents were not especially likely to leave the bureau headquarters to write a story about government. On the other hand, landuse was the most likely of all themes to be the central topic around which stories with provincial datelines were constructed. And with that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landuse</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Economics</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Issues</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensational</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3
observation, I now move to the landuse theme to discuss how landuse showed up as the most important theme for stories with datelines outside of Moscow.

**Landuse**

Landuse was the dominant theme into which I categorized articles with provincial datelines, accounting for 99 of the 438 stories. Table 6.4 shows the most important territories for representing landuse from outside of Moscow, and Figure 6.3 shows the distribution of datelines between Russian territories. Nearly half (38 of 80) of the territories included in the study had at least one provincial dateline for a landuse-related story. Yet the distribution of landuse-related stories *favors heavily the Russian Far East*, which accounts for 36 of the 60 articles represented by Table 6.4. East and West Siberia and the Northern economic regions make up the other main territories for the category of landuse, with most of Russia west of the Urals accounting for few stories overall.

### The Most Important Territories For Stories About Landuse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sakha (Yakut) Republic</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Murmansk Oblast</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Irkutsk Oblast</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chukchi AO</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kamchatka Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sakhalin Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Komi Republic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tomsk Oblast</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4

270
Figure 6.3: Articles by Theme (Provincial Dateline)

Landuse
The types of landuse-related issues that fell directly under the landuse category were much broader than the narrow focus on nuclear-related landuse discovered in Chapter 4. Landuses that were discussed included:

- **Agriculture**: agriculture and privatization in Saratov and Orel (see Hoffman 1996i; Williams 1997n); the constraints placed on agriculture by organized crime in Krasnodar (Efron 1994); and crop failures because of natural disasters in Orenburg (Williams 1999b); and the harvesting of whales by indigenous people in the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug (Paddock 1997c);

- the mounting problems, constraints, and consequences associated with life in extreme northern latitudes and other remote regions like the Sakha Republic (Specter 1994d; Boudreaux 1998), the Komi Republic (Hiatt 1993g), and the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug (Paddock 1997b; Paddock 1997d);

- **Threats to species**: the danger to Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea by poaching and pollution from Astrakhan (see Hockstader 1997; Tyler 2000a) as well as the potential extinction for the Ussuri tiger in Primorskiy because of poaching (Dahlburg 1993b);

- **Pollution**: oil pollution in the Komi Republic (Shapiro 1995a); air-polluting factories on the Komi Peninsula (Specter 1994a); water-pollution at Lake Baikal and in Karelia (Paddock 1998a) (Williams
1995d); and, nuclear contamination at Murmansk and Tomsk (Hoffman
1998h) (Gordon 1994);

• how places were constructed around a contrast between the presence
of natural resources and pervasive poverty, like Kamchatka (Paddock
1999a); the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (Goldberg 1993c); and
the Sakha Republic (Bohlen 1992c);

• Activities in nature: ice fishing in Tomsk (Specter 1998) and a couple
living with bears in Kamchatka (Paddock 1999c); and finally,

• Aspects of urban landuse: military housing in Tver’ (Williams 1995f);
the leveling of a Sakhalin-town because of an earthquake and shoddy
Soviet-style construction (Boudreaux 1995b); the unique problems of
formerly secret cities from Krasnoyarsk-26 (Gordon 1998b); and,
historical and current spatial interactions that made the development of
Vladivostok unique (Hockstader 1994b).

The articles categorized as landuse imagined in specific ways a variety of
landuses, based on particular combinations of urban, industrial, rural, peripheral,
social, and natural factors. They constructed locales and regions as uniquely
Russian expressions of geographical and historical circumstances by calling upon
both the audience’s cognitive and visual faculties in order to situate Russian
places as distinguishable from yet contributing to the whole Russia.
Of all of the instances in which articles about land use played out, perhaps the most distinctive were the cases of problems of life in extremely northern or remote regions. They typically characterized the Soviet development of marginal lands as part of an ideological imperative, for instance “to ‘civilize’ the wild North...creating a special breed of people who could live and work in the cold--something the capitalists had not yet achieved” (Boudreaux 1998). The represented isolation and harshness is stunning:

Last winter for example, it twice hit 81 degrees below zero. The [established] record stood, but in weather that harsh spit freezes before it hits the ground, die-hard batteries die quickly, synthetic parkas from fancy American camping stores crack like Turkish taffy and frostbite can destroy an unprotected hand or nose in minutes....There is no hotel here. No restaurant, movie house, supermarket or newspaper either. There are no buses, no trains, no church, no clubs. There is only one phone, at the police station... [and] fewer than 2,000 people live here, but there are eight day-care centers, one every few hundred feet it seems, because children cannot be expected to move far in the winter, which lasts from late September to May...at 400 miles north of Yakutsk in the Arctic Circle, this is about as close to the middle of nowhere as it gets. (Specter 1994d)

These areas were settled, according to the narratives, in spite of the exorbitant cost of providing their inhabitants with basic goods and services: “The cost of transportation drives prices sky high. Goods in shops often cost three to five times as much as they would in Moscow – itself ranked as the third most expensive city in the world” (Paddock 1997b). After the various devaluations of the Ruble, the subsequent reduction of subsidies from the federal government, and local declines in production, the people of these regions were left largely unable to support themselves economically. Those who could not afford to migrate to more hospitable climates were simply faced with the prospect of
freezing to death in the tundra: “It's extremely difficult to keep delivering coal to a place that's not producing anything, where 900 people are just living for free” (Boudreaux 1998). For example, residents of the village of Nezhdaninskoje were represented as distraught:

“What kind of fool decided to build a village out here, 300 kilometers 186 miles from the nearest town?”... “It's like a prison camp without the barbed wire”... Rationed diesel fuel keeps the lights on two hours each morning and from 4 p.m. to midnight. Then the thieves come out, pilfering food in a crime wavelet that has shaken the villagers' us-against-the-elements solidarity. Alcoholism, a traditional male vice here, is starting to afflict women... “If coal runs out, we won't make it,” said Tatiana Filippova. “Come back in January, and see if we're still alive.” (Boudreaux 1998)

The bitter contest represented here juxtaposed regional- and federal-level officials in a lackadaisical bid to decide who would pay for evacuating residents of remote villages.96 Furthermore, it pitted locals against each other, with residents stealing dogs so that they might eat. And ironically, some residents were reported as imagining the rebirth of the Soviet Union as their potential savior (see Hiatt 1993g). Altogether, these remarkable passages combined to construct Russian spaces as moribund, as quarantined (making voluntary and involuntary migration impossible), as historical, and as arenas of within-class conflict as new geographies emerged and historically developed trading networks disintegrated. Furthermore, what emerges through the discussion around the use northern lands is an intricate inter-weaving of history, economics, social problems, and government through the representation of core-periphery conflict.

96 Said one regional official, “Last I heard, the entire Soviet Union created the gold-mining industry [here in Sakha], and the Russian Federation is its legal successor...The Russian
The regions that contributed to the elections theme at the highest frequencies included southern West Siberia plus Krasnoyarsk; the much smaller collection of the oblasts of Nizhniy Novgorod, Ivanovo, and Yaroslavl’; plus individually, Tula, Samara, and Primorskiy (see Table 6.5). As a whole, however, the Far East only contributed five articles to the theme. In contrast, a large, contiguous band of territories from the North Caucasus, stretching into the Volga, Central Black Earth, and Central Economic Regions contributed very significantly (see Figure 6.4). Although most of the regions only had one story for the elections theme, this broad patchwork of territory contributed 28 of the 62 election-related articles. And counting the already-mentioned 3-oblast region of Nizhniy Novgorod, Yaroslavl’, and Ivanovo, against which abuts this larger chunk of territory, this continuous stretch of territories contributed 38 of the 62, or sixty-one percent of the elections-related articles. Vast expanses of the North, Urals, West and East Siberia, and the

---

The Most Important Territories For Stories About Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tula Oblast</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Novosibirsk Oblast</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ivanovo Oblast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yaroslavl' Oblast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6.4: Articles by Theme

Elections

(Provincial Dateline)
Far East were not visited by foreign correspondents when they published stories predominantly about elections.

Most of the election-related articles related to the 1996 presidential campaign, which was the first presidential election since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Goldberg (2003) indicated that foreign correspondents do not normally leave Moscow for the provinces just to cover election-related stories. Stories about elections worked by:

- **Linking demographics to support for candidates**: the elderly and infirm supporting the communist Zyuganov in Krasnoyarsk (Hockstader 1996g) and young people, already having decided to vote for Yeltsin, reacting with silence to Zyuganov’s overtures to them in Novosibirsk (Shogren 1996);

- **Linking production to support for candidates**: scientists at Akademgorodok\(^{97}\) in Novosibirsk supporting the communist Zyuganov (Specter 1996c); former workers at textile mills in Ivanovo, which have suffered badly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, begrudgingly supporting Yeltsin (Bennett 1996a; Rupert 1996); workers at a factory in Nizhniy Novgorod, where manufactured submarines rust without having ever touched water, supporting Zyuganov two days before the 2000 election (Dixon 2000a); and speculation that in Togliatti, Samara, “home

\(^{97}\) a city built in Siberia by Khrushchev especially for scientific research
to Russia's largest auto maker, the Volga Auto Factory” voting will be
split down the middle for Yeltsin and his opponents (Hockstader 1993a);

- **Linking regional economic development to support for candidates:**
  Yeltsin campaigning in the empty streets of “strapped” Ryazan, where
  workers from at least 30 enterprises were sent home “in the middle of the
day for no damn reason” by a local body politic that feared Yeltsin’s
  presence would generate unrest (Williams 1995b); voters in the Russian
  Far East, from factory workers to military personnel to coal miners,
  likely to “play a scratchy tune for President Boris N. Yeltsin” (Brooke
  1996); and, voters in Krasnoyarsk potentially voting against Yeltsin, who
  symbolizes a Moscow “that sucks up profits from the region's gold,
  mineral and oil wealth and sends back precious little in return”
  (Hockstader 1996d).

- **Exposing political candidates who bought support:** Yeltsin making a
campaign swing through Belgorod “remarkable for its staggering harvest
of presidential commands, mandates, promises and decrees” and
behaving as much as “a czar, say, or even a deity” than a president
(Hockstader 1996f); Yeltsin promising corporate tax relief in Yaroslavl’
during his reelection campaign despite warnings from his finance
minister that it would “wreck the budget of this entire country” and
jeopardize his commitment to the IMF (Boudreaux 1996c; Stanley
1996f); and, an election drama in Tula in which candidates gave tea, vodka, and cash out to voters who promised to support them (Specter 1997d);

- **Other elections noteworthy because of scandals or other factors**: a contest in Krasnoyarsk between Lebed and an economics professor in which spending limits were ignored, the local press aligned with specific candidates, “no one is telling the truth,” and Lebed was backed by tycoon Boris Berezovsky (Bohlen 1998d); a race in violence-plagued Karachevo-Cherkessia in which Boris Berezovsky hunted for a home so that he could run for Russian parliament from there in order to “influence laws that will affect [his] business interests” (Bohlen 1999a); and an election race featuring a man running for parliament and stumping in Tambov who served ten years in Soviet concentration camps (Efron 1993b).

Clearly, the bulk of stories about elections tended to represent regional and local economic conditions as part of the narrative. What is perhaps most interesting is that Yeltsin, while running for reelection in 1996 on a reform-ticket, was represented as making election-promises to “Communist-era factory owners” that could break Russia’s budget (Boudreaux 1996c). It is worth noting this, as the chapter will elaborate more on the imagination of reformers who sometimes put their personal interests ahead of the interests of reform.
For now, I consider that election-related stories construct two particular kinds of geographies: a historical geography, in which past decisions have led to unavoidable, industrial demise, as well as a particular economic geography, which suggests that a village is only as good as its best factory. I start with the first case:

Ivanovo's economy is built around 40 Soviet-era textile factories, most of which are dead or dying. In a nation full of jobless people, official statistics measure unemployment here at four to five times the national average and incomes at about half the average. The Almanac of Russian Politics describes Ivanovo as Russia's "most vivid example of a depressed region."

The roots of the problem were obvious today at the Krasnaya Talka textile factory. In one of its buildings, a four-story, century-old mill, moribund machines rumbled and roared, oozing grease and hissing steam.

Boris Galashin, a 39-year-old factory director, said the plant runs at a quarter of capacity because of high electricity costs and the difficulty of getting affordable cotton -- which once came readily from Soviet Central Asia. Still, he said, Krasnaya Talka was "doing better than most" textile plants in the province, some of which barely operate at all.

Another director, Alexander Tokarev, said some Ivanovo factories supply whole villages not only with jobs, but also with power, hot water, kindergartens and other services. "When such a factory shuts down," he said, "life immediately becomes impossible" in that village.

(Rupert 1996, my emphasis)

The vivid geographical imagination constructed here is one in which, first, because of the lost, imperial connections with Soviet Central Asia (trans-boundary flows in the wording of Chapter Four), the Ivanovo textile industry may never be profitable, with its "moribund" machinery, buying cotton from suppliers that charge world-prices rather than Soviet, fixed prices.98 The second

98 Bennett (1996a) puts it another way: "As its old supplies of cheap raw materials from Central Asia were cut off by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin's government opened up the Russian economy, and Ivanovo lost out to foreign competition."
imagination is that Russian spaces were constructed with a built-in vulnerability that is only visible in hindsight. According to this imagination, the Soviets killed many birds with one stone, by linking the electro-mechanical equipment of factories to the power- and heating-services of the villages that supplied them with labor. And it is even explained that social services such as kindergartens were administrated through factories. Therefore, the consequences to villages and families of losing a factory are simply devastating. And informed with this interpretation, the following exchange between Yeltsin and a pensioner in neighboring Yaroslavl’ takes on a new meaning:

“It's a mistake and will be corrected,” he [Yeltsin] told a woman who complained about her $42 monthly retirement income. “A law [raising the minimum pension] will be passed by summer.”

“By then we'll be dead,” she said.  
(Boudreaux 1996c)

This brief synthesis goes a long way towards addressing the issue of the nonpayment of wage arrears frequently raised in articles with Moscow-datelines. In other words, the message from the provincial dateline informs quite profoundly the message from the Moscow-dateline!

To build on the point, I consider the following quote from an article with a Krasnoyarsk-dateline, thousands of miles away from the Central Economic Region.

Across town at the Krasnoyarsk Combine Factory, more than half the work force, which once numbered 11,000 workers, has been laid off in the last couple of years. The factory, which turned out 21,000 combines in its Soviet

---

99 see for example Tavernise (2000b), Hoffman (1997b), Williams (1997o), and Erlanger (1994a)
heyday, would do well to reach its target of 3,000 machines this year. The problem: Most of the purchase orders come from the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where the economic crisis is even deeper than in Russia. The buyers need the combines but have no money to pay for them.

“Unfortunately, our customers are in even worse shape than we are,” said Gennady Ostrovsky, the plant's commercial director. “We're owed $12 million [for] combines that were bought and never paid for.”

(Hockstader 1996d, my emphasis)

Again, strained ties and altered networks with formerly Soviet lands are the basis for major economic problems. And Krasnoyarsk Kray was where Alexandr Lebed, Yeltsin’s most extensively represented rival, won the governorship, providing the geographic basis for his run for the presidency. And Hockstader’s story contributes to the idea that opponents, both to Yeltsin specifically and to reform in general, capitalized on economic malaise.

One major problem for Yeltsin is that 2 in 5 workers in the Krasnoyarsk region are on the federal payroll, which has been hit hard by paltry tax receipts. They include doctors, teachers and tens of thousands of employees at still-secret nuclear weapons facilities near Krasnoyarsk, the region's capital. There is barely anyone here who doesn't have a relative or friend who has been forced to cope with not being paid in the last year.

“I'll be frank,” said Vladeslav Yurchik, a Communist member of parliament who is running the Zyuganov campaign here. “It's the economic situation that has created Zyuganov. This [support for Zyuganov] is not an expression of love. It's an expression of economic desperation.”

(Hockstader 1996d, my emphasis)

This representation suggests that economic malaise, tied to the historical circumstances of Soviet production, made Russia’s communist front-runner popular. It implies that the circumstances of production Russia inherited from the Soviet Union are directly responsible for the reproduction of the communist
party.\textsuperscript{100} Place here is certainly constructed as an agent in its own development. Again, the message from the provincial dateline both challenges and informs the mainstream perspective that communism persisted for ideological reasons.

So to conclude this discussion on election-related stories, elections were an important vehicle for the construction of economic geographies, which elaborated on the basic spatial categories from Chapter Four of trans-boundary flows, core-periphery relationships, and place as input of its own development. And at least as importantly, the economic geographies inherited from the Soviet Union were imagined as constituting the political problems that Boris Yeltsin faced for his reelection in 1996. This imagination took place independent of anything that Yeltsin did during his first term as well as of any conception of ideology as an entity separate from lived, material circumstances. Etic codes that emerged in my analysis of narrative that are supported by this discussion include moribund spaces (spaces that are in decline), umbilical spaces (connected spaces that exhibit a strong dependency or symbiosis as in the representation of villages that “live off” of factories), inertial spaces (spaces constructed as resistant to change because of the cumulative momentum of history), spaces of fear (spaces in which fear of present circumstances and of the future characterized the

\textsuperscript{100} The notion that some reason other than ideological is responsible for the reproduction of the communist party in Russia has other support. Another story explains: “‘To accuse the old party officials of wanting to rebuild communism is nonsense, when you think about it,’ said editor Doronina. ‘Former party officials are precisely the people who were able to benefit most from private enterprise. Many of these people became bankers and businessmen. They would be idiots if they tried to rebuild communism. It’s against their interests’” (Dobbs 1993c).
atmosphere of change as old, Soviet landscapes withered away), and the production of political parties.

**Government and Economics**

The distribution of Government and Economics articles is especially skewed, with Nizhniy Novgorod, Primorskiy, Tatarstan, and Chelyabinsk accounting for about half (28 of 57) of the stories about Government and Economics (see Table 6.6). The North Caucasus and the Northwest economic regions did not contribute any stories to the theme (Figure 6.5). The spatial distribution of datelines is patchy, with only a few contiguous territories with at least one story. Three clusters of territories contribute nine (Primorskiy, Khabarovsk, Sakhalin, and Sakha), nine (Omsk, Tyumen’, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, and Krasnoyarsk), and twelve (Chelyabinsk, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, and Samara) datelines to Nizhniy Novgorod’s thirteen, accounting for eighty percent of the Government and Economics stories. Had Sverdlovsk been included, it likely would have added to a band of datelines from Saratov in the Volga.
Figure 6.5: Articles by Theme

Government and Economics

(Provincial Dateline)
Economic Region to Krasnoyarsk in West Siberia. Leningrad likely would have scored high as well. Articles about government and economics fell into the following categories:

- **Reform**: The support of reform or opposition to it is represented as the single issue around which all Russian governments, from local to federal, are built (Dobbs 1993c); An entrepreneur who owns a grocery store in Nizhniy Novgorod proclaims reform has “gone too far and changed the lives of too many people to be reversed” (Williams 1995a);

- **Privatization**: Russians buying trucks at an auction in Nizhniy Novgorod (Simon 1992f); the privatization of small businesses and the problems faced by small investors in Nizhniy Novgorod (Simon 1992b); and collective farmers in Nizhniy Novgorod opposing private farming (Goldberg 1992b);

- **Business and government alliances**: the linking of Yeltsin’s son-in-law to ruthless oil interests in Omsk that funnel money out of Russia (Wines 1999g); A political decision by Governor Nazdratenko of Primorskiy reduces the role of foreign investors in the Far Eastern Shipping Company (Working 1999); and, a conference in Tyumen’ about the development of oil in Russia, sponsored by the United States Energy Department, for high-level American and Russian businessmen and
officials, in which the Russian side pushed for limiting returns on foreign investment (Uchitelle 1992c);

- **Corruption:** The mayor of Vladivostok is removed from office physically by the governor of Primorskiy, highlighting a culture of business and government in which “Everywhere the bureaucrat has power, there is fertile soil for organized crime” (Boudreaux 1994a); The chief federal judge in Vladivostok fears for her life, and the president of the Primorsk Shipping Corporation and Governor Nazdratenko's political rival states, “This is effectively no longer the Russian Federation. It's another country” (LaFraniere 2000a); as well as the use of bankruptcy law by “local politicians and business tycoons” to take over healthy companies (Tavernise 2000a).

- **Reformers in power:** Yeltsin appoints Nemtsov from Nizhniy Novgorod, who “labored mightily to make this Volga River region a bastion of free-market reform,” to the position of First Deputy Prime Minister (Gordon 1997d)\(^\text{101}\), and the pro-Yeltsin, reformer-governor Vadim Solovyov maintains his power in Chelyabinsk as Boris Yeltsin wins a referendum (Dobbs 1993e);

- **Court Cases:** The trial of Sergei Shashurin, “one of Russia's most prominent-if shady-businessmen,” in Kazan raises the question of how

\(^{101}\) This received coverage by references in stories with Moscow-datelines as well.
the law should treat businessmen, if all successful businessmen are criminals (Goldberg 1994a); a Russian court in Murmansk ruling in favor of foreign investors and repatriating profits stolen by “greedy local bureaucrats scuttling a booming business by muscling out the foreigner and grabbing his share” (Williams 1998a); and

- **Core-periphery**: Even though the regional government is slimmer and operating more efficiently in Omsk, it “threatened to stop paying its federal taxes if the government would not settle up what it owes the region” (Goldberg 1994d); Vladimir Putin, “the acting president and the clear favorite in the March 26 presidential election, keeps hammering away at variations of a single theme: the urgent need to restore the authority of a strong central government in Russia and bring its far-flung, free-wheeling regions to heel” (Bohlen 2000); industries in Nizhniy Novgorod “ranging from nuclear power plants to machine-building factories” issue their own currencies to keep the regional economy moving (Simon 1992a); and, Tatarstan governor Mintimer Shaimiev protecting Tatarstan’s financial interests by for instance buying a controlling interest in Kamaz, “the largest heavy-truck factory in the former Soviet Union,” when it was threatened with bankruptcy by Yeltsin’s administration (Hoffman 1997a).
The Government and Economics category is useful, because it highlights the representation of activities that link money and law, on one hand, with the construction of entrepreneurial behavior in business and government, on the other hand. The result is a printed discourse on the joint-exercise of economic and political power. One story, for instance, dealt with the exercise of power by a Russian court, which established a legal precedent for the protection of foreign investors from predatory, local officials (Williams 1998a). Another story involved a political decision by Governor Nazdratenko, which ultimately inhibited the role of foreign investors in the Far Eastern Shipping Company (Working 1999). These representations construct risk from governmental agents to foreign investors in Russia as well as the possibility of protection by the government, such as from the Russian courts. But how do they imagine Russian entrepreneurs? And furthermore, how do they relate to the historical and geographical perspectives on space that I earlier argued characterized representations of place from the provinces? Some Russian entrepreneurs are constructed as independent:

With its flat tire, shattered windshield and corroded chassis, the dump truck didn't look capable of carting a pebble out of the parking lot. But Alexander Migunov was counting on it to carry him smack into the middle of Russia's chaotic market economy.

The mud-splattered truck was one of 60 state-owned vehicles sold to entrepreneurs in this Volga River city Saturday in a bold effort to break the government's stranglehold on cargo transport. (Simon 1992f)

Other entrepreneurs work in groups:
The city [Nizhniy Novgorod], by draw, selects 20 small state-owned businesses for auction each Tuesday. After designating a property for privatization, the city waits three weeks before auctioning it. But employees complain that even that grace period is insufficient for them to rustle up the money to bid on their workplaces.

Further, 80% of businesses auctioned aren't sold outright. Instead, investors bid for the right to lease the stores for five years.

“This is what these blockheads in our government call privatization,” said Vera Pavlova, 55, who with her co-workers paid 3 million rubles-$158,000 at current exchange rates-for the dubious right to pay the municipal government rent each month to lease back their cheese store.

“We bought nothing but air,” Pavlova said, spitting on her office floor to express her anger. “How can we feel like real owners when the future is so murky?” (Simon 1992b)

Privatization in these stories worked differently for different Russians, even those who were making relatively small purchases. And these stories collectively imaged Russians as diverse at the local level! Moreover, the mayor of Nizhniy Novgorod justified bidding to lease rather than to own by explaining that five years provided time for a commercial real estate market to develop and helped to ensure that the government received fair compensation for its land. So it is hard from these stories to know with whom to sympathize. Even so, Simon’s narrative continues:

[A bookstore owner] wants to replace the rickety iron shelves with solid wooden bookcases but says she cannot find a bank to lend her even the ruble equivalent of a few hundred dollars...

“Unfortunately, privatized businesses seem like too much of a risk for most banks,” said Alexei Mikhailov, 29, a consultant with the Moscow-based Center for Economic and Political Research who advises Nizhniy Novgorod's government. “They would rather lend to government stores, which they know won’t ever go bankrupt.”

Far from getting loans, in fact, Ryabova has been socked with astronomical fees for everything from telephone “registration” to police “protection.”
She recently received a bill for 25,000 rubles—about $135, but almost as much as her entire staff's wages for a month— to “re-register” her phone. She considers the charge pure extortion by the municipal phone company, a monopoly. “Just because we're a private business now, everyone thinks we're rich,” Ryabova fumed. “It's always pay, pay, pay.”

Adding to the financial burden are crushing tax rates—60% to 70% of a business's net income goes to municipal, regional and national governments, according to Bednyakov. (Simon 1992b)

So, several factors—an inability to receive loans, astronomical bills simply to exist, and a gigantic tax-burden—add to the problems of the owners of small businesses, who must deal with a constellation of competing interests on a daily basis. The imagination here points to a divisive undercurrent beneath the surface of “reform.” Just how divisive that undercurrent might be, beyond representations of spitting on the floor, is imagined in other stories.

The Novokuznetsk Aluminum Plant here turns out 276,000 tons of metal a year, more than 10 percent of Russia's total production and enough to build more than 3,500 Boeing 747's.

It makes a profit on every ton by selling its ingots abroad for foreign currency after processing it in Russia, where workers' wages and supplies are priced in rubles far below world cost.

Nonetheless, in January, a local court, prodded by the regional governor, declared the company bankrupt and named a new set of managers. It is now controlled by a former competitor, one that has cultivated a relationship with the governor. (Tavernise 2000a)

The first two opening paragraphs of this article represent an economic geography of a healthy Russian company doing a large volume of business on an internationally competitive scale. The third paragraph describes how that same company was declared bankrupt by a local court. The remainder of the 1829-word article is dedicated toward unraveling the mystery:
As Novokuznetsk Aluminum’s fortunes demonstrate, bankruptcy in Russia often has more to do with politics than it does with balance sheets. A two-year-old bankruptcy law lets debts of as little as $5,000 topple companies worth millions, if the bills go unpaid for three months. In Russia, where even the government routinely runs months behind in paying wages and other obligations, that means most companies are candidates for receivership. The number of bankruptcies has soared 150 percent in two years.

All over Russia, local politicians and business tycoons have latched onto the bankruptcy law to effectively seize valuable companies at a fraction of their market value, critics say. Powerful local politicians start the process by opening the door to a predator business group and pressing judges to put the target company into bankruptcy and name one of the predator’s own employees to manage it. Through these managers, called receivers, the process is most often abused, critics said. (Tavernise 2000a)

In the case of this story, the government is constructed as holding businesses to a standard in the payment of debts that it itself cannot meet. One might wonder how this seemingly bizarre legislation even passed, had the article not explained that politicians collaborate with tycoons in order to share the booty from the forced takeover of productive assets. The imagined moral geography relates corruption in all three major branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) to the spatial reproduction of trading networks:

“This was theft in broad daylight,” said Mikhail Zhivilo, the former owner, in an interview earlier this year. “If it was the money they wanted, they could have just seized the supplies that were en route to the plant. They wanted the factory, and the only way to do this was through bankruptcy.”

(Tavernise 2000a)

And the story goes on to explain that because of the application of bankruptcy laws in Russia, almost as many healthy companies fall into bankruptcy as financially insolvent ones. This narrative, published in October of 2000, significantly complicates the imagined geography of Russia. It raises the specter that even with the right “reforms”, the transition of Russia to a pluralist
democracy or to a “free market” may not happen. Or put a different way, the narratives I’ve presented here destabilize the very codes (like bankruptcy, privatization, and reform) that were used to construct a geographical imagination of Russia.

It is possible that the economic transition ended when reform-narratives lost the effective use of codes that made a smooth transition imaginable. I am suggesting, in other words, the possibility that Russia’s political and economic transition ended in the United States when it died a textual death. The point may be impossible to prove, because as standards of living ostensibly failed to improve for many people in Russia, the ways in which reform was imagined inevitably changed. I will take up the issue of the destabilization of the codes of reform later, but for now I want to point out that the phenomenon happened by the end of 1996, the year Yeltsin was elected to a second term. It was represented that “the government had essentially lost nearly half its expected tax receipts” by the height of Yeltsin’s reelection campaign because of “tax breaks” and “special preferences” (Hoffman 1997b). Yeltsin’s promises to pay wage arrears remained unfulfilled, with about $8.5 billion in unpaid wages having accrued by March of 1998 (Hoffman 1997b). And a translated article was published on January 4, 1997, originally by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, entitled “What Kind of ‘Democracy’ is This?” The codes “reform,” “democracy,” and “liberalizing of

---

102 I will specify later in this chapter how Yeltsin’s campaign-tactics in 1996 marked a continuation of behaviors favoring his own personal interests above those of Russia.
prices,” all occurred in quotations, and the article used other terminology like “so-called economic reforms” (Solzhenitsyn 1997). The appearance of these codes signaled to the casual reader that the mainstream discourse on reform was not sufficiently self-critical. Solzhenitsyn even addressed the limits of that criticism, writing “The rulers’ important motives, decisions, intentions and actions, as well as shifts in personnel, are completely opaque to society at large, and come to light as only as faits accomplis” (Solzhenitsyn 1997). And it is furthermore important that the New York Times choose to publish Solzhenitsyn’s words. As a respected Soviet dissident who had returned to Russia in May of 1994 from exile in Vermont, Solzhenitsyn carried the kind of weight necessary to establish a benchmark for criticism against Russian reformers, who were during the early to mid 1990s strongly supported by the IMF and the Clinton administration.

Returning to the above representations, two points summarize the argument thus far. Firstly, doing honest business in Russia was represented as extremely difficult, with any one factor presented here, like the 60-70 percent tax on net income mentioned by Simon (1992b), conceivably strong enough to ruin a business venture. Secondly, political power overall was constructed as capricious. Courts were constructed as sometimes ruling in favor of even non-Russian investors, while other times they ruled in grotesquely unfair ways toward Russian owners. Likewise, local politicians were constructed as

---

103 Solzhenitsyn, a Soviet dissident, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970.
concerned, in one case thoughtfully supporting a potentially unfair law toward new business owners with a careful regard toward privatization that was fair to all parties involved. And in contrast, other local politicians were imagined as abusive thieves. These points bring me to the story of Sergei Shashurin.

Shashurin was “an organized crime kingpin in the mid-1980s, back when the decaying Soviet economy's gaps meant gold for those able to exploit them” (Goldberg 1994a). He entered the reform period with a mixture of connections in industry as well as in the criminal underworld, and he rapidly became among the wealthiest of all Russians. For example, his primary company accounted for 200,000 employees. Shashurin’s fate changed when he supported the losers during Yeltsin’s battle with parliament in the fall of 1993 and ended up in jail and later on trial for attempted murder in an unrelated incident. A defense attorney, as well as others, spoke to the situation:

With so many outdated or Draconian laws on the books, virtually every entrepreneur is at risk of arrest – not an encouraging prospect for the dynamic types needed to get the fledgling private sector going.

“I'm convinced that in our country, in this transitional period, purely honest business is impossible,” Padva said. “Big business here almost always smells of something bad. But in this stage of establishing capitalism, you have to understand that if you obey all the bans, you can't do business at all.”

With regret, the government and independent economists agree.

“I know for sure that every Russian businessman has violated the law at least once,” said economist Nikolai Shmelev. “This is a terrible thing, if you think about it. We are trying to build a state ruled by law that rests on the foundation of a market economy—which was itself built by illegal means.”

---

104 The story with a provincial dateline, Kazan, Tatarstan where Shashurin lived, provides an excellent historical context.
105 According to one journalist in the story, Shashurin seemed to be only trying to get a man to leave a room by grasping his collar.
The Kremlin cannot ignore the scofflaw flavor of Russian business. But it also cannot put the entire Russian Fortune 500 in jail. (Goldberg 1994a)

Summed up in one sentence, illegality is imagined as a necessary and perhaps even essential component of reform! And that constructs a man imagined as honest, like Mikhail Zhivilo, as “reformed” out of his own, profitable factory.

So to conclude this section on the theme Government and Economics, I am positing that the discourse on reform jeopardized itself from the provinces by destabilizing the very codes, like “bankruptcy,” “privatization,” and “aid,” upon which it depended, in particular for Moscow, for discursive unity. Bankruptcy and tax laws that seemed to be reform-oriented created pretexts for predatory and illegal behaviors. And while “the approach toward each businessman” was represented as “very individual” (see Goldberg 1994a), there was the concurrent dilemma that “Everywhere the bureaucrat has power, there is fertile soil for organized crime” (Boudreaux 1994a). So as the “reform” period wore on, it was only possible to tell on a case by case basis if reform meant either permissiveness, or its opposite, intolerance. Goldberg (1994a) wrote that it was hard to tell whether the arrestee Shashurin is crazy “or Russia is.” The evidence here supports codes I developed, including Reform Movement as Factioned, Space of Corruption, Barriers to Privatization, and Russia as a “Free for All.”

The final code I mentioned here, Russia as a “Free for All”, addresses the imagined Russian political-economic geography that “anything goes, almost.” It also speaks to the postmodern problematic of representation that emerged as
codes like privatization and reform lost their ability to describe. Russia increasingly became a space for which I understand the code “reform” as a floating signifier – such a rough copy of a concept that it could be tied to anything that happened during the 1990s in Russia. The referential meaning of reform, a conception of well-intended, institutionalized change for the benefit of all, was lost. And the flimsy condition of the code “reform” made all the more instrumental the representation of the spatial networks traced out by flows of money and property as a basis for the reader to judge what was happening. In other words, as law was lost as a way to judge right from wrong, speaking to a networked conception of space became a more important way for foreign correspondence to characterize change. And as an unstable term (or set of terms), the codes of reform were all the more versatile for use in oppositional discourses.

**Economics**

Stories about economics occurred at a rate just less than that of government and economics, including 53 stories with provincial datelines. Table 6.7 shows the most important territories for representing economics from outside of Moscow, and Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of datelines between Russian territories. Forty-two percent of the articles about economics occurred for only five territories, with Primorskiy accounting for a very large number of those (10). Again, the distribution of stories favors heavily the Russian Far East, which

---

106 Recall that Chapter Five found “hard-liner” to be a floating signifier as well.
accounts for over half (13 of 22) of the articles represented by Table 6.7. The Northern and Central economic regions are significantly represented, in addition to a pocket of references in West and East Siberia for Altay Kray, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, and Krasnoyarsk. Another band of references occurs for Samara, Tatarstan, and the Udmurt Republic.

Manufacturing, business deals, ownership, and joint-ventures showed up in these articles, as they did in the references addressed in chapter four. Household and regional economies were more prominent as well. The following list describes the economic phenomena that were represented in stories with provincial datelines:

- **Household economies**: doctors in Tver’ impoverished very early in 1992 (Goldberg 1992c) and a struggling military family in Novosibirsk (Erlanger 1993f);

- **Regional economies, with an emphasis on one particular firm or industry**: textile factories in Ivanovo working at a small fraction of capacity (Goldberg 1994e); the mutual fates of Vologda Oblast and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ivanovo Oblast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Karelia Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kemerovo Oblast</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khabarovsk Kray</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.7
Figure 6.6: Articles by Theme

(Provincial Dateline)
Severstal steel mill (Williams 1997f); and, depression and poverty in a coal-mining town in Kemerovo (Wines 1998b);

- **Constraints and possibilities for regional development in an international context**: border trade between Blagoveshchensk in the Amur Oblast with a neighboring city in China and the comparison of the two cross-border towns (Bohlen 1999f); the contrast between growth and the lack of foreign partnerships and investment despite foreign interest in Primorskiy (Williams 1995g); and, foreign enterprises and traders from Korea, China, and Japan in Khabarovsk (Specter 1994c);

- **Trading Networks**: the mixture of cash and barter trade that produced specialized trade networks and made the Smolmyaso cannery in Smolensk a strong company (Paddock 1998f); and,

- **Corruption**: the murders of local business leaders and coal-mine directors by organized criminals who habitually steal from coal mines in Kemerovo (LaFraniere 1999).

There was also considerable emphasis on both export- and local-oriented production:

- **Export-oriented production**: the importance of exports and international law to the Vaz automobile company in Samara (Uchitelle 1992e) in addition to the production in full-swing at an export-driven textile factory in Vologda (Wines 2000b);
• **Businesses that serve local markets**: the American financing of a fast food restaurant in Nizhniy Novgorod (Hiatt 1992a) and bungee jumping in Primorskiy through a Russian-American joint venture using Australian equipment and know-how (Williams 1998b); and,

• **A comparison** of profit and difficulty in Karelia for two foreign-owned companies, Ben and Jerry’s and a timber company, with spatially different markets (Knobel 1993).

All of the articles about economics fit generally into the above categories, some being significantly more diverse than others. In other words, some articles fit very neatly into these categories, while others raised several of the above issues and fit into the categories through the presence of a more dominant or pronounced message. Together, they carried all sorts of meanings about progress as well as about the reworking of local spaces and financial networks. For instance, one article tells about Russians in Vladivostok bungee-jumping for $58 a jump, “several days' pay for most people” (Williams 1998b). Vladivostok was imagined as a place with almost a million people but having nothing for young people to do. So a Russian-American joint venture put together an operation with a low initial investment that promised “to be profitable within weeks,” selling an average of five times more jumps per day than what was needed just to break even. The story ends with an ambitious imagination of what the city will look like in the future.
"This is just the beginning. This whole waterfront will eventually be full of things for people to do," predicted Peter Tarrant, a New Yorker who has made his home here for five years. "People in the West still have this image of the city as a big mafia haven, but it's a wrong impression. There's a lot of good stuff happening here." (Williams 1998b)

The bungee-jumping story is an alternative to representations of Russia as mafia-dominated. It represented a case of a successful business, left alone by corrupt elements. In contrast, one especially potent representation of Kemerovo portrays the director of a mine being “axed to death in the elevator” of his apartment and a total of “180 contract murders in the first nine months of 1998 – or an average of two killings every three days” (LaFraniere 1999). It indicates that “fuel, energy, alcohol and raw materials are now in criminal hands.” Organized crime there exerts heavy control over the processing and distribution of coal, siphoning off profits and leaving mine directors unable to pay the expenses of the mine. Directors who do not cooperate are, in the best case, simply left with nowhere to sell or process their coal, because, as people from the enrichment factory explain: “We have a program, and you are not on our program. We have other mines that deliver us coal” (LaFraniere 1999). Mine directors are not even safe from their own employees. Miners, unpaid for months whether their mines produce or not, have threatened to kill factory directors.

Moreover, optimism (expressed for instance about the redevelopment of the waterfront in Vladivostok) is not necessarily apparent even in stories that represent economic success through much harder work and at a larger geographic scale than simply putting up a bungee-jumping platform. For example, in one
story, the Vologda Textile factory is represented as making a profit after implementing a tremendous number of changes, including: layoffs; the factory director “hawking his wares at trade shows in Milan, Paris and New York;”\textsuperscript{107} the construction of a foundry to produce spare parts too expensive to import; and, the rebuilding of 400 looms to produce 150-centimeter fabric (Wines 2000b). In addition, the crash of the ruble in 1998 contributed to the success of Vologda Textile: “The crash of ’98 solved Vologda Textile’s competitiveness woes: almost overnight, the ruble's plunge made its linen four times cheaper to foreign buyers. Nationally, textile production shot up 20 percent in 1999, even as other industries struggled.” Exports, according to the story, account for 80% of sales and allowed the company to pay its wage arrears.\textsuperscript{108} And “a landscape littered with bankruptcies two years ago now sprouts hundreds of Vologda Textiles” (Wines 2000b).

Yet for all of the changes, and the profit, the likelihood that the progress for the textile industry in Vologda meant progress for Russia was downplayed:

Eduard F. Baranov, the first deputy chief of the government's Economic Research Center, says Russia's boomlet has been confined mostly to raw-materials exports and light industries like food processing and textiles. Major industries have mostly been left behind. Companies like Vologda Textiles “are like little plants that give us hope,” he said. But they are not the architects of basic reform that the economy needs. fabric (Wines 2000b).

\textsuperscript{107} see Wines (2000b)
\textsuperscript{108} The story also indicates that the 80% figure for exports is so high, because Russia as a whole is too poor to consume its own products.
Additionally, the success of textiles in Vologda is attributed to broader geographic factors influencing the global production of textiles:

“In Europe, the textile industry is shutting down,” Mr. Petukhov said. “Labor costs are very expensive in Europe, and fabrics produced in Europe are very expensive.” The centers of textile production, he said, have been moving east to Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere.

The story suggests that economic growth elsewhere has contributed to the ability of other places to import Russian textiles in the first place. And the endemic poor quality of Russian consumer goods, the narrative explains, makes broad increases in their export “unrealistic.”

Just because a profitable Vologda Textile is not constructed as meaning much for Russia does not detract from the representation of the future of the mill or the region. The governor and factory director are imagined as entrepreneurial, as looking forward to shifting “from a supplier of basic cloth to a producer of more profitable dyed and refined fabrics, and eventually to make and export clothes” (Wines 2000b). Additionally, challenges and successes are represented concurrently: “We have only to solve the problem of the quality of our material and little by little increase the volume,” Mr. Petukhov said. ‘What’s needed is that in Russia we produce as much as possible, and buy as little as possible abroad’” (Wines 2000b). That includes boosting the quantity of locally grown flax. Yet even the director is satisfied with importing materials, despite

---

109 The governor even testified that private investors could buy the factory by the end of the year.
the effect on costs: “For once...we're importing our raw materials from the West, instead of the other way around” (Wines 2000b).

No fewer than ten significant observations stem from the discussion about the economics theme I just made. Among them are:

- The representation of complexity, including specific changes in the production and sale of manufactured wares.
- The imagination of an intricate independence and interdependence between Russian and non-Russian producers.
- The imagination of flows made possible by the breaking down of the production process and the problematization of those flows. For instance, corruption, in the case of organized crime in Kemerovo, was intricately tied to the spatial distribution of coal once it left the mine.
- The imagination of contested spaces and futures, depending on who gets to export what to whom.
- The representation of the ruble crash of 1998 as good for parts of the Russian economy.
- The imagination of Russian production as relating to a much greater, global, economic, and non-reform context.
- The construction of Russians as hard workers and shrewd decision-makers. The imagination of Russians as “other than” victims of reform, including that of entrepreneur.
• The construction of a semantic boundary between the success of an individual firm or industry and what constitutes “basic reform” in Russia. Additionally, Russian voices and testimony are involved as critical players in drawing that line.

• The construction of regional differences. Based on the reading of the narrative, even a whole landscape spotted with mills does not mean that a neighboring region is economically viable.

• Regional interdependence and the representation of produced space. The collapse of textiles in Western Europe has helped a “boomlet” in textiles take place in Vologda. And,

• The representation of change in regional economies.

The conclusion that emerges from this work is that journalists who write stories about economics from provincial datelines are in a much better position to elaborate on through their fieldwork household, local, and regional economies. By doing so, they offer an alternative to the ideological discourses on abstract spaces by providing material examples of flows in production, profit-taking, and loss. And although, for instance, Goldberg (2003, personal communication) indicated that it is not common practice for foreign correspondents to visit places for the purpose of representing marginalized groups, alternative voices about

110 And, to the contrary, there would not be much of a payoff for a foreign correspondent at the foreign bureau who was especially interested in examining various aspects of the production process. The intimate details of production for a single factory somewhere in the provinces, when the journalist is at the bureau headquarters, are probably unavailable.
economic development and space emerged simply through the journalistic emphasis on reporting what was said. Because as the foreign correspondent moves into the provinces, the likelihood that she or he will encounter “other” interest-groups goes up.

**Government**

With 28 stories, the theme of Government was not especially popular. Foreign correspondents didn’t tend to go to the provinces to write stories strictly around this theme. Table 6.8 shows the more important territories for the construction of government away from Moscow.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bryansk Oblast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Karelia Republic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Perm’ Oblast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8

Primorskiy and Tatarstan accounted for six stories each, or 12 of the 28 total narratives. Samara and Ul’yanovsk raised the Volga Region’s contribution to eight, while the Central Economic Region contributed six more stories (see Figure 6.7). Karelia, Krasnoyarsk, Perm’, Kaliningrad, and Omsk round out the other territories that participated in the

---

111 When I develop chapter seven to show how articles from the provinces construct the audience as “insider”, a powerful combination of results will emerge that shows that stories like the one by (Wines 2000b) do not exhibit a propagandistic character.
Figure 6.7: Articles by Theme

Government

(Provincial Dateline)
construction of government. This distribution left the North Caucasus and the Central Black Earth regions out of the picture altogether, along with vast, unrepresented stretches of the Far East, the Siberias, and the Northern regions.

Only three categories of government-related stories emerged from the analysis:

- **Development of Democracy**: coverage of the Pasco-trial in Vladivostok imagined as “a test of whether there is really freedom of speech in Russia” (Gordon 1999c); Yeltsin’s dismissal of the governor of Bryansk, Yuri Lodkin, after Lodkin opposed Yeltsin’s disbanding of parliament by presidential decree (Bohlen 1993c); ten political prisoners freed from a “notorious” labor camp called Perm’ 36 (Associated Press 1992); Yeltsin stumping in Kaluga for his proposed constitution in June of 1993 (Efron and Loiko 1993); and, Russia’s Prosecutor General quits and returns home to Omsk, enraged that “The reason for Russia's crisis is ineffective and immoral power on all levels” (Goldberg 1994c);

- **Diplomacy**: Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Vladivostok “suggesting that better communication is needed between Washington and Moscow” in negotiating peace in the Middle East (Williams 1994a), as well as an ice-breaking meeting in Krasnoyarsk between Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, highlighted as “the
first postwar [post World War Two] Russian-Japanese summit in Russia” (Williams 1997d); and,

- **Core-Periphery**: Tatarstan leading the “far-flung semiautonomous regions” in Russia at “wresting power and perquisites from Moscow” (Hiatt 1993b); Bryansk “and dozens of provinces like it across Russia's expanse [putting up] fierce resistance to Yeltsin and his reforms” in 1993 (Goldberg 1993e); and, Karelia “often simply ignoring federal laws it does not like...is taking advantage of political strife in Moscow to seize more and more power from the center” (Hiatt 1993c).

Although I did not observe many articles as part of the government theme, the articles I read contributed to the developing perspective on the representation of Russian spaces as corrupt and as places where “Anything goes, almost.” To start with, one story from Bryansk explained “how special forces loyal to Yeltsin took over the government building here during his recent Moscow showdown with Parliament” (Goldberg 1993e). The example draws attention to the connection between core-periphery relations and the development of democracy. Other representations elaborate:

Like a large stone dropped in a small pond, the political confrontation in Moscow is rippling through Russia's 88 regions and territories. The day after leaders of the Parliament were arrested, Mr. Yeltsin called on the regional soviets, legislative strongholds of Communists and opponents of reform, to dissolve themselves and make way for new elections. (Gordon 1993)
Yet dissolving regional parliaments by brute force of executive decree seems to avoid the issue raised earlier in the chapter that Yeltsin’s political opposition was represented as produced by geographic circumstances beyond his control.

And most ominously for Yeltsin, at the national parliamentary elections that he has called for Dec. 12, there is no reason to think that the Bryansks of Russia will have changed their minds about the conservative majority they elected last time.

The new federal Parliament could well turn out as recalcitrant as the old one, and local legislatures could end up just as hostile to governors like Karpov.

“In two months, there will be even more tension than now,” said Pyotr Shirshov, head of the Bryansk City Council. “The new (legislature) will speak once, and they’ll disband it right away.” (Goldberg 1993e)

Yeltsin here is simply constructed as a belligerent thug who ignored the geographic circumstances—historical, political, and economic—that produced his opposition. When he is unable to deal with the complexity of the problems facing him, he resorts to force. Yeltsin’s proposal to replace regional legislative bodies in opposition to him112 “was not the first time that Mr. Yeltsin has thrown a political thunderbolt without saying what would happen if his demand was not carried out” (Gordon 1993). And Yeltsin’s “thunderbolts” were sometimes represented as threatening to lead to an “anything goes” state:

“Because the people of Bryansk voted for him [Yuri Lodkin, a governor deposed by a Yeltsin-decree], and what we see are unconstitutional methods,” said Valentina R. Podobedova, a 36-year-old kindergarten teacher, explaining her anger. “If we allow the Constitution to be violated, then it will lead to lawlessness all around, to violence and anarchy.” (Bohlen 1993c)

112 Those bodies are called Soviets and were inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR. Gordon (1993) coded the regional soviets as “legislative strongholds of Communists and opponents of reform.”
Lodkin’s words were even more to the point, “There you have your democracy, your civilization” (Bohlen 1993c).

One article followed the resignation in 1994 of Alexei Kazannik, Russia’s Prosecutor General, a position analogous to the Attorney General in the United States. The story describes him as “so outraged that he went on to give details of the ineffectiveness and immorality he had seen in the Kremlin” (Goldberg 1994c). Goldberg (1994c) explains:

Kazannik's moral clash with Yeltsin was inevitable.

It came in February, when Parliament issued an amnesty letting all Yeltsin's worst political enemies out of jail and off the hook for their rebellion against him last October.

Kazannik did not like the amnesty, but he could see that it was constitutional, and he ordered the men released.

The displeasure from Yeltsin's circle was so great that Kazannik, unwilling to back down, quit his job and gave up a palatial Moscow apartment in the same building as the president.

He returned home to Omsk, to his old job as a university law professor at one-fifth his Moscow salary and to his book-lined apartment looking out on a chemical plant and a prison camp.

The article also reveals that Kazannik received an unsigned note from the Kremlin detailing the specific legal steps he was to undertake in order to divert to the military for execution all of the parliamentarians arrested from the October 1993 attempted coup. And it does not stop there:

Kazannik said President Boris N. Yeltsin is manipulated by his top aides and that Yeltsin just “serves the interests of a narrow corporative group” – or what in Russian politics is known as his “circle,” an entourage of aides and advisers who were chosen largely for their personal loyalty...
But Kazannik went much further, saying that the men around Yeltsin take the approach that “we can do anything,” regardless of the law and the constitution...

And there was the time he was offered a luxurious government dacha-only to find out that it had last belonged to one of the rebels he had recently arrested.

“I arrested the person and I'm supposed to live in his dacha?” Kazannik asked, appalled that the officials who offered him the house did not even sense the impropriety. (Goldberg 1994c)

The “anything goes, almost” code then extends to cover many instances of the capricious or corrupt exercise of power: known violations of the constitution by the president, bureaucrats personally benefiting from the arrest of political foes, manipulation of the highest executive powers for business interests, and the attempt of politically motivated executions. The geopolitical imagination of the reformers here is that of tyrannical autocrat.

The construction of law emerges as something other than law, as something that may or may not be followed: “You don't really know on any given day to what degree the laws of Russia are going to be honored,” said Richard Conn, an American lawyer in Moscow who advises American firms and the Russian government. “It creates interesting legal issues” (Hiatt 1993c).113 And it creates very interesting conditions for the textual imagination of core-periphery relationships. For when a region like Karelia, Nizhniy Novgorod, or Tatarstan is constructed as “simply ignoring federal laws it does not like,”114 that

113 If law does not provide a stable logic for the assignment of guilt or blame, then what does?

114 Hiatt (1993c)
region is in one sense distinguishing itself from the core. And in another sense, it is doing exactly what those in Moscow do.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter was about understanding the ways that American journalism from the provinces of Russia imagined Russians. It dealt with foreign correspondents doing fieldwork away from the bureaus headquarters, and it included data from people whom foreign correspondents encountered when they were in the field, such as factory directors, deposed governors, heads of city councils, kindergarten teachers, small businessmen, pensioners, Northern Villagers, and even Americans. It reviewed some of the vivid accounts of people and spaces represented in American foreign correspondence from the provinces of Russia and discussed some important ways in which geographies of Russia were imagined.

A slight majority of the total provincial datelines occurred for only 15 of the 80 territories under study. Thirteen of those appeared as popular Moscow-datelines as well. This suggests that at least in spatial terms, the printed discourse emanating from the provinces was correlated with that which emanated from Moscow. Territories that were not referenced much from Moscow were likely not to be places to where American foreign correspondents traveled.
The chapter found that the Russian Far East was the most important Economic Region for stories with provincial datelines and that landuse was the most common topic around which stories with provincial datelines were written. The landuse topics that were written about were vastly more diverse than the topics for references to landuses that appeared in chapter four, including agriculture, life in remote regions, threats to species, many types of pollution, activities in nature, and urban landuses. The chapter then used the representation of life in remote regions to begin making the argument that stories with provincial datelines were effective at representing social and geographic complexity in Russia.

Articles with provincial datelines evidenced a strong, historical-geographic construction of Russian regions, tied to Soviet economic development and the changing links between formerly Soviet territories and other parts of the world. This way of imagining Russian regions included the notion that industrial demise in Russia was unavoidable as well as the imagination that a Russian village is only as good as its best factory. These ways of seeing Russia often combined to produce a bleak outlook on the prospects for prosperity. Nonetheless, the stories in the chapter exhibited tensions that played out between local and trans-national groups as historically developed trading networks disintegrated and new geographies emerged in a global context. And core-periphery relations were commonly imagined as part of this process.
The production of an electoral geography and a party politics ensued around the social and economic problems inherited from the Soviet Union. With regard to this phenomenon, the opposition to Yeltsin was explained as based on a political appeal to people in regions severely impacted by the above regional economic demise. These representations suggested a historical and materialistic reason for the reproduction of the Communist Party other than any ostensibly ideological explanation. Stories about elections always included political and economic forces, geodemographic considerations, or references to corruption or scandals.

Heterogeneity was constructed in Russian locales with the playing out of antagonistic and cooperative relationships between residents. One basis for this construction was the representation of how privatization and reform worked differently for different businessmen. The representation of local voices was especially important for constructing these differences, and overall, the imagined geographies in foreign correspondence would be substantially less rich without voicings. Additionally, local politicians were represented both as expressing an interest in privatization being carried out fairly, as well as resisting the transfer of ownership of property. Another important point was how the opportunistic exploitation of bankruptcy law acrimoniously juxtaposed different, local interest-groups. Nonetheless, futures for regions were sometimes represented as different than the future of Russia, with progress within the regions constructed as not
necessarily constituting basic reform in Russia. And imagined moral geographies related corruption in all three major branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) to the spatial reproduction of trading networks.

Subsequently, there emerged the construction of law and lawlessness in Russia, characterized by a confounding mixture of good intentions and corruption. Successful businessmen in Russia, exemplifying the go-getter mentality necessary for a successful capitalism, were constructed as de facto criminals. Even President Yeltsin’s behavior was characterized as unconstitutional\textsuperscript{115} in an article that described a Stalinesque request for the executions of Yeltsin’s political opposition coming from Yeltsin’s own office. Likewise, representations of President Yeltsin’s deposing of democratically elected governors and regional legislatures called into question the chief executive’s commitment to democracy. Lawlessness also characterized some provinces, the governments of which doing whatever they wanted regardless of federal law. In contrast, some regional officials cited law when they were involved in local conflicts or in conflicts with the government in Moscow. The resulting moral geography was one in which Russia under reform meant Russia under “anything goes, almost.” The ground supporting the referential power of the code “reform” fell away. As law was lost as a way to judge right from wrong, speaking to a networked conception of space became an important way for

\textsuperscript{115} Also, recall the same criticism levied against Yeltsin by Chief Justice Zorkin in a story with a Moscow-dateline.
foreign correspondence to characterize change. And as an unstable term (or set of terms), the codes of reform were all the more versatile or use in oppositional discourses.

By the end of the period under study and just prior to the election of Putin, there emerged an imagination of Russia as urgently in need of a strong, central authority. What is left up to question is how such an authority was represented as capable of solving the economic-geographic problems in Russia, especially when many times the various regions were constructed as playing the same “anything goes, almost” game as the core. At first blush, it seems as if authoritarianism speaks to the organizational problems of lawlessness by creating order through ruthlessness instead of through law. The analysis employed in chapter seven will hopefully be equipped to explore this question in more detail.

What is so important to emphasize here is that stories with provincial datelines were much better equipped to construct the historical perspectives that were so critical to a materialistic understanding of space as produced. At the bureau headquarters, historical testimony about the economic development specific to the various Russian territories is simply not as available as it is when the foreign correspondent has the opportunity to interview interest groups who have lived their lives in a particular locale. On the basis of the journalist’s physical location alone, the data available to the writer produce a very different imagination in the text.
To summarize the very complex relationships developed in foreign correspondence from the provinces and elaborated upon in this chapter, success today sometimes meant, and sometimes did not mean, success tomorrow. The whole of Russia was constructed as a battleground in which various parties used the resources at their disposal in order to hedge their positions against other interest-groups. At some times, that amounted to a pensioner complaining to President Yeltsin during his 1996 presidential campaign. At other times, that amounted to a textile factory in Bryansk succeeding by exporting cloth to foreign markets, opened up by the crash of the Ruble and the failure of competing factories in other parts of Europe. One way in which Russia’s periphery emerged as similar to Russia’s core is through the capricious exercise of political power. At all scales, what developed was a government by entrepreneurs for entrepreneurs. And furthermore, force was used by both governmental and non-governmental agents in complex situations. Ultimately, the consequences for the representation of reform was the destabilization of codes such as reform and privatization, which lost their referential meaning in the face of an onslaught of represented behaviors that connected reform with the use of political and economic power for the advancement of personal, rather than public, goals.

116 I imagine that a separate study incorporating representations of the Russian military in Chechnya would well develop this concept.
CHAPTER 7 – A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF STORIES WITH PROVINCIAL DATELINES

Stories from the provinces narrate space differently than stories from Moscow. What made the code “reform” so powerful in the early 1990s is that it created the mental space to narrate events for a very large country, Russia, from the central place of Moscow. But as telling a story about “reform” came to mean telling a story about almost anything, the efficacy of the code “reform” at setting the stage for a story about events in Russia diminished.

In Chapter One, I discussed the risks for a foreign correspondent of leaving Moscow for the provinces. A major benefit of leaving Moscow, I am positing, is that stories from the provinces can be about the provinces. And as such, stories from the provinces during the 1990s did not necessarily need a code like “reform” to announce that they were narrating something that was significant for the whole country. In fact, they often announced from the start that they were not even attempting to tell a story about all of Russia, such as the stories discussed in Chapter Six about textiles in Ivanovo or bungee jumping and the development of the waterfront in Vladivostok.

Excursions into the provinces enabled foreign correspondents to use places selectively to narrate ongoing changes within but not necessarily for Russia. They freed the narrator from the codes of reform and often signified for
the narrator a retreat from aggrandizing narratives about Russia. Likewise,
leaving Moscow facilitated the use of new textual devices to deliver stories from
outside the center. While one story from a provincial dateline may not have had
the power to retool the code “reform” or the perspectives of Russia that emanated
from Moscow, stories from the provinces overall constituted a chorus of
narrative voices, speaking from the margins to the center, about the development
of society and space since the fall of the Soviet Union. After all, stories with
provincial datelines exist in tandem with and with respect to the quantitatively
dominant messages assembled in Moscow. Additionally, actants in stories from
the provinces themselves voice ideological (abstract) perspectives on space. In
either case, ideology finds its way into provincial stories through the narrator.
Foreign correspondence from Russia’s provinces is not an alternative to
ideological discourses on space from Moscow. Rather, I take the position that
stories with provincial datelines, simply based on the fieldwork that journalists
do in order to develop their data, produce a qualitatively different staging in
which the narrator is a geographic construct infused with a spatialized identity
that can be either that of insider (provincial) or outsider (core). And that identity
influences the ways in which the casual reader engages the story as well as the
imaginations of Russian space and society that are transmitted.

I understand individual works of foreign correspondence from Russia’s
provinces as piecemeal yet ongoing stagings that constituted a commentary about
success and contested identity in Russia. This chapter builds off of the previous work and investigates constructions of success (both macro-level in terms of reform and micro-level in terms of the individual) and identity by elaborating on the interplay of data derived from different spatial scales and perspectives in journalistic narratives written from outside of Moscow. Part of that interplay results in the construction of mixed voices and identities that do not rely solely on political or economic factors. Another aspect is that new textual methods are available to the narrator in order to facilitate the ease of reading.

This chapter finally builds off of Chapter Five by contributing to the thesis that foreign correspondents produced audiences as hopeful, fearful, confused, and allegiant. It adds to the previous work by developing two additional ways, specific to foreign correspondence from outside of the bureaus headquarters in Moscow, in which the relationship between the audience and the narrator is constructed. It also expands earlier arguments by incorporating stories from provincial datelines that dealt with social and cultural issues, two themes which thus far have been disregarded by the analysis.

**Organization**

The chapter is written in three major parts. The first part addresses the ways that texts construct the outside world by reference and builds off of the observations in Chapter Six. It conceives of stories from provincial datelines as
participating in an ongoing discussion about identity and the success of reform in Russia and as narratives which construct individuals and regions somewhat apart from economic and political terms. This discussion can be thought of as a critique of codes like “reform” that lost their meaning later in the 1990s or as an alternative to the use of those codes at all.

The second part of the chapter interrogates the level of production of the storytelling relationship by delving into the ways that narrative voices marshaled representations of the extreme and the transgressive from the provinces in order to help deliver messages. It builds off of the other textual functions developed in Chapter Five by introducing a new function, which I call distinction, to the way that journalistic texts flatter the casual reader. That function, in order to exist, relies on fieldwork outside of the bureau headquarters in Moscow.

The third part of the chapter further explores the level of production of the reading context to expand the discussion of the narrator as a geographic construct. It analyzes two stories which construct mixed local voices and economic class as complicit in the production of difference. It also shows how stories with provincial datelines succeed at representing identity as at least partially locally constructed and apart from the national scene.
This section deals with representations of identity and success from the provinces for two different kinds of social-spatial settings. The first setting is comprised of rural or isolated spaces and spaces geographically distant from Moscow. The narratives I discuss are not predominantly about economics or government. The second setting involves stories involving industrial landuses distant from Moscow for a variety of factories with varying degrees of success at manufacturing in Post-Soviet Russia. These stories are largely economic in character and include references to company-towns. Analysis of the combination of settings provides fertile ground for assessing the ways in which provincial stories constructed reform and identity away from Moscow.

Representations of Culture, History, and Identity

These are not uniforms we wear any longer, these are national costumes. (Schmemann 1992a)

“People come to find their past,” said a local tour guide who specializes in nostalgia tours. “They find their old house or the field where their house once stood, and it is very emotional for them. Many just break down and cry when they see it.” (Shapiro 1993e)

The above quotations address the precarious relationship between identity and change. The first quotation is attributed to a “born-again” Cossack. The second passage is from a tour guide who gives tours to Germans visiting
Kaliningrad, formerly the German city of Koenigsberg before Soviet occupation during the second World War.\footnote{Stories that dealt with history frequently concerned military engagements.} I think they are important, because representations of Russia from Moscow that produce certain favoritisms within the audience, for instance fanatical support of austerity or stern judgment of hard-liners, ask the audience to de-emphasize, or to forget altogether, the importance of identity for Russians as objects of change. However, these two quotations from foreign correspondence from the provinces emphasize the role of history in the present construction of identity.

What makes the case of Kaliningrad interesting, is that regardless of whether the Russians there are interested in the past, they will be forcibly reminded of it. More than 300,000, mostly German tourists, visited the city in 1992 (Shapiro 1993e). Russians there are constructed as offering to help the visiting Germans to rebuild their former homes, while the mayor stresses that the city “has reappeared on the European map” (Shapiro 1993e). Russians thinking of themselves as European is important to German interests as well, explains a representative from a German bank: “We tell people they must not emphasize the German presence in Kaliningrad. It should be a European region” (Shapiro 1993e). The fears of a xenophobic reaction to the Germans are imagined alongside “this once beautiful Hanseatic city...rediscovering its roots and hoping to parlay them into prosperity.”\footnote{I will mostly leave it up to the reader to identify previously discussed textual devices, in this case, identifying the role of history in the present construction of identity.} And while investment from Germany is
constructed as incapable of solving all of the problems of Kaliningrad, the story attributes most foreign investment, as well as the largest projects, to Germany. Success for the region was thus constructed as mutually contingent on the history of the region, on the importance of a European identity for Russians, and on foreign investment.

The case of the Cossacks is full of contrasts. Rather than being constructed as important to foreign interests or even cut off from larger Russia, the Russian region this time is imagined as significant to Russians as a whole:

Every Russian was raised on the ballads and legends of the brutal rebels Stenka Razin and Yemilian Pugachev. Russia's greatest writers -- Aleksandr Pushkin, Mikhail Lermontov, Leo Tolstoi, Nikolai Gogol, Isaac Babel, Mikhail Sholokhov -- immortalized the blend of savagery and romance that was the Cossack. (Schmemann 1992a)

But the analysis of Cossack identity from Cossacks themselves is pragmatic and sober: “We cannot become, say, Germans...We can only try to return to our own roots, to a system, to ethics that worked for centuries. But of course to idealize the past, to try to literally revive it, is absurd” (Schmemann 1992a). Nonetheless, the story explains that even President Yeltsin has issued a decree to resurrect the political status of the Cossacks. In this representation, the core seems more interested in reviving the local, historical, political tradition of the Cossacks than some of the locals themselves! And the narrative voice remarks that “after 70 years in which even to claim a Cossack heritage was considered seditious,” it is difficult to imagine Cossacks openly embracing their past (Schmemann 1992a).

case the interplay between hope and fear.
Yet a voluntary resurgence of affinity for Cossack ancestry is evidenced by a man dressing in “Cossack garb” one summer day. Having given up architecture to “revive Cossack handicrafts,” he admits that his interest in Cossack traditions is personal and laments that the youth, coded as the people on whom a revival of old traditions depend, are clueless:

This is not rebirth...It's a genetic nostalgia. I cry for the past, and if something can be returned through these tears, fine. But it is not rebirth. What saddens me is that most of the interest in my work is from émigré Cossacks or old-timers. The youth just look and ask, ‘How much?’ (Schmemann 1992a)

The coded argument, then, is that hypothetically, Cossack traditions could inform contemporary life through historical and ethical lessons. Yet sadly, those who are most important for such cultural education are simply unequipped to receive the teaching. In this case, success for the region is imagined in cultural terms as contingent on its youth. National attention on the region is seemingly unimportant.

Another interesting article, about the history of an island called Solovki in the White Sea, goes back to the 15th century and is a rare example of a story exploring the past at length. Much of the success of the article hinges on the construction of the audience as interested in the island as the site of the first gulag. The site is constructed as a place connected to Russia and to foreign places by tourism. Likewise, the present, rather than the past, is imagined as

---

119 However, the audience is told that one powerful regional official is both a “former high-ranking Communist official” as well as a top ataman (Cossack chief).
120 The method of seduction employed here, regional distinction, is the subject of the next part of this chapter.
more important to daily life: “Today, a few people can remember those years, but would rather not...Mostly, like the rest of Russia, Solovki is moving on...Like everywhere else, people here grouse about the high prices of Russia's post-Soviet free market. But they also marvel at how much is available in the little local stores” (Shapiro 1994a). Success here is equated to tourism and consumerism. And contrary to the previous two articles, remembrance of the past is unimportant for attaining fulfillment.

One additional story with a provincial dateline that celebrated “the local” included a narrative from rural Yaroslavl’. It concerned the return of a Moscow-priest to his boyhood home, from which his father sent him 45 years prior:

“How do I see my place?” [the priest] asked. “Sometimes I see myself like Abraham, commanded by God to leave for unknown lands. Sometimes I think that leaving Moscow I'm like Lot fleeing Sodom. But mostly I feel like Adam. In Heaven.

“I feel I am contributing to the rebirth of Russia through the church.”

(Schmemann 1993d)

This fascinating representation combines a comparison of Moscow to Sodom and the imagination of contemporary Russia itself as being reborn with a happy narrative voice. It is especially important to identify “the rebirth of Russia” as an alternative to “reform” as a way to construct change. Moreover, Father Sergei’s return to his boyhood home resonates with larger Russia:

Yet the legend of the old priest who gave up everything and found happiness in restoring the trampled temple of his youth has struck a distinct chord in a nation searching for the severed thread of its history. Reporters and even a television crew have made their way to this hamlet between Yaroslavl and the Volga River, a sweep of peat and cranberry bogs so sparsely settled that the regional center five miles away is called Bolshoye Selo, Big Village.

(Schmemann 1993d)
Alienation from history again comes up as an important component of imagining Russian futures. The representation even elevates the importance of spirituality and the struggle for identity in Russia to the same level of significance as economic and political problems:

It was not that others necessarily saw in Father Sergei, or in his return to the village, an answer to their own “nerazberikha” -- the economic, political and spiritual “muddle” in which most Russians find themselves in the post-Communist world...But his story seemed to speak to a common yearning among many Russians for spiritual roots, for values, legends and a vision on which they could try to rebuild their nation. There has always been a widely shared assumption among Russians that their nation is distinct in character and destiny, and many intellectuals have argued that the current political struggles are not only over political power or economic direction, but over Russia's very identity. (Schmemann 1993d)

This narrative voice powerfully formulates a change that criticizes many Moscow-based representations as misguided in their heavy-handed treatment of reform as a mostly political-economic restructuring. The significance of this story, written in 1993, is only amplified in hindsight, after I developed in the dissertation my own narrative of the moral failures of reform. Of course, another way of signifying the importance of the story is to point out that in spite of its early insights into the spiritual and emotional components of identity-construction in Russia\textsuperscript{121}, the discourse on reform from Moscow largely failed to acknowledge them. Nonetheless, the story is a powerful cry for a “vision on which to rebuild” Russia apart from profit. This vision collides with the great emphasis reform placed on financial concerns like bankruptcy, austerity, and aid.

\textsuperscript{121} The historical articles discussed earlier were all published no later than 1994.
And vision, it would seem, is an appropriate term to contrast the above narrative, which constructed success as a spiritual awakening, with a foreign correspondence that from Moscow alone would have been incapable of “seeing” or delivering it.

Thus emerge from the representations four barriers to awareness of the past in Russia: a tradition of punishment, which informs contemporary attitudes toward being different; the desire to move on and lack of willingness to remember the past anyway; the detachment of youth, after 70 years of Soviet rule, from the traditions of their ancestors; and, spectacularly, through the story of Father Sergei, life in Moscow itself! These four articles, which I coded either as culture, history, and demographics, give birth to a salient point. Foreign correspondents used areas outside of Moscow to imagine Russians as alienated from history and thus especially challenged to take measures to consider ethically the present. This construction, I believe, reinforces my interpretation of Russia as a place where “anything goes, almost” and speaks volumes to the representation of Prosecutor General Kazannik’s reaction to improprieties, discussed in Chapter Six. Furthermore, it addresses the dominant representations from Moscow, which normally consider the past as a Soviet moment to be corrected.

These stories additionally problematize Russian identity by suggesting that Russians are especially challenged to think of themselves in new ways. As a
group, they imagine Russian identity as contested in ways that are not related to
economics and success as only partially based in the economic and political
rationale of reform. They lay the foundation for an argument for compassion and
sensitivity towards Russians and provide a new terrain for balancing even the
pragmatic attitude coded in the audience toward Russia. I think that these
findings are especially important, because they equip the reader with a powerful
tool to contemplate the construction of Americans as interested party and
Russians as objects of reform in future readings.

**Provincial Examples of Success and Failure in Manufacturing**

Stories about economics from the provinces also represented alternatives
to market-based constructions of success and identity. One representation
constructed management at the Vaz automobile factory in Volgograd as
empowered through its ability to manage political and economic networks:

Vaz's profitability gives its 150 top managers -- most of them men in their 40's
-- an advantage that increasingly allows them to operate like Western
executives, said Maksim Boiko, a Russian economist.

“The managers' new authority is coming from their special skill in knowing
how to run a company that can prosper without subsidies, and the workers
know this,” [the chief financial officer (C.F.O.)] said. “They are the ones who
know how to find cheap credit, negotiate with Government ministries and sell
cars abroad.”

(Uchitelle 1992e)

The narrative voice explains that at Vaz, the workers are paid at twice the
national average. There are unions at the factory, and thus far, the managers have
not laid off any workers, because layoffs are “a big problem connected with the
psychology of our people.” The factory provides clinics, hospitals, kindergarten, daycare, vacation spots, and 30,000 garden plots for its workers. In return, management is paid higher for making decisions that have a greater impact on the company. Yet the company’s C.F.O. is only paid 3.5 times a worker’s salary. Russian workers and management are thus imagined as engaged in competitive and mutually beneficial struggle regulated by moral and social considerations.

The key to the factory’s success, running the factory without subsidies, is linked directly to the sale of cars in foreign markets:

“The idea is to export more cars, not sell more at home,” said Mark V. Demidovtsev, the company’s chief designer. “Otherwise, how will we earn the dollars we must have to invest in new models?” Despite huge increases this year in domestic car prices, ruble sales generate too little profit.

(Uchitelle 1992e)

This conception of modernization is spatial, specified as developing new models for export along trans-national trading networks. And while reform was normally imagined from Moscow as including both modernization (albeit not specified so much in spatial terms) and strict financial discipline, the experience at this local factory is voiced differently:

The whole issue of credit angers Mr. Glushkov. He said Vaz must have access to loans, here and abroad, if the company is to survive the transition period. The Western industrial nations and the International Monetary Fund disagree. They are urging the Government to strengthen the ruble by limiting loans that increase the number of rubles in circulation.

Such thinking is short-sighted, Mr. Glushkov said, if it results in the bankruptcy of a company like Vaz. “The I.M.F. is not interested in Russian car production,” he said. “Why keep car production going here, when car companies in the United States and Japan can't sell all the cars they make.”

(Uchitelle 1992e)
Modernization voiced from Moscow is criticized as a euphemism for importing the latest products from outsiders. And maintaining a “strong” ruble likely would have kept the imagination of success at the Ivanovo Textile Mill in Chapter Six from happening, because the lion’s share of credit for the revitalization of that mill went to the fortuitous crash of the ruble, which opened up foreign markets to exports from Russia. The success of exports from Vaz is explained as a necessary precursor to any revamping of the designs for domestically sold cars. Russian models are manufactured on a separate assembly line, alongside the models made for export, using superannuated technology for distribution through a very different network:

While robots weld together the various metal panels and sections that become the Samara's outer skin, the bodies of Vaz's six other models, sold primarily in Russia, are welded by hand, with equipment often as old as the factory itself.

At one station, a man with a pistol-shaped welder attaches metal bars, one by one, to the rear door panels for the Zhiguli station wagon. Nearby, a woman uses a hand-operated pneumatic puncher to make screw holes in headlight panels. And at the end of the line, as the various sub-sections arrive, five men put them into a large iron frame and weld them together by hand to produce a finished Zhiguli body.

One hundred feet and a world away, a Samara door enjoys a different birth. A half-dozen Italian and Russian-made robots weld the door, each robot performing a different function. Each door panel rests on a computerized cart that automatically carries it from robot to robot. Engine assembly and the machining of parts are similarly automated for the Samara, the goal being higher, more uniform quality than for models sold principally in Russia.

(Uchitelle 1992e)

Uchitelle (1992e) never used the code reform in this 2203 word article from July, 1992. Yet the narrative voice superbly explored how a single factory simultaneously produced for two entirely different spatial networks. And in
doing so, it codified and specified interactions between a number of foreign and
Russian interest groups around the concept of modernization\textsuperscript{122} and linked
success through modernization to increasing the standards of living of Russians
themselves. The narrative’s contribution emerges precisely from its not trying to
do too much. Rather than relying on sweeping abstractions like “reform” from
Moscow, the foreign correspondent did fieldwork away from Moscow to gain
special insight into one particular, socio-spatial aspect of Post-Soviet Russia.
Furthermore, the contradiction of a Russian factory producing for non-Russian
markets provided an important extra-textual circumstance that the narrative used
to produce the seduction in the text that led to the casual reading.\textsuperscript{123} The function
of contradiction or confusion, as an opening, seems to be well suited for
producing the audience in foreign correspondence that interrogates the
contradictions inherent to production under capitalism.

\textit{Other Trade Networks}

Foreign correspondence represented Russian factories that were unable to
sell to foreign markets as taking a different approach, bartering, to reproduce
themselves. One particular story constructs an especially intricate and detailed

\textsuperscript{122} Modernization was coded for instance as “investing in new models.” The emic code
“modernization” only appeared once, near the middle of the narrative: “But slowly, as more
money is channeled into modernization, labor costs are being cut” (Uchitelle 1992e).
\textsuperscript{123} The opening paragraph of the article reads, “Among Russia's giant state-owned manufacturing
enterprises, the Volga Automobile Associated Works is one of the few that seem likely to survive
and prosper in a market economy -- but not by selling cars to the many Russians who want them.
The company’s energies and money are focused instead on making cars for sale abroad.”
representation of networked space, invoking distance, maps, the loss of international trade, and conceptions of poverty:

Struggling businesses are compelled to negotiate complex trades that can involve more than half a dozen companies and span thousands of miles. Local governments finance their budgets with milk, lumber and vodka that they receive in taxes. Down-and-out commodities brokers who once negotiated major international sales now search the Internet for firms with something to trade...

“We have to spend all our time studying the industrial map of Russia and leafing through outdated directories to look for information on what is produced and where,” said Yuri V. Dadychenko, marketing director for Analitpribor, a Smolensk firm that makes gas detectors for mines and power plants.

Dadychenko recently set up a six-stage deal to pay the company's taxes by finding supplies for the city hospital. It worked like this: Analitpribor shipped its safety devices to a nuclear power plant in the Tver region northwest of Moscow, which canceled debts owed by a smaller electric company. The electric company canceled debts owed by a glass factory. The glass factory sent bottles to a plant in the republic of Mordvinia southeast of Moscow that manufactures hospital supplies. That factory filled some of the bottles with saline solution and shipped them to the Smolensk hospital. The city of Smolensk credited Analitpribor with paying its local taxes.

(Paddock 1998f)

The mind-boggling complexity of the represented barter-network suggests that an elaborate spatial interdependence in Russia emerged as a result of the shortage of cash. Yet there was room for success (limited success in this example) in Russia through non-monetary trade. That system of exchange favored companies that could trade with distant partners as well as “pay” laborers with products that were consumable at the household-level in order to avoid the saturation and loss of local markets. Hence cans of meat, that could be bartered over long distances and paid to workers as a much better substitute for cash, than say drills, became “like the dollar” (Paddock 1998f).
So rather than succumbing to bankruptcy, which I already showed in Chapter Six was represented as threatening to entire cities, factories as well as city governments survived based on what Paddock (1998f) dramatically judged as “a medieval system.” And he linked that system of barter to corruption:

Barter first became widespread in Russia in 1994, when investors, bankers and even factory managers found it more profitable to invest their money in get-rich-quick schemes than in manufacturing or agriculture, diverting cash that could have been invested in production.

Russian economists attribute the rise of barter to government policies that restricted the supply of money available to industry and agriculture. Aid from the International Monetary Fund and other major lenders was granted with the idea that Russia would maintain a tight monetary policy.

So-called young reformers brought in by President Boris N. Yeltsin to build a market economy instead helped create a system of gangster capitalism that transferred much of the country's cash to foreign bank accounts. And rather than encouraging investment in production, Yeltsin's government attracted money to its own treasury by selling short-term bonds that paid interest rates of up to 200%.

“The young reformers have managed to eliminate the line for goods that existed in Soviet times and replace it with a line for money...We have managed to build an economy in which, instead of a deficit of goods and services, there is a deficit of money.” (Paddock 1998f)

While the foreign correspondent writes from Smolensk, the narrator in the resulting story mixes local perspectives with those from the center, such as those of Russian economists, young reformers, the International Monetary Fund, and Yeltsin’s government. And the narrator, by juxtaposing center against periphery, criticizes Russia’s economy with the highly descriptive and geographically derived code “gangster capitalism.” The resulting imagination posits spatial
economic networks in Russia as *produced* by corruption and an individual landscape sustained by immoral motives, by get-rich-quick schemes.\(^\text{124}\)

Furthermore, the narrative positions itself to speak in a fairly direct way to the incongruence between space as produced and mental spaces. On one hand, barter is coded as simply a reaction to the shortage of money in Russia and as affording protection from the collapse in the ruble specifically, and banking generally, by reducing the importance of cash-assets to producers. On the other hand, American economists are voiced as expressing the decision to barter as an intellectual exercise gone awry: “We call the new system Russia's virtual economy because it is based on illusion, or pretense, about almost every important parameter of the economy: prices, sales, wages, taxes and budgets” (Paddock 1998f). While one perspective treats the decision to barter as made by economic actors embedded in a historical and material social situation, the other perspective treats it as if it were strictly a semiotic exercise based on indicators.

The provincial dateline provides the terrain for these competing international and local voices to appear together in a single narrative.

Another factory in Smolensk, the Smolmyaso meat cannery, was introduced this way:

> Every hour, thousands of shiny cans of beef and pork roll off the assembly line at the Smolmyaso cannery here. For the company, it's better than printing rubles.

\(^\text{124}\) It cynically hearkens to the passage from Chapter Five, a quote from Anatoly Chubais, that the beginning of privatization was “the starting point of the capitalist education of the Russian people” (Bohlen 1992a).
In this part of the world, Smolmyaso's 12-ounce cans of meat are as good as cash. The cannery trades its finished product for cows and pigs to slaughter, aluminum to make the cans, equipment to can the meat, electricity to run the equipment, and cardboard boxes to ship the cans. It even pays its taxes in canned beef and pork.

“Canned meat has become like the dollar here,” said Smolmyaso Director Vadim D. Skorbyashchev, holding up one of the cans. “These are our dollars.” (Paddock 1998f)

This particular factory was constructed as wildly successful – opening retail outlets, establishing farms, and almost tripling its workforce in only five years.

Yet in Tutayev, Yaroslavl’, the Tutayev Engine Factory also relied on barter, and it was imagined as struggling. Annual production fell from 12,000 engines to 222 in 1998. Furthermore, engines are not divisible as wages. The factory, which was the hub of the town’s economy, established a system of coupons:

What they earn instead are coupons--ration tickets issued by the factory that can be used for bread or dinner in the cafeteria. One meal coupon costs about 25 cents and is deducted from what the factory owes Protasova [a lathe operator] in back wages. A bread coupon of similar value will buy one loaf of white and one loaf of rye at the factory bread counter.

The coupon system extends into the town as well. Protasova's two children get coupons for school lunches--a ticket worth about 12 cents pays for a roll or meat pie and a glass of tea. Last summer, it was even possible to use a factory coupon to get a hairdo at a salon.

The coupons are currency in a local barter economy centered on the factory. The plant gets bread from the local bakery in return for supplying it with truck parts and a delivery fleet. Similar arrangements with local farms provide the food for the cafeteria. When a nearby clothing factory needs truck parts, dresses appear in the company coupon store. (Reynolds 1999c)

The story imagines Tutayev as a Pullman Town, created out of economic desperation instead of greed. And most Americans have never experienced anything like it. So how does the narrator set the stage for the story? The opening paragraphs read:

339
Every day, a miracle of loaves and fishes takes place in this Russian town.

In the gray of morning, thousands of workers emerge from concrete apartment blocks carrying empty tin lunch pails. They trudge out of town, across a snowy field and into a ramshackle set of buildings called the Tutayev Engine Factory.

They work all day but produce next to nothing. The factory loses money but is not bankrupt. No one gets paid, but they don't go hungry. When the workers head home, they carry sacks full of bread and lunch pails full of dumplings, fish cutlets and potatoes.

It's a form of economic magic unimaginable in the West. (Reynolds 1999c)

The story employs the textual function of confusion to produce the audience. In particular, the narrative voice deploys the codes “miracle” and “unimaginable economic magic” to stretch the narrative-canvas. These codes are the in-situ abstractions upon which the provincial dateline relies to initiate the storytelling process. By doing so, it produces the expectation in the audience to receive a bizarre and compelling message by setting itself up for the challenge of imagining the unimaginable. And the narrator codes the Western ideologies about economics in a way similar to the previous story, as unbending, finished products that are above being informed by the Russian case: “It’s as if the laws of economics are in suspended animation.”

Finally the narrator is coded as searching for a future for the factory other than minimal production and simply feeding workers:

“If we are bankrupted, nothing would take our place.”

Bankruptcy is not Tutayev’s only option. Several American engine manufacturers who have visited Tutayev with an eye on investing say the plant could have a future as a component supplier for European producers, or an assembly center for European engines heading for the Russian market.
The one thing potential foreign investors say the plant will never do again is precisely what it was built to do: make large engines on a large scale.

Even under the best-case scenario, only a fraction of Tutayev’s workers would find new employment in a streamlined, foreign-run plant like that. And the revamped factory would not feed the town. (Reynolds 1999c)

Apparently, large-scale layoffs are inevitable if the plant is ever to make a profit again. Success, for most of the plant’s workers, is out of reach. And the social imagination that informed the actions of the plant-managers at Vaz is simply absent in the coded minds of the foreign investors. The hopelessness of the situation of this town, a mere “150 miles northeast of Moscow,” is akin to that represented for cities built in Russia’s extreme north:

What if Western economic theories were put into effect in Tutayev? What if the factory laid off its workers and shut down operations? What if it shut the cafeteria, closed the bread counter and stopped issuing coupons?

That is Nina Nefedeyeva's nightmare.125 She runs the town's unemployment office, and she knows maybe better than anyone that Tutayev’s workers have nowhere else to go. There are no other significant businesses in town. Workers can’t commute out of the area because virtually none have cars, and public transportation is spotty. There is almost no way to find out about jobs elsewhere in the country, and no way to move even if there were.

“The town could become a danger zone,” she says, imagining the unemployed roaming the streets, looting houses and stealing anything they can. “You should be ready for anything. Hungry people are evil people.” (Reynolds 1999c)

It is unclear how to map the abstract, Western prescriptions coded in the article, which make a case for Russia “gradually dismantling its current economy” and “slowly whittling factories down to efficient size,”126 onto Tutayev. Workers there were represented as desperately needing the factory, the “only significant

125 Note the hope-fear dynamic.
126 see Reynolds (1999c)
business in town,” in order to eat and as unable to afford relocation even if they had somewhere else to go. And with various local leaderships at the factory-level sometimes explained as working and other times simply “prolonging our agony,”127 Russian voices didn’t agree internally on how to imagine themselves.

The provincial dateline quite effectively imagined this one region in Russia as beyond reform through a story of protracted economic agony. The lack of consensus on local identity and the portrayed suffering and hopelessness were juxtaposed against abstract economic reasoning from the developed West that simply didn’t seem to speak to the local situation. Thus abstract conceptions of Russia from the core were problematized through representations of spatial networks and dependencies in one of Russia’s provinces.

Summary

The stories I reviewed here collectively constructed success and failure along a variety of economic and non-economic lines. These constructions constitute a commentary on reform from the provinces in which government and economics are not the only priorities for Russian life. Russian factory managers, for instance, voiced a concern for using the moral and psychological dimensions of social life to inform their treatment of workers. Rather than go bankrupt, many factories and local governments were coded as highly interdependent, engaging in barter through highly complex spatial networks. Those networks themselves

127 see Paddock (1998f)
were imagined as moral spaces by way of both corruption in Moscow that robbed them of the cash necessarily for monetary transactions as well as through competing Western conceptions of how society and space should be organized. The need for those networks was bound up with the Soviet development of cities and towns around factories, and stories from the provinces approached space from a much more historical-material perspective than did stories from Moscow.

Reporting from the provinces allowed foreign correspondents to code sensibilities that were both core and periphery in “origin,” thus producing a narrator who was neither local nor national in character. Regional datelines thus incorporated a narrator who spoke not strictly from a provincial perspective but from one that was informed by the core and concerned with connectivity, with both intra-regional and inter-regional networks. The narrator was a geographic construct of the foreign correspondent’s own experiences of Russian spaces and coded a perspective that was both local/insider/embodied and national/outsider/disembodied. The next section builds on those notions.

THE STORYTELLING RELATIONSHIP IN FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL DATELINES

Freedom from coding the narrative voice as “from the center” did not result in a whole new use of textual strategies for producing the casual reading.
Identification and confusion/contrast were more important than in stories from Moscow, while alarm and reassurance were somewhat less important. This second section of Chapter Seven considers representations of the extreme, the transgressive, and the regionally distinct as textual functions that complete the list of ways that foreign correspondence from Russia pulled off textual seduction. It continues the work in this chapter by looking at the imagination of the extreme and the transgressive as involved in both the geographic construction of the narrator and in the imagination of Russian identity and space. Furthermore, it continues to incorporate stories about culture and social issues while focusing more on stories about landuse, which was the most important topic for stories with provincial datelines.

**Staging the Extreme**

Without identifying them as such, I already described in Chapter Six some stagings of the extreme. They included for instance representations of the impacts of isolation and severe climate on Verkhoyansk (Specter 1994d); dramatically elevated prices because of the cost of transportation to remote areas in the north (Paddock 1997b); and, climate and lack of supplies making life in the north, where people were eating each other’s pet dogs, “like a prison camp without the barbed wire” (Boudreaux 1998). Hiatt reported widespread alcoholism in Ust-Usa (Hiatt 1993g).
Representations from Kamchatka, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, and the Sakha Republic juxtaposed shortages or poverty against the construction of Russia as rich in natural resources:

[Kamchatka’s] natural assets make it one of the richest regions in the country, but Russia's poorly functioning economy provides little money to develop the resources... “Life is so terrible here we're going to die like dogs,” says a 20-year Oktyabrsky resident who gives her name only as Yulia. “But before we die like dogs, we're going to eat the dogs we have.” (Paddock 1999a)

And alongside the poverty and resource-rich constructions was imagined terrible waste:

Workers sliced open the female fish and extracted the rich, red caviar. But local canneries, run-down and poorly managed, could not process most of the salmon. As the brigades kept catching fish, trucks dumped an estimated 50,000 tons of salmon in fields to rot. The ground was so thick with fish that the trucks simply drove over the decaying salmon to dump their loads.

(Paddock 1999a)

Sakha was constructed as diamond-rich but lacking adequate housing, paved roads, and running water (Bohlen 1992c). Sakha was imagined as tantamount to Saudi Arabia in its mineral wealth but a place where workers only received half of the pay they needed “to live normally” (Goldberg 1993c). And in Primorskiy, residents explained their “medieval” lifestyles. They “have suffered from severe fuel shortages for four years in a row” despite Russia’s being “blessed with one of the world's biggest oil and gas reserves” (LaFraniere 2000b). And even in a cultural story, a shortage in cash was compared to a supply of freedom. Ironically, Russian theaters used to be “subsidized, but on a tight leash. Now they are free, and helpless” (Stanley 1996g).
Yet while many representations of the extreme occurred in articles about life in severe climates, they also appeared elsewhere. They included:

- **Agriculture**: Killing frosts, fires, cholera, and now locusts keep Russia “in the grip of serial disasters” (Williams 1999b). Also, watermelons and grapes are grown at a dacha\(^{128}\) in Nizhniy Novgorod, far from the areas they are normally cultivated. But the grower, “is an extreme case of the Russian summertime zest for country living” (Williams 2000c);

- **Rampant disease**: Inmates in Russia’s prisons are expected to catch tuberculosis at “a rate 60 times greater than what the World Health Organization considers an epidemic” (Williams 1999c). In Kaliningrad, “there were at least 1,850 [cases of AIDS], a far higher proportion in this city of 400,000 than anyplace else in Europe” (Specter 1997a). And “across Russia, signs are mounting of a decline in health that demographers say is unprecedented for a nation in peacetime” (Goldberg 1992a); and,

- **Merciless punishment in Russia’s legal system\(^{129}\)**: “A professional hunter with no previous criminal record killed a drunken forest ranger during an argument” and was sentenced to death. The man’s body will not even be returned to his family (Kraft 1996).

---

128 country home  
129 It is likely that this category would have developed more if articles from Chechnya had been included. One article from Chechnya, for instance, even documented the use of “bespredel” by Russian soldiers. Bespredel translates as “excesses” or “atrocities” (Reynolds 2000e).
In each case, narratives exploited “the extreme” in order to produce drama, which then participated in the act of textual seduction.

**Staging the Transgressive**

Corruption was one of the two most common transgressions that appeared in stores with provincial datelines. Representations of corruption included:

- buying support and other misconduct related to elections (Hockstader 1996f; Specter 1997d; Bohlen 1998d; Bohlen 1999a);
- use of the law and political position to seize assets (Goldberg 1994c; Williams 1998a; Working 1999; Tavernise 2000a); and,
- the criminalization of the profession of business itself (Goldberg 1994a; Hockstader 1995c; LaFraniere 1999).\(^{130}\)

Other kinds of transgressions involved:

- **Poaching:** In Astrakhan, poachers “slaughtered a mountain of sturgeon...to eat the meat and sell caviar ripped from the females to black marketeers” (Tyler 2000a). As few as thirty Amur leopards survive in Primorskiy (Dahlburg 1993b). And in Kamchatka, a fisherman without a license explains, “Life is all about poaching...What do you think life is

---

\(^{130}\) Because I discussed in Chapter Six many of these representations, I will move on to describe other transgressions.
like when you don't get paid at all? If someone gave us the money, we would be out of here in no time” (Paddock 1999a);

- **Prostitution and drugs**: Teachers, nurses, single mothers, and schoolgirls in Saratov prostitute themselves (Stanley 1998b). Prostitutes, as well as intravenous drug users, are at high risk for AIDS in Kaliningrad (Williams 1999a);

- **Stealing**, which has become commonplace in Russia. For instance, “in one recent case in the Volga River region of southern Russia, thieves cut into a pipeline, installed a spigot and filled a waiting tanker” (Paddock 1998d). An employee of a gun factory in the Udmurt Republic stole parts to manufacture and sell weapons out of his home (Bennett 1996b);

- **Cannibalism** in parts of Siberia, where in Kemerovo a man and his mother cannibalized homeless children (Bennett 1997a);

- **Witchcraft**: A story in Kursk about the attempted murder of a witch tells that witchcraft is normal practice in Russia (Bennett 1996b); and,

- **Offenses Against Nature and Society**: A voice from Kola laments “Nature never meant for humans to live and prosper at this latitude” (Williams 1998e). Oil rigs “ripped to shreds” the Yamalo Nenets region, where people are forced to drink bathwater (Specter 1994b), and the Chukchi Peninsula is so littered that it “gives new meaning to the word ‘wasteland’” (Paddock 1997d). At the cultural treasure of Leo Tolstoy’s
home, called Yasnaya Polyana or Clear Glade, pollution creates a “whiskey-colored haze” and causes the leaves to fall off of the trees three months early (Hiltzik 1993).

Overall, irresponsible development\textsuperscript{131} and corruption were the most significant instances of transgression for stories from the provinces. And one of the best examples of irresponsible development was the establishment of cities in extreme climates, effectively linking the two concepts.

The small, tireless ethnic Yakut mayor said she saw 40 complaining villagers on a recent day, one at a time, and that all but one cried. In an interview, she emphasized her mission to inspire optimism and forestall panic, but at one point she broke into tears herself.

"What kind of fool decided to build a village out here, 300 kilometers 186 miles from the nearest town?" she wondered.

The answer: Nikita S. Khrushchev's Soviet planners. (Boudreaux 1998)

The story of a Neftegorsk, a “sickly creature of Soviet planning,” razed by an earthquake elaborates on the “fool” just imagined. “Quick and dirty craftsmanship” was blamed for the destruction of all 17 five-story apartment blocks. But:

The peculiar tragedy of last week's quake was that the village had no humane reason to exist in the first place.

Like too many mining and industrial towns, it was founded under a Soviet system that sent people and their families where the work was, no matter how hostile the environment.

The Siberian tundra and Arctic wastes are dotted with cities of tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of settlers with little in life but ugly, gray, boxlike flats and hard labor extracting the diamonds, timber, gold and oil that are Russia's wealth.

\textsuperscript{131} Although the Soviet Union was given credit for irresponsible development, pollution was also represented as Russian (Post-Soviet).
In other countries, miners and oil workers go in shifts to temporary quarters without their families. The Soviets just moved in the lot... But the nearest fire station was two hours away by road. For the better part of a day, the devastation of the quake went unnoticed outside the village, and flames killed many who might have survived.

If life in Neftegorsk was bad to begin with, it only got worse. Prospectors cut down much of the surrounding forest and spoiled the earth with spilled oil, turning the place into something more like a desert. Some Russian geologists believe that the drilling destabilized the underlying rock, making quakes more likely. (Boudreaux 1995b)

This especially vivid portrayal of a tragedy (also a fine example of the construction of a region as distinct) represents the very building of Neftegorsk as a crime against humanity. It constructs Soviet, ideological policies toward labor in extreme climates as a radical departure from those of other countries, involving a despicable, involuntary migration to a desolate and hard life. Other imagined transgressions against society include Soviet construction techniques and the location of the fire station two hours away. Deforestation and the extraction of oil are imagined as transgressions against nature, which even potentially reinforced the social disaster.

Other representations of transgressions against nature, which incorporate elements of the extreme, included:

- a story about an oil spill several times greater than that of the Valdez spill in the Komi Republic. “Wanton disregard for nature was the norm for decades in the Soviet era. ‘In our country, rivers, lakes and forests were sacrificed in the name of industrial development’” (Shapiro 1995a);
• representations of Nikel, Murmansk, detailing deformed tree trunks, acid rain, and only one-third of babies born healthy (Shogren 1992a) as well as black snow falling in what was “once a place of unparalleled beauty...The Kola peninsula has become one of the most poisoned spots on earth -- relentlessly transformed by Russian industry into a laboratory of ecological destruction” (Specter 1994a);

• In Leonidovka, Penza, at “a verdant pine forest here, sprinkled with birch trees, the lush growth suddenly disappears. Underbrush gives way to a black ulcer on the earth. In the clearing nothing grows, not even grass.” The site is a clandestine chemical weapons dump, where “there is more than enough nerve gas, if distributed by individual doses, to wipe out every human on Earth” (Hoffman 1998a); and,

• a vivid portrayal of Lake Baikal in Irkutsk: “Lake Baikal, with 20% of the world's supply of fresh water, was long protected by its remote location north of Mongolia. But today, its legendary purity and unique life forms are under assault from industrial pollution, illegal logging and untreated sewage. The most dramatic menace is a former military factory, now a pulp and
paper mill, that pumps 140,000 tons of waste water--containing
deadly dioxin--into the lake every day” (Paddock 1998a).

Each case imagines a spoiling or ruination as part of the transgression and mixes
Soviet-era development with current circumstances.

Perhaps the supreme representation of transgression against society and
nature involved the neglect of human subjects in the case of nuclear testing and
research, which connects extreme injustice with a representation of the Cold
War:

Nobody told the villagers why the fish in the river turned blind. Or why
bulldozers showed up one day to plow under the road. So, they continued to cut
hay in the meadows. When these peasants were forced by soldiers to leave their
cottages in the Urals, they still didn't get a frank explanation.

And even when they began to die, they were not told the truth.

(Dahlburg 1992e)

The representation combines corruption (lies and deception); offenses against
nature and society caused by pollution; and extremes in terms of the magnitude
and spatial extent of pollution, as well as the coded forced migration, to produce
what is perhaps the most ghastly and dramatic story I encountered:

From 1949 to 1956, about 2.6 billion cubic feet of waste laden with 2.75
million curies of radioactivity—or more than half the long-term radiation
released at Hiroshima—were poured into the Techa... tens of thousands of
people downstream were exposed to dangerous doses that ranged as high as
350 rems per year, said Dr. Mira M. Kosenko, head of the institute's clinical
department. (In comparison, a nuclear power plant employee in the West,
experts say, should receive no more than five rems.)

The eyes of the pike that live in the Techa turned a dead, glassy white. Even
today a gamma-ray detector placed on the bank reads 1,700 micro-roentgens
per hour—100 times normal levels.
It was only when radioactivity showed up in waters 1,000 miles downstream, in the ocean off northern Russia, that the bomb builders turned off the stream of waste. Evacuation of the villages began in 1953 but dragged on for eight years.

When confronted by residents who were beginning to complain of health problems—from nosebleeds and chronic listlessness to leukemia and cancers—Kosenko and her fellow physicians were told by authorities to say nothing about radiation. “We were always feeling unwell,” one woman from near the Techa remembered. “But at the Institute of Physics and Biology, the diagnosis was always the same—blood pressure problems.” (Dahlburg 1992e)

The representation takes the “anything goes, almost” category developed in Chapter Six to a pinnacle. The narrator continues by explaining that the bomb-builders ceased dumping waste into the river only to resume unprotected dumping somewhere else in nature:

Deprived of the Techa to use as a sewer, Soviet bomb builders next began dumping high-level waste into an open lake, Karachai. Even today, environmentalists are stunned at the results.

“They made it into the single most polluted spot on the face of the planet,” said Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist at the Washington-based Natural Resources Defense Council who has visited Mayak.

Today, the lake is so laden with radioactivity—120 million curies’ worth, or almost 2 1/2 times as many long-lived isotopes as spewed from Chernobyl—that “to stand on its bank, even for a half-minute, would be deadly,” Kosenko said. (Dahlburg 1992e)

Yet another story narrates the test-explosion of a nuclear bomb:

Forty years ago this week, a Soviet warplane bombed this area with an atomic weapon more powerful than the one that flattened Hiroshima. Nikolai Levonov, who had been evacuated from his farming village a few miles from the center of the target zone, returned the next day to find his house flattened and his tomatoes turned from green to red. Levonov, now 68, set about rebuilding his house. He also ate the tomatoes. (Hiatt 1994g)

The story also explains that minutes after the bomb detonated, Soviet troops were “ordered into the atomic inferno,” mostly without protective gear. Afterwards, water for washing off was scarce, and many of the soldiers kept the new belts
they were given on the occasion of the test. “Many have died as a result” (Hiatt 1994g). Hiatt’s story, like Dahlburg's, explains the corrupt secrecy around the environmental and health-related consequences of radiation through the coded drama of the Cold War. As a label for the described events, the term corruption even looses its efficacy to describe what seem to be outright crimes against humanity.

Text and Distinction of Place

This part of the chapter examines the production of distinctive places in foreign correspondence from the provinces. It links one of the more obvious aspects of journalism from the provinces, that it imagines regions in Russia as individually distinctive, with less noticeable, textual factors. It considers transgressions and extremes as the two most important dimensions along which regional distinctiveness is expressed.

The observations that I make in this section help me to develop the argument that space informs mediated discourse by playing a major role in constructing narrator-audience relationships. In the context of the journalistic priorities on brevity and relevance to a general audience, space has a say in how it is coded, not just in terms of how it is described but also with respect to how readers are invited to read. Space affects its own communicability, and for the purposes of foreign correspondence, not all spaces are equally communicable.
For Russia, places that can be coded as spaces of transgression and extremes are much more suitable for dramatic coding and for being characterized as distinct. And the results of this chapter indicate that distinction is the primary textual device made additionally available to foreign correspondents when they leave the bureau headquarters in Moscow.

I found two basic cases for the production of distinction in the text. The first instance produces a narrator as topophile or as docent and an audience as understandably ignorant. It constructs an atmosphere in which the narrator and audience engage each other in a respectful way as pedagogue and student. The text thus stages what amounts to a rational documentary on place that imitates the interactions that commonly take place in Western museums. In the second instance, the narrator is produced as an adventurer, bravely navigating foreign spaces, both urban and rural. The atmosphere of the text is that of a traveler’s tale, with the audience occupying the position of the uninitiated or the naive. The text stages an insider’s account in which the sequence of events described can be as illogical or disorderly as the adventure itself, mimicking the spontaneity of a discussion that might take place between two interlopers in any number of unstructured social settings.

In both of the above cases, the uniqueness or distinctiveness of place and its inhabitants produces a piqued curiosity in the audience in the face of mystery, developed by the narrator as sleuth, that seduces the reader into reading casually.
Both instances produce the narrator as a carrier of local or regional knowledge.

The emotional responses in the audience include privilege, appreciation, exhilaration, and sobriety.

I now take a look at the first case of distinction, which I call documentary distinction:

The basic view from this mountain village hasn't changed for 7,000 years, since a giant reservoir of molten lava crested over to form the mighty peak of Asia's largest and most active volcano. Eagles and falcons dance through the crisp air. Not far away, the world's biggest population of grizzly bears -- shaking off their winter slumber -- forage for salmon as big as dogs.

There is nothing else in Russia, and little left on earth, like Kamchatka. A peninsula the size of California, with just one long, partly paved road, it has more earthquakes and live volcanoes -- including Asia's biggest and most active, Klyuchevskaya Sopka -- than anywhere else. Thanks to its fertile rivers, lakes and seas, the region accounts for nearly half the fish produced in Russia. But while Kamchatka, in Russia's Far East, is one of the last pristine places on the planet, it has been left that way by accident. More than 5,000 miles from Moscow, the region was protected by the Soviet Union because it was home to a nuclear submarine base in the port city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. For decades it was off limits to all but natives, sailors and fishermen. The staggering wealth that lies beneath the soil -- gold, silver, platinum and more -- has never been touched. (Specter 1997b)

Fascinating attributes characterize these two, lead paragraphs, among them:

- **an emphasis on visual description**, with which the whole lead-paragraph is occupied, including vivid terminology like “molten lava,” “Eagles and falcons danc[ing] through the crisp air;” and “salmon as big as dogs;”

- **a broad time-span**: “The basic view from this mountain village hasn’t changed for 7,000 years” as well as the placing of the narrative in a Soviet context;
• **contrast**: “There is nothing else in Russia, and little left on earth, like Kamchatka; ”the presence of “staggering” yet untouched mineral wealth; and “A peninsula the size of California, with just one long, partly paved road;”

• **the extreme**: “Asia’s largest and most active volcano;” the region accounting for “nearly half the fish produced in Russia,” and, “5,000 miles from Moscow;” and finally,

• **a rational, omnipresent perspective**: All of the preceding features combine produce a narrator who is analytically capable of incorporating a wide array of seemingly disparate phenomena into a single, objective tale.

In these opening paragraphs, there is no actant with whom the audience can identify, no confusion (the unchanging landscape was quickly explained), no alarm, and no reassurance. Instead of producing drama through an oscillation between hope and fear, the text creates drama through the coding of visual and physical geographic circumstance that make Kamchatka an especially distinctive place. Textual drama inhabits the space produced by the imagination of extreme, physical geographic contrast rather than by a movement between alarming and reassuring messages.

Moreover, the rational description and analysis of such a broad set of features combine to produce a narrator with special abilities to see and reason. Because there is little evidence that produces the narrator is an embodied
fieldworker other than a link in the first two sentences to a particular vista, the narrator is coded as having the power of omnipresence. That ability extends infinitely through both space and time, further enhancing the narrator’s flexibility to combine any number of circumstances in a unique way for the purposes of imagining place as distinctive. The resulting audience is that of a respectful student that honors the thoroughly impressive abilities of the narrator through feelings of appreciation, awe, and patience. And that emotional involvement, adopted by the casual reader, sets the narrator up to deliver the rest of the 2025 word article.

So what does a more embodied account of Russian place that produces distinction look like? The following example, which avows embodied fieldwork to a greater degree, also constructs Russian place as spoiled by the same Soviet development that left the Kamchatka peninsula pristine:

It looks as if someone poured buckets of thick black ink into the streams, coating miles of banks, bushes and birch trees with a slimy cover of crude oil, inches deep. The cold wind stinks of petroleum vapors.

The river into which these creeks feed is covered with a rainbow slick for miles. Nearby, a lake of gooey crude, the size of several football fields, burns furiously, sending a billowing column of acrid blue-gray smoke into the air, where it drifts for miles above the tundra -- the flat, subarctic plain that in these parts is marshy.

132 Unlike in academic writing, which requires citations as evidence of where research was conducted, there is no trace—simply the dateline published before the narrative begins in earnest—of how the narrator came to know the represented information. It is as if the space referenced outside of the text is smaller than the narrator. This is why I especially like the conception of the narrator as docent. When I re-read the above passage after I developed this idea, I imagined that I was in a wax museum, looking around at a model of the Kamchatka Peninsula as a docent spoke the written words.

133 I could not be more aware that as I write these words, I exploit contrasts in the data in order to produce a text that helps to propel the reader along.
Experts argue about the size of the pipeline oil spill that occurred last summer in this remote Komi region of Russia, 1,000 miles northeast of Moscow -- whether it was eight times the size of the massive 1989 Exxon Valdez spill off Alaska or just three times. There is no question, however, that an environmental disaster of major proportions is emerging from a deep winter freeze.

“This is a monster spill. I've just never seen anything like it,” said Richard McGahan, one of dozens of Alaskans experienced in other oil cleanups who are hard at work on a World Bank-funded effort to block the oil from further fouling Komi's rivers and tundra. (Shapiro 1995a)

The story constructs the narrator as seeing (“rainbow slick,” “billowing column,” and “miles above the tundra”); “feeling (“cold wind”); smelling (“cold wind stinking” and “acrid smoke”); and perhaps even hearing (“burns furiously”). To this end, it goes a lot further toward placing the narrator at the scene, as an embodied adventurer in Usinsk, rather than at nowhere in particular, as an omnipresent viewer. And as was the case in the first article, a narrator coded with a broader historical perspective allows an oil spill from six years past in Alaska participate in the meaning-making. Thus, an important and extreme transgression, in this case a “monster spill” in such a remote “subarctic tundra” that experts cannot know how many times greater in size this spill was than “the massive 1989 Exxon Valdez spill,” also characterizes the story. This suggests that in order to introduce extremes, which in turn participate in producing textual drama, the coded narrator in stories with provincial datelines may exhibit a certain schizophrenia, at some times speaking with an embodied, territorialized,

134 I will discuss this more in Chapter Eight. Terdiman (1985) argued that the narrator addresses “No one in particular.” I am suggesting that the narrator’s argument can emanate from nowhere in particular, despite the publishing of a dateline with the story.
local voice in the present, while other times speaking from a broader historical frame of reference which may include a disembodied, omnipresent perspective. And although alarm is produced (“an environmental disaster of major proportions is emerging from a deep winter freeze”), it occurs alongside and after the vivid, embodied details of the foreign correspondent’s experience in place.

As foreign correspondents deviate more from disembodied approaches to knowledge in their stories, they also move towards the construction of the narrator as adventurer. The representation of local voices as vernacular and conversational rather than as interviewee assists in this process. The following example, a particularly rich one, starts with an intrepid narrator, strolling through the street at midnight in Siberia, among drunks. It builds on the construction of the narrator as standing outside in the previous example:

You could film "The Night of the Living Dead" in this Siberian hinterland without hiring any extras.

First one tipsy inhabitant staggers by. Then another reels past. Then a small group of zombie-eyed young men in dusty work clothes weave their way up the town's only paved road.

A little girl on a late-night delivery scampers along with a full vodka bottle in the sleepy surreal light of the midnight sun. A Russian Orthodox priest pats two young Khants-the Eskimo-like natives of this swamplike region near the

---

135 It is interesting to imagine the narrator as ruled by Janus, “the Roman god of beginnings, of the past and the future, and of gates, doorways, and bridges...traditionally depicted as having two faces” (Microsoft-Encarta 2001). In other words, each geographic description or place name seems to have its own particular gateway in to the story, be it in terms of the past or the future or through the narrator’s body or another source.

136 An interview constitutes an agreed-upon interaction between interviewer and interviewee. The incorporation of interview-data in stories imparts the text with a certain, professional atmosphere. Likewise, conversation-like speech in a vernacular or local setting that takes place outside of a contract endows the conversation with a more spontaneous and adventuresome feeling.
Arctic Circle-and says paternally, “Drink, my children. It's a festival and everything is allowed.” (Goldberg 1993a)

As the story continues, the narrative voice staging a chance-encounter with a saucy (and soused) local:

Volodya can't get a plane out and has clearly been boozing away his time when he approaches visitors in the town canteen. “Come to Saranpaul,” he slurs.

He has cunning, squinting blue eyes and a tanned, grimy face. “We have great stones there, rutile and mountain crystals. . . .”

Rutile?

“If you don't know what it is, I can't tell you,” he says. (A subsequent look in the encyclopedia discloses that it is a red or brown lustrous mineral.) But “Come to Saranpaul. It's only an hour by helicopter, or in the winter you can get there by the zimnik,” the winter road over the frozen swamp.

Volodya, it turns out, is a trucker, proud of his ability to navigate roads so bad that it can take 48 hours to go 70 miles. He is also, it turns out, a smuggler of the minerals he is advertising-just back from Yekaterinburg, where he traded stones for the money he is now “drinking through,” as the Russians put it. If he keeps smuggling stones, he'll be able to afford to buy an apartment and move to the Big Land to get his son educated. So long as he's not caught first. (Goldberg 1993a)

Both quotations are characterized by identification as well as elements of the transgressive. The first example involved a Russian Orthodox Priest taking an “everything goes” attitude toward unabashed drunkenness, while the second quotation depicted a smuggler. And place is constructed as distinctive through the unpredictable, once-in-a-lifetime interactions of an adventurer in a locale.

As it turns out, the adventurer declines the trip with the smuggler in favor of an even better offer.\(^{137}\) The narrator then dives into a rich, physical geographic

\(^{137}\) Goldberg (2003, personal communication) even indicated that fieldwork provided an opportunity to go on an adventure, as was evidenced by this story.
description of part of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug. The earlier drama, imagined through the unpredictable and messy human encounters on the streets, is now produced by extremes in scenery (particularly the representation of “this part of Russia” as “untouched” and “virgin”). The representation of the unique interactions between the traveler and the locale continues, with the a collection of “bigwigs” and “guests” on a helicopter-adventure with a “40-pound white salmon.” The new representations of transgressive behaviors include descriptions of drinking from the bottle and hot-tubbing in underwear:

The Berezovo leadership has an even more intriguing invitation: Come with us to the Source.

In midafternoon, council Chairman Lyutikov, an assortment of local and regional bigwigs and a few foreign guests pile into an Aeroflot helicopter with boxes of Bulgarian wine and an impressive 40-pound white salmon.

For half an hour it flies over untouched green-and-blue swamp until it reaches the Source—a natural hot spring, discovered when explorers looking for gas drilled a hole and a geyser of hot water came out instead. Called Bolshiye Shogany, it is surrounded by virgin birch forest where elk and bear still roam.

The spring is as unfinished and rough as all of this part of Russia. A wooden staircase rises to a point where the geyser batters and sprays bathers, and the pool below is just a dirty water hole, ringed by logs.

Visitors lounge in the hot pool drinking wine from the bottle—no long-stemmed glasses here, my dear—and those without bathing suits take a dip in their underwear. (Goldberg 1993a)

Throughout the story, there has not been much in the way of a panoptic or historical perspective on the part of the narrator. Yet extreme contrasts predominate, such as a party in the middle of “virgin birch forest where elk and bear still roam;” the approval of debauchery by a priest; and, the smuggler
Volodya not being able to decide whether people in Saranpaul “suck” or “are wonderful” (Goldberg 1993a).

Transgressive imaginations continue to appear in the story. One part of the narrative represents local beliefs in the supernatural through the imagination of an abominable snowman kidnapping a human concubine to produce a daughter with a “big and hairy” left hand. And near the end of the story, “extreme” even appears as an emic code, finally avowing perhaps the most important representational strategy that got the casual reader that far in the first place:

Other extremes abound. At the headquarters of the Surgut Oil & Gas Co., a giant firm, a secretary slinks by in three-inch heels and a dress cut nearly to her navel from both directions. As visitors' mouths drop open, another employee asks innocently, “Oh, don't they dress to go to work that way where you live?”

No, she is told.

“Well, here, we go too far with everything,” she says. (Goldberg 1993a)

And at the headquarters of the “giant” Surgut Oil and Gas Company, the janitor uses a broom made out of birch. But for all of the embodied, local perspectives in the exciting traveler’s tale, the last utterance of the narrative voice is ideological:

True Russian hospitality always includes parting gifts. But what can humble Berezovo offer?

Viktor Gontarovsky, a former weightlifter and construction foreman who now heads Berezovo's cultural department, descends into the town hall's basement and comes up grinning. Across his office desk he lays out the bedspread-sized red banner of Leninism that used to stand in the town hall.

"For you," he says. "Remember us." (Goldberg 1993a)
Like two bookends that hold together a collection of stories, “The Night of the Living Dead” and the “red banner of Leninism” are two ideological references at opposite ends of the story, serving to open up and close off the mediated discourse for the American reader. The first reference was delivered vis-à-vis the judgment of the narrator, while the second one occurred through the staging of a local voice. There is only one other significant passage with ideological references. The passage also indicates that the consciousness of the narrator extends beyond the present locale:

> How do they live here? How can they stand nine months of winter followed by summers when 75 days out of 90 can be rainy? Ask them and they wax eloquent about the beauty of their birches, the rich harvest of berries and mushrooms in the woods, the complexity of life back on what they call the Big Land-European Russia.

This is the Wild North. Moscow has gotten full of Marlboro billboards, Coca-Cola booths and Mercedes-Benz sedans; St. Petersburg swarms with tourists and Baltic businessmen. But here, 1,000 miles from Moscow, there is still room for purely Russian adventure. (Goldberg 1993a)

These two paragraphs also construct the region as distinctive, as presenting special problems for survival. They manufacture heterogeneity, an imagined cultural boundary between the Khanty-Mansi and other Russians, by voicing a conception of the provincial people as not the people of “Big Land-European Russia.” And they associate consumer culture and business with Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia’s two largest cities. Identity is represented as territorialized, as it was in other passages, through the representation of activities

---

138 It is interesting that Goldberg chose an ethnic republic to represent a place where “purely Russian adventure” was possible.
in nature, coded here as “purely Russian adventure,” leaving no room for the audience to misunderstand that the narrator is an adventurer.

Finally, the function of identification is mixed in with the construction of the narrator of adventurer. Most of all, the narrative voice asks the audience to lose itself emotionally in the romanticism of the narrator’s once-in-a-lifetime adventure. The coded succumbing of the audience to the romantic appeal of chance encounters, unpredictability, and escapism of the narrator’s odyssey is the dominant emotional involvement upon which the seduction depends.

Furthermore, instances occur throughout the story, during which the audience has the opportunity to act out emotionally toward other actants: with indignation toward the use of the little girl as a vodka-courier; with reassurance, at the priest’s urgings that normal, moral behavior is temporarily suspended for the “festival;” with fear, regarding the chances of the smuggler being caught; with respect, in terms of the smuggler’s skills and the risks he takes in the name of entrepreneurship; with astonishment or envy, at the drinking in underwear; as rooting for or opposing the construction of sexuality in the headquarters of the oil and gas company; and lastly, with sympathy, toward Viktor Gontarovsky, coded as a Russian in a remote “swampy region near the Arctic Circle” who just wants to be remembered. The joint participation of distinction and identification (even which incorporated alarm and reassurance) suggests this article to be highly seductive and implies that distinction through adventurer’s tale has available to it
a wider textual versatility in pulling off the act of seduction than does documentary distinction.

Summary

At this juncture, I have differentiated between two different textual methods of producing drama through distinction. One extreme involves the construction of the narrator as an embodied adventurer who is an insider, privy to information only by virtue of “being there when it happens.” The other pole is staked out through disembodied yet descriptive narrative that produces the narrator as a special seer, describer, and analyst. These perceptive and analytical abilities locate the narrator as an outsider, not only as “not there” but as not needing to be there. In practice, these archetypes are most likely to play out together, intertwined in a single story, with different stories exploiting different combinations in their own ways. The produced audience may even oscillate back and forth between the exhilaration of a traveler’s tale and the sober respect for receiving the pedagogy of an exemplary teacher. However, the finding that the adventurer’s tale has available to it a greater flexibility to seduce supports the observation that encyclopedic distinction rarely occurred by itself.

Chapter Four found out that references to place in stories with Moscow-datelined generally (but not always) arose with specific issues. This chapter finds that specificity, that is, regional character produced in the text by making the
provinces distinct, is exactly the atmosphere that makes texts most readable to the casual reader. One way in which provincial-datelines served foreign correspondence was by making individual regions distinct through celebrating the uniqueness of place. Ironically, after so many representations of the extreme and of transgressions, foreign correspondence collectively imagined these outliers as normal for Russia. Again, the “anything goes, almost” theme is reinforced for foreign correspondence on Russia during the reform-period.

One way to qualify the “anything goes” perspective is through provincial foreign correspondence that highlights diversity and conflict as essential components of the local scene. The final section in this chapter examines two stories that did so.

THE READING CONTEXT: LOCAL VOICES, IDEOLOGY, AND CHANGE

Figuring into the reading context for stories with provincial datelines is tricky. Political figures speaking from the center, dealt with in Chapter Five, frequently resorted to ideology and were unproblematically understood as privileged voices. However, in stories with provincial datelines, local voices were frequently coded as seriously telling a version of what was “really happening” away from Moscow. Understanding the narrator as lampooning in these cases posits local voices, often expressing hardship and poverty, as cynical
and unreliable: “We will complain no matter what things are like.” It understands them as utterly provincial, as so locked up in local circumstance, that they cannot see the forest for the trees. They will winge no matter how badly others in different regions have it. Thus foreign correspondence from the provinces takes on the flavor to the ironic reader of dark comedy.

Yet it is not my main intention in this section of the dissertation to find humor in representations of depravity and local struggle in Russia. Instead, I will look at two examples of representations of local voices as mixed in order to show how representations of diversity and class inform the construction of identity.¹³⁹ The interplay between local voices, ideology, and scale in stories with provincial datelines is highly complex. This portion of the dissertation engages stories, coded through a narrator with a shifting spatio-temporal perspective, that teach different ways of being in Russian locales that are not characterized by extremes.

The first example touches on the ways that Russians rely on each other outside of the organized setting of a factory to live:

It has been a long time since anyone in this pretty but forlorn city on the Oka River in central Russia heard any good economic news. Local industrial and agricultural production has dropped 22 percent in the last four years. Doctors, teachers and most factory workers have not been paid in months and their salaries, when they get them, are on the average a paltry $110 a month.

Bad news, on the other hand, arrives regularly. And this week, while the ruble tumbled, it was coming in by the truckful as shipments of imported goods pulled up to Kaluga’s crowded street market with prices on Turkish jackets,

¹³⁹This really continues what I’ve been doing thus far in this chapter, which is juxtaposing representations of the cultural and the historical against the political and the economic in stories as well as showing how different representations of three factory towns constructed Russia as comprised of a variety of networked spaces.
Polish boots and Korean blankets already as much as 10 percent higher. In the circumstances, what is a Kaluga street vendor to do? (Bohlen 1998e)

These two opening paragraphs employ in the casual reading a third-person account of Kaluga, which aggregates events across an unknown period of time, likely months or years. The narrator is not constructed as an involved “insider” but rather through a more dispassionate and omnipresent narrative voice that, in its removal from the immediacy of any one event, is capable of identifying larger trends. There is alarm, that much time has passed “since anyone...heard any good economic news.” Yet the narrative voice continues to specify the conditions of an ailing local economy through a rational and objective treatment of data, producing a documentary distinction.

The second paragraph shifts to a more localized, insider-account of events. The narrative voice emphasizes a narrower time-scale and aspects of the visual, the inspection of prices on shipments of “Turkish jackets, Polish boots and Korean blankets,” as it distinguishes Kaluga. It also employs the function of identification, asking the audience to sympathize with a street vendor. The end of the paragraph provides a transition to an even more localized account:

“We have raised our prices a little, but there is so much competition we can't raise them too high,” said Oleg, 34, who left his job at a local military plant four years ago to try his hand at selling shoes. “If you raise them too high,” added Oleg, who would not give his last name, “people won't buy because they just don't have the money.” (Bohlen 1998e)

By identifying with Oleg, the casual reader adopts a fearful attitude and understands that street vendors face big problems.
My ironic reading, however, draws attention to what is not local about the account. Returning to the lead sentence, my ironic reading understands that the codes “long time,” “forlorn,” and “good” are judgments from an outsider, the docent, about Kaluga. The “hearing” of “economic news” constructs the locals, not the narrator, as embodied and then leads the audience to value abstractions of space, economic indicators like changes in production and the exchange value of a paycheck, over other ways of representing. And the appearance at the outset of these abstractions is important, because they allow the narrative voice to very quickly stretch the canvas upon which the rest of the story will be portrayed. The value of the abstraction is in its economy, allowing in this case a quick progression to the contrast of the outsider’s judgment that “Bad news, on the other hand, arrives regularly.” The textual magic being pulled off here is quite ingenious, because good news not arriving is practically the same as bad news arriving, in that the audience has already been told of the arrival of bad news as well as its passage (“it has been a long time”)! Nonetheless, the contrast produces the textual space for a seductive, dramatic action.

The narrator as sleuth, after asking the question of what “street vendors” do, provides the answer through the speech of a local actant that makes reference to competition, an ideological code in Western discourses on economics. That code communicates the flattering message that one paramount aspect of capitalism is happening in Russia. And the local voice, which staged an
ideological construct, precedes a return in the narrative to a broader scale, where alarm is constructed: “As the value of the ruble fell after the Russian Government's sudden shift in economic policy, people here in Kaluga, 100 miles south of Moscow, were poised for the worst.” And perhaps even more importantly, my ironic reading recognizes that the audience is being told that locals are being educated in the ways of capitalism. My ironic reading understands that message as a reassurance, as a participant in textual drama, as well as a narrative about progress buried inside of a narrative about struggle.

So in this example, the story started with a narrator as docent but transitioned rapidly to a voice that coded the narrator as adventurer (having a chance encounter) and then back to docent again. A local voice was used to introduce an ideological account of society and space after an outside voice judged what was happening on the inside of Russia. The narrator exploited abstract reasoning as well as a representation and then a re-representation of the same trend in order to create the gateway into the story itself. And my ironic reading discovered a subtext about progress or success embedded within a narrative about struggle. The text is a caldron of messages in which textual seduction is informed from one scale (local or international) while the extra-textual world is produced at the other scale. This observation honors an arresting complexity\(^{140}\) and builds off of the work in Chapter Five (page 218) that one

\(^{140}\) I think the complexity in the art of writing foreign correspondence is something that even foreign correspondents have a hard time specifying. When I asked John-Thor Dahlburg (2000,
geographic scale can facilitate the level of production of the extra-textual world while simultaneously a different scale works to produce the storytelling relationship. Put another way, the narrator is geographically located and repositioned through codes as local or as foreign, as insider or as outsider. The storytelling act depends on the spatialized identity imagined for the narrator through linguistic codes.

Once into the story, however, it becomes clear that Bohlen is discussing events in Kaluga “as the value of the ruble fell after the Russian Government's sudden shift in economic policy” (Bohlen 1998e). The provincial dateline gives the narrator a chance to voice local concerns toward the center, and these voices show up in a number of ways:

- Prices were going up, but in a country where everyone, including the Government and the banks, is running out of money, that does not necessarily mean inflation; it just means people are going to have to do with even less than the little they have. “In Russia, it is just a matter of survival,” said Lena Petrukhina, 27, who sells shoes in a tent next to Oleg. “Right now, things are very tense. I don't see how it will get any better, if it ever does get better.”
“I can name you 10 factories in the whole region that pay their workers on time,” said Yuri Rastorguyev, business manager at the local government newspaper Vest. “So you can understand, if people haven't gotten their salaries in six months, and they raise prices, where does that leave them? **Basically, the system is in total collapse.**”

Yet people do survive, or as Denis Skyanik, a 25-year-old violinist, noted, “**Nobody is going to die of hunger.**” In his case, he supplements his 300-ruble monthly salary from the Kaluga Orchestra by playing on a street corner, weather permitting. He also plays at parties. **“Russians like to drink and have fun,” he said. “So that business will always be there.”**

To make ends meet, Igor Babichev, editor of a private financial newspaper that by his own admission makes no money, sold shoes, imported Spanish wine and dabbled in real estate before settling on a side business of campaign consulting. **“Everybody here has a hobby,” he said almost cheerily, “and no one will tell you how much they earn.”**

Mr. Akimov, 28, is not so worried about inflation, or the value of the ruble...His worries are about the freeze on capital investment, domestic and foreign, that this region of 1.1 million sorely needs to pull itself out of its economic mess. “The main problem is how debt crisis affects investments,” he said. “The reaction of capital markets will be, ‘Better
not to even touch Russia,’ and who can blame them? **If I were an investor, I would take my money and run.**”

The narrative voice, through staging local concerns, aired fears and reassurances about the money supply in general as well as the particular issue of wage arrears; the obtaining of supplemental income (both through career-related and non-career-related skills); and, foreign investment. Local voices were actually localized expressions of the relationships and issues between actions at the core and the periphery. Although the narrative voice does not attempt to delve into these issues, the voices themselves teach a variety of lessons: Learn how to rely on money less! Learn how to need the system less! Diversify! Enjoy your life! And to foreign investors, “We will understand if you divest from Russia.”  

141 Each of these lessons hearkens back to representations already discussed, like for instance barter in Smolensk, export to alleviate the need for credits in Togliatti, tourism in Kaliningrad, and the happy priest in Frolovskoye.

Russians who diversified their lives in response to economic hardship were imagined alongside those who were constructed as complaining about the system. Both the musician and the editor were represented as finding innovative
ways to connect themselves socially and economically to other Russians in order to “have a hobby” and “survive.” These imaginations are important constructions of success, and they show up as significant alternatives to the extreme and dramatic representations of poverty and hopelessness that went before them.

The final story deals with life in a cluster of dachas (country homes), a spatial and social setting thus far only mentioned once, in a reference to an ambitious man growing grapes and melons at his dacha (Williams 2000c). It builds off of earlier representations, including the one just discussed, which indicated that Russians wouldn’t starve because of household-level agriculture in the countryside. And it strikes at a nexus of politics, economics, identity, history and space by representing class conflict through competing landuses.

The article is a story about the new ways space is politicized in the dacha clusters surrounding Moscow through the re-working of local networks.142 It narrates rising, class-based tensions as wealthy Russians buy up multiple, contiguous dacha-plots in order to build large homes. Some of these Russians were not even party to the original, Soviet-era allotment of land, making them newcomers altogether to the dacha cluster into which they are buying. Expanses of grass have replaced subsistence-style gardening for those who can afford the

---

142 The story takes place 30 miles outside of Moscow, and I found it by searching on the term “dacha.” Using it allows me to kill several birds with one stone, including showing a vivid example of class conflict playing out through space as well as introducing a story about an important type of local space that I have mostly disregarded thus far. In Chapter 8, I will use it to tie in to the limitations of the study by showing how I did not interrogate the ways that foreign correspondents in Moscow “hit the streets” while they are there.
luxurious construction of new housing. Some formerly public areas, where for instance mushrooms were collected for household-canning, are now privatized and off-limits. Responses to the newly wealthy have ranged from admiration to indignation to sabotage, with some of the newer homes being burnt asunder by arsonists or Molotov cocktail attacks. The story also explains tensions between those who have benefited from privatization, with the wealthy already locked into the circular battle of “keeping up with the Joneses.” While the wealthy compete with each other to build the most current version of a fashionable landscape, the less-fortunate complain about how the newly rich have depleted the water supply and filled the surrounding forests with trash. Whether because of bitter emotions or because of a loss of commonality between neighbors whose relationships used to include common material concerns, long-time friends have lost the ability to socialize together.

Reading from an ironic perspective discovers that the narrative voice associates itself with different social positions over the course of the story. The narrative voice begins with an attitude that identifies with the disenfranchised dacha owners:

Tatyana Ivanovna and Sergei Pleshkov spent childhood summers swimming and hunting for mushrooms together at their parents’ dachas, which face each other across a narrow dirt road here.

Like the other country cottages in this community 30 miles west of Moscow, theirs were the same size, the same shape and bore scars of the same winters. Both were built in 1957, when the nearby MIG fighter plane factory distributed small garden plots to its employees.
But this summer, Ivashentseva, 36, and her husband are putting the finishing touches on a grand new edifice three times the size of the one they tore down. And Pleshkov, looking up at their third-floor window from his peeling yellow porch, says he hasn't spoken to his friend this season.

“They look down on us now,” says Pleshkov's wife, Olga, who recalls going for long evening walks with Tatyana when both were pregnant a few years ago. “All we do is say 'hi' from behind the fence.” (Harmon 1996)

In some statements, however, the narrative voice associates itself not only with different social positions but also with different historical moments:

The fortress-dachas popping up in the fields where villagers tend their crops, however, are hard to miss. And in the close-knit dacha clusters where families have lived side by side for decades, even subtle improvements tend to get in everyone's face. (Harmon 1996)

Here, “close-knit” produces a social context that the narrative already has “voiced” no longer exists in the extra-textual world. Thus, the narrative voice is decidedly Soviet, or at least pre-privatization, in its association. However, “subtle improvements” is a staging that identifies with those Russians who have made inroads into new financial networks and who regard new building in the dacha cluster as upgrades. The phrase “get in everyone’s face,” however, affiliates itself with the disenfranchised, those who have failed to connect themselves with new flows of currency, who regard new building in the dacha cluster as an eyesore and have not benefited from privatization. The shifting allegiance and spatio-temporal positioning of the narrative voice produces, in two sentences, three simultaneous mental spaces: a space of community, a space of progress, and a space of transgression. The narrative voice passes itself off as
objective only to the extent that major shifts in the spatio-temporal construction of the narrative voice go undetected.

Later, the narrative voice introduces what is apparently expert testimony on the issue of class-based conflict in the dacha clusters:

“If we're talking about dachas, the main expression of class conflict is burning houses down,” says sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya, former president of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion. “The quality of non-urban housing is a sign of social prestige, and the construction we are seeing is a vivid element that reflects the stratification of society.” (Harmon 1996)

The voicing of Zaslavskaya’s statement by the narrator is remarkable. Reading ironically, the statement is a code on space in which produced space is selectively reduced to semiotic space. Housing quality is represented as a sign of social prestige rather than an expression of class conflict. According to the representation, built space only reflects the stratification of society, which exists structurally prior to development, rather than produces it. While on the other hand, arson is a full-blown expression of class conflict. These codes are fascinating, because they show how the narrator, in this particular case through representing a voice, reduces selected aspects of the landscape to a purely semiotic significance, privileging one social group over another. In this case, exorbitant fortress-dachas as naturalized while resistance to chance is made problematic. Regardless of whether the reader understand the dacha cluster as a success in danger of being spoiled by a recalcitrant few, or as a new space of marginalization where failing behaviors are being problematized by a nascent
discourse on free markets, the newspaper article is a narrative with the potential
to produce many new mental spaces.

Represented problems that the disenfranchised dacha-owners are facing
include losing water, the trashing of forests, and a restriction of access to
mushroom-picking grounds:

...Victor and Galina Ivanov glower at the brick walls that enclose the area
where their children used to play. When people like the Ilyinskys drive by, the
Ivanovs shake their fists. Among other things, they blame the new neighbors
for depleting their water supply and dumping garbage in the woods.

“They've ruined the spirit of this village,” says Galina, 40, an accountant.
“We've been coming here for many years, and now they come and act like they
own the place. Every other year at this time, we've had water in our wells. Now
they've all drilled their own wells, and we have no water.”  (Harmon 1996)

When one government official explains the political difficulty in regulating
changes in the dacha cluster, he constructs an interesting, local geography:

“There was a time when everything was forbidden and nothing was allowed”
says Yuri S. Martyushov, deputy chairman of the Moscow land resource
committee. “Now we've switched to a time when everything is allowed and
nothing is forbidden.”

With few inspectors and much chaos in the land-use regulations, Martyushov's
office takes the ascendant laissez-faire approach.

“Maybe it's hard for people to understand, but your neighbors are very
powerful people now and they can spoil your life,” he says.  (Harmon 1996)

This remarkable geographic imagination constructs difference at an exceptionally
detailed spatial scale, with difference between households resulting in a
neighborhood-level political geography. That geography extends the conception
of alienation, developed thus far in this dissertation mostly either with respect to
history or to flows of capital and credit, to an immediate, local domain:
“I personally think that people shouldn't live equally,” says Tatyana F. Kolkneva, head of the local administration for Fyodorovka and seven other villages in the region. She says villagers' complaints about water and garbage disposal are unwarranted: “People are not equal, and I don't think houses should be alike either.” (Harmon 1996)

The story finally imagines disenfranchised dacha-owners as having little administrative recourse, either because of officials who lack the necessary resources to do anything about their problems, or in a worse case, because of administrators who don’t even care. The imagined moral geography extends to include ideological conceptions of individuals and household spaces that justify indifference in presumably democratic, local councils toward residents.

Success at resolving a vexing landuse dispute seems elusive, even for a space just a few dozen kilometers outside of Moscow:

But sipping tea on his terrace in nearby Fyodorovka, Igor Ilyinsky, 60, says the problem is not so much class tension as an obsolete world view. The villagers can't seem to remember, for instance, that the mushroom site under the oaks in front of his house no longer is public property.

“There's an old Soviet song, ‘Everything around here belongs to the collective farm, so everything around here belongs to me,’” he says. “That's still the psychology of the local people.” (Harmon 1996)

Ilyinsky, newly rich in Russia, is represented as an embodiment of the “New Russian” ethos. His moral position is that his “world view” is fashionable and correct, while the locals retain an outmoded, pastoral, and Soviet perspective on life. Ultimately, the perspective on Russian space that emanated from the core, regarding the clearing of industrial dinosaurs to make room for new factories, also resided in individual neighborhoods, where one neighbor regarded another’s thinking as having passed into obsolescence. At all scales, from neighborhood-
level to trans-national, the greatest disagreement was about the degree to which historically produced spaces and spatial practices were subject to change according to the priorities of capitalism. And because of the geographic construction of the narrator, these concerns were staged in very different styles, depending on whether the foreign correspondent was operating out of the bureau headquarters in Moscow or in the provinces.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter contributed to the argument that the foreign correspondent’s experience of a place influenced that place’s communicability in print-journalism. In particular, it showed how the narrator is a geographic construct, a product of the foreign correspondent’s embodied or disembodied experience with place. The chapter revealed two new textual functions, displayed in Table 7.1, in American foreign correspondence. These textual functions support the argument that foreign correspondents, when doing fieldwork outside of Moscow, strongly tended to take advantage of their embodied experiences in fostering the ease of reading in their stories. In this sense, the dichotomous geography of Moscow-and province-based foreign correspondence affects the produced texts by creating new possibilities and constraints in terms of how the reader is asked to engage the story.
Furthermore, the socio-spatial situatedness of the narrative voice changes within stories, sometimes quite rapidly and unpredictably. This construction of the narrator allowed mixed voices to show up in an organized way. Additionally, there was an intricate switching between historical, materialistic, and abstract perspectives on space. As the ideologies and moral geographies communicated by foreign correspondence changed, often so did the socio-spatial construction of the narrator. In other words, emic codes construct and rely on an implicit geographic perspective in the narrator in order to work.

There were several ways in which stories with provincial datelines spoke to the mediated discourse on reform emanating from Moscow. Among the most important were:

- bringing to light failures or inconsistencies in abstract conceptions of space from the core with representations of local, lived experiences;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function of Message</th>
<th>Audience’s Predominant Feeling</th>
<th>Pathways or Space for Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Astonishment</td>
<td>Awe</td>
<td>To be impressed by extremes or transgressions To be desensitized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinction</td>
<td>Respect / Thrill</td>
<td>To learn about a foreign place To be bored by mundane details</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• constructing identity-forming processes as geographically diverse and related to cultural and historical factors not bound up with economics or government;
• speaking to other limitations of reform as conceived of from the core, by constructing regional barriers, particularly geographic isolation, insularity, and barter, to the integration of the national economy;
• constructing regional narratives on success through the representation of multiple, local voices; and,
• considering inter-regional flows, factory-specific trading networks, and emerging class differences as an integral part of the social fabric of wider Russia.

At the local level, property owners and officials voiced the opinions that some Russians thought in outdated ways and that social differences were inevitable regardless of class. These constructions indicate that foreign correspondence from the provinces successfully located the broader debates about the transformation of space and spatial practice at the local level through the voices of “ordinary” Russians, effectively linking the highbrow debates of national-level politics with the local Russian scene. Foreign correspondence thus constructed somewhat successfully an integrated debate on space at local, regional, national, and trans-national geographic scales.
Emphases on extremes and transgressions in articles from the provinces helps to explain why such a high percentage of articles with provincial datelines occurred for Siberia and the Russian Far East, where natural resources abound, population is space, and severe physical-geographic factors made life harsh. The strong reliance on extremes and transgressions to develop the involvement of the audience with the narrator suggests that Russians were especially prone to be constructed as victims, for instance of corruption, misguided development, or the development of nuclear weapons. Because landuse showed up as such an important topic for foreign correspondence from the provinces, fieldwork there seemed to be a way for the foreign correspondent to get away from the political-economic discourse reported on from Moscow.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation investigated the construction of Russia in American foreign correspondence during the 1990s. It examined many stories and found a wide range of ways in which transition and reform were imagined. Despite the paradoxes, stemming from many voicings from diverse social and spatial perspectives and manifesting themselves in both profoundly abstract and historical-material representations of space, regularities emerged in the narration of Russia over the period of study.

This chapter brings together the results of the dissertation by highlighting significant trends in the representation of Russia in transition. It focuses on key meanings that were communicated to American readers in stories about Russia. It discusses:

• the predominant features that characterized representations of transition and reform over time in Russia;
• the geographic importance of provincial datelines;
• narrated policies from the West toward Russia and the represented, material consequences of those policies;
• the efficacy of ironic reading;
• the various views toward Russia and the world posited by American foreign correspondence and how those views situated the audience to respond to emerging Post-Soviet issues; and,
• the importance of foreign correspondence as a cultural product.

THE PROGRESSION OF TRANSITION

The Initial Years

For most of the time that Boris Yeltsin presided over Russia, President Clinton was in office in the United States. The Clinton administration was widely reported as working with lending agencies like the International Monetary Fund as well as independently in order to transfer technical, monetary, and food-aid to Russia. Two beliefs profoundly influenced foreign policy toward Russia. First, President Yeltsin was considered himself to be the embodiment of reform. Second, fiscal reforms, such as the liberalization of prices; the privatization of state-owned assets; and, carefully controlled spending in order to minimize inflation were considered necessary in order to let capitalism and democracy evolve under the right economic conditions (see Dobbs and Blustein 1999). Dobbs and Blustein (1999) note that these two assumptions were widely referred to as the Washington Consensus.
Because the 1990s were characterized by a profound industrial slowdown in Russia and a shortage of currency, flows of money to the government as taxes and to industry as credits were sharply reduced. International loans and aid flowed to the Russian government in order to maintain the stability of the Ruble and to allow Russian producers to buy foreign-made products in the correct currencies. In return, the Russian government promised to maintain austere economic policies, which were thought to be important in order to facilitate bankruptcies of unprofitable firms.

The liberalization of prices, which occurred on January 2, 1992 at the outset of the reform-period, happened because of the abrupt termination of government subsidies for consumer products. Foreign correspondence explained that it resulted in a dramatic increase in prices yet was not accompanied by a commensurate rise in wages (Hiatt 1992d). Consumer spending dropped, and Russian factories were forced to look more toward markets outside of Russia in order to make a profit. Many were not prepared to manufacture or distribute products according to global standards for international trade. Firms faced the nearly insurmountable challenge of updating production in a very short amount of time, with little or no capital for modernizing superannuated equipment and technologies. Because the Russian government was receiving few taxes, loans from the International Monetary Fund and backed by the United States were
important to pay for its operating expenses. The Russian parliament and Central Bank, which were often controlled by Yeltsin’s opposition, were reported as frequently getting in the way of fiscal austerity by printing money or issuing credits against President Yeltsin’s wishes. Throughout the course of reform, parliament made several attempts to impeach President Yeltsin.

The reported responses of Russian firms to the new, cash-short environment of business were multi-fold. Companies were reported as early as 1994 as heavily dependent on barter for inter-firm transfers as well as for paying taxes. Complex webs of barter-networks spanned the country, and some companies hired full time barter-specialists who spent their days looking through industrial registries and on the internet for intermediate firms with which to trade in order to complete transactions. Workers were sometimes paid in products rather than wages. Companies that manufactured specialized or indivisible products like machine tools or trucks found their markets saturated (Paddock 1998f). Some factories even opened company-stores and paid their workers in coupons. Eventually, an exchange opened for Veksels, or corporate IOUs, which were traded on a margin defined by the probability that the IOUs would ever be paid (Andrews 1997b). A securities market based on speculation began to thrive in Russia. Barter, however, was not the only reason that fiscal austerity failed to cause widespread bankruptcies.

143 In this way, the interests of the Russian government were split between domestic and foreign parties.
Maintaining employment was especially important in terms of food, because Russia inherited a system of food production from the Soviet Union in which auxiliary agriculture supplemented supplies of food that families bought on the market (see Hedlund 1989). Access to garden plots under auxiliary agriculture was often employment-based and granted by the company or factory for which one worked. Employment thus guaranteed access to a supplementary farming system by which Russian households cultivated valuable foodstuffs. Being employed meant more than simply earning a wage. As austerity and periodic devaluations of the Ruble eroded savings and as manufacturing in Russia declined steadily with the reduction in credits, auxiliary agriculture was explained as even more important for some Russian workers, who continued to show up for work as factories ran canteens in which workers were paid in food (Reynolds 1999c). Underemployed workers still had a strong incentive to keep their jobs, even having accumulated wage arrears for months or in some cases years. It was reported in 1997 that 30% of Russians relied on garden plots for food, with another third relying on money from their extended families and twenty-two percent borrowing (see Hoffman 1997b). Because this economic structure made no sense from the Western perspective, some scholars termed Russia’s economy “virtual” (see Paddock 1998f).

Russia was furthermore reported on as lacking mechanisms to enforce bankruptcy as a procedure for shutting down a business and liquidating its assets.
Fiscal austerity in Russia, rather than creating conditions favorable for a new and capitalistic economic landscape, resulted in what one Russian termed a system of “feudal communism” (Paddock 1998f). In some cases, workers stripped factories bare after they were idled by economic conditions (see LaFraniere 1998a). Other times, the unemployed became successful shuttle traders, ferrying manufactured goods from China, Turkey, and the Middle East to Russian markets as a way to make money when much of Russian industry was idle or operating at severely diminished capacity. Foreign correspondence indeed indicated the emergence of a persistent middle class in Russia, despite its being greatly outnumbered by the newly poor (see Herbert 1994; Erlanger 1995c; Williams 1996h; Hoffman 1998d).

**Problems with Finance and Ownership**

Privatization proceeded largely without the help of investment banks, and oftentimes companies were privatized without an accurate assessment of their value. In late 1992, the Russian government distributed privatization vouchers, worth about $40, to each citizen in order to initiate the privatization process (Bohlen 1992a). Although the privatization program was hailed as the start of capitalism in Russia (see for instance Bohlen 1992a) it effectively alienated most Russian from production-related decisions. It left most Russians as very small
investors in a world of much wealthier foreign investors, and later contributed to the ascent of the so-called Russian oligarchs.

The chronic indebtedness of the Russian government left it vulnerable to the powerful influences of money. Foreign correspondence explained that a class of oligarchs was created by the loans-for-shares program, which the Russian government instituted in late 1995 as a way to raise money for itself. Under the program, control of the largest and most lucrative businesses, such as oil, metals, and shipping, was transferred to the wealthiest Russians in exchange for low cash payments (see Stanley 1996c; Dobbs and Blustein 1999). Bidding was reportedly rigged (Simon 1995b; Hiltzik 1998). The loans-for-shares program was ultimately credited as one of the major events by which assets were transferred to a privileged few. One commentary in The Washington Post suggested that the Clinton administration protested this scheme inadequately, because it was afraid of withdrawing American support from Yeltsin shortly before the 1996 presidential campaign (Ignatius 1999). Dobbs and Blustein (1999) argue that American policy-makers did not object vociferously to loans-for-shares, because they discounted the importance of control of Russia’s assets in favor of simply seeing them privatized. Nonetheless, President Yeltsin began his 1996 reelection campaign, from which he ultimately emerged victorious, with his approval rating below ten percent (see Hockstader 1996f; Hockstader and Hoffman 1996). With

144 Alexandr Solzhenitsyn (1997) noted that the value of the vouchers represented less than one percent of the value accumulated under the Soviet Union.
infusions of funding, particularly from those enfranchised by the corrupt privatization process, Yeltsin probably spent according to foreign correspondence more than 100 times the official spending limits and made promises during the election-campaign that according to his finance minister threatened to ruin Russia’s budget. (Boudreaux 1996c; Hockstader and Hoffman 1996).

Yeltsin’s victory did little to remedy the lack of inflow of investment capital to Russian producers. Articles explained that investors, bankers, and factory managers invested money in get-rich-quick schemes rather than investing in Russian production. Moreover, a prohibitive tax structure further encouraged entrepreneurs to hide profits. Billions had left Russia by the end of the 1990s, and as the Bank of New York scandal unraveled, it was discovered that wealthy Russians were diverting profits through foreign banks, including ones in America.145 Furthermore, when the cash-needy government offered short-term bonds called GKOs at interest rates between 100 and 200 percent, investors had a strong incentive to finance the debt-strapped government rather than invest in Russian production (for instance Paddock 1998f). Russian banks themselves often lent money to the government instead of to small businesses. Meanwhile, foreign investors expressed interest in Russian firms, but sometimes under conditions that most employees be laid off and production heavily streamlined or

145 At least $25 billion per year flowed from Russia into foreign accounts (Solzhenitsyn 1997).
reorganized altogether (see Reynolds 1999c). Because Russian law required privatized factories to sell off 75% of their shares before laying off workers, many factories that didn’t meet that figure remained unattractive to investors.

Moreover, the Russian government needed additional loans to maintain a supply of dollars with which to service debt to foreign banks. Yet as the Russian parliament and Central Bank periodically released credits and increased money supply against President Yeltsin’s wishes, an even greater supply of foreign currency in Russia was necessary to keep the Ruble stable. The last IMF bailout of Russia, a package of loans totaling $22.6 billion, faltered only after a few weeks. On August 17, 1998, the Russian government was reported as devaluing the ruble, which lost a third of its value in one day, in addition to suspending payments on short-term bonds (Hoffman 1998j; Hoffman 1998k; Wines 1998d). Prospects for additional foreign aid died alongside the failing Ruble. Additionally, the whole Russian banking system was felled by the combination of the devaluation, which eroded working capital, as well as by the default on short-term bonds, which accounted for a large share of total investments (Hiltzik 1998).

After the 1998 devaluation, the Yeltsin government was reported as seeking the advice of Gorbachev-era planners and policy-makers. New appointments included the head of the Central Bank as well as Yevgeny M. Primakov as Prime Minister, both of whom occupied high positions in
Gorbachev’s government (Bohlen 1998c; Bohlen 1998b).146 Capital flight from Russia remained high, partly for the purposes of laundering money and evading taxes. Russia began investigations of its own banks, including an inquiry into the banking practices of Yeltsin’s son-in-law (Gordon 1999e; Wines 1999g). The 1998 default in some cases, however, was reported as making Russian exports more affordable and helped industries to recover from severe economic depression (see Wines 2000b). Oil exports further benefited from increased global prices (Tavernise 2000b). By 2000, barter was only responsible for about half of payments for electricity (Hoffman 2000b). Policy-analysts looked forward to changes in laws around the ownership and exchange of land, the regulation of banks, and bankruptcy. But by late 2000, it was reported that half of all bankruptcies were tantamount to takeovers of relatively healthy firms by predator-companies manipulating the legal-system (Tavernise 2000a).

THE GEOGRAPHIC IMPORTANCE OF PROVINCIAL DATELINES

The above summary of the narration of the significant economic moments of transition included information from both Moscow- and provincial datelines.

---

146 With additional foreign aid after the devaluation a remote possibility at best, the economic risk to the Yeltsin administration of introducing Soviet-era policy-makers into Yeltsin’s administration was diminished.
While Moscow-datelines provided information about the dispute between President Yeltsin and parliament; international lending; elections; and policy-making around for instance privatization and austerity, provincial datelines tended to be concerned with how more concrete aspects of life in Russia were interconnected with greater society. They detailed specific practices and the relationship between those practices and the economy and society overall. Examples include barter; the payment of workers; household food-economies; and, regional economic geographies. Additionally, provincial datelines were concerned with how particular policies of the federal government spatialized themselves at specific locations, like how Russians reacted to Yeltsin’s extra-legal disbanding of parliament in 1993 or how privatization created new differences and communities in various locales as well as with ecological problems related to regional development. Both Moscow- and provincial datelines were important in terms of showing multiple or competing perspectives, which often meant codifying government policies and expressing support and criticism of them through the voices of various individuals.

Although stories from Moscow often dealt with complicated problems, reporting from the provinces was particularly important for conveying complexity and difference in Russia. At local scales, stories explained important social and spatial nuances that communicated the gravity of the challenges faced by policy-makers. Provincial datelines, as a kind of storytelling mode in which
social and economic differences were concretized, were important in order to communicate the unevenness of reform. Within locals, this translated into narrating how different people responded to and thought about political and economic change. Complexity was also revealed in the myriad ways in which different provinces were imagined. Reporting from the provinces narrated Russia into a patchwork of different regions that were biophysically and culturally distinct. Journalism with provincial datelines often communicated a sense of place that Moscow-datelines lacked.

The capacity of articles from the provinces to represent Russia in different ways stems from the access that embodied reporting provides to the mundane details of daily life, to local spaces and voices, and to visual and other sensory aspects of location unavailable through news-feeds. Provincial datelines represented each of the three aspects of place explained by Agnew (1994), that is,

- locale: “the settings in which social relations are constituted”\(^{147}\);
- location: the impacts that broader social and economic processes at wider scales have on locales; and,
- sense of place: the local “structure of feeling”\(^{148}\).

Provincial datelines explained local social worlds as products of spatially discrete, territorial identities set in the context of a more objective, macro-level

\(^{147}\) from Giddens (1984)
\(^{148}\) from Williams (1977)
order. They undertook to explain the behavior of Russians, for instance support of the Communist party or showing up to work without getting paid, as grounded in specific contexts. In doing so, they served as a valuable supplement to the numerically dominant Moscow-datelines, which relied more heavily on abstract reasoning detached from local settings.

One of the greatest contributions of foreign correspondence from the provinces is that it stressed “the ways in which personal and particular choices made under given conditions are the very essence of historical-geographical change” (Harvey 1995, 79). By representing everyday spatial practice, ranging from clandestine activities like stealing, smuggling, and poaching to overt practices like bartering, going to work, growing food, trading imported wares, and building luxury dachas, foreign correspondence explained how mundane activities and individual decisions constituted the Russian response to austerity and the general lack of capital. Individual decisions, like how factory-managers spent limited profits or how factories were looted by unpaid workers, were ultimately represented as producing new geographies. Production-related decisions were explained to impact whether factories restructured or closed; how dependent Russia would be on imports; and the extent to which profiteering would be manifested on the landscape as new housing developments or as places of luxury-spending. Foreign correspondence thus imagined Russian locales as new terrains reworked by individual responses to what was generally regarded as
financial collapse. Collectively, these stories narrated transition as a new phase in economic and political development in which the provinces were portrayed as living geographies.

Foreign correspondents also used reporting from the provinces to exemplify systematic or widespread phenomena. Maura Reynolds’ (1999c) story on the persistence of auxiliary agriculture at the Tutayev engine factory argues that the particular employment-for-food scheme in Tutayev “may not make sense, but it happens every day in towns across Russia.” Reynolds indicated that she chose Tutayev for her story, precisely because it typified to her a Russian company town (Reynolds 2000b personal communication). Vanora Bennett (1996b) used a case of a worker assembling stolen parts from a factory in his home for sale on the black market to illustrate that “no one in Russia is unsympathetic to the notion of petty theft by hungry workers.” Sonni Efron (1995e) wrote about widespread problems with Russia’s health system, also drawing on frightening accounts by local voices of how easily curable diseases have landed children in hospitals for long-term stays in squalid conditions. These stories exemplify how foreign correspondents use examples from locales to scale-up or generalize for the whole of Russia. Stories that generalize are almost always accompanied by national-level statistics or other figures that support the argument for one locale being used to illustrate what is happening in Russia overall. Yet the embodiedness of these kinds of narratives easily identify them as
a provincially based stories. Because statistical data on employment, crime, and healthcare are available in Russia, the above narratives could have been written from Moscow, albeit in a different way. The advantage of the provincial dateline, in this case, is that embedding the encoded knowledge in a local context enables additional narrational techniques that make the story more accessible to the reader. Provincial-dateline serves to structure the storytelling environment in a way that facilitates the ease of reading while simultaneously buttressing the story with “real world” examples. Textual considerations participate in the decision to do fieldwork.

Stories about ecological problems and pollution, concerning for instance poaching, oil spills, and radioactive contamination were not uncommon and are fine examples of how provincial stories address localized impacts or consequences of more widespread social and economic forces. Whereas writing from the provinces was an option that foreign correspondents sometimes exercised in their reporting on widespread phenomena, provincial datelines were almost always used when foreign correspondents told stories about the ecological consequences of development. They were commonly used for stories that emphasized the spatial unevenness of development, including for instance a story from Volgograd about two assembly lines in the same factory, one producing for foreign clients and the other for domestic consumers (Uchitelle 1992e); the differences between an ice cream company and an adjacent wood-products
company in Karelia (Knobel 1993); investment in oil and gas in Tyumen’ (Uchitelle 1992c); and, rapid industrial decline in the coal mining industry of the Kuzbass (Wines 1998b) or in steel-producing regions of the Urals (Hoffman 1996h). The local impacts of the national-level political process in Moscow were widely reported through provincial datelines, including political campaigning; the taking over of local government buildings; the exercise of autonomy amidst the chaos in the federal government; referenda on Yeltsin and his economic policies; and, resistance to the construction of a nuclear power plant (see respectively Dobbs 1993e; Goldberg 1993e; Hiatt 1993c; Williams 1995b; Hoffman 1996c). The occasional story about border-issues similarly seemed to take advantage of provincial datelines (see Specter 1994c; Bohlen 1999f).

Whatever the case, locales were frequently imagined as the places where political and economic forces inscribed themselves and as sites of innovation and resistance.

Two other aspects of the relationship between the provinces and Moscow captured by stories from the provinces included regionalism and the promotion of local or regional politicians to national offices. The most prominent examples of represented regionalism, notwithstanding Chechnya, included the cases of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Sometimes, for instance, foreign correspondents reported from Tatarstan in order to discuss the national issue of ethnic separatism and central control (see Williams 1995c; Bohlen 2000). Additionally, Boris
Nemtsov, a prominent reformist from Nizhniy Novgorod, as well as Alexandr Lebed, known for his nationalist rhetoric from Krasnoyarsk, were the most notable cases of politicians drawing journalistic attention to individual regions (see for instance Gordon 1997d; Williams 1997b). A greater point, however, is that the dissertation for the most part treated Moscow- and provincial datelines as separate categories. However, these examples show that national-level issues can generate interest in the regions, while regional distinctiveness, most noticeable when looking at the whole of Russia, may generate interest in the provinces from a “core” point of view.

This dissertation showed how stories from Moscow incorporated local points of view through devices such as references to place, while there were several ways in which stories from the provinces incorporated abstract conceptions of space or dominant, core-centered perspectives on change. Yet not only do both categories of dateline incorporate features of the other, they actually co-evolve in a discourse in which one mode of writing looks to the other for answers that it alone cannot provide. It is in this way that foreign correspondence is intimately spatial. For instance, stories from Moscow reported initially on an earthquake that razed a town on the island of Sakhalin. Because the earthquake was so devastating, foreign correspondents ended up on location at Neftegorsk several days later (see Boudreaux 1995b). Provincial stories as well added to the overall discourse on Soviet development as a grotesque example of socially
irresponsible planning, which informed an historical understanding of space by illustrating the inheritance by Russia of the acute problem of ubiquitous, inadequate housing.

The dynamic of stories about the war in Chechnya was much the same, with foreign correspondents deploying themselves spatially as a reaction to the rhetoric emanating from within the Yeltsin administration. For instance, Maura Reynolds wrote in two stories printed on consecutive days about her experiences touring prisons in Chechnya in response to the official rhetoric that Chechen prisoners were not being tortured (Reynolds 2000d; Reynolds 2000a). And as a reaction to Russian officials’ denials of other atrocities in Chechnya, she wrote an extraordinary, 6759 word piece based on interviews with Russian servicemen returning from the war (Reynolds 2000e). These examples of journalism validated the reports on human rights of outside organizations, which had been discredited by the Russian government, and put to rest the debate on whether the Russian government was supporting torture in Chechnya. Another example of a national-level issue resulting in fieldwork in the provinces was an interview with dismissed Prosecutor General Alexei Kazannik in his home town about corruption, lawlessness, and brutality in the Yeltsin administration (Goldberg 1994c). Goldberg’s work was valuable, because it strongly criticized the perspective of the Washington Consensus, which understood Yeltsin as reform
incarnate. Overall, provincial datelines were important responses for a variety of reasons to political and economic processes in Russia.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENCE AND POLICY

When the newly independent Russia emerged, it was explained as a state in desperate need of major political and economic overhauls in order to make a successful transition to capitalism and democracy. The American understanding coded in foreign correspondence from the outset, that existing Russian law provided an inadequate basis to structure socio-economic activity and that Russian culture lacked a history of democracy, meant that politicians who were unaccustomed to democratic practices were responsible for codifying laws that equitably decentralized economic and political power. Many of the leaders of the reform-period were furthermore understood as influential members of the ideologically demonized Communist Party during Soviet days. The outset of transition was thus characterized by the paradox of the wolf becoming the shepherd. Ultimately, this study found sufficient evidence that American foreign correspondence represented President Yeltsin, at different times, as wolfish. The question thus arises, how was it that not until 1998 did Western confidence in Yeltsin as reformer extraordinaire openly wane?
The dominant American solution to the difficulty of gauging progress in Russia, whether Russia was on the path to reform, was largely to construct absolutes to which to moor judgment about transition. Those absolutes involved two presuppositions:

- Yeltsin himself was the personification of reform. And,
- Numerical measures such as inflation, money supply, and the exchange rate of the ruble were appropriate poles by which to guide monetary policy in Russia as well as international lending decisions.

The above “Washington Consensus,” through faith, demonstrated “considerable understanding for President Yeltsin since Sept. 21, when he invoked extraconstitutional powers and ordered the Parliament dissolved” (see Jehl 1993). It was unable to criticize Yeltsin’s subsequent use of artillery to enforce his unconstitutional dissolution of a democratically elected parliament. From the perspective of the Washington Consensus, Yeltsin’s judgment was right, because it came from Yeltsin. The assumptions of the Washington Consensus also resulted in an American perspective that was slow to criticize the brutal civil war in Chechnya (see Kempster 1995). Some reporting indicated that fear of undermining domestic support for Yeltsin was behind this failure. Dobbs and Blustein (1999) speculated that more rapid American criticism of the way in which Russia privatized its assets furthermore might have resulted in a more equitable distribution of capital.
Through reporting from the provinces, foreign correspondence provided alternate ways to understand change in Russia than that of the Moscow-centered planners and policy-makers. Provincial datelines offered both everyday life stories from regions outside of Moscow as well as a critique of the economic policies advocated by the Washington Consensus. Even though the dominant perspective in Washington emphasized unconditional support for Yeltsin and adherence to monetary guidelines, foreign correspondence was not committed to those two perspectives on change in Russia. In particular, the historical-material perspectives on space that contributed heavily to reporting from the provinces provided an important understanding of the constraints to reworking social and spatial relationships during transition.

Foreign correspondence, by spatializing itself across many Russian datelines, reported multiple, geographically situated perspectives on transition. It mapped through narrative the geographically distributed effects of political economic change. In doing so, it modeled for readers how demographically different Russians, separated widely by distance and social class, thought about complex geographic phenomena. To this end, consequences and contradictions of the Washington Consensus were revealed, especially through reporting on:

- the importance of credits or loans in modernizing Russian industry and business. The reported dearth of domestic capital for modernization threatened even viable businesses as well as the growth of locally
interested NGOs, making austerity itself seem like an imperial practice (see Uchitelle 1992e; Applebaum 1998);

- the abuse of bankruptcy law in order to award healthy companies to unscrupulous interests;

- privatization vouchers inequitably distributing ownership of industrial capital and the transferal of the most valuable assets in Russia to the hands of a few because of the impoverishment of the Russian government;

- the unintended results of barter, household agriculture, and underemployment perpetuating a moribund economic system that quickly adapted to survive with little cash;

- the communicated understanding that support for the Communist Party was not because of dogmatic adherence to Soviet principles but rather stemmed from current economic malaise. This included emphasizing the role that severed trade ties, rather than a Soviet tradition of mismanagement or recent monetary policy, played in Post-Soviet, industrial demise;

- the reckless spending of President Yeltsin in the 1996 elections, which far exceeded spending limits and, according to his finance minister, threatened to wreck reforms; and,
former Prosecutor General Andrei Kazannik’s testimony about the unconstitutional dissolution of Russian parliament, the ordered executions of participants in the coup, and the corrupting influence that members of Yeltsin’s inner circle had on the president’s decision-making.

In other words, foreign correspondence, especially from the provinces, was effective at communicating information that questioned the wisdom of the foreign policy of the United States. It presented material evidence either that the Washington Consensus failed to respond adequately to events in Russia or that its policies generated undesirable outcomes.

Although Western policy-formation was not a major concern of foreign correspondence, the values embodied in the Washington Consensus were communicated through foreign correspondence. Stories with Moscow-datelines included both abstract representations of space vis-à-vis an emphasis on monetary guidelines as well as an in-charge Yeltsin functioning as either a reassuring or alarming message. Yet despite all of the documented evidence in foreign correspondence alone that the Washington Consensus was inadequate, it was not revised until the Ruble crash of 1998, which was reported as causing consternation in Washington over the failure of foreign policy to stabilize Russia. Despite the cessation of international lending to Russia, foreign policy toward
Russia was not significantly reformulated until after the election of President George W. Bush in 2000.

THE EFFICACY OF IRONIC READING

The method of ironic reading was useful for interrogating the narrator-audience relationship in this study. Other studies that have used discourse analysis in geography did not emphasize the spatial construction of the narrator or recognize the significance of the non-referential aspects of language in delivering geographic messages.149 This dissertation, however, found that emic codes constructed an implicit geographic perspective in the narrator. In other words, it found that foreign correspondence was structured by the coding of agents whose points of view oriented the narrative (see Kaufman 2002). Those coded perspectives presented both constraints and opportunities for narration. And oftentimes, the narrative voice was characterized by sudden shifts in perspective from one social-spatial point of view to another.

Even though foreign correspondence stages a communication between a narrator (who gives voice to a number of agents) and an implied audience that

149 They often compared narratives contained in serials or novels designed to speak to the concerns of specific communities. Myers (2000), Dugas (1999), and Blunt (2000) are all examples, while Martin (2000) compared representations in mainstream papers to those printed in papers for smaller and more specific reading communities. This study examined general circulation newspapers and could not assume that a story would be read based simply on an external interest in the reader.
does not speak, there are clues in the text about how the audience is reacting to
the narrative, including the audience’s feelings about the emerging symbolic
information. The various instances in narratives in which symbolic material is
introduced, specified, reworked, abandoned, or maintained codify moments of
assumption, ignorance, confusion, understanding, satisfaction, and agreement in
the implied audience. The dissertation found that overall, the responses in the
implied audience that produced a desire for additional narration included hope,
fear, and confusion, as well as sympathy for a particular actant or character in the
story. The representation of transgressions or extremes in the text, which
produced an excited, alarmed, or astounded audience, were important as well.

Regardless of the point of view of any particular coded agent in the
narrative, the geographic situatedness of the coded speaker was instrumental in
constructing responses in the implied audience which encouraged the reader to
take sides and to get involved with the story. Whether the coded agent
corresponded to a Western economist or an out-of-work factory worker,
symbolic material was expressed that positioned the implied audience to receive
it in a certain way based on the agent’s attitude toward the message and its
recipient. Thus journalistic language helped to construct an audience that
belonged to a particular community, with issues and desires, located in a socially
and spatially differentiated society. The reader related to that audience through
his or her own experiences in a stratified world.
Moreover, abstract and historical-material imaginations of space served the narrator differently. Abstract representations of space established plots rapidly. They often showed up at the beginning of articles with Moscow datelines, and were not uncommon in the lead-paragraphs of foreign correspondence from the provinces, because they quickly established trajectories or plot-lines for stories. Abstract conceptions of space sometimes constructed an audience that was flattered as almost godlike, as quickly and succinctly grasping principle attributes of Russian space and society through little effort and few words. Represented abstract spaces served the textual needs of the narrator by creating a clear emotional pathway for the audience. For instance, the initial imagination of the West as helping Russia was easy to read, because it imagined a Western audience flattered by its own philanthropy as well as by a coded omnipotence to help Russia in a presumably unbiased or spatially undifferentiated way. It also produced a sympathy in the audience for Russia and reassured the audience that a troubled Russia was attracting needed assistance.

The ability of the narrator to contradict himself was important to the construction of hope, fear, and confusion. The unstable narrator, vacillating between alarming and reassuring messages as well as different sides of an

\[150\] Whether the narrative subsequently destabilized this conception of aid did not bear upon the efficacy of the initial abstraction at serving its purpose of opening and maintaining the communicative channel.
argument, often did so by committing to geographically separate (socially
differentiated) agents, voiced at various moments during the story. But those
commitments were often temporary, with the storytelling process often
juxtaposing, especially from provincial datelines, representations of various
abstract and historical-material spaces from different agents against one another.
This continual playing off of perspectives against each another generated a
seductive tension that facilitated reading. And from provincial datelines, stories
had the additional option of incorporating the additional points of view of an
embodied narrator (as adventurer) or a disembodied narrator (as docent) as
narrative agents, spatialized in a Russian locale itself.

Understanding the journalistic representation as a simulated discourse
between geographically situated and separate agents is important, because it
leads to an insightful critique of reporting. Reporting is not a simple relaying of
information from one site to another.151 It is, according to this geographic
understanding of foreign correspondence, a contrived dialog between multiple
parties, brought before an audience in a seemingly organized way. Foreign
correspondence arranged conversations among and between agents in print, all
expressed through the narrator, that could never take place outside of the
mediated spectacle. It creates mediated realities by orchestrating virtual
conversations between spatially distributed agents. The dissertation speaks to a

---

151 Recall that mediation itself is defined as a 1-way, non-reciprocal transmission of symbols
between a sender and a receiver (Thompson 1995).
textual logic in the arrangement of voiced information in the story. It maintains that almost all foreign correspondence is orchestrated by an implied narrator who is unstable and that foreign correspondence reaps benefits from that instability, because it is able to marshal the emphasized differences in specific ways in order to make stories more readable. The dissertation found that difference was important to storytelling, because coded shifts in perspective provide for swings or movements in the story to which the reader relates emotionally. A plethora of voiced agents often assisted in creating the conditions necessary for readability.

The attention that ironic reading gave to the evolution of the narrator-audience relationship resulted in an elucidation of several dynamics within the text. The findings speak to Ed Soja’s (1989) observation that narrative is a problematic device for describing space. Soja noticed that the intrinsic linearity of narratives forces the reduction of stories about three-dimensional spaces, that simultaneously act on and are acted upon by each other, onto a linear framework. That framework dictates the delivery of symbols in a sequential succession that fails to model accurately the spatial dynamics that exist outside of the text. In understanding narrative as a kind of spatial model, Soja observes that stories are linear accounts that rigidly transform a rich simultaneity of multi-dimensional spaces – a complex, unfolding order of hierarchically and functionally arranged networks – into a one-dimensional flow. “All that we can do is re-collect and
creatively juxtapose, experimenting with assertions and insertions of the spatial
against the prevailing grain of time” (Soja 1989, 2).

Ironic reading discovered how foreign correspondence about space, as a
purely linguistic act, addresses this problem raised by Soja in order to reconstruct
a three-dimensional world out of its own reduction to a sequential stream of
symbols. By producing an audience that took sides, needed further explanations
or reassurances, or zealously adopted a voyeuristic attitude toward Russian
spaces, the studied texts attempted to produce desire in the reader to continue
reading. By securing the consumption of additional symbolic material, the texts
created their own opportunity to represent additional social and spatial
relationships by voicing agents who were spatially removed from yet logically
connected to already-introduced people and places. The method of ironic reading
discovered a remarkable complexity in the first few paragraphs, in which both
Western ideologies and local ideologies or perspectives were encoded, and
provided a new way for understanding how places are made readable to distant
laypersons. The textual sophistication that the method discovered at the
beginning of articles agrees with discourse analysis in general, which emphasizes
the work done at the beginning of stories in the lead paragraph (see Callahan and
Callahan 1997).
WORLD VIEW

The American view of the world through foreign correspondence on Russia was initially marked by an anxiety about Russia returning to a Soviet state. The previously external conflict between the good/free/democratic United States and the evil/oppressive/communist Soviet Union was largely internalized as a struggle between desirable reformers and misguided hard-liners. The internal tension between the two groups generated much interest in the domestic affairs of Russia and buttressed the American perspective on Yeltsin as the embodiment of reform. Furthermore, the growing public interest in Russian domestic affairs reaffirmed the “watchdog” role of the American media as the secret workings of the Soviet state gave way to greater public scrutiny of the government. The relevance of the media as the “eyes and ears”\(^{152}\) of the American reader was heightened especially during critical times like the shelling of the Russian parliament and the 1996 election, which Yeltsin won against a healthy opposition.

The action of “market forces” and the privatization of state property as well as limited successes at breaking up collective farms reassured American readers that the Soviet Union was indeed over (see Hoffman 1996i). The former Soviets increasingly spoke the language of capitalism, and representations of

\(^{152}\) Dahlburg (2000, personal communication)
Russians taking economic risks demonstrated that Russia was beginning to develop a culture of entrepreneurship. The American perspective toward Russia was encoded as a somewhat fanatical support of Russian entrepreneurs who were explained as seeing the benefits of individual decision-making and a drive towards Western standards for products and services. Fanatical support was coded in particular for small businessmen and investors, who were represented sympathetically as individuals to whom Americans might most likely be able to relate. Macro-level discourses on aid and monetary policy further contributed to the image of Russia as learning to be more Western through economic practice. These imaginations were accompanied by an increased fear expressed in economic terms, for instance with respect to maintaining a stable Ruble that would foster the development of Russia’s nascent middle class. Economics and its policy-related organs were viewed as major resources through which Russia could be reformed.

As the fear of a return to the Soviet era further subsided, it was replaced by the view that the world was becoming a more dangerous place because of security issues around Russia’s nuclear weapons, including the problems of so-called loose nukes and atomic theft as well as the emigration of Russian scientists to countries interested in developing nuclear technologies. These issues were themselves not a major focus of foreign correspondence (see for examples Shapiro 1995c; Hoffman 1996l). However, the American concern over the
clandestine spread of weapons-materials and technologies marked a decisively pragmatic interest in the Russian state. The successful development of commercial applications by nuclear scientists as well as the conversion of military landuses to civilian purposes received notable coverage, especially the reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk (see for instance Hoffman 1995b; Gordon 1997b; Gordon 1997c). In the latter case, the American government was reported as applying substantial pressure on Russian parties to accomplish the shift in landuses as rapidly as possible. Such projects eventually went ahead with American financial assistance. The United States also helped Russia develop modern security procedures to safeguard its nuclear materials (Gordon 1996).

Stories about increased interaction between the West and Russia contributed to the imagination of a new era of support and mutual cooperation. Joint commissions on economic or regional development (see Boudreaux 1995c; Shogren 1998); increased foreign investment and further integration into the global economy (for example Uchitelle 1992c; Knobel 1993); and other projects like food aid and even a visit from President Clinton helped to construct Russia and the West as working together. In May of 1997, Russia and NATO reached an agreement that created a NATO-Russia council for cooperation on security issues in Europe as well as gave Russia a voice in NATO in decision-making (Williams 1997j). The pact was explained as designed to reassure interests in Russia, both moderates and hard-liners, that the upcoming and inevitable absorption by
NATO of formerly Warsaw Pact countries was not a threat (also see Hoffman 1997c). Nonetheless, the inclusion of Russia in NATO, the major international organization formed in opposition to the Soviet Union, was explained as a watershed moment in global politics. The increasing formal interactions between the West and Russia participated in forming the American view that Russia was becoming a more normal country through its growing, peaceful ties to the international community.

The expansion of NATO was viewed from the American perspective as a natural step to which the West was entitled in order to annex former Eastern bloc territories into Western military structures and to further consolidate a Post-Soviet future. NATO, however, turned out to be a source of great consternation for the Russians, when the United States did not take seriously Russian objections to the 1999 NATO bombing campaigns over the former Yugoslavia. Russia was reported as indignant, after having followed American advice so closely for nearly a decade, over the disregarding by the United States of its objections to the NATO bombing of its last close ally in Europe (see Wines 1999f). The reported Russian perspective was that partnership had landed Russia, crippled by various economic crises, more than $60 billion in debt, and militarily only a shadow of what it once was. These changes, in the name of building a market economy and being a global partner to the West, were increasingly seen as the results of an unfair, if not simply exploitative, relationship.
The years 1998-2000 saw a series of developments that located Russia not as a natural ally or student of the United States, willing to cooperate unconditionally, but rather as a state increasingly predisposed to act independently. Russia’s politics were informed by the reported desire to recapture lost prestige as well as a negative reaction to the perceived imposition of the American model of democracy on it. Russia was less inclined simply to do as it was told. Moreover, reported domestic events imagined Russia as lacking democratic practice, as corrupt, or failing to make progress. These events included:

- the collapse of the American policy on Russia in August of 1998;
- the assassination of one of Russia’s top democrats, Galina Starovoitova, in November of 1998;
- the reporting of widespread corruption and the continuation of barter;
- another vote for impeachment against Yeltsin in May of 1999;
- systematic money laundering and banking scandal in Russia by October of 1999;
- reports of torture and other serious human rights abuses in Chechnya; and,
- the election of Vladimir Putin as president in March of 2000.

The American view of Russia increasingly understood it as a state with a long way to go. The election of Putin, called in one article a “dour autocrat,” was
thought by many to be a solution to Russia’s internal tensions and lack of order (Wines 1999f). Support for Putin exemplifies a third (in addition to fanatical and pragmatic) way of looking at Russia, in which a stern attitude is taken towards change. In the stern attitude, Americans advocate tough policies for Russia, like austerity, as well as take a “law and order” approach in response to what is seen as an unruly and chaotic Russia which favors the election of the authoritarian Putin. The stern point of view towards global spaces locates the United States favorably as a tough lover, as a country flattered by implied strength and a compassion that advocates toughness toward Russia for Russia’s own sake.

Throughout the reform-period, however, Russia was constructed as an internally differentiated space.153 Provincial datelines contributed heavily by focusing on local character and difference. In representing Russian locales, foreign correspondence often adopted a humanistic perspective that understood Russians sympathetically, because of the difficult material conditions facing them, or culturally, as more than just economic or political beings. By humanizing Russians, foreign correspondence constructed a different worldview by imagining the worth of Russian space differently, by making it important for its own sake. This helped to construct a merciful way of imagining Russians, as opposed to the pragmatism that characterized Moscow-datelines and narratives

153 Agnew (1998) notes that the Soviet Union, in contrast, was represented as an internally undifferentiated space when it was imagined as an evil empire.
about economic austerity. Reports of unemployment, poverty, sickness, addiction, dilapidated infrastructure and social services, and Soviet-era abuses produced sympathy for Russia and for Russians as innocent victims of Soviet development (see for instance Dahlburg 1992e). Even some Moscow-datelines imagined Russians as blameless (see Hiatt 1993h). Provincial stories that emphasized extremes and transgressions committed against Russians also reinforced the characterization of Russians as victims and advocated a merciful outlook on Russian people.

Ultimately, whether the American perspective judged the outcome of transition positively or negatively depended on the emphasis on a variety of conflicting factors. Arguments for a successful transition emphasize the importance of increased personal liberties; testimonials by individuals who have taken economic risks and been financially successful; the emergence of a small middle class; and, the high voter turnout in numerous peaceful national elections. Arguments to the contrary identify the previously named success as an attractive veneer covering serious structural problems. Those problems include a heavily controlled media; centralized power that overwhelms local, democratic initiatives; the absence of interest groups and labor unions necessary to moderate politicians between elections; a corrupt privatization that concentrated wealth in the hands of a few; and, organized crime and abuse of political office for personal gain (see Boudreaux 1996a).
THE IMPORTANCE OF JOURNALISM AS A CULTURAL PRODUCT

There are a variety of reasons why foreign correspondence is remarkable as a cultural product. First, the diversity and extent of news-coverage is impressive. The foreign correspondence in this study made available a remarkable assortment of voices and perspectives on Russia for consumption by American readers. Widely scattered territories like Primorskiy Kray, Krasnoyarsk, Murmansk, and Kaliningrad figured prominently, both relatively in terms of references to place from Moscow-datelines, as well as with respect to the absolute number of provincial datelines. Provincial datelines occurred for fifteen of the 80 territories in the study at a mean rate of at least once a year. That foreign correspondents provided this degree of coverage testifies to a basic commitment of foreign correspondents to get out of Moscow and report the material conditions of everyday life around the country. Television news simply cannot provide this level of coverage, and so foreign correspondence offers an important contribution to the geographic imagination of the American public. Stories from provincial datelines and from Moscow as well typically approach a specific problem and highlight its broader significance, thus constituting nicely packaged, geographical episodes.

Moreover, the medley of stories voiced the experiences and arguments of an impressive variety of people with a wide range of spatio-temporal perspectives. The coding of local actants or characters helped to provide an
insider’s perspective on transition. For instance, a worker in a one-factory town 150 miles from Moscow pined “We're used to waiting. We've done it for years” (Reynolds 1999c), while a computer programmer from Moscow itself proclaimed, “We want to have a normal life now—and not in a generation or two” (Dahlburg 1998). Overall, the net that foreign correspondence cast around Russia seemed to capture much as it relayed quotations and events from Russia’s Far East as nimbly as it did for regions adjacent to Moscow.

Moscow-datelines, on the other hand, reported extensively on the political culture of reform that evolved throughout the reform-period. At times they assumed a broader knowledge of the history of reform in Moscow. Because of the daily publication of stories with Moscow-datelines and the use of news-feeds, which made a wealth of data available to the writer, foreign correspondents were freer to construct continuities and discontinuities based on the introduction of changing data. Speculation was more common than in stories with provincial datelines, because the political language so often included was itself more apt to involve speculation. The cumulative, historical vigilance over politicians facilitated in some stories a weaving of past actions into current events, which helped to manufacture a sense of continuity (see for instance Hoffman 1997b; Reynolds 1999a). The wealth of expert-testimony available to stories from Moscow via news-feeds included reported speech from policy-analysts, economic consultants, pollsters, newspaper editors, magazine articles,
employees of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and various
professionals working for the Russian government (Stanley 1996b; Hoffman
1997b). The breadth of testimony brought to the reader by foreign
correspondence testifies to its remarkable power as a literary device to explain
the distant world to American readers.

The overwhelming number of datelines were from Moscow, and those
stories concentrated on politics and economics. Foreign correspondents indicated
that they worked predominantly in Moscow, because the most opportunities for
reporting were there, along with the news-feeds upon which they heavily rely.
Recognizing the impressive array of sources of data available from Moscow
fosters an appreciation of the power of that site in the news-discourse. Yet the
dominance of Moscow-datelines reinforces a preoccupation with the culture of
government and macro-economic policy. One additional reason for the
dominance of Moscow-datelines over provincial datelines is that foreign
correspondents conduct embodied fieldwork in the Moscow-region outside of the
bureaus headquarters. In other words, foreign correspondents can leave the news-
feeds and write an interview-based story without having to leave Moscow.
Stories about gambling, ultra sound clinics in the Moscow-metro, the armed
uprising in Moscow after Yeltsin’s dissolution of the parliament building, and
Russia’s middle class are examples of interview-based, embodied fieldwork in
Moscow (see Simon 1992e; Hiltzik et al. 1993; Erlanger 1995c; Williams
1997g). Leaving Moscow implies then that the foreign correspondent can write
the story in question based neither on information provided by the news-feeds
nor on any other kind of fieldwork in Moscow. The sheer size and importance of
the city, in addition to being the location of the bureaus headquarters, accounts
for the disproportionate number of Moscow-datelines. Thus the importance of
foreign correspondence is much bound up in what foreign correspondents can
accomplish writing from Moscow.

Nonetheless, provincial datelines, with a greater emphasis on the
historical-material aspects of transition, also inform a foreign correspondence
that ultimately has the potential to shape public opinion in the United States. As a
whole, foreign correspondence reported very large expenditures on Russia by the
United States and the West, as well as the failures of aid to keep the Ruble stable,
prevent the looting of Russia’s most valuable productive assets, or create the
bankruptcies that were supposed to happen with a sharply reduced flow in
industrial credits. Furthermore, the Washington Consensus did not vocalize
objections to President Yeltsin’s lavish campaign spending for the 1996 election,
which drained nearly half of country’s tax receipts (see Hoffman 1997b), or
consider the consequences of supporting a president so weakened by illness that
he was absent for a year from the public eye. These observations instead helped
constitute the role of foreign correspondence, which clearly addressed major
limitations of democracy in Russia. In particular, foreign correspondence showed
how popular support can be used as a mandate for extra-legal action; how poverty is a cumulative result of many historical factors and empowers non-reform (conservative) candidates who may have a profound affect on the course of reform; how illegality was a necessary component of successful business, thus severely complicating the enforcement of laws by seemingly requiring a deposit of faith in error-prone human judgment as opposed to statute; how money corrupted political and economic practice; and, how democratically elected local governments can be squashed by federal authority. Foreign correspondence on Russia is a fascinating pedagogy on how democracy outside of the United States works.

The overall message about transition to Americans is that we should expect parliamentary opposition to any democratically elected government and look for ways to support democracy other than elevating particular individuals to the position of reform incarnate. One article, for instance, explained that there were better ways to support Russia, mentioning that local-level democratic initiatives simply could have used telephones (see Applebaum 1998). The approach taken by the Washington Consensus led to an inappropriately informed patience with reform in Russia. Foreign correspondence on Russia suggests that a patient attitude on the part of Americans toward Russia was correct but should have stemmed from an understanding of the spatial, historical, and material challenges of reform rather than notions of President Yeltsin as infallible.
Ultimately, the strong degree of faith in President Yeltsin by the Washington Consensus expressed a preference to avoid empowering non-reform (particularly communist) candidates and underscored the importance of fear in American foreign policy and the view of the world in general. This position held despite reports that the old members of the communist nomenclature were among those enriched by privatization and accounts that communists were part of the “new way of doing things” (Williams 1995a). Furthermore, American foreign policy reportedly undermined the credibility of the United States in Russia. Dobbs and Blustein report a former U.S. diplomat in Moscow as saying, “We kept on giving them money and advice even though there were concerns about corruption. As a result, the U.S. is associated in the minds of many Russians with a failed reform, a discredited leader and criminality” (Dobbs and Blustein 1999).

Another important message is the ease with which money influenced the impoverished Russian government, leading to a highly flawed privatization process and a corrupt 1996 presidential election campaign. The reporting of many Russians turning to subsistence methods, extended family, or informal economic activities informs the American imagination of modernity as involving seemingly backward practices and constitutes a critique of progress. Ultimately, the American point of view ultimately fell back to pragmatism. By 1999, it was reported that Russia was so weak that some thought it didn’t have to be taken seriously (Wines 1999f). Other reported speech speculated optimistically that
foreign aid had to have helped a little bit (see Dobbs and Blustein 1999). When Putin was elected, and his economic agenda seemed “like a foreign investor’s wish list” (Williams 2000a), he was imagined as sending all of the right signals to the West. And conceptions of partnership emanating from the American side were conceived as “Russia [walking] in lockstep with Administration policies” (Dobbs and Blustein 1999). These imaginations raised important ethical questions for the American readership about the willingness of the crafters of foreign policy to affect foreign spaces in order to achieve their own goals and highlight an important contribution that foreign correspondence makes to the American geopolitical imagination.

INSIGHTS ABOUT TRANSITION

This study speaks to the value of foreign correspondence in understanding globalization and recent geographies of change. In the most basic sense, it found that representations of transition included portrayals of the alienation of certain groups from political and economic processes alongside the privileging of others. Examples included stories about populations in far northern and eastern towns as well as towns around moribund factories; the process of privatization that put productive capital in the hands of a few; the devaluation of labor and erosion of savings that accompanied monetary policies; the construction of fortress-like dachas alongside older ones and new landscapes of
wealth; the impoverishment of large groups of professionals from coal miners to
teachers to doctors; and, the exclusion of most Russians from the banking sector.
Both representations from Moscow and from the provinces were instrumental in
portraying increasing social stratification.

The construction of elections as potentially detrimental to reform, given
the likelihood that the electorate would use the voting process to express
dissatisfaction with its material lot, was perhaps the most interesting
contradiction of the period. Democracy, in other words, stood to retard market-
reforms, its imagined counterpart in transition, as millions of voters consistently
elected communists to legislative positions in Russia’s parliament. This
contradiction was exaggerated by the austerity policies recommended by the
West and implemented by Yeltsin’s administrations, coupled with the
significance given to Yeltsin as the embodiment of reform. This left little room in
the mainstream American imagination for communists and nationalists to be
considered as legitimate reformers, even though Yeltsin’s economic reforms
were alienating for a large number of Russians. Communists were not
constructed as reformers until 1998, after the August devaluation. At that time, a
cabinet-reshuffling resulted in positions for Russia’s new prime minister and new
head of the central bank, in addition to a top economic aid, all had served under
former Soviet President Gorbachev (Bohlen 1998c). And it was explained that
“Over the years, the Gorbachev-era economists – most of them heads of
academic institutes – have adapted to Russia's changing reality and their views have changed too” (Bohlen 1998c). Nonetheless, one of the messages that the narration of transition sends is that too much dissatisfaction with change is a threat to reform, regardless of the fears and hopes of outside parties.

One of the challenges to Yeltsin’s administration, imagined in various ways, was that it was sandwiched between domestic and foreign interests. Internal private, industrial, and individual concerns competed for President Yeltsin’s ear against foreign financial interests and governments as well as with trans-national lending organizations. The signing of high-profile trade deals and the increasing globalization of Russian space through foreign trans-national corporations helped to satisfy the reported craving of Russian politicians for reassurances that Russia remained a major global power. Russian troops were repatriated from the former East Germany with the help of German money, and the United States got involved in reducing Russian plutonium production and prioritizing the movement of Russian weapons-scientists to commercial activities. Japan’s Prime Minister visited Russia for the first time since World War Two. International aid flowed into Russia by the billions but set off heated debates between the executive and legislative branches of government over the issue of industrial credits and financing. Moreover, the great majority of the economics-related references to place involved foreign intervention in Russia’s economic spaces. An important interpretation of these reported events is that
Russia was gradually becoming more open to international influence and cooperation.

However, domestic problems were serious, and regionalism was constructed as a serious threat. Authorities in several territories judged that the Russian government was not serving their own needs. Some regions exhibited low voter turnout, withheld taxes, issued separate currencies, or exercised regional power in other ways, such as passing laws that contradicted federal law. There were even extreme cases of utilities cutting power off to military bases because of non-payment. Some ethnic minorities expressed nationalist sentiments, gaining substantial autonomy for their home-regions, while bloody conflict in Chechnya festered. Governor Nazdratenko of distant Primorskiy Kray was imagined as increasingly running his region like a fiefdom. In other words, transition was imagined as a state of in-betweenness, not only between the past and an imaginable future, but between domestic and extra-national jurisdictions. This in-betweenness was also expressed in stories for instance about separate assembly lines in the same factory (one for Russia and one for export); about populations in the oil-rich north that were relying on foreign oil companies for improving their towns rather than the Russian government; Russian shuttle traders who controversially imported cheaper manufactured wares from abroad, thus competing with domestic producers; and, foreign investors who had their capital or property seized by local moguls. Transition presented the Russian
federal government with a whole new constellation of international relationships and domestic problems that had never emerged before, which had to be resolved using a new and inchoate political framework. Dobbs and Blustein (1999) reported “open warfare” between the economic and political sections of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, in which the head of the political section maintained in 1994 that American “efforts would almost certainly fail” because of the absence of a history of free markets or the rule of law. In this context, the simplicity of the Washington Consensus is somewhat surprising.

SIGNIFICANCE

This dissertation participates in the growing volume of work on the construction of foreign and American identities during the Post-Cold War era (see for instance Castells 1996; Dalby 1998; Rygiel 1998). It contributes to the ongoing conversations in geography on critical geopolitics that have identified that the rhetorics on the economic transition of the newly independent Russia are ideological (see Unwin 1998). Furthermore, it builds off of the arguments of Castells (1996), Agnew and Corbridge (1995), Ó Tuathail (1996) and others that geopolitical space is networked and stringy, that the analysis of it requires radically different approaches than those used by past geographers. It is part of a tradition within geography that emphasizes the creative essence of geographical
description in which an active subject interprets a problematic text (see Ó Tuathail 1996; Sharp 2000). My own findings emerge from a treatment of decoding as a highly complex process.

Geographers and others have incorporated the concept of time-space convergence into their work (for instance Janelle 1968; Janelle 1969; Giddens 1984; Harvey 1989; Massey 1992; Featherstone and Lash 1995; Kirsch 1995; Soja 1996; Dodgshon 1999). This dissertation found that the technologies of time-space convergence that facilitated the high reliance of foreign correspondents on Moscow-datelines changed the ways in which texts operated by fundamentally altering the storytelling environment. In other words, the texts themselves were geographic constructs of the ways in which foreign correspondents executed fieldwork and encoded symbols that originated in spatially disparate places into a single narrative. Agents voiced by the narrator were inherently coded with spatio-temporal attributes. And those geographically imagined agents were important both to the delivery of the stories of reform and the world-views contained within them as well as to the dynamics within the text that produced it as a readable speech-act.

My work understands the local not as separate from the global but as both a product and productive of it. On one hand, it found that foreign correspondence, especially from the provinces but also sometimes from Moscow, located Russians within a broad, socio-spatial context of global, national, and
local processes. On the other hand, it noticed how different American world-views were shaped by the unfolding dynamic of transition, and that fanaticism, pragmatism, sympathy, and sternness best characterized the attitudes that the coded audience took toward the outside world. The geography of everyday experience for the reading American was constituted by a “world where immediate perception is also distant perception” (Ó Tuathail 1995, 758).

Reform in Russia belongs to what Rob Shields (1997, 187) called a “new genre of contradiction.” He argues that new meanings for the ways in which space is imagined and intervened upon are characterized by equivocality, yet they nonetheless constitute “geographies of desire.” As such, reform can be sometimes understood as a powerful discourse, emanating from what Shields identified as bourgeois science and serving the interests of dominant ideologies and dominant practices. Representations of reform-space often relocated Russian spaces into the “interiority of consciousness” (Shields 1997, 195), thereby making the market-oriented movement of Russian people and objects in space imaginable by disregarding the historical flows, spatial interactions, and networks that produced and reproduced them as fixed spatial entities. One of the contradictions of foreign correspondence was that it sometimes encoded a broad certainty about Russian spaces from Moscow that did not hold for representations from the provinces. This dissertation argues for another understanding of the discourse on reform, one which emphasizes the conjoining
of many voices through foreign correspondence, in order to imagine people and spaces that are not dominant alongside those who are.

From the analyzed texts, Russian space is best understood as a fragmented and unstable terrain, “demanding yet simultaneously denying repair” (Oakes 1997, 520). It is a terrain onto which modern contradictions of economics and government inscribed themselves, while individuals fought to make livable a space that existed somewhere between the traditional order and a new order. This characterization, informed by the work of Oakes (1997), results from many readings of a diverse body of foreign correspondence that often from the provinces posits a networked conception of space and is critical of broader material processes while avoiding the pitfall identified by Raymond Williams (1973) of understanding Soviet space as an irrecoverable, organic community dislocated permanently by capitalism. It honors the journalistic emphasis on personal experience and spatial practice that relies on individual agency while recognizing the broad, national-level impacts that transition had on Russian society and space. It includes the elements of moribund space so common to the various stories while making room for the coded contradictions of the period. And finally, this conception identifies Russian space as existing somewhere in-between Soviet space and Western political and economic spaces. It was simultaneously different than and a product of both, partially complying with
Soviet and Western norms while also being reworked by behaviors and conditions that were unique to transition itself.
Russia taking painful steps to a free market, Parks (1992)

Ending 74 years of socialism, Russia embarks today on the first substantial effort to transform its centrally planned, state-owned economy so that market forces and entrepreneurship predominate in the future.

The first, most painful step will come today with the elimination of almost all government subsidies for consumer goods and a consequent threefold increase in prices for food and many other daily necessities. Two equally far-reaching measures will follow: the privatization of thousands of state-owned enterprises and the breakup of most of Russia's 24,000 state and collective farms.

The program, virtually a forced march to a market economy, also provides for eliminating the government budget deficit through sharp cuts in military spending and tough fiscal, monetary and banking reforms that together will probably reduce living standards by 30%.

Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin, who won legislative approval of the measures at the end of October, told the nation earlier this week in a television broadcast, “There is no other way.”

“The entire world is following the rules that Russia is only now learning,” Yeltsin said of the transition to the free-market system. “We are reforming life primarily for the sake of all people, the common people.”

Still, Yeltsin is worried about an explosion of social discontent as prices soar, factories and farms close and unemployment spreads. Conservatives, including Russian Vice President Alexander V. Rutskoi, are warning against the hardships the reforms will bring. Scattered violence has been reported in the long lines outside Russian stores; two men were killed this week fighting outside a bread shop in the Siberian coal-mining center of Kemerovo.

As outlined by Yegor T. Gaidar, the deputy prime minister for economic policy, Russia will begin to break the decades-old patterns of its state-controlled economy by eliminating virtually all subsidies, permitting enterprises to raise prices to cover their production costs but forcing them for the first time to sell their products at a real price.

Vast changes are expected throughout the Russian economy, where oil, coal and gas are priced much below world levels, where there are huge government
subsidies in every sector of industry, where some manufactured goods are sold at profit margins of 600% or 800% and where prices in state-run groceries have remained the same for years, even as farmers have been paid more.

The second task, Gaidar said Wednesday, will be the stabilization on a new plane of the Russian economy, roughly two-thirds that of the former Soviet Union. The object will be to bring the resulting hyper-inflation under control and to channel that energy into long-term growth.

Beyond that, market forces are expected to produce deep, structural changes in the Russian economy under government guidance. Extensive foreign investment will be sought, for example, less for the infusion of capital than for the management know-how, marketing experience and competitive edge.

“"The truth is that we don't know the real cost of production of any item or its true worth in the marketplace,"” said a senior economist advising the Russian government. “But we are about to find out -- and we hope everything does not come crashing down on our heads.”

Price reform, always a volatile issue, has been taken by the Yeltsin government as the key lever in an overall economic transformation. Almost every Soviet effort at economic reform in the last 30 years, including those proposed by former President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, faltered largely on the issue of price increases.

“"Every economist has agreed on reform theory, including real prices, but no government has been able until now to put those prices into effect,"” the senior economist advising the Russian government said at a press briefing this week. “The point is not that this is historic, a watershed, although it is; the point is that, finally, fundamental decisions have been made.”

By forcing enterprises to pay real costs for materials, labor and, eventually, capital, the government hopes that it will introduce supply-and-demand considerations into the economy. Higher prices and larger profits should be an incentive to enterprises to produce more goods, ending chronic shortages that resulted from below-cost prices. With subsidies eliminated, the government budget should be balanced, especially with cuts in military spending and higher taxes on business profits.

State-set ceilings on pay have been lifted in most industries in anticipation of inflation; Yeltsin has already increased the pay of government employees, including soldiers, by 90%. Government economists expect that, as prices rise,
workers will negotiate compensating pay increases -- in contracts that allow employers to cut staffs and demand greater efficiency.

From the increase in prices, the government also expects privatization to develop for potential investors -- whether they be an enterprise's managers or employees, local banks or multinational companies. They will be able to assess a firm's profitability, and thus its suitability for further investment.

Yeltsin's government, acting under a determined “Russia first” policy, declared its intention to proceed with the reforms, leaving the other former Soviet republics in the new Commonwealth of Independent States scrambling to keep up. Ukraine and Belarus will also free prices from state controls today, but other republics have yet to work out their policies.

All of this is a dramatic break from the system of central planning that has been the heart of the Soviet economy from the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.

With subsidies and state price controls gone, consumer prices are expected to increase sixfold and wholesale prices in industry fivefold, the government estimates, although some economists anticipate that inflation will run at an annualized rate of more than 1,200%.

“The initial shock will be both massive and prolonged,” Gaidar said. “Nothing will be as it was, everything will change. . . .”

For this reason, increases in the prices of some consumer goods, generally foods and essential services, will be limited to 200% or 300%, and the government will step in with further, though much reduced, subsidies, if necessary.

Nikolai P. Shmelev, a leading free-market economist, nonetheless warned Wednesday that Yeltsin is risking widespread unrest by raising prices without sufficient goods, including $10 billion to $15 billion worth of imported items, on store shelves.

Without such an offsetting move, today's price boosts will be like surgery, like the amputation of an arm without anesthetic, he told the newspaper Rabochaya Tribuna. “The patient's hands are not tied,” he said. “What if he picks up a knife and attacks the surgeon?”

Shmelev urged that the price increases be combined with privatization of state stores and factories and with compensation for poor individuals and families who need government subsidies.
“The Russian team should not be presented as a gang of bad guys who have decided to destroy the motherland,” he said. “All the measures they are undertaking are both necessary and inevitable. The question is whether they are sufficient.”

Gaidar has defended the measures and the sequence as the only practical approach, saying: “The time for democratic alternatives of reform is running out very fast in Russia. To my mind, we have no choice, and there is nothing to discuss. . . . Our defeat unfortunately would not simply be a failure, but a potentially enormous tragedy for this country.”

But the problems are manifest even at the first stage of the reforms.

The release of products, held back from the market in anticipation of the price increase, is mostly a hope; there are no solid figures on how much has been held back and at what prices manufacturers would release them.

An immediate jump of 250% to 300% in prices is the basis of all government calculations. But economists acknowledge that is only a guess because there is no way to accurately measure demand for many goods.

The government already knows that it does not have enough cash ready for the flood of bank withdrawals likely to begin when prices soar; there is serious concern that a bank run could abort the whole reform effort.

The Russian government mint has tripled its printing of bills, going to new denominations of 200, 500 and 1,000 rubles, although the average worker still makes only 350 to 500 rubles a month. Ukraine, which will free its prices today, plans to issue scrip to make up the deficit.

And until state enterprises are privatized, their monopolies ended and competitors, including foreign firms, are allowed into the market, they will feel little pressure to reduce costs or improve products.

Gaidar said he only hopes that the Russian government will have enough time to work on these problems before it is forced from office. “We have two problems to solve, and each is difficult and requires unpopular decisions,” he said. “We cannot permit ourselves the luxury of simply unfreezing prices and then leaving without stopping inflation.”

“In that case, there would be a chance that the second goal -- the stabilization of prices, of finances, the economy -- will be achieved undemocratically by the
second post-Communist government.”

Textual Analysis

The first striking aspect of the article is the territorial representation of space (“Russia embarks today...to transform its centrally planned, state-owned economy.”) The territory, however, is represented also as a unitary actor/decision-maker. Agnew and Corbridge (1998) have identified unitary representations as representations which understate the complexity of space and society by representing heterogeneous spaces as a unit. This unitary representation of Russia as a decision-maker produces a Russia with a psychology and a purpose, to create an economy where “market forces and entrepreneurship predominate in the future.” “Every economist has agreed on reform theory, including real prices, but no government has been able until now to put those prices into effect...The point is not that this is historic, a watershed, although it is; the point is that, finally, fundamental decisions have been made.” Ironic interpretation, however, juxtaposes this information against the changes represented as “a forced march to a market economy” and Yeltsin’s statement that “There is no other way.” Later, the audience is told “All the measures...are both necessary and inevitable. The question is whether they are sufficient.” Reading ironically discovers the representation of social hardship outside of the ideological construction of the emerging Russian economy, because it recognizes the construction of a journey toward “market forces and entrepreneurship” as flattery rather than reflective of an extra-textual reality. The text thus produces two narrators: one which tells a story of Russia “embarking” on a righteous and totalizing yet risky journey to a capitalist way of doing things, and another that tells the story of desperate politicians taking frantic measures to establish policies that allow households to survive while they simultaneously incur enormous losses in standards of living.

Both stories imagine remarkably different geographies. The first story places Russian statesmen into a collaborative relationship with Russian “others,” while the second creates an antagonistic relationship between them. The first story, clinging to the unitary representation of space, imagines a democracy in which informed decisions are made in a controlled environment for the benefit of everyone: “As outlined by Yegor T. Gaidar, the deputy prime minister for economic policy, Russia will begin to break the decades-old patterns of its state-controlled economy by eliminating virtually all subsidies, permitting enterprises to raise prices to cover their production costs but forcing them for the first time to sell their products at a real price.” The second story, however, produces a democracy without choice: “Gaidar has defended the measures and the sequence as the only practical approach, saying: ‘The time for democratic alternatives of reform is running out very fast in Russia. To my mind, we have no choice, and there is nothing to discuss. . . .’” Furthermore, the ironic reading is the more
powerful one, criticizing the imaging of “the Russian economy under government guidance.” The ironic reading understands that the urgent economic problems are determining government policy by leaving it with no choices. Moreover, the unitary representation of space is highly criticized by images of fragmented space, in particular the representation of within-class conflict. “Still, Yeltsin is worried about an explosion of social discontent as prices soar, factories and farms close and unemployment spreads. Conservatives, including Russian Vice President Alexander V. Rutskoi, are warning against the hardships the reforms will bring. Scattered violence has been reported in the long lines outside Russian stores; two men were killed this week fighting outside a bread shop in the Siberian coal-mining center of Kemerovo.”

Both geographies are ideological by imagining foreign capitalists in a supervisory role for their management “know-how.” The ideological expansion of capitalism into Russia is naturalized through flattery: “The entire world is following the rules that Russia is only now learning.” The narrator continues through Yeltsin’s voice, “We are reforming life primarily for the sake of all people, the common people.” This rhetoric appeals to the common good in its attempt to justify the economic changes that jeopardize the standards of living of so many people. The narratee produced in the straightforward reading (story 1) does not question this rhetoric, because that story equates market forces and entrepreneurship with righteousness. The narratee produced by the ironic reading, however, recognizes the rhetoric as an attempt to re-present things, to represent Russia as a territory without class differences (“for the sake of all people, the common people”), and to restate the involuntary character of lifting price controls as voluntary. The rhetoric represents the practitioners of statecraft as taking control of the situation: “We are reforming life...” The narrative, however, presents sufficient information for the ironic narratee to conclude not only that the represented government is in a reactive position rather than a proactive one but that the code “reforming” itself is an attempt to understate the drastic nature of the political economic changes taking place. There are other signs of re-presentation as well: “‘The initial shock will be both massive and prolonged,’ Gaidar said.” The ironic reader identifies the statement as rhetorical, rather than reflective of reality. The codes “massive” and “prolonged” ironize that the shock is “initial.” The casual narratee, however, does not recognize the deception taking place; this narratee decodes the signs of discourse as the austere words of a frank statesman honestly working for “the stabilization of prices, of finances, the economy.”

Ironic reading also discovers in this narrative multiple instances of economic realism, which have been identified as ideological (Lefebvre 1991). For example the statement “eliminating virtually all subsidies [will force enterprises] for the first time to sell their products at a real price” ironizes itself. Of course, the rubles exchanged for goods in the Soviet Union were just as real
as the ones being exchanged for products today. Another example of economic realism in the narrative is “By forcing enterprises to pay real costs for materials, labor and, eventually, capital, the government hopes that it will introduce supply-and-demand considerations into the economy.” The ironic narratee is neither flattered by the code “supply-and-demand considerations” nor lulled into thinking that for instance trolleybuses were produced in the Soviet Union independent of usage. Furthermore, Marxism has exposed the notion that supply and demand determine price as erroneous (see Harvey 1999). Economic realism entails particular, unstated conceptions of how capitalism relates to space and society and is only discovered through analysis of the codes used to signify economic practice (see Lefebvre 1991). It is used as a rhetorical device in the narrative to flatter the casual subjectivity.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{154} The remainder of the analysis is in the main text itself.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 1992</td>
<td><strong>Prices are liberalized</strong> on most products. “Scattered violence [is] reported in the long lines outside Russian stores” along with the killing of two men who were “fighting outside a bread shop in the Siberian coal-mining center of Kemerovo” (Parks 1992b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25, 1992</td>
<td>“Millions upon millions of <strong>Russian white-collar workers</strong>” are imagined “as some of the poorest people on Earth” (Goldberg 1992c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21, 1992</td>
<td>“The <strong>oil-rich region of Tatarstan</strong> along the Volga River voted in a referendum to become ‘a sovereign state’” (Shapiro 1992b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12, 1992</td>
<td><strong>Long lines for gasoline</strong> are reported, because producers in Russia are withholding the distillate until they can sell it on the world market for ten times the domestic price dictated by the Russian government (Uchitelle 1992d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 1993</td>
<td>“The planned ‘first wave’ of <strong>mass privatization</strong> of large and medium-sized firms, fraught with political as well as economic implications” begins (Hiatt 1993d).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 1993</td>
<td>The 1,033-member Congress of People’s Deputies attempts and <strong>fails to impeach</strong> Yeltsin by a margin of 72 votes (Dobbs 1993f).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 1993</td>
<td>Yeltsin and his government’s economic reform policies receive a vote of confidence in a <strong>national referendum</strong>, with a slim majority of voters expressing confidence in Yeltsin and his pro-market economic policies (Shogren 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 1993</td>
<td><strong>Pre-1993 Ruble banknotes</strong> are suddenly and unexpectedly declared void by the Russian Central Bank (Erlanger 1993d). Many Russians learn about nascent banking system loose their cash-savings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1993</td>
<td>President <strong>Yeltsin dissolves Parliament</strong> (Shapiro 1993f).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| September 30, 1993 | “**In the west Siberian city of Novosibirsk, about 140 regional leaders** threatened to set up an autonomous republic, withhold taxes from Moscow and **offer the banned parliament an alternative meeting site**” (Shapiro
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 3-4, 1993</td>
<td><strong>Armed uprising in Moscow</strong>; military units storm the Russian parliament (Hiltzik, Efron et al. 1993).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 1993</td>
<td>A new Russian constitution is adopted in a referendum. Elections to the State Duma are held. The party of nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky wins biggest share of the vote. (Schmemann 1993h)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1994</td>
<td><strong>US West signs “a joint venture deal</strong> in March with Rossvyazinform, the local phone company in Rostov, and Rostelcom, Russia's primary long-distance company, to provide long-distance digital switching equipment cellular phone service, cable television and other services in the Rostov area, 400 miles south of Moscow” (Stevenson 1994a).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 11, 1994</td>
<td>The <strong>exchange rate of the Ruble</strong> plunges and makes a partial rebound later in the week. Currency reserves of the Russian Central Bank are reported as low (Hiatt 1994e).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1995</td>
<td>Accompanied by six cabinet officials from Washington, US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin sign a <strong>“$15-billion contract</strong>, involving Russia's state oil company, Exxon Corp. and Japan's Sodeco, <strong>to develop oil and gas fields off Sakhalin island</strong> in Russia's Far East” (Boudreaux 1995c).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25, 1995</td>
<td>“At a Moscow conference center today, <strong>nuclear scientists and engineers</strong> from Chelyabinsk-70, Arzamas-16, Tomsk-7 and the other closed cities opened a joint public exhibition of <strong>civilian projects</strong> for which they are seeking investors” (Hoffman 1995b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-December 1995</td>
<td>Loans-for-shares <strong>privatization program</strong>. (Simon 1995b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6, 1996</td>
<td><strong>Alexander Nikitin</strong> arrested and charged with espionage (Hoffman 1996f).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1996</td>
<td><strong>“Shuttle trading”</strong> has emerged as a recognized occupation (Williams 1996c).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 18, 1997</td>
<td>President Yeltsin appoints <strong>Boris Nemtsov</strong>, the former reformist governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, to the position of First Deputy Prime Minister (Gordon 1997g).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1997</td>
<td>The <strong>conversion of nuclear reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk</strong> from the production of weapons-grade plutonium to purely civilian use receives attention from US diplomats. Russian officials explain that the reactors will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18, 1998</td>
<td>Blunt ex-general and former Yeltsin ally <strong>Alexander Lebed</strong> wins the governorship of Krasnoyarsk Kray (Bohlen 1998a; Paddock 1998b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14, 1998</td>
<td>“Russia won agreement from international lenders today for <strong>$22 billion in credits</strong> over the next 18 months… In exchange for the loans, which Russia desperately needs to make foreign debt payments and bolster its currency, the ruble, President Boris Yeltsin pledged to push through parliament tough fiscal reforms to boost tax collection revenue and cut government spending” (Williams 1998l).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 17, 1998</td>
<td>Russia devalues the ruble, defaults on its domestic treasury bills (GKO$s), and imposes a ninety-day moratorium on international debt service (Hoffman 1998j; Hoffman 1998k). <strong>The Ruble loses one-third of its value in one day</strong> (Wines 1998d).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 15, 1998</td>
<td>“Analysts expect that Russia will default on as much as $200 billion in foreign debt – the largest default by any government in history” (O'Brien 1998).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1998-March 1999</td>
<td>It is reported that for one city in Western Russia, Smolensk, barter comprises 80% of the economy. Workers are paid in food, clothing, and television sets (Paddock 1998f). &quot;<strong>These days only 5% to 6% of our [Russia’s] transactions are in real money</strong>&quot; (Reynolds 1999c).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12-13, 1999</td>
<td><strong>Yeltsin sacks his cabinet</strong>, including Prime Minister Primakov, “who had enjoyed broad legislative support.” <strong>Impeachment hearings on 5 counts against Yeltsin</strong> begin in Russia’s lower house of parliament (Hoffman 1999d). This “latest Government shake-up” is Yeltsin's “third in 15 months” (Bohlen 1999g).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 1999</td>
<td><strong>Captain Grigory Pasko</strong> freed from a Vladivostok jail after 20 months in prison (Gordon 1999d).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 2000</td>
<td><strong>Vladimir Putin</strong>, imagined as a “dour autocrat,” <strong>elected president</strong> (Williams 2000a).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 2000</td>
<td>“On the Pacific coast, 5,000 miles from the Kremlin, the governor of the Primoriye region, <strong>Yevgeny Nazdratenko, has taken over private businesses</strong>, seized control of the press and judiciary, pumped government budgets dry and, according to Mr. Yeltsin's Kremlin, regularly ignored federal decrees” (Wines 2000c).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3 - EXAMPLES OF REFERENCES FOR EACH OF THE 13 THEMES

Chechnya
- “On the last day of 1994, the Russian army’s 131st Maikop Brigade rolled out of the hills and advanced on Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. The brigade reached the airport, then headed for the central railroad station—and a death trap” (Hoffman 1999e). This is a reference to Maikop, the administrative center of Adygeya in the North Caucasus.
- “The Chechnya war has claimed at least 20,000 lives. More than 5,000 refugees have sought safety in the Krasnodar region of southern Russia” (Simon 1995a). This is a reference to Krasnodar.
- “Early protests stirred the heartland. Led by the Republic of Chuvashia, a few republics declared native-son conscripts in the Russian army exempt from fighting the war” (Boudreaux 1995d). This is a reference to Chuvashia in the Volga-Vyatka Region.

Civil Society
- “…the wives of 26 workers who helped clean up after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster were in the eighth day of a hunger strike Monday, seeking overdue benefit payments. And workers at the huge Chelyabinsk tractor factory in the Ural mountains staged a one-day strike Monday to protest the nonpayment of their wages—which in some cases amount to less than $10 a month” (Paddock 1997e).
- “Further anti-Yeltsin rallies were reported in other industrial cities across the country, including Chelyabinsk, Kazan and Yekaterinburg in the Ural Mountains, Bryansk, Penza and Petrozavodsk in central Russia and Angarsk, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk in Siberia” (Parks 1992a). This is a good example of how many search terms can occur in the same article.
- “The media has become an effective means to power. The great majority of media outlets are controlled by those who seek political power...this spring, state-controlled television suddenly broadcast a stream of advertisements promoting the candidacy of Vladimir Zhirinovsky for governor of the Belgorod region” (Wines 1999c). This citation is most directly a message about the press and not elections, which is why I didn’t categorize it under the elections theme.

Culture
- “It’s the anniversary of V-E day in Moscow. In Kemerovo, the local administration ordered a drinking holiday for war heroes, instructing policemen to escort the inebriated veterans home gently rather than to haul them off to drunk tanks” (Stanley 1995c).
• “The Russian premiere for “titanic” was in mid-February – not in Moscow but in Kaliningrad, on the Baltic Sea, which is home to an oceanographic institute that played an important role in explorations of the real Titanic two and a half miles below the surface of the North Atlantic” (Bohlen 1998f).

• “In Samara a “chatter dog” called Mir (Peace) has mesmerized the city – and made it impossible for its owners to get a word in on the telephone – by learning to say a few simple words like mama and papa” (Specter 1996e).

Demographics
• “Tatarstan, a multiethnic region of 3.7 million people in the Volga-Urals region east of Moscow, has decided to suspend distribution of the new passports because they do not include a place to record Tatar nationality. Tatarstan is one of Russia's 21 internal republics, most of them created in the early Soviet years to recognize strong ethnic groups” (Hoffman 1997f).

• “The harshest reaction to Mr. Yeltsin’s call for stronger executive authority has come from some of the 20 ethnic republics. In Ufa, capital of Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov, the chairman of the republic’s Supreme Soviet, said he was ‘stunned by Yeltsin’s statement, as it actually establishes a dictatorship in the country’” (Bohlen 1993a).

• “Sergei Sonochkin, 38, a local Communist activist who helped set up Zyuganov's visit to Novosibirsk, admitted that the youth event was the one flop in an otherwise successful day. It reflected, he said, the Communist Party's utter inability to attract the young generation (Shogren 1996).

Government
• “During the investigation, security agents raided Bellona's offices in the North Sea Port of Murmansk, and confiscated 1,500 copies of the Bellona report, which were labeled forbidden literature” (Bohlen 1999d).

• “Putin, stopping in the far eastern Russian city of Blagoveshchensk, described Kim as a "comfortable and pleasant interlocutor. . . . You know, all of a sudden the Korean leader showed himself as a modern man, a person who evaluates many situations in the world objectively [and] is well informed” (Reuters 2000a).

• “Besides unhappiness with Lukashenko, Yeltsin appears to be offended that regional governors have been inviting Lukashenko to Russia on their own. On a visit to the city of Nizhny Novgorod today, Yeltsin said: ‘I am warning the governors about one thing. They are forbidden to invite heads of other states without the president's permission’” (Williams 1997p).
Government and Economics

- “Nationalist lawmakers have blocked privatization of defense industries with an alarmist clamor: Sell off the Sukhoi design bureau, which crafted an arsenal of fighter jets and bombers? Might as well turn over the keys to the country, they say. Auction the Ulan-Ude Aircraft Plant? Might as well wipe out Russia's national pride” (Simon 1995b).
- “Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin and other Russian officials will seek U.S. aid for Russian farms and airlines and discuss a steel trade dispute during a trip to the United States, news reports said… [Stepashin] left Vladivostok yesterday for Seattle for talks with Boeing Co. and Microsoft Corp. He heads to Washington on Tuesday, where he will meet President Clinton, Vice President Gore and other officials” (The Washington Post 1999).
- “The threat to the unity of the Russian Federation is probably most significant. Already over the last 15 months, Russia's various semi-autonomous regions, provinces and cities have seized considerable autonomy… Provinces like Nizhny Novgorod have begun ambitious economic programs that often violate federal law. Several areas have simply stopped sending revenues to the center” (Schmemann 1993f).

Economics

- “In reporting on a survey of Russian cities, Tass asserted that ‘a substantial expansion’ of consumer goods was found, but it offered no extensive detail. The report said the price of vegetables, dairy products and eggs fell in Yaroslavl and Syktyvkar” (Clines 1992).
- “The Coca-Cola Company said on Thursday that it planned to invest $116.5 million to open four plants in Russia. The plants bring the Atlanta-based company's investment in Russia to $600 million. The new plants will be in Vladivostok” (The New York Times 1997).
- “General Motors said production could begin by the end of 1997 at a still-unfinished car manufacturing plant near the town of Yelabuga, about 900 miles east of Moscow in the Russian republic of Tatarstan” (The Los Angeles Times 1995).

Elections

- “In the Baltic Sea exclave of Kaliningrad, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Vladimir Yegorov, took a healthy lead into a runoff after winning 38 percent of the vote in the first round” (Reuters 2000b).
- “Boris Nemtsov, the reformist governor of Nizhny Novgorod, said recently that parties and politicians identified with reform are unpopular throughout most of the country. Only a new election law barring party affiliations on ballots could prevent the Communists and nationalists from sweeping to victory in parliamentary elections next December, he said” (Hiatt 1995a).
• A leading conservative in the Congress of People's Deputies spoke to a crowd in Kaliningrad using anti-Yeltsin rhetoric. “Other prominent Yeltsin opponents have fanned out of Moscow this week for campaign stops, and on all fronts the oratory has grown harsher. "Today, Yeltsin symbolizes all anti-Russian forces," Mikhail Astafyev, a leading conservative in the Congress of People's Deputies, told a crowd in Kaliningrad, on the Baltic” (Bohlen 1993f).

History
• “Citing Russians' sacrifices at Stalingrad, President Boris Yeltsin recently said, ‘Today, we are living through a similarly crucial and difficult period in our history.’ Victory this time, he said, will bring a ‘prosperous, decent and free life for Russia’” (Hiatt 1993e).
• “In a large red album given to all surviving members of the "Berlin Fighter Aircraft Detachment" -- an honorary name given his unit after the war -- Tsineman [a Soldier who fought for the Soviet Union against Germany] showed his path: Stalingrad; Kursk, where the Germans tried desperately but failed to reverse their defeat at Stalingrad; through Bryansk and Gomel to Lukow, Warsaw and Poznan in Poland; Kostrzyn, on the Polish-German border, and, finally, Berlin” (Shapiro 1995b).
• “Despite decades of anti-religious pressure from Soviet authorities, the same mix of ancient custom and local influence has persisted. The Jews of Daghestan were saved during World War II when the Nazi advance was halted in Nalchik, in the nearby northern Caucasus” (Hiatt 1993a).

Landuse
• “The company sold $429 million in equity to international investors, a landmark attempt by a Russian company to raise capital abroad. Gazprom says it needs the money to help build a huge $40 billion pipeline from the Yamal Peninsula in the Kara Sea to Western Europe” (Hoffman 1996e).
• “The Communists' development of nuclear power resulted in a string of nuclear plant accidents, from a reactor explosion at Chelyabinsk in the 1950s to the Chernobyl meltdown. Over the years, radioactive discharges from nuclear reactors, waste dumps, weapons plants, research labs and aging nuclear submarines have left Russia with a trail of contamination from the Norwegian border to the Far East” (Paddock 1998c).
Military
• “A truck exploded next to a nine-story apartment building in the Rostov region in southern Russia early today, leaving at least four people dead and 70 hospitalized. Shortly after the blast, at 5:50 A.M. in the city of Volgodonsk, Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin ordered Russian special forces to join firefighters and other rescuers at the scene” (Gordon 1999a).
• “As minister of atomic energy, Mikhailov directed a far-flung, state-owned empire that included the two nuclear weapons design laboratories known as Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. In the past, the nuclear weapons centers also have resorted to other methods to raise money, including loans from private banks. In October 1996, the director of the Chelyabinsk-70 weapons laboratory committed suicide at a time when debts to banks were mounting” (Hoffman 1998n).
• “Kidnappings and shootings are routine. In March, in the region's worst recent incident, a bomb exploded in a market in the city of Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia, killing 60 people” (Dixon 1999).

Sensational
• “A bungling army major confessed Saturday that he had tried to assassinate Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, first using homemade bombs and then a knife, Russia's Itar-Tass news agency reported….According to the semiofficial Itar-Tass, the major came from the Far East city of Khabarovsk, where he made two bombs filled with steel balls” (Goldberg 1993g).
• “A powerful earthquake rocked a large island off Russia's Pacific Coast early Sunday, flattening a remote oil-producing town and burying several thousand residents beneath collapsed apartment buildings. The quake, measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale, struck the town of Neftegorsk on the Russian island of Sakhalin at about 1 a.m. The Russian Tass news agency reported early today that more than 300 people had been killed and at least 300 injured, but reports from the scene were still sketchy more than 12 hours after the temblor” (Hockstader 1995b).
• “After battling fire and ice all night, rescue workers in the Siberian city of Irkutsk recovered the bodies of 48 victims in the crash of a giant cargo plane into an apartment building. The death toll was likely to climb to at least 60, Russian officials said. Victims under the debris who might have survived the explosion and fire that followed the crash probably would not have lived through the night, when temperatures plunged to 10 degrees below zero” (Williams 1997k).

Social
• “Some 635,000 people live in Vladivostok, most of whom could not take regular baths this summer because of the drought. For entertainment, they
turned to hand-cranked generators to power radios and televisions. To eat, they cooked on Bunsen burners. To bathe, one woman slept with her faucet turned on, so that a sudden decision by the water works to begin pumping -- usually in the dead of night -- would produce a sudden blast of water and awaken her” (Wines 1998e).

• “Twenty-nine deaths [from eating poisonous mushrooms] occurred in the Belgorod, Voronezh and Volgograd regions of southern Russia. In Ukraine, 66 have perished. Fourteen more victims were hospitalized in Voronezh in the 24 hours ending Saturday evening, despite graphic warnings on local radio and television this past week cautioning people to avoid collecting any mushrooms” (Dixon 2000d).

• “There were 3.3 million abortions in 1992, more than twice the number of births and the highest incidence recorded in the world. In a 1991 report on the Tambov region, southeast of Moscow, 5 percent of women surveyed said they had had more than 11 abortions, according to Georgetown University Prof. Murray Feshbach, an expert on Russian demographics. One woman said she had had 28” (Hockstader 1994a).
## APPENDIX 4 - SEARCH CRITERIA AND RESULTS FOR THE 80 TERRITORIES IN THIS STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territorial Name</th>
<th>Administrative Center</th>
<th>Search Criteria</th>
<th>Total Hits</th>
<th>Useable Hits</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adygeya Republic</td>
<td>Maykop</td>
<td>Adygey! OR Ma*kop¹⁵⁵</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aga-Buryat AO</td>
<td>Aginskoe</td>
<td>Aga Bur! OR Aga-Bur! OR Aginsk!</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altay Kray</td>
<td>Barnaul</td>
<td>Altay OR Altai OR Barnaul OR Gorny-Alt! OR Gorniy-Alt!</td>
<td>105¹⁵⁶</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Because the Altay Kray and Altay Republics are near each other and have the potential to be confused, I searched on both sets of place names simultaneously, sorting them out one at a time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amur Oblast</td>
<td>Blagoveshchensk</td>
<td>Amur OR Blagoves!</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkhangel'sk Oblast</td>
<td>Arkhangel’sk</td>
<td>Arkhangel!</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrakhan Oblast</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashkort Republic</td>
<td>Ufa</td>
<td>(Ufa AND Russia) OR (Bashkortostan OR Bashkiria OR Bashkirya)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>I search on (Ufa AND Russia), because many hits on just “Ufa” were either acronyms for something or related to a dance-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁵⁵ "!" is a wildcard that stands for any possible sequence of characters. "*" is a wildcard that stands for exactly one character.

¹⁵⁶ Because the Altay Kray and Altay Republics are near each other and have the potential to be confused, I searched on both sets of place names simultaneously, sorting them out one at a time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>City AND Region</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>Belgorod</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryansk Oblast</td>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>Bryansk</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buryat Republic</td>
<td>Ulan-Ude</td>
<td>Buryat! OR (Ulan-Ude OR Ulan Ude) OR (Ust'-Ord! OR Ust' Ord! OR Ust-Ord! OR Ust Ord!)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelyabinsk Oblast</td>
<td>Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chita Oblast</td>
<td>Chita</td>
<td>Chita AND Russia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukchi (Chukotka) AO</td>
<td>Anadyr</td>
<td>Chukchi OR Chukot! OR Anad*r</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuvash Republic</td>
<td>Cheboksary</td>
<td>Chuvash! OR Cheboksar!</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evenki AO</td>
<td>Tura</td>
<td>Evenk! OR (Tura AND Region)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Search Terms</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gornyy Altay Republic</td>
<td>Gorno-Altaysk</td>
<td>Altay OR Altai OR Barnaul OR Gorny-Alt! OR Gorniy-Alt!</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irkutsk Oblast</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivanovo Oblast</td>
<td>Ivanovo</td>
<td>Ivanovo</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish (Yevreyskiy) AO</td>
<td>Birobidzhan</td>
<td>(Jewish W/10\textsuperscript{157} Autonomous AND Russia) OR Yevreysk! OR Birobid!</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkar Republic</td>
<td>Nalchik</td>
<td>Kabardin! OR Kabardyn! OR Balkar! OR Nalch*\textsuperscript{k}</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaliningrad Oblast</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalmykia Republic</td>
<td>Elista</td>
<td>(Kalmyk! OR Elista) AND NOT chess</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaluga Oblast</td>
<td>Kaluga</td>
<td>Kaluga</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{157} “W/” followed by a number is an operator that stands for a search on two operands within the specified number of words within each other. For instance, “Jewish W/10 Autonomous” looks for a character string that has the word “Autonomous” no more than 10 words away from the word “Jewish.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Search Terms</th>
<th>Code 1</th>
<th>Code 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kamchatka Oblast</td>
<td>Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy</td>
<td>Kamchat! OR Petropavl!</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic</td>
<td>Cherkess</td>
<td>Karachay! OR Cherkess!</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karelia Republic</td>
<td>Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>Karelia OR Karelian OR Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemerovo Oblast</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khabarovsk Kray</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khakasia Republic</td>
<td>Abakan</td>
<td>Khakas! OR Abakan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanty-Mansi AO</td>
<td>Khanty-Mansiysk</td>
<td>Khanty OR Khanti OR Khantiy OR Mansi OR Mansiysk</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirov Oblast</td>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>Kirov AND NOT (orchestra! OR ballet OR dance! OR theater! OR music! OR museum OR opera)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The name Kirov was a complicated one, because it is the name for instance of a famous ballet company, a surname, a class of warship, as well as the name of a neighborhood in Grozny.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Search Terms</th>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Hits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Komi Republic</td>
<td>Syktyvkar</td>
<td>Komi OR S<em>kt</em>vkar</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komi-Permyak AO</td>
<td>Kudymkar</td>
<td>(Komi AND (Permyak OR Permiak)) OR Kud*mkar</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koryak AO</td>
<td>Palana</td>
<td>Kor*ak OR Palana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma Oblast</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar Kray</td>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>Krasnodar</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnoyarsk Kray</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurgan Oblast</td>
<td>Kurgan</td>
<td>Kurgan</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk Oblast</td>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>Kursk AND NOT submarine</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipetsk Oblast</td>
<td>Lipetsk</td>
<td>Lipetsk</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kurgan is the name of a region in Tajikistan in which Russia was involved in fighting.

On August 12, 2000, a catastrophic accident sank the Russian Submarine “Kursk”, resulting in the deaths of all crewmen. The incident received widespread news-coverage. See, for example, Hoffman (2000a).
Dave Magadan is an athlete who made the news during the study-period.

Murmansk was the port of the Kursk.

Searching with "OR Ossetia! OR Osetia!" yielded an additional 216 hits. So many of them were about the war in Chechnya that I elected simply to search on "Vladikavkaz."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Query</th>
<th>Hits</th>
<th>Spans</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod Oblast</td>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>Novgorod AND NOT Nizhny AND NOT Nizhni</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>the site of many chess tournaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk Oblast</td>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk Oblast</td>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel Oblast</td>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>(Orel AND Russia) OR Oryol</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>“Orel” is the given name of a prominent American baseball player</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg Oblast</td>
<td>Orenburg</td>
<td>Orenburg</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penza Oblast</td>
<td>Penza</td>
<td>Penza</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm' Oblast</td>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>Perm AND Russia</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>There were many hits for just “Perm” alone related to the Perm Ballet in America or other cultural stories. They were not written by foreign correspondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primorskiy Kray</td>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>Primorskii OR Primorskiy Primorskie OR Primoriye OR Vladivostok</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pskov Oblast</td>
<td>Pskov</td>
<td>Pskov</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Republic</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Search Query</td>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov Oblast</td>
<td>Rostov</td>
<td>Rostov AND NOT (art OR orchestra! OR ballet OR dance! OR theater! OR music! OR museum OR opera)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusions in the search were designed to weed out references to performing groups touring in the United States.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryazan Oblast</td>
<td>Ryazan</td>
<td>Ryazan</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakha (Yakut) Republic</td>
<td>Yakutsk</td>
<td>Sakha OR Yakut!</td>
<td>198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakhalin Oblast</td>
<td>Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk</td>
<td>((Sakhalin OR Sakhalinsk) AND NOT (KAL OR Korean Air Lines))</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Over two dozen references occurred to the downing of a Korean Airlines jet by a Soviet fighter plane in 1983.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara Oblast</td>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>Samara AND Russia</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Samara is a popular Arabic name.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov Oblast</td>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk Oblast</td>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol' Kray</td>
<td>Stavropol</td>
<td>Stavropol</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tambov Oblast</td>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>Tambov</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kazan is a popular surname, and I could not use it to find qualifying references. By itself, it yielded over 1,000 hits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Name</td>
<td>City Name</td>
<td>City Name OR Region Name</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) AO</td>
<td>Dudinka</td>
<td>Taymyr! OR Dolgan! OR Dudinka</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomsk Oblast</td>
<td>Tomsk</td>
<td>Tomsk</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula Oblast</td>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>Tula AND Russia</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Tula is a given name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tver' Oblast</td>
<td>Tver'</td>
<td>Tver</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyumen Oblast</td>
<td>Tyumen</td>
<td>Tyumen</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyva Republic</td>
<td>Kyzyl</td>
<td>Tyva OR Tuva OR Kyzyl</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udmurt Republic</td>
<td>Izhevsk</td>
<td>Udmurt! OR Izhevsk</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ul'yanovsk Oblast</td>
<td>Ul’yanovsk</td>
<td>Ulyanovsk OR Ul*yanovsk</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ust'-Orda Buryat AO</td>
<td>Ust-Ordynskiy</td>
<td>Ust’-Ord! OR Ust-Ord! OR Buryat</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd Oblast</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda Oblast</td>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh Oblast</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamalo-Nenets AO</td>
<td>Salekhard</td>
<td>Yamal! OR Salekhard</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaroslavl' Oblast</td>
<td>Yaroslavl’</td>
<td>Yaroslavl</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 5 - QUESTIONS THAT I ASKED CAROL WILLIAMS

I took these questions from a December 13, 2000 interview with Carol Williams of the Los Angeles Times in which I was particularly interested in pinning her down on why she used ideological and ethnocentric codes in her writing. The purpose of the questions was to verify that I was correct in asserting that these codes served primarily to flatter American readers rather than to say anything substantive about Russia. There is no standard set of questions that I ask every journalist, because each journalist’s writing is different, with some articles raising more specific and significant questions for the analysis than others.

1. Why did you write about the “slothful days of the Soviet Union” and “the drunks and the dunces” being on state farms? What was the impetus for those statements?

2. You wrote “Those fiercely loyal to communist doctrine retain a stranglehold on the countryside.” Did you do that to call attention to the fact that the people that live there consider themselves to be communists or is it perhaps a reference to those people collectively electing communists to the Duma now that Russia has a more democratic government?

3. Let me go back to the first paragraph for a second, because there’s a question I forgot to ask you. It goes back to the idea of translating what’s going on in a foreign place into an American perspective. You wrote about “Ivan.” But if I’m no reader in particular, just an American picking up a general circulation newspaper, is mentioning “Ivan” or “the drunks and dunces” or “slothful days of the Soviet Union” going to get me interested in the article? Do you think those words serve that purpose, as well as making a referential statement about what was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1980s?

4. I hope you don’t think I’m being too nit picky when I ask this question, because it’s not meant to be nit picky. One of the interesting caveats about narratives is that subsequence and consequence can be confused with one another. In other words as part of your artistic license as a writer, to write that something happened after something else -- sentence A sentence B -- the reader doesn’t know if sentence A caused sentence B or if sentence B is just subsequently there after sentence A. So my question has to do with paragraph ten where you write that “despite stunning growth in most consumer and service industries, food production is still in the clumsy hands of communist ideologues and looses more ground each year to higher quality imports and the output of private plots.” So the question then is that does this paragraph imply a causal
relationship between the communist ideologues in the first independent clause and the second independent clause, that imports and private plots are accounting for more food consumption than large scale farming?

5. You make a very evocative statement, “Valentina Lukshina never had to make a major decision about her life.” And you write immediately after that that she went to college, and she got married, and she decided to have kids. Obviously this happened before state planning collapsed. But as a critic, I could read the article and say well, Carol Williams is writing lies because getting married is a major decision about your life. And so how can you write that Valentina Lukshina never made a major decision?
LIST OF WORKS CITED


Boudreaux, R. 1993b. Urals Nuclear Disasters Contaminated 450,000 Russia: Figure is given by officials in account of events at the Mayak atomic plant from 1948 to 1967. They say site could still pose hazards. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A6.


Boudreaux, R. 1995b. Next Step Erasing Another Communist Error. Neftegorsk was a village that never should have been. Now a tragic quake and Khrushchev's heirs are 'correcting' his folly. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A3.


Boudreaux, R. 1996b. Russia's Historic Vote; News Analysis; Yeltsin Faces Tough Job if Reelected; Runoff: Victory would probably make incumbent freer than ever to rule Russia. Yet the burdens are weighty. The Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles: A10.


Dahlburg, J.-T. 1992e. Soviet Nuclear Bomb Drive Took a Vast Human Toll; Radiation: Shocking episodes are revealed. In one, workers were sent into


Dixon, R. 2000d. Russians Dying--Literally--for Favorite Fungi; Europe: It's mushroom-picking season, and this year dozens have died after eating a poisonous variety. Overconfidence among the harvesters is a factor, authorities say. The Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles: A9.


Editor and Publisher 2000. International Year Book. New York, Editor and Publisher.

Efron, S. 1993a. Foes of Yeltsin Get Ultimatum; Russia: Parliament members have until Monday to end their standoff or face 'grave consequences.'


472


Goldberg, C. 1992a. Every Day a Sick Day for Russia; In the Cities and in the Countryside, Medical Costs are Soaring and Ailments That Were Once Conquered are Staging a Fierce Comeback. The Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles: A1.


Hoffman, D. 1997h. Yeltsin Says He Will Not Try to Change Constitution So He

Hoffman, D. 1997i. Yeltsin, Hashimoto Hold Informal Siberian Summit; Leaders
Try to Warm Russia-Japan Relations. *The Washington Post*.

Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998b. Doctors Order Ailing Yeltsin to Take Break; Russian Leader

Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998d. In Russia, Hopes Dimmed but Not Extinguished; Economic
Upheaval Tests New Middle Class. *The Washington Post*.

Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998f. Lebed Wins Key Election in Russia; Presidential Hopeful

Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998h. Rotting Nuclear Subs Pose Threat in Russia; Moscow Lacks

Washington Post*.

*The Washington Post*.

Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998l. Russia's Devaluation Drama; Officials Spent Night Juggling
Demands of Tycoons, IMF. *The Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1998m. Russia's Nuclear Force Sinks With the Ruble; Economic

Washington Post*.

Hoffman, D. 1999a. Economic Crisis Reaches Moscow; City Must Restructure

Hoffman, D. 1999b. The Fall of the Financiers; Russia's Oligarchs Have Lost
Hoffman, D. 1999c. Immunity Rule Draws Russians to Politics; Duma Seats
Hoffman, D. 1999d. Legislators Begin Debate on Yeltsin; Russian Faces
Hoffman, D. 1999e. War Gives New Clout to Russian Military; Chechen
Hoffman, D. 2000b. Russian Economy Shows Signs of Life; Oil Revenues,
hooks, b. 1984. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Boston, South End
Press.
198-214.
Jacobs, M. 1959. *The Content and Style of an Oral Literature; Clackmas
Chinook Myths and Tales*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Style, Indiana University, The M.I.T. Press.
Jameson, F. 1991. *Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*.
Professional Geographer* 20(1): 5-10.
Jehl, D. 1993. Showdown in Moscow: U.S. Reaction; Clinton Is 'Foursquare'
Johnson, A. W. 1978. *Quantification in Cultural Anthropology*. Stanford,
Stanford University Press.
Kraft, S. 1996. Executions Accelerate in Russia; Seeking European favor, Yeltsin vowed to end the death penalty. But crime is fueling public ire, inmates are condemned every few days, and the president, facing an election, is rejecting all appeals. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A1.
Marshall, T. 1998. U.S. Policy on Russia Seen as Failure by Some Experts; Economics: Other Observers Say the Conditions Are Too Fluid and the


Paddock, R. C. 1997c. Outfoxing Limits on Whaling; In a remote Russian village, the natives hunt whales under international rules. But their hunting methods hark back to the Soviet era, as does their motive--to feed foxes being raised for fur. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A1.

Paddock, R. C. 1997d. Russia; 70 Years' Worth of Waste Has Remote Region over a Barrel; Fuel drums litter tundra in Far Eastern peninsula. Shipping them out for recycling is seen as too expensive, but some find creative uses for the rusty scrap. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A2.


Paddock, R. C. 1997f. Yeltsin Names Potential Successor to Top Post; Russia: Reformer Boris Y. Nemtsov, 37, is tapped first Deputy Premier. Move is

Paddock, R. C. 1998a. Crystalline Lake Baikal Has Cloudy Future; The purity and unique life forms of the 'jewel of Siberia' are under assault from industrial waste, logging, sewage. Experts worldwide are trying to figure out how to protect evolutionary laboratory. \textit{The Los Angeles Times}. Los Angeles: A1.


Paddock, R. C. 1998c. Floating Nuclear Plants for Far Places; Russia plans a fleet of stations to supply electricity, heat or desalinated water anywhere accessible by ship. And mindful of Chernobyl, Moscow insists its reactors are safe. \textit{The Los Angeles Times}. Los Angeles: A1.


Paddock, R. C. 1998f. Russians Bank on Bartering; Instead of a modern market economy, a medieval system of trade has emerged. Critics see the cashless exchange of goods and services as a 'virtual economy.' But for many it is the only way to stay alive. \textit{The Los Angeles Times}. Los Angeles: A1.


Reynolds, M. 1999c. A Russian Company Town's 'Miracle'; Engine plant workers don't produce much and are barely paid. Yet they keep their jobs, the factory feeds them, and, as elsewhere in the nation, the laws of economics appear to be suspended. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A1.


Reynolds, M. 2000e. War Has No Rules for Russian Forces Fighting in Chechnya; Troops admit committing atrocities against guerrillas and civilians. It's part of the military culture of impunity, they say. But many now have troubled consciences. "I remember a Chechen female sniper. We just tore her apart with two armored personnel carriers, having tied her ankles with steel cables. There was a lot of blood, but the boys needed it." *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A1.


Shogren, E. 1992c. Wounded Nuclear 'Heroes': Russia's elite atomic scientists, hidden away for decades, are finally free to speak out. And the world may not like what they have to say. The Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles: A1.


Simon, S. 1992b. Russian City's Privatization Effort Reaping Wages of Bitterness; Economy: Nizhny Novgorod is racing ahead with a bold effort to sell state property. But residents say the program is ill-conceived and may impede a free market. *The Los Angeles Times.* Los Angeles: A3.


Williams, C. J. 1996a. Despite Lead in 1st Round, Victory Not Assured for Yeltsin; Russia: President has Made All the Right Campaign Moves, but Poor Voter Turnout in Runoff, Due to Summer Vacations, Could Cost Him the Election. *The Los Angeles Times.* Los Angeles: A4.


Williams, C. J. 1996h. Russia's Reemerging Bourgeoisie; The true state of the masses may not be as bleak as many contend. It's a brittlely thin layer, but a middle class is pushing through despite a culture that compels people to play down good fortune. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A1.
Williams, C. J. 1997g. World Perspective; Russia; Ultrasound in the Underground; Clinics Offering Scanning, Optometry Services Open in Moscow Subway Stations. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A5.
Williams, C. J. 1997h. Yeltsin Fires Top Military Officials in Crackdown; Russia: Defense minister, chief of staff failed to reform army, president


Williams, C. J. 1998f. World Perspective; Politics; For Ex-General, Path to Kremlin May Lie in a Detour to Siberia; Alexander Lebed will run for governor of a remote region. With the post come a parliament seat and a chance for Russian presidency in 2000. *The Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles: A5.


Williams, C. J. 2000a. In The West's View, Putin Very Well Could Be The Businessman's Special; Russia: Foreign Investors Predict a Boom under


